IR 05000272/1979016

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IE Insp Rept 50-272/79-16 on 790427-0502 & 22-23. Noncompliance Noted:Disregard of Contamination Control Procedure
ML18079B011
Person / Time
Site: Salem PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 07/11/1979
From: Caphton D, Kalman G
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML18079B009 List:
References
50-272-79-16, NUDOCS 7910010602
Download: ML18079B011 (6)


Text

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Report No. _7_9_-_16 ___ _

Docket No. _5_0-_2_7_2 __ _

L *

N DPR-70

.1cense o. ------

Priority ------~----

Category ______ c __ _

  • -

-

Licensee:

. Public Service Electric and Gas Comp~ny-80 Park Place Newark, New Jersey 07101 Facility Name:

Sal em Unit l Inspection at:

Hancock 1s Br1dge, N.J:.

date signed Inspection conducted: 4/27 - 5/2 ~~:~3 Inspectors:

,..

  • . ~z.~~

G, Kalman f

~L--

Reacto~ Ins~ector q?~igned Approved by:CJ-l~-

D. L. Caphton date signed 7/t1172

'da t~ signed Chief, Nuclear Support Section l Inspection Summary:

Inspection on* April * 27.;.May * 2 *and.* May* 22.;.23, 1979 (Report No. 50.;.272;79.;.16)

Areas lrtspetted: Routine, unannounced inspection of refueling activities, outage maintenance, surveillan~e activities, snubbers and pipe supports a*nd restraint The inspection involved 48 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC regional based inspecto Results:

Of the four areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were found in three areas, one apparent item of noncompliance was found in one area (Deficiency*disregard of contamination control procedures, paragraph 3.C).

Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)

  • DETAILS Persons Contacted G. Duncan, ISI Maintenance Engineer J. Guell er, Senior Performance Supervisor
  • W. Hunsinger, QA Engineer
  • S. La Bruna, Maintenance Engineer
  • +B. Leap, Station QA Supervisor

+M. Metcalf, QA Engineer

. *+H. Midura, Station Manager J. Nichols, Reactor Erigineer

  • +L. Norrholm, Resident NRC Inspector
  • F. Robertson, Senior Maintenance Supervisor E. Roscioli, Senior Reactor Staff Supervisor
  • +J. 'Stillman, Station QA Engineer
  • +J. Zupko, Chief Engineer *

In addition to the above listed personnel, other licensee employees and contractor personnel were contacted during the course of the inspectio * Denotes those present at the.May 2, 1979 exit intervie + Denotes those present at the May 23, 1979 exit intervie.

Licensee Action on Previously Identified* Findings (Closed)

Unresolved item {79-10-02):

Refueling procedure con-formance to ANSI 18.7. Additions were made to the refueling procedure which addressed requirements for RHR operation, con-tinuous monitoring of source range neutron instrumentation, an core verification. The inspector reviewed the procedural changes and had no additional question (Closed)

Inspector follow item {79-10-03):

Evaluation of potential for inadvertantly raising an'.'*irradiated:1fuel *~ssernbly with the new fuel elevator. Licensee representatives concluded that it was mechanically possible to raise an irradiated fuel assembly with the new fuel elevator. A precaution prohibiting the placement of irradiated fuel assemblies on the new fuel elevator was added to the procedur This item is considered closed.

(Closed)

Inspector follow item (79-10-04): Verification of re-fueling prerequisites following interruption in fuel handlin Licensee representatives reviewed refueling procedures and concluded that following an interruption in fuel handling operations, applicable refueling prerequisites are adequately addressed in existing procedures. This item is considered close (Closed)

Inspector follow item (79-10-05):

Piston position

  • measurement during hydraulic snubber vi sua 1 i nspecti an The inspector inspected the hydraulic snubbers on the MSIV's and steam generator The snubbers were.typical of the type reviewed by the NRC and found to require piston position measurement during each visual inspection to assure operability.' Snubber piston position measurements are to be compared to precalculated criteria to ensure that normal thermal induced movement will not cause the pistons tn lock at the stroke limit *

The above follow up item will be reclassified as an unresolved item pending the revision of the hydraulic snubber visual in-spection procedure to include criteria for acceptable snubber piston positions (272/79-16-01). Refueling Activities Scope The in~pector verified that refueling prerequisite plant conditions, tests, and inspections were satisfied during the course of the refueling operation Refueling activities

~ere witnessed and compliance to Technical Specifications and applicable procedures was ascertaine As part of the above inspection, fuel status boards were checked for accuracy, manning in the control room and on the refueling floor was compared to procedural requirements, and the house keeping and health physics practices on the refueling floor and in the spent fuel building were inspecte Documents Reviewed Form 54990, fuel assembly inspection (Core 1 fuel receipt inspection)

.

Westinghouse nuclear fuel division, quality release documents (Core 1 fuel assemblies)

  • * *

Startup Procedure 6.0, Initial Core Loading Unit No. l. *

Westinghouse procedure FP-PSE-FEl, Rev. 0, Fuel Inspection Procedure Salem #1* (PSE), EOC Westinghouse memo, precautions for reloading of Salem Unit 1 Core, dated May 22, 197 Administrative Procedure #24, Rev. Findings The inspection found that refueling operations were being conducted in accordance with Technical Specifications and governing procedure Potential problems in housekeeping and health physics practices were discussed with licensee repre-sentative The inspector observed health physics practices that appeared to be contrary to requirements on three separate occasions at the step-off pad leading to the containment air lock and the spent fuel building entrance.

On two of these occasions a vendor representative failed to use the frisker when exiting the contaminated area, and on one occasion a member of the security force walked across the step-off pad from the contaminated side to the clean side and back without changing shoe cover Failure to observe contamination control practices is contrary to paragraphs 6.93 and 6.94 of Administrative Procedure #24, Rev. 5 and is an.item of noncompliance (272/79-16-02).

Prior to comple-tion of the inspection, the licensee took corrective action by stationing a health physics technician at the step-off pad area to insure improved conformance.with requirement Fuel Assembly Grid Damage Licensee personnel detected grid damage on several of the fuel assemblies which were removed from the core during the course of the refueling, This finding led to a total defuel-ing of the reactor and an inspection of all fuel assemblie The inspection results indicated that 29 fuel assemblies included grids with varying degrees of damag The damage ranged from scratches on the grid straps to segments of the grids missin The damage was analyzed by licensee personnel and fuel vendor representative They concluded that 9 of the 29 assemblies were damaged sufficiently to prevent reuse in the core. A meeting with the licensee and the fuel vendor was scheduled on May 25, 1979 by the NRR licensing project

  • manager to review the findings and to discuss the proposed plans for refueling the reacto.

Outage Maintenance Scope The procedures for maintenance activities scheduled during the refueling outage were reviewed on a sampling basis to verify that the procedure format complied with the facility administrative requirements and that safety precautions, quality assurance, and testing requirements were include Where applicable, the maintenance related safety evaluation was reviewed to determine whether an unresolved safety question was involved. Maintenance activities were observed and contract maintenance workers were interviewe Documents Reviewed DCR MD-0051, R.V. Head Tray Modification DCR lEC-0479, Install check valves in the #1 RCP Seal Leak-off Line Procedure.M6M, #11, 12, 21, & 22 Safety Injection Pump Disassembly, General Repair & Assembl Findings No inadequacies were identified~ Surveillance Activities Scope The inspector randomly selected for :revtew Qne of the *surveillance tests required by the Technical Specification The test procedure was reviewed for adequacy in meeting the Technical Specification requirement, the contractor personnel assigned to perform the test were interviewed and portions of the test were witnesse Documents Reviewed Procedure Ml5E, Containment Isolation Type B and C Test *

STS 4.6.1.2 (d) and 4.6. l.'3(b), Rev., 0. * Findings No inadequacies were identifie.

Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviation An unresolved item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in paragraph.

Exit Interview The inspection met with licensee representatives on May 2, 1979 and at the conclusion of the inspection on May 23, 1979 (see detail 1 for attendees) to summarize the scope and findings of the inspection *