IR 05000311/1979010
| ML18078B199 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 03/01/1979 |
| From: | Durr J, Mcgaughy R, Toth A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18078B198 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-311-79-10, NUDOCS 7904190137 | |
| Download: ML18078B199 (9) | |
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Report N ~311/79-10 Do~ket No. 50-311
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Region I License N CPPR-53 Priority------
Category ---~B ___ _
Licensee:
Public* Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Place Newark*, New Jersey 07101 Fae i1 ity Name:
Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2 Inspection at:
Newark, -New Jersey Inspectors:
'2-ll-79
- date signed
,~_hG-69 date 4i i gned 1-?tf-7~
date signd Approved by:
g l 1 I '?f da.te signed
- Inspection Summary:
Unit 2 Inspection on February 6, 1979 (Report No. 50-311/79"'."10)
Areas Inspected: Special, announced inspection by 3 regional based inspectors
- to review the results of the Containment Structural Integrity Test, review licensee actions on Bull~tins and Circulars, followup on 50.55(e) reports,
~nd review licensee a~tion on previous inspection finding The inspection involved 16 inspector-hours onsite by 3 regional office based inspector Results:
No items of noncompliance were identifie Reaion I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
7904190/87
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DETAILS Persons Contacted PSE&G R. Brandt, Senior Engineer R. Dierkes, Lead Engineer, Materials Group
- R. Evans, Principal Engineer, QA W. Gailey, Principal Engineer, Electrical
- R. Griffith, Senior Staff Engineer, QA K. Kieper, Materials Test Engineer K. Kraska, Engineer
- L. Murray, Construction Engineer
- F. Omohundro, Principal Engineer, QA W. Pavincich, Senior Staff Engineer Electrical J. RogozensRi, Principal Engineer D. Sachs, Engineer F. Shen, Principal Staff Engineer, Structural
- denotes those present at the exit intervie.
Licensee Actions on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Noncompliance (311/77-26-07)
(Closed) Unresolved Items (311/77-26-08, 09, and 101 References:
311/77-12, 78-31, 78-51, and 79-02 Exceeding* the heating/cooling rates and maximum temperature for local post weld heat treated (PWHT) pipe weld The foregoing item of noncompliance and unresolved items invol\\iled the following issues:
Failure to assure the PWHT process was controlled in accor-dance with the applicable cod Specifically, the licensee failed to control the heatup/cooldown rates and the maximum temperature limits of the pipe welds.
- The PWHT procedure did not appear to adequately specify the insulation requirements for PWH The PWHT procedure did not appear to specify thermocouple placement so that temperature extremes were monitore The PWHT procedure and practices did not adequately control the location of the induction coil The licensee established a four part program to*resolve the above issues by:
Revising the PWHT procedure to reflect the B31.7'code require-ments.*
Reviewing the Unit 2 PWHT charts to identify the nonconformfog weld Classifying these welds into three thickness ranges and selecting one representative weld from each group for additional testing. The tests included ultrasrinic, magnetic particle, hardness traverses, and acoustic emission examina-tions. These welds would be incorporated into the in-service-inspection program for further monitorin.
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From the review of the PWHT charts, determine the 11worst case
heatup/cooldown rates and maximum temperature limits. Perform a PWHT on a test pipe of the same material using parameters that exceed the worst case envelop The test piece would have the same nondestructive tests performed on it as the three field welds discussed abov In addition, it would be destructively examined to verify that the mechanical properties were not degrade *
A design stress review of the main steam and feedwater piping systems to assure that the FSAR committed stress values were not violated due to the PWHT practice The licensee revised the PWHT procedure, Specification 70-5050, Section A, Technique VI, dated March 20, 1978. !The revision included additional guidance for insulation, induction~ coil, and thermocouple placemen The revision also included the specific requirements to control the heatup/cooldown rates and maximum temperature limits in accordance with B31.7 code requirement..... -
The licensee performed the review of the Unit 2 PWHT charts (see reference 311/78-51) and identified the nonconforming weld joint The weld joints were grouped according to thickness ranges and from these three groups, three welds were selected for testing. The
- Southwest Research report titled, 11Ultrasonic Examination of Selected Welds and A~eas on Salem 2 Main Steam Piping and Associated Test Piece, 11 SWRI Project 17-3052, describes the ultrasonic and magnetic particle tests performed on the three welds and the test pip The report states that no significant indications were noted in the test piece or the. pipe field weld The acoustic emission examination performed on the field welds also found no significant indications. (see reference 311/78-31).
The licensee submitted a preliminary copy of the PWHT report to the NRC for revie The preliminary report included the following documents:
(1) Type and Purpose of Test; (2) Results of Testing of Stress Relieved Al55KC70 Pipe; (3) Mechanical Tests; (4) Results of Hydrostatic Tests; (5) Comparison of Tens*ile and Impact Values: (6)
Hardness Measurements;, (7) Heat Treatment Conditions; (8) Acoustic Monitoring Report; (9) Ultrasonic Examination Report; (10) Test Report from PSE&G Research Corporation; and (11) Drawing HT-1 (showing location of test specimens and test results).<
The NRC review of these documents resulted in several questions which were discussed in the December 19, 1978 meeting (see reference 311/78~51 and 79-02).
- The licensee presented the final consolidated report titled, 11 Inves-tigation of Field Post Weld Heat Treatment Practices, Salem Generating Station No. 2 Unit.
11 * The report describes and summarizes the
results of the destructive and nondestructive tests and piping stress analysis. The report concludes that based on the studies, 11the nonconforming heat treatments did not introduce defects, aggravate existing defects, -Or degrade material properties of the niain steam and s*team generator feed piping systems.
The report satisfies the technical questions raised by the NR The licensee presented a letter, dated January 3, 1979, from the Chief Mechanical Engineer to the Manager - Salem Nuclear Generating Station, requesting that the three selected field welds be added to
, the Inse*rvice Ins.pection Pla This information has been incorporated into the NRC Region I inservice inspection surveillance program and will be inspected at a future dat Based on the foregoing information, these items are considered resolve (Closed) Unresolved Item (311/78-15-01):
Junction box and terminal block environmental qualification. During a previous inspection, it was determined that environmental testing of terminal blocks/boxes for post accident environment conditions had not been performe Subsequently, the licensee implemented plans to have Conax Corpora-tion conduct testing* of these item The testing has been completed and the licensee is compiling the data for a final repor The inspector examined the test procedures and some of the test dat The inspector noted that the test conditions did not appear to corresp6nd to the test condition~ described in figure 7.5-5 of the FSA Although the 286°F maximum test temperature was achieved, the initia*l rate of rise,. and the plateaus of 219°F and 152°F were not achieve However, additional tests had also been conducted to consider main steam line break conditions, which may be more limiting. The licensee stated that the final test report will address these matters and will be provided to NRC for revie The Salem 2 Safety Evaluation Report (SER) Supplement #3, Section 8.4-.8(1) identifies Electrical Terminal Block qualification and test result information as an unresolved area of concern, subject to NRR review and resolution prior to a decision concerning the issuance of an operating license, and subject to documentation of findings in a subsequent supplement to. the SE The SER describes the pending further development and review of the required test envelope, to incorporate consideration of the main steam line break*
condition Since the test criteria are under development and will be reviewed by the NRC:NRR along with test data as a condition of the operating license, this matter is considered closed as a separate inspection ite.
Licensee Followu Activities Relative to Items Re orted to NRC Under 10 CFR 50.55 e Steam Generatot:Head Ciadding Indications The inspector interviewed licensee engineering staff regarding status of activities described in the PSE&G August 23, 1977 l~tter to NR The licensee stated that liquid penetrant examination had been completed after cold hydrotest and hot functional test, but documentation of final action has not yet been completed. * An interim report, discussing current status of this matter, is expected to be issued by March 1, 197 This item is unresolved (311/77-00-26).
- 6 Licensee Action on NRC Issued Circulars The inspector reviewed records and interviewed personnel regarding licensee followup action on recent NRC issued Circular He ascertained that the Circular was received by licensee management, assigned to an appropriate individual for action, a review for applicability to Salem 2 performed, and appropriate corrective actions defined and scheduled to be implemente The licensee actions appeared to be reasonable for the following:
Circular#78-18, UL Fire Test: Licensee control form #QAF-44 (November 15, 1978) assigns responsibility for review, and referenced letter SM~988 describes action take It documents that Salem EPR hypalon and neoprene cables are more flame retardant than polyethelene PVC cables described in the Circular, and that Salem 2 vertical cables are enclosed in
- cabinets such that flammable liquids such as heptane would not enter the cabinets.. The 1 icensee QA representative clarified that such vertical cabinets have a geometry coupled with a floor sleeves which prevent liquid from running under the edge of the cabinet *
Circular #78-19, Manual Override of Safety System Actuation Signals: This Circular arose from a condition associated with Salem 1, and the licensee technical staff was fully appraised of the su.bjects relative to Salem Licensee control form
- QAF-44 (January 15, 1979) assigns responsibility for review**
of the Circular, and referenced letter SM-1044 describes action taken. It describes that a PSE&G analysis was performed to ascertain that no safety functions could be blocked by manual reset following an unrelated occurrence. That analysis is documented in PSE&G Controls Division Evaluation CD-SE-The analysis included the Safeguards Equipment Control (SEC)
criteria that if one signal energizes a memory device then that action should not prevent a subsequent signal from being registere The analysis concluded that manual reset upon completion of Mode 1 (LOCA) sequence could prevent proper action if a subsequent blackout were to occu (Due to the reset, only the blackout condition would be acknowledged by the SEC system.) The analysis describes that Station Emer-gency Procedure EI14.4 alerts the operator to this incident and the need to restart safeguards pumps following the completion
of the blackout sequence (Mode III). The analysis concludes that sufficient annunciation of Safety Injection overrides at the system level presently exist and that the design facilitates adequate administrative control of manual reset action '
The licensee actions relative to the above circulars appears reasonable and appropriat.
Review of Results of Containment Structural Integrity Test (CSIT)
The inspe_ctor reviewed the test records relative to the CSI The final data was compared to the acceptance criteria stated in the FSAR and also to the results of the Salem Unit 1 CSI The following paragraphs. summarize the results of the revie Rebar Strain Gauge Measurements Although not normally required to be measured in a non-proto-type *containment, the 1 icensee committed in Amendment 38 of the FSAR to measure the strain in selected rebar to supplement containment growth measurement The reason for this as explained in the FSAR was because it was not possible, due to equipment interferences,. to run transducer wires at several points along six meridians as recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.. 1 The* results of these strain measurements showed values substantially less than predicted. This is consistent with similar measurements taken in Unit 1.
. Containment Displacement Measurements by Linear Variable Differential Transformer (LVDT)
Containment displacement was measured radially, ta_ngentially, and vertically from inside containment by the use of LVDT' The results of the measurements showed containment radial and vertical growth met the acceptance criteria as stated in the FSA The tangential growth has no FSAR acceptance criteria but was found to be consistent with the results of Unit The LVDT's used.to monitor for unusual growth in the equipment hatch and personnel hatch areas showed results consistent with those of Unit )
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Rosette Strain Ga_uge Measurements Rosette strain gauges were attached to the containment liner plate in several ~ifferent locations to measure liner plate strain. The results of these measurements indicated that no excessive strain of the liner plate took place at the monitored locations. This result is consistent with Unit 1 result Crack Measurements The FSAR limit of.030 inches maximum crack growth during pressurization from 0 psig to 54 psig was exceeded in a total of 39 instance Of th~se 39 instinces, 30 were in the area of the equipment hatch and 6 were in the area of the personnel hatc The licensee elected to chip away approximately 1/8
of surface concrete in the area of 4 of these cracks to deter-mine their depth. This was accomplished at the maximum test pressure of 54 psig. It was determined that in none of the 4 cracks explored did the crack width exceed.015 inches 1/8
dee~ into the concrete *
Th~ FSAR limit of.020 inches maximum residual crack growth after depressurization was exceeded in one instance in the area of the equipment hatc The licensee intends to explore this* crac The above results are not consistent with Unit However, the FSAR stated acceptance criteria for the containment struc-ture is "... demonstration that the overall structure exhibits elastic behavior throughout the test range.
The licensee feels, based on the values of the other measurements and the results of the crack exploration, that the containment structure did demonstrate elastic behavior and that the crack growth data is anomalou The displacement and strain measurement data examined by the inspectors appeared to support this conclusion. The licensee will offer an explanation for the crack growth in the final CSIT repor The licensee has stated that the CSIT test results will be submitted by Tetter to NRR with an evaluation of the crack The excessive crack growth discussed in paragraph d. above is unresolved pending ~ubmission of the evaluation report and review by NRR (311/79-10-01).
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- Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information'is re-quired in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviation An unresolved item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph.
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- Management Meeting At the conclusion of the inspection on February 6, 1979, a meeting was held at the corporate offices with representatives of the licensee organization. Attendees at this meeting included personnel whose names are indicated by notation(*) in paragraph The inspectors summarized the results of the inspection as described in this report.