IR 05000271/1992022
| ML20126D724 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png |
| Issue date: | 12/18/1992 |
| From: | Eugene Kelly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20126D715 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-271-92-22, NUDOCS 9212280128 | |
| Download: ML20126D724 (13) | |
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U.S. NUCLliAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I !
Report N Docket N Licensee N DPR 28 Licensec: Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation RD 5, llox 169 Ferry Road -
lirattleboro, VT 05301
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Facility: Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station Vernon, Vermont
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inspection Period: October 25 - November 28,1992 Inspectors: 11arold Eichenholz, Senior Resident inspector Paul W. Ilarris, Resident inspector Neil Perry, Senior Resident inspector, Yankee Rowe Approved by: 1 / w . kv 'l %
i Eug'ene M.' Kelly, Chief,' Reactor Projects Section 3A 13 ate Scope: Station activities inspected by the resident staff this period included: plant operations; radiological controls; maintenance; security; engineering and technical support; and safety assessment and quality verification. Interviews - ,
and discussions were conducted with members of Vermont Yankee management and staff as necessary to support this inspection An initiative selected for inspection was Vermont Yankee's operating experience involving i Potter and Urumfield MDR relays. Periodic inspections amounting to 31 hours3.587963e-4 days <br />0.00861 hours <br />5.125661e-5 weeks <br />1.17955e-5 months <br /> of holiday and backshift activities were performed on October 25, 26, 28, November 5, 8,11,16,18,19, and 2 Findings: The inspection is summarized in the Executive Summary. A non-cited -
violation regarding failure to maintain' minimum shift staf0ng is discussed in Section .
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9212200128 921221 PDR 0 -ADOCK 05000271
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ENI'.CUTIVE SUMM AltY Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station Report No. 92 22 Plant Operations Control rmon operators responded well to two reactor power transients on November 8 and 9, caused by the " A" reactor recirculation pump inadvertently tripping. Good corrective actions were promptly initiated in response to a contractor inadvertently tripping a battery charger supply breaker for emergency core cooling system logic circuitry. A non-cited violation was issued regarding the November 3,1992 incident where minimum shaft staffing was not met for 45 minute I Itadiological Controls Good radiological housekeeping practices were observed on the refueling ikxtr and in the reactor building. Chemistry logs and trends were accurate and the laboratory was maintained free of uncontrolled radioactive materia Maintenance Good maintenance using detailed work instructions identified and corrected the cause of the reactor recirculation pump trips. The overall quality of the preventive maintenance performed on the "11" service water pump was much improved since last performed, and high quality workmanship was eviden Engineering nnd Technical Support Vermont Yankee performed an effective and timely review to assess whether the recent _
industry reliability problems involving Potter and llrumfield MDit llelays were applicable at their facility. No such relays are used at Vermon Safety Assessment and Quality Verification The semi-annual Nuclear Safety Audit and 1(eview Committee critically assessed the performance of Vermont Yankee, including recommendations intended to improve the assessment capability of its members, ii
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TAllLE OF CONTENTS liX 11C UTI Vli S U h1 M A R Y , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii TA lli . fi O F CONTliNTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii SUMM ARY OF FACILITY ACTIVITiliS . . . . . . . . . . . . .... .. .. I PLANT OPliRATIONS (71707,92700,92702. 90712) . . .. .......... 1 Operational Safety Verification ......................... I Delayed 10 CFR 50.72 Notifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Minimum Licensed Operator Shift Staffing Not Maintained . . . . . . . . . 3 limergency Core Cooling llattery (IICCS) llattery Charger . . . . ..... 4 -- R ADIOLOGICAl. CONTROLS (71707) .. . .. .. .......... ... 4 M A INTliN A NCli (62703, 92700, 71707) ............. . .. . ... 5 "11" Service Water Pump Preventive Maintenance . . . . . . ... .... 5 Reactor Recirculation Pump Trips ...... ...... .......... 6 SliCURITY (71707) .. ................................. 7 ENGINiiliRING AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT (71707,92700) ..... .... 7 Potter & Brumfield M DR Relays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 SAUIITY ASSESSMiiNT AND QUALITY VliRIFICATION (40500,90712, 90713, 92700) . . . . . . . . ......... ... ........ ..... .. 8 Nuclear Safety Audit and Review Committee (NSARC) ..... ..... 8 Periodic and Special Reports . . . . . ........ ...,...... .. 9 _ M ANAGEMiiNT MEliTINGS (30702) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......... 9 Preliminary inspection Findings . . . . ................... . 9 S A LP Management Meeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Security Management Meeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 NITACHMENT - Attendees and Agenda for 10/29/92 Security Management Meeting Note: Procedures from NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 2515, " Operating Reactor inspection Program" which were used as inspection guidance are parenthetically listed for each applicable report sectio iii
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DETAll S SUNIN1ARY OF FACll.lTY ACTIVITIES I Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station (VY) continued full power operations this period i except for two power transients on November 8 and 9. These transients were as a result of
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the "A" reactor recirculation pump (RRP) inadvertently tripping from approximately 100 percent of rated power. The plant was operated in single loop for eight and 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, -
respectively, until the conditions that caused the trips were corrected and the pump returned !
to service. Elforts continue to install the new fuel pool cooling system'. This new seismic, safety-related system augments the old system and allows more spent fuel assemblies to be ;
stored onsite. Completion of t' N system modi 0 cation is expected in January 199 .0 Pl. ANT OPER ATIONS (71707, 92700, 92702, 90712) l Operational Safety Verification
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This inspection consisted of direct observation of facility activities, plant tours, and operability reviews of systems important to safety. The impectors verified that the facility ;
was operated in accordance with regulatory requirement Control Room Observalimb
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Control room operations were obsened to be professionally conducted, and in accordance with operating procedures. Operator response to alarms, control of reactor power, and .
release of equipment for maintenance and surveillance demonstrated effective control of facility operation On November 9, the inspector obsened good operator response to a trip of the "A" reactor recirculation pump (RRP). Intra-crew communications were professional and immediate actions were promptly initiated to stabilize the plant transient in accordance with plan:
procedures. Operators promptly informed plant management of the event and took appropriate actions to exit Region 11 of the Technical Specifications (TS) power to-flow ma The inspector verified that all associated alarms were received and acknowledged, and that an Auxiliary Operator was directed to investigate the trip of the RRP motor generator se Section 4.2 describes VY's response to this even SystatLt\lignments anttflimt Tours The following items were reviewed during routine facility tours: control room logs, i . operating orders, control room annunciators, recorder traces, and emergency power sources.
i Tours were performed of accessible plant areas to verify that plant and equipment conditions ,
supported operability, ignition sources and flammable materials were properly controlled, and seismic supports for system piping were properly fastened and aligned. Regular and backshift tours were performed of the following areas and systems:
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Control Room liigh Pressure Coolant injection (llPCI)
Diesel Generator Rooms Residual Heat Removal
- Radioactive Waste Facility Core Spray On November 12, the inspector observed the performance of a fire protection inspection of the diesel generator rooms by the VY Fire Protection Coon'inator. The Coordinator inspected the connections associated with fuel oil transfer and lube oil system, and the drip pans below the fuel injectors, and the area below the diesels for abnormal accumulation of oil. The Coordinator observed no conditions adverse to the operability of the diesels and verified the completion of corrective actions associated with a condition noted during a
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previous fire protection inspection. The inspector considered this inspection to be effective in identifying and preventing fire harards, in addition, on November 17 the inspectors toured the facility with the Director of the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. Inspections were performed of the hardened vent system, areas within the reactor building, and the drywell via a remote video camera syste No conditions adverse to plant safety were observed; however, some poor housekeeping conditions were observed on the 303 foot level of the reactor building. Items such as tools, motor operators, welding equipment, work clothes, etc. on the floor in the vicinity of the reactor coolant sample sink and the emergency core cooling system battery system were present. .hese observations were discussed with plant management and were subsequently correcte " Delayed 10 CFR 50.72 Notifications This violation (92-04 01) concerned two instances of failure to follow procedures, resulting in ,
a 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> ENS notification pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 being made approximately six days lat In the first instance, the Shift Supervisor (SS) failed to recognize that the HPCI system was inoperable when the inverter tripped on February 20. The root cause for this was determined to be that Alarm Response Sheet (ARS) 3-U-5, liigh Pressure Coolant injection, Revision 2,-
implied that if the alarm associated with the condition will reset, then the HPCI system is not inoperable. Corrective actions included revising the ARS to explicitly state that if the
- inverter trip is confirmed, then the HPCI system is to be considered inoperable. The SS_ was counselled regarding HPCI operability when the inserter trips, and the incident was reviewed at an SS meeting held on April 30. Additionally, the shift engineer position was established as the on-shift individual knowledgeable in 10 CFR 50.72 requirements, and for providing the SS with reportability input as necessary. Shift engineers received training concerning 10 CFR 50.72 requirements, and reference material to assist in making reportability determinations was placed in the control. roo The second instance of failure to follow procedures occurred on February 24, when an ;
engineering supervisor failed to immediately nctify the SS that the HPCI inverter trip event +
-was determined to be reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72. The root cause for this was determined to be personnel error. Corrective actions included counselling the supervisor as to the importance of following procedures, especially when dealing with operability issue Additionally, all engineering supervisors were retrained to ensure that the requirements for ,
repo table occurrences are clearly understoo ;
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The inspector reviewed applicable procedures and records and discussed the corrective actions with plant management. Actions taken to address the violation were appropriate, and the item was therefore close ,3 Minimum 1.icensed Operator Shift Stafung Not Maintained On November 3 at 5:20 a.m., an onshift Control Room Operator (CRO) received permission from the Shift Supervisor (SS) to leave site and attend to an emergent family issue. This resulted in the shift staff going below the minimum requirements for Control Room Operators as described in TS Table 6.1.1. The SS documented this event in the control room log and initiated immediate actions to restore shift complement by calling in an on-coming CRO. At approximately 6:05 a.m., the relieving CRO reported onsite, thereby re-establishing compliance with TS requirements. During this event, the plant was operating at 100 percent of rated power and no signiGeant surveillances were being performe On November 12, the Plant Operations Review Committee reviewed this event and mandated the initiation of VY's forn.al reportability determination process. On November 16, this process was commenced by the generation of a Potential Reportable Occurrence (PRO) report which is VY's vehicle to assure a formal management and engineering review of plant issues and events to determine whether a reportable condition exists. From this process, corrective actions can be recommended by plant management. On November 18, the Technical Services Supenntendent informed the inspectors of the PRO and the potential reportability of the event. Subsequently, on November 19, the plant manager became aware (for the first time)
that this event constituted a failure to meet minimum shift staf0ng requirement The inspector noted that, following this event, various plant managers and the relieving Shift Supervisor reviewed the control room log and did not appropriately question the need to issue a PRO. Poor logkeeping practices were evident in the failure of the SS to explicitly document that the actions resulted in a condition contrary to the license. This condition may have contributed to the lack of timely awareness by senior plant managers of the staffing issue. In addition, based on inspector discussions with department heads in attendance at the PORC and a review of the preliminary PORC meeting minutes, the Committee (1) did not review or assess the propriety of a Shift Supervisor to voluntarily allow shift staffing to go below TS requirements and (2) did not explicitly discuss whether this issue constituted a TS noncompliance. in light of this event, Vermont Yankee initiated the following corrective actions: (1) a Plant Manager memorandum was issued on November 23 that provided specific directions to Shift Supervisors when confronted with situations that may result in not being able to meet TS minimum shift staf6ng requirements; (2) on November 24, a memorandum from the Operations Superintendent to all Department Heads re-emphasized the importance of promptly initiating a PRO so that the corrective action process, reportability determinations, and management reviews are formally initiated; and (3) procedure revisions to AP 0894,
" Shift Staffing / Overtime Limits," and AP 0152, " Shift Turnover," were implemented to provide amplifying information regarding the considerations involved and controls for any deviation from stafGng requirement . _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _- -_ _ _-__ _- -._ . __
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The failure of VY to maintain minimum shift staf0ng as required by TS 6.1 is considered a ,
violation. This violation is not being cited because it was self-identined, of minimal safety I signincance, and your corrective actions were timely and comprehensiv ' Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) llattery Charger On November 24, a contract electrician and engineer performing a field inspection of Motor Control Center SC inadvertently tripped the supply breaker for the "A" ECCS battery charger for the 24 Vdc logic power supply. This resulted in the logic circuits being solely supplied by the battery. Control room operators immediately responded to the event, in part, because an alarm condition was received in the control room and because the contract engineer promptly reported the event to the control roam. The TS limiting condition for operation was entered and a potential Reportable Occurrence report was initiate The inspector interviewed the contract engineer and determined that the trip was due to personnel error; however, cognizant errors were also made during this event. One error ,
involved the re-shutting of the supply breaker without proper authoritation from the control room. Iloth the Engineering Director (ED) and the contractor's supervisor considered this action unacceptable, in addition, the ED informed the inspector of the immediate actions taken to prevent recurrence. The cognizant individuals were laterviewed and counseled, and I
department training was conducte The inspector considered this event to be isolated and of minor safety significance. The ED acknowledged that the immediate actions of the cognizant individuals were not in the interest
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of plant safety and did not promote effective control of plant equipment. The inspector concluded that VY initiated appropriate immediate corrective actions to understand the situation and to prevent recurrence. The inspector noted past good performance by the contractor (Mercury) during such activities as the installation of the new spent fuel pool cooling system and seismic supports for the emergency diesel generators. Therefore, this event was considered as isolate ,0 R ADIGI,0GICAl, CONTROL.S (71707)
The inspectors frequently toured the Radiation Control Area (RCA) and inspected several radiation work permit areas. The inspector verified that locked high radiation doors wer properly secured and that portable radiation survey instruments were properly calibrated. The inspector reviewed the RCA log, the air sampling survey log, and reviewed a personnel contamination event report. No discrepancies were identined, improvements in radiological housekeeping were noted on the refuel floor and on the 213 foot level of the reactor building. The inspector observed that miscellaneous material ,
preventing access to areas on the refuel _ Door was removed and that total square footage of contaminated Door in the torus room had been reduced. Additionally, efforts to clean and remove used anti-contamination clothing from the vicinity of the reactor water clean up system room contributed to good housekeeping in that area. The inspector concluded that VY was making good progress to restore access to most areas in the plant without reliance on the need for protective clothin .
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The inspectors also verified that reactor cooiant chemistry met TS requirements. Analyses per'bimed to determine coolant conductivity, radiciodine concentration, and reactor coolant 70ss act: ,y were properly logged and evaluated with respect to limits. Analytical results were ' rended. Chemistry technicians were cognizant of any variations from normal values and :.ould articmate why normal values were not observed. The chemical laboratory was M an and free of uncontrolled radioactive materia .0 M AINTENANCE (62703, 92700, 71707)
The inspector observed selected maintenance on safety-related equipment to determine whether these acovities were conducted in accordance with VY 'la, approved procedures, regulatory requirements, and appropriate industry codes and standard .1 "It" Service Water Pump Preventive Maintenance During the period between November 3 and 20, VY performed preventive maintenance on the "11" seivice water (SW) pump. The maintenance scope included pump and motor inspections, replacement of worn parts, and resolution of a non-conformance associated with the motor winding heaters. Generally, one SW pump overhaul is performed every year; however, pump and motor performance indicator.. such as now rate, discharge pressure, vibration, and motor current were used to lengthen the overhaul periodicity. In the case of the "11" SW pump, performance parameters met TS requirements; however, since April 1991, hi'her
, than normal motor vibrations have been identifie The inspector performed inspections of the various components in:luding the motor winding bearings, heaters, and electrical connections; and the pump casing, impellers, shaft seals a friction surfaces. 11ased on these inspections, review of the vend ( r technical manual, and discussicas with cogmzant mamtenance personnel, the inspector verified that the mechanics . i and electricians were knowledgeable of the work performed. The work areas were clean and nJequately segregated quality-controlled parts. - Replacement of components was based on visual inspections by the mechanics and evaluations performed by cognizant engineers. In regards to the higher than normal motor vibration, non-concentric wear patterns on the pump shaft at the stuffing box were preliminarily identified as the cause. This type of wear pattern was previously identified on other SW pumps, and evaluated as an expected condition based on past pump performance. The inspector identified no concerns associated with the assembly, disassembly, and mechanical inspection of the "I1" SW pump and moto The documentation of maintenance has improvea since the last SW pump overhaul (Inspection Report 92-09). One such improvement involved the written instructions in the work control documents. Instructions sequei.. .:d the maintenance to be performed by referring to specific q paragraphs in the vendor technical manual for the detailed steps to be perfonned. This has required more eft'ective pre-planning of the work. Mechan!:s were able to articulate and j show documentation that substantiated the adequate performance of required maintenance.
l- steps, in part, because ihe work instructions were more detailed. Improved documentation of i
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documentation of vendor.provided acceotance criteria, inspections, and assembly techniques .
was also observed. Past maintenance discrepancies were effectively reviewed and incorporated into the current work instructio The overall quality of this maintenance was much improved since last performe Maintenance personnel continued to exhibit excellent equipment knowledge and "ownersVpf Workmanship during the assembly and disassembly of the pump and motor was of high quahty and contributed to the successful preventive maintenance on this safety-related syste Vermont Yankee is in the process of resolving the motor heater non-conformanc .2 Reactor Recirculation Pump Trips During this inspection period, VY experienced two trips of the "A" reactor recirculation ,
pump (RRP) while at approximately 100 percent of rated power. In both events, reactor power decreased along the 100 percent rod pattern line and entered Region 11 of the TS power to flow map. Operators inserted rods and reduced RPP speed to exit the region in accordance with procedures. No reactor oscillations were observed. Both trips were caused by generator lockout due to a momentary loss of the motor-generator (MG) set electric fiel Vermont Yankee determined that the loss of field was, in part, was due to degraded components within the exciter 3-phase rectifier and the voltage regulating circuit, and as a -i result of slip ring contaminatio In response to the first trip, which occurred on November 8, VY focused on very fine, black, ferrous particles that were identified within the MG set end on the 280 foot level of the reactor building where the RRP motor generator sets are located. Vermont Yankee was of the opinion that the accumulation of these particles between the slip rings and brushes caused a high resistance that resulted in a momentary loss of the generator field. This root cause was supported by the identification of dull, non-uniform wear patterns on some of the MG set-l brushes; minor pitting on both the generator and exciter end slip rings; recent maintenance on the reactor building ventilation system; and, two indications, which resembled. burn marks, on the inner-race slip ring on the generator end. The lack of additional indications, such as the l actuation of other protective relays, also contributed to this initial cause determinatio Vermont Yankee had not identified the source of the particles prior to the end of the inspection period. Based on the material conditions identified, VY's corrective actions were reasonable. The inspector noted that the root cause was not positively identified nor corrected to prevent a subsequent RRP trip on November Vermont Yankee's response to the second pump trip was well coordinated, broad in scope, -
and involved personnel with diverse engineering backgrounds. Communications with vendors were prompt and contributed to the identification of the troubleshooting methods and potential root causes. Thermography expertise from Yankee Nuclea SWnq Division was promptly obtained. An electrical engineer was dedicated full time to this dort. Good coorc;aation
! between Operations and Maintenance departments was demonstrated by haprovemen's incorporated into the corrective maintenance and post-maintenance testing (PMT) plans to account for RRP speed mismatch concesas.
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Maintenalce engineering identified degradied components in the rectifier, voltage regulating (VR) circuit, and MG trip relays. Verment Yankee stated that, with the exception of one of six diodes replaced in the VR circuit, the components replaced were original plant equipment and that a maximum service life or preventive maintenance plan was not prescribed by the
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vendor. Electrical maintenance upgraded electrical splices for the power supply cables and corrected a nonsafety-related discrepancy awociated with MG set protective relay '
The documentation of discrepancies, measurement of critical attributes, and troubleshooting performed were good in that field notes accurately described the work performed, acceptance criteria were explicit, and troubleshooting instructions were detailed. The implementation of the PMT included direct communications with the control room, an off-shift SS directly controlling the PMT, installation of recorders to trend key MG performance parameters, and good management oversight. Prior to this testing, the inspector questioned whether maintenance personnel would be controlling RRP pump speed, and therefore controlling core reactivity and reactor power. This concern was acknowledged by the Operations Manager who promptly initiated instructions to control room operators to assure that NRC-licensed operators controlled reactor operations. Following the PMT, increased surveillances were performed on the MG set to verify proper system operation, contributing to the fmal restoration of the " A" RRP to servic Since the return of the " A" RRP to service on November 16, the motor generator set has been operating properly. The Maintenance Manager indicated that VY will continue to assess the performance of the MG set to identify the root cause for the trips. The inspector independently verified that MG set speed control and field voltage and current were steady, and that no slip ring arcing was apparent on either the "A" or "B" MG sets. Based on the
, satisfactory performance of the MG set following the work, the' inspector concluded that the maintenance was effectiv .0 SECURITY (71707)
The inspector verified that security conditions met regulatory requirements and the physical security p'an. Officers properly responded to security parameter deficiencies, complied with p.ocedures, and effectively controlled access into the Protected Area. Officers in charge of security control centers were knowledgeable of the status of the security system, effectively controlled officer response to alarms, and promptly informed security supervision of off-normal condition .0- ENGINEERING AND TECilNICAL SUPPORT (71707,92700) Potter & ilrumfield MDR Relays Reliability prob! cms with Potter & Ilrumfield Model MDR rotary relays have occurred at-several nuclear power plants. This issue was the subject of NRC Information Notice (IN) 92-04, issued on January 6,1992. Vermont Yankee received the subject IN on
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February 6,1992, and within eleven working days had initiated an Operating Experience Review Report (GERR) to assess the applicability of the issue at VY. The Operations Department (the principle reviewer), Corporate Purchasing, Procurement Engineering, Receipt inspection, Maintenance Department, and Instrumentation & Controls Department were provided the OERR information. By March 22,1992, VY completed its review of the IN and determined that the subject relays were not in use at their facility. The review was accomplished well within the 60 days allowed for by the VY's industry experience progra Additionally, the inspector noted that the IN received a wide distribution within the plant, corporate and Yankee Nuclear Services Division organization .0 SAFETY ASSFSSMENT AND QUALITY VERIFICATION (40500,90712,90713, 92700) Nuclear Safety Audit and Review Committee (NSARC)
On November 18 the inspector observed portions of the NSARC meeting and concluded that the TS requirements for committee composition, qualification, and meeting frequency were adhered to. Quality assurance audits and surveillances, plant performance reports, and presentations of past and current plant issues were used and referenced during the meetin Issues presented to and reviewed by NSARC included: the recommendations resulting from the emergency diesel generator task force; engineering evaluations regarding the uninterruptible power supplies, reactor nozzle shield blocks and the advanced offgas system; and, the status of the Individual Plant Examinatio The NSARC members critically assessed the performance of VY. Questions were probing and focused on issues affecting safe plant operation. Discussions appropriately converged on corrective actions and root causes for the reactor nozzle shield block issue which involved inadequate control of the blocks, and errors associated with data supplied by General Electric for use in core loading evaluations. The inspector noted that the assessments of individual plant issues were more detailed than the reviews performed at previous NSARC meeting The Committee also deliberated changes to the method by which members are presented plant data and information for their review prior to the semi-annual meeting. The Committee noted that the packages supplied to its members on a monthly basis were good, however, the summaries describing plant events and issues generally lacked specificity. To improve the overall understanding of plant events and issues by its members, NSARC considered the implementation of increased plant visits by NSARC members, frequent observations of the Plant Operations Review Committee, and involvement with the conduct of audits and surveillances. The inspector concluded that the above considemtions represent a good initiative to improve the offsite review committee proces .
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9 Periodic and Special Reports The inspector reviewed the following reports and determined that the information presented was accurate and comp'ete. Engineering evaluated the plant variables trended and appropriate management reviews were performed. No off-normal conditions were identined Failed Fuel Action Plan report for October 1992
- Monthly Statistical Report for October 1992 L Feedwater Nozzle Temperature Monitoring Data for October '1992 MANAGEMENT MEETINGS (30702) Preliminary inspection l'indings l
l Meetings were periodically held with plant management during this inspection to discuss l preliminary inspection Ondings. A summary of 6ndings was also discussed at the conclusion of the inspection on December 1. No proprietary information was identified as being included in the report.
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' SAI.P Management Meeting i
The inspectors attended a meeting at Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station on October 29 l between the NRC and VY to discuss the results of the NRC Systematic Assessment of
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Licensee Performance (SALP) review conducted for the period of March '17,1991 through l
I August 1,1992. This assessment is documented in SALP Report 91-9 .3 Security Management Meeting l On October 29, a management meeting was held at the Vernon Town Hall in Vernon, VT to discuss sceurity related-issues. This meeting resulted from a request made by VY in_ their l_ !ctter to the NRC dated October 23, and was closed to public participation because the issues l discussed involved safeguards information. - Attendees and a meeting agenda are attached.
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[ Vermont Yankee described the issues, clarifications and coccerns they developed subsequent
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to their review of the initial SALP report. The NRC staff provided clarifications and NRC views on VY performance. The Regional Administrator indicated that upon VY providing
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written comments including correction of factual information, the SALP Board would be reconvened to re-evaluate the initial assessment in this functional area.
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ATTACilMENT LIST OF ATTENDEES AND AGENDA Security Management Meeting, October 29,1992 NRC Attendees T. Martin, Regional Administrator, NRC Region 1 Office C. lichl, Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)
J. Linville, Chief, Projects Branch 3, DRP J. Joyner, Chief, Facilities Radiological Safety and Safeguards llranch (FRSSB),-
Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards (DRSS)
R. Albert, Physical Security inspector, FRSSB, DRSS '
W. Butler, Director, Project Directorate (PD) 1-3, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)
P. Sears, Project Manager, PD l-3, NRR D. Dorman, Project Manager, PD l-3, NRR H. Eichenholz, Senior Resident inspector P. Harris, Resident inspector Vermont Yankee Attendeqs J. Weigand, President and Chief Executive Officer W. Murphy, Senior Vice President, Operations J. Pelletier, Vice President, Engineering D. Reid, Plant Manager
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R. Pagodin, Technical Services Superintendent
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Af&ILda Reasons VY requested meeting I VY's evaluation of Security area at beginning of SALP period and changes made Il NRC response I VY't. meetings with the NRC and conclusions from those meetings .NRC response V VY's conclusions and plans for security improvements