IR 05000272/1979027
| ML18081A981 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 10/31/1979 |
| From: | Norrholm L, Reimig R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18081A976 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-79-27, 50-311-79-34, NUDOCS 8001300555 | |
| Download: ML18081A981 (15) | |
Text
u.s~ NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT 50-272/79-27 Region I Report N /79-34 50-272 Docket N c DPR-70 License N CPPR-53 Priority -------
Category Bl
__
- ....;_ ___
___,...
Licensee:
Public Service Electric and Gas Company-80 Park Pl ace Newark, New Jersey 07101 Facility Name:
Salem Nuclear Generating Station - Units 1 and 2 Inspection at:
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey Inspection con~ducted:
Septe:be~ 10~-
October 6, 1979 Inspectors:
~
/~~;- ""Jfspectar Approved by:
Section Inspection Summary:
date signed date signed date signed
/CJ-.31-tJ date signed Inspections on September 10 - October 6, 1979 (Combined Re art Nos. 50-272/79-27 and 50-311/79-34 Unit 1 Areas Inspected:
Routine inspections by the resident inspector of plant operations including tours of the facility; log and record reviews; review of licensee events; followup on IE Bulletins and Circulars; observation of emergency drills; and, followup on previous inspection items. *The inspections involved 46 inspector-hours by the resident NRC inspecto Unit 2 Areas Inspected: Routine inspecti6ns by the resident inspector of plant preoperational testing including tours of the facility; staff training;.test program implementation controls; storage of new fuel; fire protection; preparedness for an operating license; and,followup on previous inspection item The inspections involved 23 hours2.662037e-4 days <br />0.00639 hours <br />3.80291e-5 weeks <br />8.7515e-6 months <br /> by the resident NRC inspecto Results: One item of noncompliance was identified relative to Unit 2 (Infraction -
failure to conduct monthly fire extinguisher inspections - Para. 7).
No items of noncompliance were identified relative to Unit Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
DETAILS Persons Contacted PSE&G E. Barradale, Construction Manager S. LaBruna, Maintenance Engineer A. Meyer, Site QA Engineer E. Meyer, Project QA Engineer H. Midura, Manager - Salem Generating Station W. Reuther, Site QAD F. Schnarr, Station Operating Engineer R. Silverio, Assistant to the Manager J. Stillman, Station QA Engineer J. Zupko, Chief Engineer The inspector also interviewed other licensee personnel during the course of the inspections including management, clerical, maintenance, operations, performance, quality assurance,. testing,. and construction personne.
Status of Previous Inspection Items (Closed) Follow item (272/78-09-05): Replacement of stem-mounted limit switche By direct inspection and review of design change records, the inspector verified that stem-mounted limit switches on in-containment valves had been replaced with qualified switches during this outag (Closed) Noncompliance (272/79-08-02): Failure to follow procedures relative to surveillance test SP(0)4.2.l.l, Axial Flux Difference.* The inspector verified licensee corrective actions in changing procedure SP(0)4.2.l.1 Check Off Sheet 4.1 to clarify the source of target axial flux difference dat In addition, availability of this information in Table 3 of the Reactor Engineering Manual was verifie The inspector had no further questions on this ite (Closed) Noncompliance (272/79-12-02): Failure to maintain controlled copy document contro The inspector reviewed licensee actions taken to establish effective control over distribution of the Maintenance Manual and changes theret The inspector had no questions relative to actions take (Closed) Noncompliance (272/79-17-03): Failure to post documents required by 10 CFR 19. 1 The inspector verified that a letter indicating the location of the required documents has been posted at the Control Point entrance, complying with the requirements of 10 CFR 19.1 The inspector had no further questions on this ite (Closed) Unresolved item {_311/79-05-01): Inspection of fire extinguisher The inspector reviewed documentation which indicated that the fire extin-guishers in question had been inspected during December 1978. Subsequent failures to inspect, or document the inspection of, portable fire extin-guishers are identified as an item of* noncompliance in this repor {Closed) Unresolved item (311/79-27-01): Replacement of seismically un-qualified PVDll relays in vital switchgea Through* direct inspection and review of engineering change documentation the inspector verified that the relays in question had been replaced with qualified type PVD21 relays. Post-installation test documentation was also reviewe The inspector had no further questions on this ite Unit l Pl ant Tour In the course of the inspections including backshifts and a weekend, the inspector made observations and conducted tours of:
Control Room Relay Room
--
Auxiliary Building Yard Areas Rad Waste Building Site perimeter Electrical penetration area Control Point Turbine Building The following determinations were made:
Log A sampling review of station operating logs was made to verify comp 1 i ance with procedures and to verify operating para-meters were within Technical Specffication limit Monitoring instrumentation.. The inspector frequently verified that selected instruments were functional and demonstrated parameters within Technical Specification limit Valve Positions: The inspector verified that selected valves were in the position or condition required by the Technical Specifications for the applicable plant mod Radiation Control The inspector verified by observation that control point procedures and posting requirements were being followe The inspector identified no failure to properly post radiation and high radiation area * Plant housekeeping conditions. Observations relative to plant housekeeping and fire hazards identified no notable condition Fluid leak No fluid leaks were observed which had not been identified by station personnel with corrective action initiated, as necessar Piping vibratio No excessive piping vibrations were observed and no adverse conditions.note *
Selected pipe hangers and seismic restraints were observed and no adverse conditions note Control Room annunciator Selected lit annunciators were discussed with control room operators to verify that the reasons for them were understood and corrective action, if required, was being take By frequent observation through the inspection including shift turnovers, the inspector verified that control room manning requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(k) and the Technical Specifications were being me In addition, the inspector observed that frequent tours were made by shift supervision. *
Technical Specifications. Through log review and direct obser-vations during tours, the inspector verified compliance with selected Te~hnical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operatio The following parameters were sampled frequently:
RHR flow rate, Boric Acid Storage Tank levels and concentration, emergency and off site power avai 1abi1 ity, source range nu cl ear instrument The following acceptance criteria were used for the above item Technical Specifications Operations Directives Manual Inspector Judgement The following specific observations were made by the inspector and problems were identified promptly to station man.agemen During an inspection tour of the Unit l/Unit 2 interface areas, the inspector identified a breach in the Unit 1 vital area barrier. This finding, along with similar findings during previous inspections, is addressed in a special NRC Inspection Report (50-272/79-26).
While making observations of shift activities in the control room, the inspector noted that operating procedures in the Station Plant Manual had been placed in protective plastic sheets. Subsequent release of printing ink onto the plastic resulted.in an illegible copy, requiring removal to be rea The protective covers were remove *
The inspector had no further questions in this are.
Shift Logs and Operating Records The inspector reviewed the following plant procedures to determine the licensee established requirements in this area in preparation for a review of selected logs and records. *
AP-5, Operatirig Practices, Revision 9, April 23, 1979 Operations Directive Manual AP-13, Control of Lifted Leads and Jumpers, Revision 3, February 22, 1979 AP-15, Tagging Rules, Revision O; April 13, 1976.
The inspector had no questions in this are Shift Logs and operating records were reviewed to verify that:
Control Room log sheet entries are filled out and initialed; Auxiliary log sheets are filled out and initialed; Log entries involving abnormal conditions provide sufficient detail to communicate equipment status, lockout status, correction, and restoration; Log Book reviews are being conducted by the staff; Operating orders do not conflict with Technical Specification requirements; 11 Plant Information Records" confirm there are no violations of Technical Specification reporting or LCO requirements; and, Logs and records were maintained in accordance with Technical Specifications and the procedures in 4.a. above.
- *
6 The review included discussions with licensee personnel and the followi_ng plant shift logs.and operating records for the intervals indicated:*
~-
Log No. 1 - Control Room Daily Log, September 8-11, 14-19, 24-26, 28-30, October 1-2-Log No. 3 - Control Console Reading Sheet, September 14-19, 24-26, 28-30, October 1-2 On October 1, 1979, fire watches were posted as required by Technical Specification 3.7.10.3.a when it was noted by shift supervision that Cardox system level was at 45%.
The minimum level specified in the Technical Specifications is 50%.
Subsequent review of logs indicated that the system had been at 45% since September 26, 1979 when a dis-charge into the diesel generator area had occurred, apparently caused by a heating steam leak which triggered heat detec:tor The system level had been recorded daily as 45% on Operations Log #6, Primary Plant Log, had been circled in red, and a notation on the cover sheet-made to the effect that the Senior Shift Supervisor had been informe The licensee reported these findings in Licensee Event Report 79-64 on October 2, 197 System level was restored to within limits on October 2,. 1979 and the fire watches secured.
The inspector stated his concern that a failure to recognize operation beyond the limits of a Limiting Condition of Operation could persist for an extended period of time, through several shift changes, with no corrective action initiated. Prompt and effective action to ensure shift cognizance of limiting conditions will be reviewed by the inspector. This item is unresolved (272/79-27-02).
Emergency Dri 11 On September 20, 1979, the licensee conducted an emergency drill in con-junction with the State of Delawar The licensee used this exercise as a practice for the annual emergency drill scheduled for the following wee The scenario postulated a primary-to-secondary leak through ruptured steam generator tubes, coupled with stgnifjcant fuel failur No site evacuation was conducted during this.exercise and Unit 2 construction personnel were not involve *
The annual drill was conducted on September 27, 1979, with initial notifi-cation of the tube leak. betng made at approximately 1 :00 p.m. and the postulated rupture with fuel fai"lure occurrtng at 3:00 p.m.. This drill included evacuation of personnel from the site, still did not include Unit 2 construction personnel, and was coordinated with a State of New Jersey exercise of their communications and resources.
- The inspector attended the pre-drill briefings, observed both drills from the control room, and attended the post-drill critique for the first dril The inspector 1 s corrnnents on the conduct of the drill were duplicated by the drill referees and were included in the drill evaluation for followup and resolutio The following comments were made by the inspector:
Emergency Plan check lists, kept in the control room, for use as working copies, were in some cases~ found to be out of date. This was noted by shift personnel during the exercise..
Notification of off site authorities was unduly delaye NRC was notified of the incident by means of the 11hot line 11 at approximately 4:00 The initial off site call was made approximately 35 minutes after indications of a problem had been given to shift. operator The principal cause of the delay appeared to stem from hesitation on the part of station personnel to make notifications before detailed calculations of projected dose had been mad The inspector stated his opinion that, with a known and continuing uncontrolled release, notifications should be made promptly to mobilize off site suppor Initial notifications containing dose projections further delayed any notification of agencies further down the call lis The inspector had no further question Review of dri 11 deficiency corrective actions will be conducted during a subsequent inspectio Unit 2 Fuel Receipt and Storage During the period October 1978 - January 1979, the licensee received ship-ments of fuel for Salem Unit The fuel was received directly in the Unit 2 Fuel Handling Building, unpackaged, inspected, and placed in new fuel storage racks or spent fuel racks (dry).
Tours of the Fuel Handling Building were made by the inspecto The following aspects of new fuel handling and storage were inspected:
Building integrity Security and access controls Security awareness and procedures Dust protection of fuel Health physics coverage Tag board maintenance Compliance with license SNM-1831 requirements
The inspector noted that excessive accumulations of debris and packing material have been permitted in the Fuel Handling Buildin The integrity and protection afforded the fuel itself was found to be acceptabl Inspection of installed fire protection equipment identified the following conditio The Unit 2 Fuel Handling Building contains three portable fire extinguishers as the only means of fire suppressio These extinguishers are located in an equipment room on elevation 100
, on the operating floor at elevation 130
, and on top of the cask handling crane. Inspection of attached tags to determine continuity of periodic inspections identified the. following:
Extinguisher N No number
359 Location FHB 100
FHB 130
Crane~FHB Indicated Last Inspection 5/79 No tag 8/78 The inspector made these observations on October 4, 197 The applicant's Construction Fire Protection Manual requires that these inspections be conducted monthl *
This finding contributes to an apparent item of noncomplianc ~ Pre-Operational Fire Protection/Pr.evention To verify adequacy of fire protection and prevention measures, the inspector reviewed the findings of independent reviews in the area of fire protection conducted by the site Quality Assurance staff. The inspector had no questions relative to the review, the applicant's response dated August 13, 1979, or the resulting letter to the Electric Production Department dated August 22, 197 *
Inspection of fire extinguishers and detection/suppression equipment in Unit 2 identified an area of concer In addition to problems found in the Fuel Handling Building which are detailed in this report, the inspector found that the Unit 2 4KV Vital Switchgear Room contained 6 portable fire extinguishers which, ba~ed on attached documentation, had not been inspected since April 27, 197 This observation was made on October 4, 197 Sub-sequent review of.records maintained by the Electric Production Department, which apparently. has jurisdiction over this area, indicated that 3 portable extinguishers in this area were inspected in August 197 However, the i denti fyi ng numbers for these three ex ti ngui shers ( #213, 214, and 215) do not correspond to any of the six found in the field (#227, 813, 180, 723, 789, and 818) on October Lacking relevant evidence to the contrary, it appears valid to conclude that inspection at 30 day intervals, as required by the Construction Fire Protection Manual, had not been conducted on any of the 6 portable extinguishers found in the Switchgear Room~
Failure to condutt monthly fir~ extinguisher inspections constitutes an apparent item of noncompliance (311/79-34-01 ). Plant Tour The inspector conducted periodic tours of accessible areas in the plan During these tours, the following specific items were evaluated:
Hot Wor Adequacy of fire prevention/protection measures use Fire Equipmen Operability and evidence of periodic inspection of fire s~ppression equipmen Housekeepin Minimal accumulations of debris and maintenance of required cleanness levels in systems under or following testin Equipment preservation. Maintenance of special preservative measures for installed equipment as applicabl Component Taggin Implementation and observance of equipment tagging for safety or equipment protection.. Nine tagged components were selected for revie *
Maintenanc Corrective maintenance in accordance with established procedure Instrumentation. Adequate protecti,on for installed instrumentatio Cable Pulling. Adequate measures taken to protect cable from damage while being pulle Communicatio Effectiveness of public address system in all areas of the sit Equipment Control Effectiveness of jurisdictional controls in pre-cluding unauthorized work.on systems in test or which have been teste Log Completeness of logs maintained and resolution of identified problem Foreign Material Exclusio Maintenance of controls to assure systems which have been cleaned and flushed are not reopened to admit foreign materia Securit Implementation of security provisions. Particular attention to maintenance of the Unit I protected area boundar Testing. Spot-checks of testing in progress are mad *
The following specific comments apply to tours made during this inspection perio Inspection findings relative to fire protecti*on are included in detail paragraph 7 of this repor Inspection of the low-voltage breaker for valve 22BF13 identified a collection of cable insulation, paper, foodstuffs, and other debris inside the breaker enclosure.* Subsequent investigation reveal~d~that some Unit 2 areas have become occupied by rodents.. Corrective actions to clean up nests,. provide rodent screens for switchgear and exterminate have been initiate The inspector had no further questions in this are.
Pre-Operational Testing Program
. The inspector reviewed implementation controls established for the preoperationa 1 test program to veri'fy continuity of control over tested equipment to preclude invalidation of completed testing. This review included observations of work in progress to ensure coverage by appropriate documentation to require retest and to limit work scope, observations to ensure that jurisdictional tagging boundaries were complied with, and observations of maintenance in progres The inspector expressed concern over the apparent lack of adminis-tration over the preventive maintenance program, particularly in view of the increasing interval between testing of various systems and the issuance of an operating license. Preventive maintenance is defined by Startup Manual Implementation Instruction (SMII)-22, Post Pre-operational Testing Turnover System Maintenanc The system established by SMII-22 provides recommended maintenance to be conducted at periodic intervals for Unit 2 equipmen For rotating equipment, this consists of monthly rotation, if not run, and lubrication. Additional recom-mendations relative to load testing of diesel generators, verification of penetration nitrogen pressure, and similar unique items are also provide The inspector noted that responsibility for completion of these items had.not been given to any single individual or group, resulting in a number of items not being accomplished' at the stated interval In addition,,no routine program for verifying water qua 1 i ty in Unit 2 filled fluid systems had been established. A number of these systems have remained filled and idle for several.month Some, notably the reactor coolant system, have been opened during that perio,,--
At the conclusion of this inspection, a comprehensive program to monitor equipment preventive maintenance actions, including fluid system sampling, was instituted. This item is unresolved pending review of these actions to ensure that all aspects of preventive maintenance on Unit 2 systems have been routi'nely addressed (311/79-34-02). Supplement 3 to the Salem Nuclear Generating Station Safety Evaluation Report, dated January 12, 1979, in-section 8.3.2,(6) states that the applicant will provide a method by which a control room operator can close valves 2SJ67 and 2SJ68 (Safety Injection Pump Recirculation Valves).
This method shall not be subject to the single failure of a 28 volt DC bu The inspector verified through direct inspection and review of documentation associated with ECN 35243, that control switches for both valves have been installed just above the power 1 ockouts in the control roo These switches a 11 ow the operator to close either valve using one of two 28 volt power supplie The modification was completed and tested on April 19, 197 The inspector had no further question.
Operational Readiness 10 CFR 50.57 states that the issuance of an operating license is, in part, contingent upon a finding that construction of the faci 1 i ty has been sub-stantially completed, in conformity with the construction permit and the application, as amended, the provision of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commissio In order to provide a basis for.this finding, the inspector is conducting a continuing review of licensee readiness to operate the facility. This review includes, but is not limited to, the following areas:
Completion of the NRC inspection program to assess construction, testing and operational preparednes Status of facility operating procedures and personnel trainin Status of all enforcement items and unresolved matter Status of the preoperational test progra Status of construction activitie Proposed facility Technical Specification Review of licensee outstanding items, particularly those identified for completion or resolution after core loa Implementation of corrective measures for Unit 2 as a result of items identified in*Unit l from Reportable Occurrences, inspection findings, and IE Bulletin and Circular Operational safety concerns arising from the above reviews will be promptly identified to facility management for resolution prior to the inspector reaching a finding of operational readines No specific safety concerns have been identified to dat.
IE Bulletin and Circular Followup The IE Bulletins discussed below were reviewed to verify that:
Licensee management forwarded copies of the response to the bulletin to appropriate onsite management representative Information discussed in the licensee's reply was supported by facility records or by visual examination of the facilit Corrective action taken was effected as described in the repl The licensee's reply was prompt and within the time period described in the bulleti The review included discussions with licensee personnel and observation and review of items discussed in the details belo By correspondence dated May 3, 1979, September 21, 1979, and October 11, 1979, the licensee responded to IE Bulletin 79-07, Seismic Stress Analysis of Safety Related Pipin NRC review of the proposed sampling recalculation to validate the stresses concluded in th original calculations is continuin By correspondence dated August 16, 1979 and September 14, 1979, the licensee responded to IE Bulletin 79-14, Seismic Analysis *for As~Built Safety Related Piping System The licensee outlined a program for verification of stress isometrics used in the seismic analysi Resulting from seismic recalculations, the licensee has identified approximately 250 supports requiring repair to meet design criteria to dat Of those, approximately 160 have been complete Reanalysis of those safety-related systems described in the October 11, 1979 letter is near completio Resulting from the system walk-downs conducted pursuant to IE Bulletin 79-14, approximately 40-50 nonconforming conditions have been identified on Unit 1, requiri_ng some type of repai The inspector reviewed the
..
.conditions foun In most cases, the deficiency consisted of bent rods or potential thermal interference problems, which would not be expected to impact on support operability under design condition Approximately ten percent of the problems identified in this program had an impact on operability of the support and these will be repaired prior to Unit l Mode chang Relative to the above conditions, the inspector restated the NRC position *that, for those systems required to be operable for a given plant mode, identified support deficiencies must be either repaired to meet design criteria.or evaluated in terms of system operability with a safety factor of at least two.. Such an evaluation will apply prior to making a mode change and for any nonconforming support identified while the* plant is in operation. The time inoperable criteria of the Technical Specifications gover The licensee acknowledged the i nspector 1 s statement *. By correspondence dated July 6, 1979 and September 24, 1979, the licensee responded to IE Bulletin 79-02, Pipe Support Base Plate Design Using Concrete Expansion Bolt Salem 1 and 2 employ Hilti 11Quik-Bolts
to secure floor mounted base p 1 ates and wall and cei 1 i ng mounted s tructura 1 steel which support.safety related piping system The licensee 1s response outlines a test program consisting of pull tests on floor mounted base plates and ultrasonic examination of wall and ceiling bolt In additton, to verify design adequacy oti the*!installation, the licensee has joined an owner 1s group employing the services of Teledyne Engineering Service In the September 24, 1979 letter the licensee outlines a program to verify wedge setting of concrete anchor bolts by means of a sampling test program which will apply torque to the load nu The inspector observed torque testing in progress in both Units l and 2, and re~t~wed the applicable procedures (Unit l - Maintenance Procedure T-16, Verifi-cation of Wedge Setting of Concrete Anchor Bolts, with change P-1, Unit 2 - Appendix II, Revision 2.to Design Memorandum SGS/M DM-107, Procedure for Verification of Wedge Setting of Concrete Anchor Bolts).
The realized rejection rate, due to inaccessibility and excess freedom
.of movement during torquing, raised the sample for t'orque testing to virtually every concrete anchor bolt in the safety~related system As stated in correspondence from NRC Region I dated August 28, 1979, completi'on and resolution of these problems in the inaccessible areas must be completed prior to going to Mode.4 on Unit The licensee's test program identified several instances where repair or replacement of concrete anchor installations were require Over 1600 supports, involving over 3300 anchor bolts in safety related systems were ultrasonically teste Torqu~ testing of approximately half of the anchor bolts has been complete As a result of this testing, some corrective action was required in 247 installations to dat have been complete Licerisee~Event Report 79-49 identifies this findin Evaluation and repair of torque test rejections is continuin The inspector's position relative to system operability stated above, applies to deficient anchors identified in this p~ogram as wel The inspector had no further questions in this area at this tim IE Circular discussed below was reviewed to verify that it had been reviewed for applicability by cognizant management, and appropriate action initiated. *
The review included discussions with licensee personnel and observation and review of items discussed in the details belo IE Circular 79-17 was transmitted on August 14, 1979 and details a potential problem with contacts in SB-12 switches installed in GE metalclad switchgear shipped between August l, 1978 and July l, 197 The licensee's evaluation of this potential problem concludes that, since all Salem l and 2 GE 4KV switchgear was delivered prior to August 1978, no action is require The inspector verified through. field observation, that the manufacture date of 4KV switch-gear in both units precedes, by a considerable margin, the dates in questio The inspector had no further questions on this ite.
Operational Staff Training On receipt of an operating license for Salem Unit 2, currently assigned operations personnel will assume duties for both unit The inspector's evaluation of preoperational training consists of an on-going review of requalification and replacement training programs on Unit During the course of this inspection, the inspector observed operators undergoing simul.ator training at the Indiah Point simulator, and reviewed personnel trainfog files and simulator evaluation report Interviews with operators were also conducted as part of routine control room inspection *
1 The inspector noted that the currently approved Operator Requalification Program, des.cribed *in.:the Final Safety Analysis Report, as a:mended, makes no provision for the use of a simulato By correspondence dated* June 6, 1977 and response dated June 30, 1977, the licensee outlines plans to use the Indian Point simulator for operator training. While records of reactivity manipulations at the s*imulator are maintained, the inspector identified no case where simulator manipulations were used to meet re-qual ification program requirement The inspector stated his opinion that the records were insufficiently detailed to show specific manipulations*
conducted by specific operator *
Observations of. simulator training included various accident transients, demonstrations, and a review of TMI-type events as related to 4-loop Westinghouse plant The inspector.noted that the simulator program for each weekly shift of operators appeared to be ill-defined, with no outline of evolutions to complete, and no method of evaluating the effectiveness of instruction/training received. This area is unresolved pending further review by the inspector and establishment of a simulator program, including evaluation, by the licensee (272/79-27-01).
Unresolved Items Areas for which more information is required to determine acceptability are considered unresolved. * Unresolved items are contained in Paragraphs 9 and 12 of this repor.
Exit Interview At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss inspection scope and findings.