ML17284A696

LER 98-010-00:on 980615,TS Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of TIP Sys Isolation Valve Was Noted.Caused by Improper Installation of TIP Tubing.Reattached Affected Tubing & Inspected Other TIP tubing.W/980715 Ltr

ML17284A696
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	07/15/1998
From:	Arbuckle J, Bemis P WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
GO2-98-123, LER-98-010, LER-98-10, NUDOCS 9807220142
Download: ML17284A696 (8)

Text

CATEGORY REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:9807220142 DOC.DATE: 98/07/15 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-397 WPPSS Nuclear Project, Unit 2, Washington Public Powe 05000397 AUTH.NAME . AUTHOR AFFILIATION ARBUCKLE,J.D. Washington Public Power Supply System BEMIS,P.R. Washington Public Po~er Supply System RECIP . NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 98-010-00:on 980615,TS required shutdown due to inoperability of TIP sys isolation valve was noted. Caused by improper installation of TIP tubing.Reattached affected tubing &. inspected other TIP tubing.W/980715 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:

TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES:

RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL 0

PD4-2 PD 1 1 POSLUSNY,C 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS 1 2 2 AEOD/SPD/RRAB 1 1 . 1 NRR/DE/ECGB 1 1 1

'NRR/DE/EMEB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HICB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HOHB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HQMB 1 1 NRR/DRPM/PECB 1 NRR/DSSA/SPLB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SRXB 1 1 RES/DET/EIB 1 1 RGN4 FILE 01 1 1 D

EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LITCO BRYCE,J H 1 1 NOAC POORE,W. 1 1 NOAC QUEENER,DS 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 N

NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE. TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION REMOVED FROM DISTRIBUTION OR REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED BY YOU OR YOUR ORGANIZATION, LISTS CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK (DCD) ON EXTENSION 415-2083 FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 24 ENCL 24

0 h

WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM f PO. i)ox 968 ~ Richlaiul, Washington 99352-0968 July 15, 1998 G02-98-123 Docket No. 50-397 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk DC 20555 'ashington,

~

Gentlemen:

Subject:

WNP-2, OPERATING LICENSE NPF-21 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 98-010-00 Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No. 98-010-00 for WNP-2. This report is submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 and discusses the items of reportability, corrective action taken, and action to preclude recurrence.

Should you have any questions or desire additional information pertaining to this report, please call me or P.J. Inserra at (509) 377-4147.

Ily,/

Vice President, Nuclear Operations Mail Drop PE23 Attachment cc: EW Merschoff - NRC RIV NRC Senior Resident Inspector - 927N (2)

KE Perkins, Jr. - NRC RIV, WCFO DL Williams - BPA/399 C Poslusny, Jr - NRC NRR INPO Records Center PD Robinson - Winston & Strawn 9807220i42 980715 PDR ADOCK 05000397 8 PDR

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT fACILITY NAME (1] DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE (3)

Washin ton Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 50-397 1OF3 TITLE (4)

Technical Specification Required Shutdown due to Inoperability of a Traversing Incore Probe System Isolation Valve EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMB R (6) REPORT DAcE (7) OTHER FACILIT ES INVOLVED le)

MONTH DAY SEOUENTIAL REV. DAY YEAR FACIUTYNAME DOCKETNUMBER NUMBER NUMBER 15 98 98 010 00 07 15 98 FACILAYNAME DOCKET NUMBER OPERATING MODE THiS REPORT:S SVBHITTED PVRSVAh-. TO THE REQVIRY".ENTS OF IO CFR 5:;Check one oc .".ocel ii))

20.402(b) 20.405(c) 50.73(a) (2)(iv) 73.71(b)

POWER LEVEL 20.405 a 1 50.36c 50.73 a 2 v 1 73.71 c 37 20.405(a)(1) (ti) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) OTHER 20.405 a 1 tit X 50.73 a 5073 a 2 vite A 20.405 a 1 w 50.73 a n 50.73 a 2 vti> B 20.405 a 1 v 50.73 a 2 iii 50.73(a x LICENSEE CONTACc .=OR THIS -c.R ( 2)

NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Inciude Area Code)

J.D. Arbuckle, Licensing Technical Specialist (509) 377M01 COMPLETE ONE LINE cOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE COMPONENT REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TQ EPIX TO EPIX SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) EXPECTED MONTH DAY YES NO (tf yes, completed EXPECTED SUBM)SS)QN DATE).

ABSTRACT:

On June 15, 1998 at 0222 hours0.00257 days <br />0.0617 hours <br />3.670635e-4 weeks <br />8.4471e-5 months <br />, with the plant in Mode 1 at 37 percent power, plant operators commenced a controlled reactor shutdown as required by the Technical Specifications due to a Traversing Incore Probe PIP) system malfunction. The TIP "B" drive machine cabling would not retract and plant personnel were unable to close the associated penetration isolation ball valve due to the inability to withdraw the detector cabling. At the time of the event, the plant was in power ascension following the annual maintenance and refueling outage. On June 15, 1998 at 1947 hours0.0225 days <br />0.541 hours <br />0.00322 weeks <br />7.408335e-4 months <br />, the plant entered cold shutdown, well within the time frame required by the Technical Specifications.

The cause of this event was improper installation of the TIP tubing due to inadequate selfwhecking. It was determined that the tubing had been installed in the reverse direction and not adequately tightened during TIP tube removal and replacement efforts in the recently-completed maintenance and refueling outage. This resulted in the tube fittings becoming loose.

There was no additional immediate corrective action other than control room operators taking appropriate and timely action to maneuver the plant to a shutdown condition as required by the Technical Specifications. Further corrective actions consisted of re-attaching the affected tubing, inspecting other TIP tubing and discussing this event and the importance of self-checking with the individuals involved and the maintenance organization in general.

The safety consequences associated with this event were low. The associated penetration isolation shear valve was operable to maintain a containment isolation function and the plant was shutdown well within the time-frame allowed by the Technical Specifications.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

Technical S ecification Re uired Shutdown due to Ino erabili of a Traversin Incore Probe S stem Isolation Valve E'ACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER I2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

SEQUENTlAL REVISS NUMBER hUMBE$,

Washington Nuclear Plant Unit 2 50-397 98 010 00 2 oF 3 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17) vent Descri tion On June 15, 1998 at 0222 hours0.00257 days <br />0.0617 hours <br />3.670635e-4 weeks <br />8.4471e-5 months <br />, with the plant in Mode 1 at 37 percent power, plant operators commenced a controlled reactor shutdown as required by the Technical Specifications due to a Traversing Incore Probe (TIP) tlG]

system malfunction. The TIP "B" drive machine cabling would not retract in channel 09 past position 0598.

On June 14, 1998 at 2007 hours0.0232 days <br />0.558 hours <br />0.00332 weeks <br />7.636635e-4 months <br />, the'plant had been in a power ascension following the annual maintenance and refueling outage when there was a concern that the TIP "B" detector cabling was mechanically bound and would not retract on an isolation signal. The TIP "B" drive isolation ball valve, TIP-V-2 PSV], was declared inoperable and the appropriate Primary Containment [NH] Technical Specification actions were entered. The ball valve isolates the TIP system from primary containment when the system is not in use. Following troubleshooting efforts on June 15, 1998 at 0007 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />, plant personnel were unable to isolate TIP-V-2 due to the inability to withdraw the detector cabling.

Accordingly, control room operators made preparations for the initiation of a plant shutdown in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

On June 15, 1998 at 1000 hours0.0116 days <br />0.278 hours <br />0.00165 weeks <br />3.805e-4 months <br />, control room 'operators manually scrammed the reactor'as part of the controlled shutdown process and entered Operational Mode 3 as required by the Technical Specifications. On June 15, 1998 at 1947 hours0.0225 days <br />0.541 hours <br />0.00322 weeks <br />7.408335e-4 months <br />, Operational Mode 4 was entered when reactor coolant temperature became less than 200 degrees Fahrenheit, well within the time frame required by the Technical Specifications.

The problem was traced to work that was performed during the recently-completed outage. During the outage, a work order had been initiated for Local Power Range Monitor (LPRM) PG] replacements. As part of the work order, one of the tasks included TIP tube removal and replacement. However, during removal and replacement efforts, the tube was inadvertently re-installed in the reverse direction and not adequately tightened.

This resulted in the fittings becoming loose and separating from the LPRM dry tube. When the TIP detector was inserted, the cabling spooled out onto the floor and then would not retract.

Immediate rrec ive Action There was no additional immediate corrective action other than control room operators taking appropriate and timely action to maneuver the plant to a shutdown condition as required by the Technical Specifications.

Further Evaluation This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) as the completion of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the Technical Specifications. Technical Specification 3.6.1.3, "Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIV)," requires each PCIV, except reactor building-to suppression chamber vacuum breakers, to be operable during Operational Modes 1, 2 and 3. In the event that a PCIV is inoperable and the associated conditions and actions cannot be met, Technical Specification 3.6.1.3 directs that the plant be in Operational Mode 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />'and Operational Mode 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

r I t

'ICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

Technical S ecification Re uired Shutdown due to Ino erabili of a Traversin Incore Probe S stem Isolation Valve fACZLITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

SEQUENTIAL ICVIS ION HVNBER IAMB E R Washington Nuclear Plant Unit 2 SO-397 98 Olo 00 3 oF 3 TEXT (If more space is required, use addNonal copies of NRC Form 366A) (1 7)

Root Cause The cause of this event was improper installation of the TIP tubing due to inadequate self-checking. Upon further investigation, it was determined that the tubing had been installed in the reverse direction and not adequately tightened during the recently~ompleted maintenance and refueling outage.

This resulted in the fittings in becoming loose and separating from the LPRM dry tube. The other end of the tubing at the under-vessel wall was found to be loosely connected. When the TIP detector was inserted, the cabling spooled out onto the floor and then would not retract.

Further Corrective Action

1. An inspection of the fittings was performed and no damage was observed. The associated tubing was then correctly re-attached.

2. The other TIP tubing was checked for proper installation with a second verifier and no additional discrepancies were identified. All connections were verified to be correctly installed.

3. This event and the importance of self-checking were discussed with the individuals involved and the maintenance organization in general.

A ses"ment of afe Con e uences The safety consequences associated with this event were low. Appropriate and timely action was taken to maneuver the plant to a shutdown condition well within the time-frame allowed by the Technical Specifications. Furthermore, associated TIP Isolation Shear Valve TIP-V-8 tlSV] was operable during the event period and maintained a containment isolation function. Therefore, this event had minimal impact on the health and safety of either the public or plant personnel.

Similar Events There have been no recent similar events.