IR 05000272/1979003
| ML19269D461 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 03/08/1979 |
| From: | Robert Carlson, Devlin J, Gallina C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19063C911 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-79-03, 50-272-79-3, NUDOCS 7906040089 | |
| Download: ML19269D461 (14) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Report No. 50-272/79-03 Docket No. 50-272 License No. DPR-70 Priority
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Category C
Licensee:
Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Place
_ Newark, New Jersey 07101 Facility Name:
Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1 (SNGS)
Investigation at: Hancocks Bridge and Newark, New Jersey Investigation conducted Janu ry 30 - February 1 and 5,1979 b
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Investigators:
W. O. Gallina, Ph.IK, Investigation Specialist date/ sighed Wh 3//j19
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p.E.Finkel,ReactorInspector date signed W8/?4
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S. D. Ebneter, hief, Engineering Support date signed
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,RC&ES Branch
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3 /$ /~J4 Approved by: JU
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(,/ W. Devlin, TChief, Security and Investigation 4 ate' sigr(ed SecH nn. S#
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s Branch
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Approved by:
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.3/87/9 R. T. Carlson,' Chi 5f, Reai:TdP Construction
'date signed and Engineering Support Branch 6040081 Investication' Summary:
Investiaation on January 10-February 1 and 5,1979 (Report No. 50-272/79-03)
Areas Investicated:
The investigation covered four allegations relating to maintenance and installation projects being performed at the SNGS.
The allegations were made on January 24, 1979 and related to unsealed penetrations, welding machine calibration, torn security cable and QA/QC controls.
This investigation involved 45 man-hours on site by an investigator and reactor inspector and 12 man-hours at PSE&G corporate office by a supervisor and reactor inspector.
Resul ts:
Of the 4 allegations investigated and 3 additional areas identified during the investigation, two (2) items of noncocoliance were identified (1. infraction - unsealed penetration, Paragraph D.1; 2. infraction - failure to meet controls and verification for associated circuit, Paragraph E.1).
Three (3) unresolved areas were also identified (1. evaluation of PSE&G and Catalytic procedures, Paragraph D.3; 2. engineering design review techniques, Paragraph E.2; 3. access to vital areas, Paragraph F.1)
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TABLE OF CONTENTS I.
Background A.
Reason for Investigation B.
Identification of Involved Organizations II. Summary of Findings A.
Allegations and Investigation Findings B.
Exit Interviews III. Details A.
Introduction B.
Scope of Investigation C.
Persons Directly Interviewed and/or bontacted During the NRC Investigation D.
NRC Findings and Conclusions Related to Allegations E.
Additional Findings F.
Security Findings *
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2258 248 contains material exempt from public disclosure in accordance with
the provisions of 10 CFR 2.790(d)
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I BACKGROUND A.
Reasons for Investigation On January 24, 1979, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Inspection and Enforcement-Headquarters, received a telephone call from an individual who identified himself as working at the Salem Nuclear Generating Station (SNGS)(Public Service Electric and Gas Company; Docket No. 50-E72). The alleger made various allegations related to construction and modification operations at SNGS, Unit 1.. The basic allegations were related to (a) unsealed penetrations; (b) welding machine calibration irregularities; (c) torn security cable and (d) lack of overall QA/QC control.
These allegations were forwarded to Region I on January 26, 1979.
Subsequently an investigation of the allegations was initiated on January 29, 1979.
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B.
Identification of Involved Organizations 1.
Public Service Electric and Gas Company (PSE&G)
80 Park Place Newark, New Jersey 07101 A corporation licensed by the NRC to operate the SNGS at Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey under NRC Operating License No.
2.
Catalytic, Incorporated Philadelphia, Pennsylvania This firm, under contract to PSE&G, provides various maintenance services at the SNGS.
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II SUMMARY OF FINDINGS A.
Allegation and Investigation Findings This investigation involves the allegations received by the NRC via telephone on January 24, 1979. These allegations are described and numbered 1 through 4 below.
During the review of the above referenced allegations, additional problem areas were identified, come of which developed into unresolved items and an item of noncompliance.
These additional findings are described and numbered 5 and 6 below.
A third additional unresolved item was identified with respect to the area of security. This item is described in item 7 below but the report details contained in Section III-F of this report are exempt from public disclosure in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 2.790(d).
Allegations 1.
A conduit at about the 88' elevation of SNGS, Unit 1 relay room, between EE and DD building designation, does not have fire stop material inside it.
The NRC investigation found this allegation to be substantiated and resulted in an infraction level item of noncompliance with respect to the licensee's failure to seal the penetration after installing conduit within the penetration and failure to establish a fire watch as required by Technical Specification 3/4.7.11 (Details, Paragraph D.1).
2.
Machines used for welding in SNGS, Unit 1 are to be calibrated and tested for grounding every four months.
New calibration stickers were put on all welding machines on December 12, 1978 with a date differing from December 12, 1979 to lead an observer to conclude that the certification is ongoing with machines due for calibration on different dates.
It was also alleged that this action was directed by a supervisor.
The NRC investigation found no informatien and/or evidence to substantiate this allegation (Details, Paragraph D.2).
3.
As part of a new security system modification, Cable #1SEC555-SQ on the 84' elevation in the Auxiliary Building in cable tray 1A033 (vital tray), 6 feet north of 12.3 line, approximately 4 feet west of building line LL has a rip in the outer sheath.
This rip was reported through the supervisory chain of the contractor responsible for installing and pulling the cable but corrective action was not taken.
It is also alleged that contractor personnel caused the rip and that there was a general lack of QA/QC control over work in this area.
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The NRC investigation confirmed the rip in the cable but could not establish the cause.
With respect to the lack of appro-priate QA/QC control, it was concluded that the apparent problem resulted from differences in PSE&G and Catalytic, Inc.
procedures, a matter being considered as unresolved pending further evaluation by the licensee (Details, Paragraph D.3).
4.
There are contractor personnel who believe that the contractor was not particular about safety-related work and may have not reported work nonconformances to PSE&G.
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The NRC investigation found no information and/or evidence to substantiate this allegation (Details, Paragraph D.4).
Additional Findings 5.
Designation of Associated Circuits The NRC investigation identified an infraction level item of noncompliance relative to the licensee's failure to meet controls and verification requirements for associated circuits as required by SNGS-FSAR, Section Q7.ll-2 and 3 and Appendix B, Criterion III of 10 CFR 50 (Details, Paragraph E.1).
6.
Site Programs and Design Review The NRC investigation identified an unresolved item relative to engineering design review techniques associated with the classification method that is established with respect to safety-related and non-safety-related installations (Details, ParagraphE.2).
Security FinJings 7.
The NRC investigation identified an unresolved item relative to access to vital areas at the SNGS (Details, Paragraph F.l*).
This material is exempt from public disclosure in accordance with the
provisions of 10 CFR 2.790(d).
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B.
Exit Interviews An exit interview was conducted at the SNGS site on February 1, 1979 in order to discuss the various allegations and additional findings associated with the NRC investigation.
Identified items of noncompliance were also reviewed at this time.* Irdividuals present at this meeting are delineated in Section III-C of this investigation report.
An additional management meeting was conducted at the corporate offices of PSE&G in Newark, New Jersey on February 5, 1979 in order to discuss more generic problems identified during the investigation, specifically the engineering design review techniques associated with the classification method established with respect to safety-related and non-safety-related installations.
Individuals present at this meeting are delineated in Section III-C of this investigation report.
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- Mr. E. Schwalje, Corporate QA Manager of PSE&G was also contacted by telephone to discuss the results of the investigation.
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III DETAILS A.
Peason for Investigation This investigation was initiated as a result of the NRC being con-tacted by an individual on January 24, 1979, who alleged that various maintenance and modification operations at the Salem Nuclear Generating Station (SNGS) were being conducted in a manner not in compliance with NRC regulations and/or requirements.
B.
Scope of Investigation This investigation included the direct observation of various work areas at the SNGS; an examination of pertinent documents and records; and interviews with various licensee and contractor personnel.
C.
Persons Directly Interviewed and/or Contacted During the NRC Investigation 1.
Public Service Electric and Gas Company (PSE&G)
- H. Midura, Manager, SNGS
- J. Zupko, Jr., Chief Engineer, SNGS
- S. La Bruna, Maintenance Engineer, SNGS
- W. Treston, Quality Assurance Engineer, SNGS J. Brody, Electrical Engineer, SNGS
- F. Christiana, Chief Controls Engineer
- Y. Yaworsky, Assistant Chief Engineer
- J. Wroblewski, Principal Engineer - Controls
- R. Gura, Principal Engineer - Controls
- A. Gilrain, Senior Engineer - Electrical
- G. Harbin, Planning Engineer, Salem Site
- F. Meyer, Mechanical Plant Engineer B. Gailey, Principal Engineer G. Supplee, Chief Engineer E. Schwalje, Manager of Quality Assurance
- F. Orrohundro, Assistant Manager of Quality Assurance T. Lesh, Security Supervisor 2.
Catalytic, Incorpcrated
- J. Furlong, Project Engineer
- H. Snow, Electrical Superintendent
- T. Lavin, Site Quality Assurance Manager J. Wanner, Quality Control J. Bernert, Material Storage and Handling Superviser
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Several other employees of Catalytic, Incorporated were also interviewed during the course of this investigation.
present during exit interview at SNGS site on February 1, 1979
present at management meeting at corporate offices on February S,
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D.
NRC Findings and Conclusions Related to Allegations 1.
Allegation No. 1 a.
Allegation A conduit at about the 88' elevation of SNGS, Unit 1 relay room, between EE and D0 building designation does not have fire stop material inside it.
b.
NRC Findings The investigators examined the above referenced area, specifically a penetration at approximately the 88' level of the Auxiliary Building, Unit 1, and determined that the penetration between EE and DD building designation did not have any fire barrier material in it.
The investigators also determined that no fire watch was in the area while the penetration was unsealed.
The licensee was notified of the condition and within 10 minutes a fire watch was in the area and the penetration was sealed by the end of the day shift on January 30, 1979.
-The installation of the conduit in the penetration of the Auxiliary Building wall did not comply with the requirements of PSE&G Procedure M34 entitled " Repair of Fire Barrier and Flood Protector Seals." This procedure is to be used for the repair of electrical, mechanical and structural seals opened during maintenance and or replacing cable at the SNGS-1 site.
The SNGS Technical Specification 3/4.7.11 entitled "Penetra-tion Fire Barriers" states in part that, "All penetration fire barriers protecting safety-related areas shall be functional. With one or more of the above required penetration fire barriers non-functional, establish a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the affected penetration within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />."
The licensee failed to seal the penetration after installing a conduit within the penetration nor did the licensee establish a fire watch at the penetration location.
The licensee was infonned that this was contrary to the requirements of Technical Specification 3/4.7.11 entitled
" Penetration Fire Barriers" Amendment No. 11 as stated a bove.
This was considered to be an item of noncomp fance (272/79-0 3- 01 ).
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c.
NRC Conclusions The NRC concludes that the above allegation was substan-tiated and resulted in an infraction level item of noncom-pliance as detaile) in Paragraph D.l.b above.
2.
Allegation No. ?_
a.
Allegation Machine; used for welding in SNGS, Unit 1 are to be calibrated and tested for grounding by electricians every four months.
New calibration stickers were put on all welding machines on December 12, 1978 with a date differing from December 12, 1978, to lead an observer to conclude that the certification is ongoing with machines coming due for calibration on different dates.
It was also alleged that this action was directed by a supervisor.
b.
NRC Findings The investigators examined the welding machines and associated maintenance records and reviewed the control procedure that Catalytic Incorporated was using on the maintenance work being performed at the SNGS, Unit 1.
The listed welding machines were numbered, recorded and identified in the "One Year Welding Machine Maintenance Record" on the dates indicated:
Welding Machine Serial No.
Date Recorded W537734 June 1978 HE804489 June 1978 U503503 June 1978 HG48787 June 1978 HG057245 June 1978 72645323 June 1978 71600032 June 1978 HG064117 July 1978 HD671309 July 1978 71600030 July 1978 HD671309 July 1978 72635868 July 1978 SD487206 August 1978 71600045 September 1978 4G048794 October 1978 2258 255
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The investigators noted that Catalytic, Incorporated's Procedure, CMP-15 entitled " Control of Calibration Tools, Measuring and Test Equipment," Revision 0, dated July 20, 1978 does not require the welding machines to be calibrated.
There is a requirement that each welding machine be marked with an identification number and date.
Each machine was numbered and the serial number recorded in the "One Year Welding Machine Maintenance Record" but the stickers that Catalytic, Incorporated put on the machines with the date and identification infonnation was not sticking in all cases to the machine surface.
Of the welding machines observed directly, welding machine 72645323 and 71600032 were noted as having missing stickers.
The licensee stated that new stickers would be placed on the equipment.
The investigators noted that the "One Year Welding Machine Maintenance Records" were recorded on the dates indicated above but were approved as a package by the Electrical Superintendent in December 1978.
It appeared that December,1978 was the date when the Material Storage and Handling Supervisor was presented the data sheets for review and approval.
It also appeared that during that period of time the welding machines had their stickers attached and dated as listed above.
The investigators noted that a requirement for the welding machines listed in CMP-15 is as follows:
"The welding machines (including remote and drawer units) shall be checked annually for minimum potential amperage output as recomended by the manufacturer."
The dates listed above established the one year due dates.
The investigators reviewed the SNGS Storeroom Department Manual Administrative Procedure SR-5 entitled " Calibration Program - Mechanical" and determined that there was no requirement that welding equipment be part of the calibration control system.
c.
NRC Conclusion The NRC concluded that no information and/or evidence could be identified to substantiate this allegation.
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3.
Allegation No. 3 a.
Allegation As part of a new security system modification, Cable
- 1SEC555-SQ on the 84' elevation of the Auxiliary Building in cable tray lA033 (vital tray), 6 feet north of 12.3 line approximately 4 feet west of building line LL has a rip in the outer sheath.
This rip was reported through the supervisory chain of the contractor responsible for installing and pulling the cable but that corrective action was not taken.
It is also alleged that contractor personnel caused the rip and that there was a general lack of QA/QC control over work in this area.
b.
NRC Findings The investigators noted that during the installation of non-safety-related cables in the area described in this allegation, cable 1SEC555-SQ was pulled in safety-related cable tray 1 A033.
The cable was observed by the investi-gators to have a rip in the outer jacket,-approximately~
4 inches long and approximately 40% of the circumferential
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part of the cable jacket.
The initial inspection of the cable by the investigators could not determine whether the conductors within the jacket were damaged.
The cable jacket and the conductors within the cable jacket are scheduled to be examined by the licensee.
The investigators noted that this condition was not reported in the nonconformance and corrective action system (CMP-18) being used by Catalytic, Incorporated because of the fact that the job was not complete and consequently not inspected by contractor Q.C.
The licensee plans to review the quality assurance documentation presently used by Catalytic, Incorporated to assure that the site requirements are translated into procedure requirements.
This matter was considered to be unresolved (272/79-03-04).
c.
NRC Conclusion The NRC concluded on the basis of visual evidence that the primary aspect of the allegation, that is, the torn cable was substantiated although the cause could not be established. With respect to the lack of appropriate QA/QC control, the NRC investigators determined that the apparent lack of QA/QC control was due primarily to differences between PSE&G and Catalytic, Incorporated procedures and site requirements.
This matter was considered as unresolved pending further evaluation by the licensee.
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4.
~ Allegation No. 4 a.
Allegation There are other contractor personnel who believe that the contractor was not particular about safety-related work and may have not reported work nonconformances to PSE&G.
b.
NRC Findings Because the alleger declined to specifically identify co-workers to substantiate the above allegation, the NRC in-vestigators selected at random, twelve (12) individuals (11 employees of Catalytic, Incorporated and one PSE&G supervisor) for interviews related to the above allegation.
During the course of these interviews, which included Catalytic foremen, the investigators noted that in no case did any individual believe work nonconfonnances were being withheld or minimized by Catalytic supervision.
Most of the individuals interviewed believed that they could take their problems to their immediate supervisor and that appropriate action would be taken.
Although
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some complaints were noted, these were generally limited to equipment unavailability and not to a lack of at-tention and/or concern on the part of Catalytic management.
c.
NRC Conclusion The NRC concluded that in the absence of specifically identified individuals and based on the interviews conducted, no evidence or information could be obtained that would substantiate the above allegation.
E.
Additional Findings 1.
Designation of Associated Circuits During the course of the investigation, the investigators noted that as part of the installation of non-safety related cables at the 100 foot level of the Auxiliary Building, approximately 17 cables coming out of safety-related tray 1C2C7 were tied to the underside of safety-related tray 1C2C6.
The cable break out was not in accordance with the requirements of the licensee's
" Cable Control Manual" and the installation violated the fire barrier separation requirement due to the fact that it was considered a non-safety modification.
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Due to this classification of the security system installation, the non-safety related cables were pulled in safety-related tray systems and entered vital area penetrations which at this point become associated circuits and should have had the same controls and verification requirements as safety systems.
SNGS-FSAR, Section Q7.ll-2 and 3 states in part "... Written design and installation procedures are established to assure that non-safety related cables only run within one safety related channel."
The licensee, by classifying this system as a non-safety related system, did not require the necessary controls to assure that the non-safety related cables were installed in accordance with safety related requirements.
The licensee was informed that this was contrary to the re.quirements of the
" Cable Control Manual," and Appendix B, Criterion III of 10 CFR 50."
This was considered to be an item of noncompliance (272/79-03-02).
2.
Site Program Requirements and Design Revie'v During the course of the overall investigation, the investigators identified various problems with site program requirements and related design review areas.
The investigators informed the licensee that in discussions with Catalytic, Incorporated site management and site crafts, it appeared that the licensee's site requirements for cable installation, penetration opening and resealing, applicable Technical Specifications for penetration fire barriers and nonconformance and corrective reporting were not fully understood by Catalytic, Incorporated site management nor transcribed into Catalytic, Incorporated procedures for direction to the craft personnel.
The investigators also reviewed the engineering design review techniques associated with the classification method that established the security system as a non-safety type of installation.
The investigators emphasized that where these cables associate with safety related systems, the same type of control should be required so that the original safety related installations are not degraded by the non-safety installation work.
This matter was considered to be unresolved (272/79-03-03).
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Security Findings 1.
Door to Vital Area THIS PAGE HAS BEEN INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK; IT CONTAINED 10 CFR 2.790(d) INFORMATION - NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE.
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