IR 05000271/1992023
| ML20125B153 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png |
| Issue date: | 12/03/1992 |
| From: | Albert R, Keimig R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20125B140 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-271-92-23, NUDOCS 9212090229 | |
| Download: ML20125B153 (6) | |
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- SAFEG0ARDS INFORMATI0ft DITERMillATI0l MADE BY l(5, pat-2{ :
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 1 Report No.
50-271/92-23 Docket No.
50-271 License No. DPR-28 Licensee:
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation Facility Name:
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Pour _ Station Inspection At:
Vernon. Vermont
Inspected Conducted:
November 3-6.1992 Al I-F4 Inspector:
(J. Albert, Fhysj' pia S rity Inspector Date Safeguards Sectic#
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Approved by:
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a-3 -22 g R. KeimYgTChg Date Safeguards SectioV Facilities Radiological Safety and Safeguards Branch Areas Inspected: Management Support and Audits; Protected Area Physical Barriers and Assessment Aids; Protected and Vital Area Access Control of Personnel and Packages; Alarm Stations and Communications; and Training.
Results: The licensee's security program is directed toward public health and safety. The lice isee was in compliance with NRC requirements in the areas inspected.
9212090229 921203 PDR ADOCK 05000271
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DETAILS 1.0 Key Personnel Contacted 1.1 Licensee R. Grippardi, Quality Assurance Supervisor J. Meyer, OSD G. Morgan, Security Manager J. Moriarity, Security Operations Specialist R. Pagodin, Technical Services Superintendent D. Reid, Plant Manager R. Wanczyk, Operations Superintendent 1.2 Contractor F. Harper, Security Administrator, Green Mountain Security Services (GMSS)
W. Jacobson, Security Operations Supervisor (GMSS)
J. Jasinski, Security Training Supervisor (GMSS)
1.3 U.S. Nuclear Reeulatory Commission H. Eichenholz, Senior Resident Inspector P. Harris, Resident inspector The inspector also interviewed other licensee and contractor personnel during the inspection.
2.0 Management Supnort and Audits 2.1 Management Sunnort Management support for the licensee's physical security program was determined by the inspector to be adequate.
This determination was based upon the inspector's review of various aspects of the licensee's program during this inspection, as documented in this report.
2.2 Audits During Inspection No. 92-11, the inspector reviewed the annual security program audit report,.VY-92-04, and noted a finding concerning a vital area (VA) that was protected by only a single barrier. The licensee's response to that audit. invoked NRC Review Guideline Number 13 as justification. However, an exception to the double barrier criterion for this VA-is not contained in the licensee's NRC-approved physical security plan (the Plan) and it was not clear that the Review Guideline is applicable in this particular case. This matter was reviewed further l
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by the NRC subsequent to the inspection. While the Review Guideline was not intended to cover the case in question, the single barrier configuration in this particular case was deemed acceptable for the reason giv n below.
TBS PARAttAPR CONAR$ SAFEBIAll!
INFORMATION AM l$ NT FOR PWLit DISCLOSRE; li IS INTDm0RAlli LEFT ILAN.
This exception and its justification should be im.luded in the next revision to the licensee's physical security plan.
3.0 Protected Area (PA) Physical Ilarriers and Assessment Aids 3.1 PA Ilarriers The inspector conducted a physical inspection of the PA barrier on November 5,1992, and determined that the barrier was installed and maintained as described in the Plan.
3.2 Isolation Zones The inspector verified that the isolation zones were maintained to permit observation of activitics on both sides of the PA barrier, l
i 3.3 Assessment Aids i
The inspector observed the PA perimeter assessment aids and determined that i
they were installed and operated as committed to in the Plan.
3.4 PA and Isolation Zone Lichting l
l The inspector conducted a lighting survey of the PA and isolation zones on November 5,1992. Theinspector determined by observation that lighting in the PA and isolation zones was adequate.
There were no deficiencies identified in these areas.
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4.0 Protected and Vital Area Access Control of Personnel nnd Packages 4.1 Personnel Access Control The inspector determined that the licensee was exercising positive control over personnel access to the PA and VAs. This determination was based on the following:
4.1.1 The inspector verified that personnel were properly identified and authorization was checked prior to issuance of badges and key cards.
4.1.2 The inspector verified that the licensee has a search program for firearms, explosives, incendiary devices and other unauthorized materials as committed to in the Plan. The inspector observed personnel access processing during shift changes, visitor access processing, and interviewed members of the security force and licensee's security staff regarding personnel access procedures.
4.1.3 The inspector determined, by observation, that individuals in the PA and VAs displayed their access badges as required.
4.1.4 The inspector verified that the licensee has escort procedures for visitors in the PA and V As. During a previous inspection, the inspector identified a potential weakness in this area. During this inspection, the inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective measures and found them satisfactory.
4.2 J'ackace and Material Access Control The inspector determined that ISe licensee was exercising positive control over packages and materials brought into the PA at the main access control point.
During a previous inspection, the inspector identified a potential weakness in this area. The licensee took acceptable short-term corrective measures. During this inspection, the inspector observed satisfactory performance and adequate staffing for the area. However, the licensee is still reviewing this area with the possibility of rearranging search detection equipment as a long-term corrective measure.
There were no deficiencies identified in these areas.
5.0 Alarm Stations and Communications The inspector observed the operations of the CAS and the Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) and determined that they were maintained and operated as committed to in the Plan. CAS and SAS operators were interviewed by the inspector and found to be knowledgeable of their duties and responsibilities. The inspector verified that the CAS
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and SAS did not contain any operational activities that would interfere with assessment and response functions. There were no deficiencies identified in this area.
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6,0 Security Training During this inspection, the inspector met with licensee and contractor security personnel to discuss and review security training activities that had been initiated since the Operations Safeguards Response Evaluation (OSRE) that was conducted at the station in Octobu 1991. Licensee post OSRE activities included, but were not limited to, weapons upgrade and associated training, and tactical training. The inspector's findings in those areas follow:
6.1.1 Wrapons Upgrade and Training
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The inspector verified, through a review of training documentation, that all armed security personnel had been trained and certified before being equipped with the upgraded weapons in June 1992.
The inspector also observed night
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familiarization training for the shotgun and handgun. No deficiencies were
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identified.
6.2 Tactical Training Based on documentation provided by and discussions with the licensee, the licensee's actions to address tactical training initiatives since the OSRE were as follows:
6.2.1 Adversary and resnonse force tactical training;. On February 20,1992, the licensee's on-site security contractor conducted this training for 11
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security officers who volunteered to serve as adversaries during contingency drills involving armed intruders.
6.2.2 Adversary instructor training course: On April 21-23,1992, the license sent three contractor security personnel to another nuclear station for this training. The training was provided by an independent contractor.
6.2.3 Training the trainer - tactical resoonse orocedures course: On-June 29-30,1992, the licensee again sent three contractor security personnel (one of whom attended the previous adversary instructor training) to another nuclear station for training. This course consisted of(1) understanding the role. ' of the response force in a physical protection system, (2) fundamentals of tactical-response requirements, (3) use of table-top.
drills to evaluate response procedures and deployment strategies, and (4) use of limited scope exercises to understand inherent difficulties and f
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potential problems associated with contingency responses. The training was conducted by an independent contractor.
i 6.2.4 Tactical training During August 1992, the licensee's security contractor conducted this training for the entire security force.
The training consisted of 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> of classroom training, 3-4 hours of table-top exercises, ar.d limited scope drills. These drills consisted of walking through a field test of the armed responders' matrix, but did not include the use of firearms or engagement in real time tactical maneuvers.
6.2.5 Force-on-force drills: On September 28-30,1992, the licensee used a consultant to evaluate the security force's performance during force-on-force drills. About 60 percent of the force actively participated in 12 drills, each with a different scenario. Another 25 percent were observers from the on-duty shift or escorts for adversary players. Fifteen percent of the force were not involved in any drills, as players or observers.
Since the force-on-force drills in late September, no tactical drills had been conducted, nor had the licensee formulated a schedule or methodology for conducting tactical drills. When this was questioned by the inspector, the licensee committed to reevaluate its approach to and frequency of tactical drills and to provide the NRC with a drilling schedule within a short period following this inspection.
This matter is considered an inspection followup item (IFI 50-271/92-23-01) and will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.
LO Exit Interview The inspector met with the licensee representatives indicated in Paragraph 1,0 at the conclusion of the inspection on November 6,1992. At that time, the purpose and scope of the inspection were reviewed and the findings were presented. The licensee's commitments, as documented in this report, were reviewed and confirmed with the licensee.
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