IR 05000220/1986003
| ML17055B562 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 04/15/1986 |
| From: | Meyer G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17055B560 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-220-86-03, 50-220-86-3, NUDOCS 8605010060 | |
| Download: ML17055B562 (22) | |
Text
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
DCS Nos.
50220-860201 50220-860308 Report No.
50-220/86-03 Docket No.
50-220 License No.
DPR-63 Priority Category C
Licensee:
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation 300 Erie Boulevard West Syracuse, New York 13202 Facility Name:
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit
Inspection At:
Scriba, New York Inspection Conducted:
February 24, to March 31, 1986 Inspectors:
S.
D. Hudson, Senior Resident Inspector C.
S. Marschall, Resident Inspector Approved by:
~(21~
eyer, Acti g Chief, Reactor date Projects Sectio No.2C, DRP Ins ection Summar Ins ection on Februar 24 to March 31 1986 Re ort No.
50-220/86-03 R
R R
R Rd Areas inspected included:
operational safety verification, physical security, plant tours, Licensee Event Reports, Emergency Notification System Reports, preparation for refueling, refueling activities, allegation followup, safety system operability verifications, and periodic and special reports.
Results:
One violation was identified.
This violation concerns the failure to properly barricade and post a high radiation area.
Details are provided in paragraph No.
5.
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DETAILS 1.
Perso'ns Contacted J. Aldrich, Superintendent, Operations T.
Roman, Station Superintendent The inspectors also interviewed other licensee personnel during the course of the inspection including shift supervisors, administrative, operations, health physics, security, instrument and control, and contractor personnel.
2.
Summar of Plant Activities During the inspection period the plant coasted down from 72% on February 24, 1986 to 69% on March 7, 1986.
On March 7, 1986, the licensee commenced plant shutdown for a scheduled fourteen week refueling and modification outage.
On March 8, 1986 while conducting the shutdown, two HPCI initiation signals were received.
These events are discussed in the Review of Emergency Event Reports section.
3.
0 erational Safet Verification a
~
Control Room Observation Routinely throughout the inspection period, the inspectors indepen-dently verified plant parameters and equipment availability of engineered safeguard features.
The following items were observed:
Proper control room manning and access control; Adherence to approved procedures for ongoing activities; Proper valve and breaker alignment of safety systems and emergency power sources; Reactor control panel instrumentation and recorder traces; Reactor protection system instruments to determine that the required channels are operable; Stack gas monitor recorder traces; Core thermal limits; and Shift turnove i, f
0
b.
Review of Lo s and 0 eratin Records The inspectors reviewed the following logs and instructions:
Control Room Log Book Station Shift Supervisor's Log Book Station Shift Supervisor's Instructions Reactor Operation Log Book The logs and instructions were reviewed to:
Obtain information on plant problems and operation; Detect changes and trends in performance; Detect possible conflicts with Technical Specifications or regulatory requirements; Assess the effectiveness of the communications provided by the logs and instructions; and Determine that the reporting requirements of Technical Specifications are met.
No violations were identified.
4.
Observation of Ph sical Securit The inspectors made, observations to verify that selected aspects of the plant's physical security system were in accordance with regulatory requirements, physical security plan and approved procedures.
The following observations relating to physical security were made:
The security force was properly manned and appeared capable of per-forming their assigned functions.
Protected area barriers were intact gates and doors closed and locked if not attended.
Isolation zones were free of visual obstructions and objects that could aid an intruder in penetrating the protected area.
Persons and packages were checked prior to entry into the protected are Vehicles were properly authorized, searched and escorted or controlled within the protected area.
Persons within the protected area displayed photo badges, persons in vital areas were properly authorized, and persons requiring an escort were properly escorted.
Compensatory measures were implemented during periods of equipment failure.
No violations were identified.
5.
Plant Tours During the inspection period, the inspectors made frequent tours of plant areas to make an independent assessment of equipment conditions, radio-logical conditions, safety and adherence to regulatory requirements.
The following areas were among those inspected:
Turbine Building Auxiliary Control Room Vital Switchgear Rooms Cable Spreading Room Diesel Generator Rooms Reactor Building The following items were observed or verified:
a.
Fire Protection:
Randomly selected fire extinguishers were accessible and inspected on schedule.
Fire doors were unobstructed and in their proper position.
Ignition sources and combustible materials were controlled in accor-dance with the licensee's approved procedures.
Appropriate fire watches or fire patrols were stationed when equip-ment was out of service.
On March 5 and 11, 1986, the inspector discovered protective clothing stored in the fire break zone on the 298 ft. level of the reactor building.
A continuous firewatch was posted in the area during this time period due to removal of a fire door.
Storage of flammable material in fire break zones is prohibited by licensee procedure.
Discussions with
the licensee resulted in immediate removal of the protective clothing and instruction on observing the fire break zone prohibitions to contractor s working in the area.
b.
E ui ment Controls:
Jumper and equipment mark-ups did not conflict with Technical Specification requirements.
Conditions requiring the use of jumpers, received prompt licensee attention.
Administrative controls for the use of electrical jumpers and equip-ment mark-ups were properly implemented.
c.
Vital Instrumentation:
Selected instruments appeared functional and demonstrated parameters within Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation.
d.
Radioactive Waste S stem Controls:
Gaseous releases were monitored and recorded.
No unexpected gaseous releases occurred.
~Hk Plant housekeeping and cleanliness were in accordance with approved licensee programs.
'.
Radiation Protection:
Personnel monitoring was properly conducted.
Randomly selected radiation protection instruments were calibrated and operable.
Radiation Work Permit requirements were being followed.
Area surveys were properly conducted and the Radiation Work Permits were appropriate for the as-found conditions.
On March 7, 1986 the inspector found the entrance to a high radiation area (the gate in the fence surrounding the Turbine deck)
propped wide open with a hand truck.
The open gate rendered the existing posting unobserv-able at the gate entrance.
The licensee's. radiological survey of the Turbine deck conducted earlier on March 7, 1986 had confirmed radiation levels up to 400 mrem/hr in the vicinity of the north and south reheater There were two people in the vicinity, one inside the fence inspecting the turbine and one outside the fence.
Both appeared to be complying with the licensee's radiological control procedures.
However, Technical Specification 6. 12. 1 requires that each high radiation area
"be barricaded and conspicuously posted as a high radiation area."
Therefore, the failure to maintain the turbine deck barricaded and conspicuously posted is a violation. (50-220-86-03-01)
When notified of the violation, the licensee immediately closed and locked the door to the high radiation area.
Licensee investigation disclosed that the door had been propped open by maintenance personnel earlier that morning.
On the following day the licensee di rected all department heads and contractor management to instruct all personnel concerning strict adherence to radiation protection procedures and postings during the refueling outage.
The inspector judged this corrective action to be acceptable.
6.
On March 18, 1986 the inspector witnessed a licensee employee fail to follow correct step-off pad procedure and fail to frisk as required.
Radiation protection personnel stationed near the step-off pad failed to observe the procedure violations.
The inspector advi sed the employee of the requirement to frisk and discussed the incident with the radiation protection personnel present.
Discussions with licensee management resulted in relocation of the radiation protection station for a better view of the step-off pap and counseling of the employee involved.
Review of Licensee Event Re orts LER's The LER's submitted to NRC, Region I were reviewed to determine whether the details were clearly reported, including accuracy of the description of the cause and adequacy of the corrective. action.
The inspectors also determined whether the assessment of potential safety consequences had been properly evaluated, whether generic implications were indicated, whether the event warranted on site follow-up and whether the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 had been met.
During this inspection period, the following LER was reviewed:
LER No.
Event Date Subject 86-02 February 1,
1986 and Inoperable Stack Gas Pump February 8, 1986 On February 2,
1986 at 7 a.m.
the licensee discovered that the Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring System (RAGEMS) stack gas sample pump no.
had tripped.
A computer error message indicated the pump had tripped at 8:38 p.m.
on February 1,
1986.
The pump was restarted at 7: 15 a.m.
on February 2, 1986, and then removed from service for trouble-shooting at 7:45 a.m.
The Old General Electric Stack Monitoring System (OGESMS)
pump No.
12, part of a redundant system, was placed in service at that tim On Februrary 8, 1986, at 12:20 p.m., the licensee discovered that OGESMS pump no.
12 had failed at some time after 7:30 a.m.
on February 8,
1986.
OGESMS pump no. 11 was immediately placed in service.
On February 10, 1986 RAGEMS stack gas sample pump 1 was restored to service
.
The inspector discussed the following concerns about LER 86-02 with the licensee:
Technical Specification LCO 3.6 '4.b, Gaseous Process and Effluent requires, in part, that a minimum of one operable channel is required to monitor the release of Iodine and particulates via the Radioactive Gaseous Process ( stack gas)
system.
With less than the minimum number of operable monitoring channels, Technical Specifica-tion Table 3.6. 14-2 allows continued stack gas release of Iodine and particulates provided that samples are continuously collected with auxiliary sampling equipment.
However, the time required to restore RAGEMS to service or to place auxiliary equipment in service is ap-proximately one hour.
The inspector noted that the delay in connec-ting the auxiliary sampling equipment was acceptable, as the delay was implicit in the auxiliary equipment's use.
(It is not normally connected, and it mus.
be moved into position and connected to be used).
The licensee stated that the Technical Specifications (TS)
would be reviewed to determine if a TS change to better clarify this issue would be desirable.
Licensee action in this area will be reviewed in a future inspection report.
(50-220/86-03-02)
Although operations personnel'otified the NRC of the loss of stack gas monitoring on February 2, 1986 they were unaware of the require-ment of 10 CFR 50.36 to conduct a plant shutdown for a condition of plant operation not covered by Technical Specifications.
The licensee has conducted training on
CFR 50.36 with all operations personnel.
A plant shutdown was initiated on February 8, 1986 when OGEMS pump 12 was. found tripped and terminated after OGEMS pump ll was placed in service.
The licensee will submit a revision to LER 86-02 to address these concerns'o violations were identified.
7.
Review of Emer enc Notification S stem Re orts The inspector s reviewed the following events which were reported to the NRC via the Emergency Notification System as required by 10 CFR 50.72.
The purpose of this review was to determine if the event was properly reported, if any generic implications exist, and if appropriate corrective
action has or will be taken'dditionally, the significance of each event was evaluated to determine if on-site followup may be necessary to ensure that the safety significance of each event has been properly determined.
During the current inspection period, the following reports were reviewed:
Event Date Subject March 8, 1986 HPCI initiation.
At 1: 16 a.m. during a normal plant shutdown for a fourteen week refueling outage, a HPCI initiation was received upon tr ip-ping the turbine.
Operations personnel reported this event although HPCI initiation is normal on turbine trip and the HPCI function was bypassed by holding in the HPCI reset buttons.
The report was made due to confusion in interpreting the alarm typer.
March 8, 1986 HPCI initiation.
At 2:08 a.m. while testing the turbine mechanical overspeed trip, a HPCI initiation was received.
Although the HPCI initiation should have been bypassed after the turbine governor was tripped at 1: 16 a.m. without being reset, a sticky pushrod failed to actuate the limit switch in the turbine front standard, and the HPCI initiation signal was inserted.
The licensee plans extensive overhaul of the turbine control system during the refueling outage.
No unacceptable reports were noted.
8.
Safet S stem 0 erabi lit Verification On a sampling basis, the inspector s directly examined selected safety system trains to verify that the systems were properly aligned in the standby mode.
This examination included:
Emergency Diesel Generator Air Start-Systems Emergency Ventilation System No violations were noted.
9.
Review of Periodic and S ecial Re orts The inspectors reviewed the following periodic and special reports to determine whether the safety significance of each event has been properly evaluated, to monitor plant operations, to determine if appropriate
corrective action has been taken, and to ensure compliance with NRC reporting requirements.
During this inspection period, the following reports were reviewed:
~Te Oate Subject Voluntary February 19, 1986 Contaminated cask received at Barnwell burial site.
Monthly March 5, 1986 Operating Experience for February, 1986.
Special March 12, 1986 Fire barrier penetrations.
Special March 21, 1986 Inoperable High Range Gamma Monitor The inspector determined that the requirements of Technical Specifications were met and no violations were noted.
10.
Pre aration for Refuelin The ins ector witnessed p
selected aspects of preparation for refueling to insure that licensee procedures and administrative controls for refueling and outage activities were adequate.
The following items were observed or verified:
Checkout and dry run of refueling bridge.
Operability of refueling interlocks.
Operability of refueling floor radiation monitors.
Operability of emergency ventilation system.
The inspector noted that when maintenance personnel assigned to perform refueling bridge checks were discovered by the refueling floor coordinator to be unfamiliar with the procedure, the refueling floor coordinator stopped work to minimize personnel exposure to radiation.
The licensee assigned maintenance personnel familiar with the procedure to complete the task.
No violations were noted.
11.
Refuelin Activities The inspectors witnessed refueling activities to determine whether activi-ties were being controlled and conducted as required by Technical Speci-fications and approved procedures.
The following activities were observed or verified:
Periodic testing and verification of the operability of refueling related equipment.
Reactor disassembly including vessel head steam dryer and moisture separator removal.
Fuel handling operations.
Housekeeping and loose object control in the refueling and spent fuel areas.
The inspector noted that the licensee experienced considerable difficulty in removal of the moisture separator and numerous problems with the refueling bridge.
Difficultywith removal of the moisture separator resulted from a suspected bent lifting lug on the moisture separator.
The licensee is investigating possible modifications to the lifting rig to correct the difficulty experienced in attaching the lifting rig to the moisture separator.
Numerous problems with the refueling bridge resulted from proximity switch problems in the grapple, which were eventually corrected, and drive problems.
Cleaning relays and replacing circuitry corrected many of the drive problems so that defueling proceeded with a minimum of delay.
The inspector also noted that during the initial lift of the reactor head from the vessel, water from within the vessel flowed over the vessel flange into the refueling bellows.
guick action on the part of mainte-nance personnel caused the head to be lowered, stopping the flow of water.
The potential existed for maintenance personnel to be unnecessarily contaminated by reactor water and for reactor water to flow through three open hatches in the refueling bulkhead down into the drywell.
The in-spector discussed the incident with the licensee and determined the cause to be a plugged instrument line causing level indication to be inaccurate on the flange level indicator.
The licensee has committed to change the refueling procedure to include a step which requires maintenance personnel to visually check water level immediately before lifting the vessel head.
This will be done by using a flashlight to look down into the vessel through one of the open nozzles in the vessel head.
This will allow assurance that water level is below the level of the flange before the vessel head is lifted.
No violations were observed.
12.
Alle ation Followu On March 3, 1986, NRC Region I received an allegation (no. RI-86-A-0024)
from a reporter in which the alleger stated that in April or May of 1984 a
fire brigade member had been caught sleeping in the cable spreading room and four other fire brigade members had been found asleep elsewhere on
J I
site.
Technical Specifications require posting of a continuous fire watch with additional fire-fighting equipment when the installed fire suppression equipment is inoperable.
Technical Specifications also require a minimum of five fire brigade personnel on site.
The inspectors discussed the incident with the licensee and learned that" on May 3, 1984, four fire brigade members had been discovered asleep by a licensee supervisor in a trailer on site and one fire brigade member had been found asleep in the fire extinguisher repair room.
None of the five people found sleeping had been involved in a continuous fire watch.
In addition to the fire brigade members found sleeping, six other regular fire brigade personnel and five operations personnel temporarily assigned to the fire brigade'ere on shift.
The licensee indicated that all five people found sleeping were suspended for a week without pay.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's documentation of the incident to verify the presence of the additional fire brigade personnel.
Based on licensee statements and review of documentation, the inspectors concluded there were no violations or reportable events.
13.
Exit Interview At periodic intervals throughout the reporting period, the inspector met with senior station management to discuss the inspection scope and findings.
Based on the NRC Region I review of this report, it was determined that this report does not contain information subject to
CFR 2.790 restric-tion ~
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