GO2-82-989, Final Deficiency Repts 210 & 218 Re Deficient Emergency Diesel Generators DG-1 & 2 Airstart Circuits & MSIV Leak Control Sys,Respectively.Initially Reported 820830 & 1111. Silver Plated Contacts to Be Replaced in Airstart Circuits

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Final Deficiency Repts 210 & 218 Re Deficient Emergency Diesel Generators DG-1 & 2 Airstart Circuits & MSIV Leak Control Sys,Respectively.Initially Reported 820830 & 1111. Silver Plated Contacts to Be Replaced in Airstart Circuits
ML20064C130
Person / Time
Site: Columbia Energy Northwest icon.png
Issue date: 12/17/1982
From: Matlock R
WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
To: Engelken R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
References
10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, 210, 218, G2-82-989, GO2-82-989, NUDOCS 8301040331
Download: ML20064C130 (3)


Text

Docket No. 50-397

, "' e 50.55(e) Report 40 Washington Public Power Supply System /fg, P.O. Box 968 3000GeorgeWashingtonWay Richland, Washington 99352 (509)k Docket No. 50-397 //fj h

December 17, 1982 ligg #8//p.

G02-82-989 6 Mr. R. H. Engelken Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region V 1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210 Walnut Creek, California 94596

Subject:

NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2 10CFRE0.55(e) REPORTABLE CONDITIONS #210, EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS DG-1 AND DG-2 AIRSTART CIRCUITS; AND

  1. 218, MSIV-LCS

References:

1. Telecon L.C. Floyd to J. Elin, dated August 30, 1982
2. Interim Report G02-82-819, R.G. Matlock to R.H.

Engelken, dated September 30, 1982

3. Telecon, M.E. Rodin to R. Dodds, dated November 18, 1982 In accordance with the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e), your office was

! informed of the above subject conditions on August 30, 1982 and November 11, 1982. Attachments A and B provide the Project's final reports on Conditions 210 and 218.

If there are any questions concerning this matter, please contact Roger Johnson, (509) 377-2501, extension 2712.

r . $ oc Program Director, WNP-2 LCF/kd Attachments: A. Final Report - 10CFR50.55(e) Condition #210 B. Final Report - 10CFR50.55(e) Condition #218 cc: W.S. Chin, BPA - Site A. Forrest, Burns and Roe - HAP 0 N.D. Lewis, NRC J. Plunkett, NUS Corp.

R.E. Snaith, Burns and Roe - NY A. Toth, WNP-2 Resident Inspector (917Q)

Document Control Desk, NRC WNP-2 Files (917B) ese10.es21 e2121, PDR ADOCK 05000397 PDR

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., ,2 ATTACHMENT A WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2 DOCKET NO. 50-397 LICENSE NO. CPPR-93 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS DG-1 AND DG-2 AIRSTART CIRCUITS 10CFR50.55(e) CONDITION #210 FINAL REPORT DESCRIPTION OF DEFECT OR NONCOMPLIANCE E1ch diesel generator has two air receiver tanks which provide the air to start the diesels. The airstart circuit (K-17) selects between these two tanks when a diesel airstart is required. The K-17 circuit could fail in its function and not give either tank the signal to discharge air to start the diesel due to low coil current causing the silver plated contacts to oxidize (contacts stick).

SAFETY IMPLICATION The inability to start tre diesel generators during a loss of off-site power or during a postulated accident could adversly affect the safe shutdown of the plant.

APPROACH TO RESOLUTION Discussions with the manufacturer (Potter Brumfield) on their MD-5089 relay, indi-cate that they have had this type of problem on other relays. They recommend replacing the silver plated contacts with gold plated contacts.

CURRENT STATUS The Supply System Equipment Qualification Group has evaluated the manufacturers recommended corrective action and has determined that both the seismic and environ-I mental status of the relays will be unaffected by the use of gold plated contacts, l

and the use of gold plated contacts will ameliorate the present oxidation of the

contacts. A Project Engineering Directive has been issued to replace the K-17 relay with the same type relay using gold contacts.

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ATTACHMENT B WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2 DOCKET NO. 50-397 LICENSE NO. CPPR-93 MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE LEAK CONTROL SYSTEM 10CFR50.55(e) CONDITION #218 FINAL REPORT DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY WNP-2 design incorporates a leakage control system past the MSIV's in order to minimize the release of fission products if the MSIV's were to seat poorly. Suc-tion would normally be taken off the piping downstream of the outboard MSIV, and discharged into the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS). It has been discovered that a valve, MS-V-146, on one of the branch pipes is not powered from a critical bus. Post-LOCA, one could not assume it would close, nor could one assume the piping past the valve, ANSI B.31.1, would remain intact.

The fans associated with each MSLC system are designed for 50 cfm flow at 20" of water. Of this flowrate, about 10% is leakage from the main steam lines, the balance is diluent air. This amount of steam does not affect the Standby Gas Treatment System Operation. However, this flowrate is too small to create a face velocity of sufficient magnitude to assure in-leakage of Turbine Building atmos-phere into a 24" pipe. Thus, the fan of the outboard MSLC will not create suffi-cient suction pressure and line velocities to assure that backflow of fission products past this open valve to the atmosphere and hence to the site boundary does not occur.

ANALYSIS OF SAFETY IMPLICATION As stated above, the function of the MSLC system is to prevent potential leakage of containment atmosphere through closed main steam isolation valves from reaching the site boundary without filtration after a LOCA. It is postulated that after a DBE, the non-seismic Class I steam piping will no longer be intact. An open path to the Turbine Building atmosphere will be created.

This leakage is postulated to occur at a rate of 11.5 ft /hr per steam line due to poor seating of the MSIV's. The fission products in this leakaae stream, were they to reach the site boundary without filtration, could result in off-site doses which are a substantial fraction of 10CFR100 valves.

CORRECTIVE ACTION l

A Project Engineering Directive (PED) will be issued to power valve MS-V-146 from a critical bus to assure that MSIV-LCS can perform its intended function when required.

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