ML17285A477

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Part 21 Rept Re Defects in Target Rock Actuator Kits (Part 300562-1).Initially Reported on 890516.Defects Noted in Cold Solder Condition,Insufficient Solder Joints & Failed Solder Joints.Defective Kits Returned to Mfg for Repair
ML17285A477
Person / Time
Site: Columbia Energy Northwest icon.png
Issue date: 05/19/1989
From: Bouchey G
WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
To: Murley T
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
REF-PT21-89-080-000 GO2-89-095, GO2-89-95, PT21-89-080-000, PT21-89-80, NUDOCS 8905260197
Download: ML17285A477 (4)


Text

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REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:8905260197 DOC.DATE: 89/05/19 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET g FACIL:50-397 WPPSS Nuclear Project, Unit 2, Washington Public Powe 05000397, AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION BOUCHEY,G.D. Washington Public Power Supply System RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION MURLEY,T.E. Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Director (Post 870411

SUBJECT:

Part 21 rept re defects in target'ock actuator kits.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE19D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR Q ENCL 0 SIZE:

TITLE: Part 21 Rept (50 DKT)

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WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM P.O. Box 968 ~ 3000 George Washington Way ~ Richland, Washington 99352 May 19, 1989 G02-89-095 Docket No. 50-397 Mr. T. E. Murley, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:

Subject:

NUCLEAR PLANT NO. 2 LICENSE NO. NPF-21 10CFR PART 21 REPORT This is a special report submitted in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR Part 21 by Mr. G. D. Bouchey, Director, Licensing and Assurance. The address of the Washington Public Power Supply System is as follows:

Washington Public Power Supply System PO Box 968 3000 George Washington Way Richland, Washington 99352

(}uestions concerning this report should be referred to Mr. J. D. Arbuckle, Compliance Engineer (509) 377-2115. The verbal notification of this 10CFR Part 21 condition was made on May 16, 1989 by Mr. C. M. Powers, WNP-2 Plant Manager to Mr. P. Johnson, Section Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3, NRC Region V.

The basic components which contained the defects are Target Rock Actuator kits (Part No. 300562-1). They were manufactured as equality Class I by Target Rock Company, East Farmingdale, New York. The defects noted are as follows:

o Cold solder condition o Insufficient solder joints o Failed solder joints 8905260i97 8905i9 ADOCK 05000397 'DR S PDC c+>~

Page Two

- 10CFR PART 21 REPORT The defects were discovered on Hay 9, 1989 by Plant Electrical Haintenance engineers when they were prepar ing the components for installation. It should be noted that tHe actuator kits, which were part of an equipment qualification upgrade, were never installed in the Plant. All defective kits (a total of 17) were returned to Target Rock on Hay 11, 1989 for repair.

The reasons the Supply System considers this to be a 10CFR Part 21 condition are

1) the actuator kits are basic components 2) the components (if installed) would have been used to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents (the kits would have been used in a containment isolation function) 3) the kits contained defects which were deviations in a delivered component and 4) evaluation showed that the defects could create a substantial safety hazard. The reason for the substantial safety hazard is that, had the components been installed, with a cold solder condition they could have successfully passed a preoperational test and then failed at a later time, rendering the containment isolation valves inoperable. Th'e failure mode would have been either loss of position indica-tion, or the valves failing in the closed position. The defective components were to be installed on four Containment Supply Purge (CSP) valves and 13 Process Instrumentation (PI) valves. All of these valves are one-inch, solenoid actuated valves.

As previously stated, all defective actuator kits were returned to the manufac-turer for repair. Further corrective actions include 1) evaluating the receiving inspection process at HNP-2, and 2) evaluating the necessity to increase vendor surveillance activities at Target Rock facilities. In addition, Target Rock will be formally notified of this 10CFR Part 21 determination.

Very truly yours, G. D. Bouchey, ctor Licensing and Assur ance JDA/bk cc: JB Hartin - NC RY NS Reynolds - BCP8R RB Samworth NRC DL Williams - BPA/399 NRC Site Inspector - 901A Document Control Desk - NRC

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