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FACILITY NAME I I )
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER TEXT CONTINUATION DOCKET NUHBER I2)
YEAR LER NUMBER I6)
SEQUENT1AL NUMBER AEVlSIOr NUMBER PAGE I3)
Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 50-397 98 00 3
OF 5
TEXT(Ifmore space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
At approximately 40 minutes into the event, the initial.SCRAM was reset to minimize temperature stratification in the lower RPV head area.
Approximately 10 minutes later, during manual operation of MSRVs for RPV pressure control and manual operation of RCIC for level control, a second reactor SCRAM occurred due to RPV low level at +13 inches.
This second SCRAM is the subject of LER 98-003.
The second SCRAM was subsequently reset, emergency operating procedures were exited when entry parameters were restored to normal and conditions were stable, and the RPV was depressurized per normal plant operating procedures using main condenser turbine by-pass valves.
During.the activity of re-opening MSIVs to allow depressurization to the main condenser it was recognized by the operations crew that MS-V-22D would not re-open.
10CFR50.72 reports were made addressing the initial SCRAM and MSIVisolation, the Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuations that occurred due to low RPV level, the ESF actuations that occurred due to high drywell pressure, and the second RPV low level SCRAM.
mmedi e
rr tiv Ac ion A Problem Evaluation Request (PER) was written for the failure of MS-V-22D.
Plant Management initiated an investigation to determine the exact details of the event.
Additional PERs were initiated for the problems found.
Further Evaluation Although the cause of the SCRAM was not initiallyknown, investigation revealed the cause to be inadvertent closure of MS-V-22D due to a failed Containment Instrument Air(CIA)tLD] tube supplying actuating nitrogen to the valve actuator.
The ESF actuations that occurred due to low RPV level and high drywell
- pressure, which are also reportable per 10CFR50.73, were a direct and expected result of the initial SCRAM.
A detailed review of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and related documentation was performed to verify the observed. plant power level response, RPV pressure and level response, and containment pressure response were as predicted by analysis.
Given the differences in plant operations and the analysis assumptions, the plant response to the event was consistent with the analyses.
A scenario very similar to the actual event was run on the WNP-2 simulator.
With fullMSIVclosure, the RPV level decreased to approximately -27 inches during the simulation, versus approximately -50 inches experienced during the event.
Changes in simulator modeling of pressure-induced RPV level effects are planned and are further detailed in LER 98-003.
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| | | Reporting criterion |
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| 05000397/LER-1998-001, :on 980203,automatic Start of HPCS EDG Was Noted.Caused by Operator Error.Operations Crew Stabilized Plant at Approximately 75% Reactor Power & Investigation of Event Was Initiated |
- on 980203,automatic Start of HPCS EDG Was Noted.Caused by Operator Error.Operations Crew Stabilized Plant at Approximately 75% Reactor Power & Investigation of Event Was Initiated
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000397/LER-1998-002, :on 980311,reactor Scram & Plant Transient Occurred,Due to Failed Closed Main Steam Isolation Valve. Caused by Loss of Pneumatic Actuating Supply Pressure. Problem Evaluation Request Written for Failure of MS-V-22D |
- on 980311,reactor Scram & Plant Transient Occurred,Due to Failed Closed Main Steam Isolation Valve. Caused by Loss of Pneumatic Actuating Supply Pressure. Problem Evaluation Request Written for Failure of MS-V-22D
| | | 05000397/LER-1998-003, :on 980311,WNP-2 Experienced Scram Signal as Result of Low Rpv.Caused by Less than post-SCRAM Operational Strategy for Resetting Scram Signal in Conditions.Changes in post-SCRAM Operational Strategy Implemented |
- on 980311,WNP-2 Experienced Scram Signal as Result of Low Rpv.Caused by Less than post-SCRAM Operational Strategy for Resetting Scram Signal in Conditions.Changes in post-SCRAM Operational Strategy Implemented
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000397/LER-1998-004, :on 980502,determined That Primary Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Does Not Meet Reg Guide 1.63 Requirements.Caused by Inadequate Design Changes. Installed Addl Fuse in RHR-MO-9 Circuit |
- on 980502,determined That Primary Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Does Not Meet Reg Guide 1.63 Requirements.Caused by Inadequate Design Changes. Installed Addl Fuse in RHR-MO-9 Circuit
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000397/LER-1998-005, :on 980506,potential for Failure of RHR Sys Valve to Close on Isolation Signal Was Noted.Caused by Design Deficiency.Caution Tag Was Placed on RHR-V-40 Control Switch to Inform Plant Operators of Limitation |
- on 980506,potential for Failure of RHR Sys Valve to Close on Isolation Signal Was Noted.Caused by Design Deficiency.Caution Tag Was Placed on RHR-V-40 Control Switch to Inform Plant Operators of Limitation
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000397/LER-1998-006, :on 980520,discovered Discrepancies in Low Voltage Bus Calculations During Review of 10CFR50,App R Calculations for High Impedance Faults.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Implemented Procedural Changes |
- on 980520,discovered Discrepancies in Low Voltage Bus Calculations During Review of 10CFR50,App R Calculations for High Impedance Faults.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Implemented Procedural Changes
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2)(vii) 10 CFR 50.73(s)(2)(ii) 10 CFR 50.73(s)(2)(x) | | 05000397/LER-1998-006-01, Forwards LER 98-006-01,discussing Results of Root Cause Analysis & Addl Corrective Actions Taken to Rectify Deficiencies in Wnp,Unit 2,10CFR50,App R High Impedance Fault Calculations | Forwards LER 98-006-01,discussing Results of Root Cause Analysis & Addl Corrective Actions Taken to Rectify Deficiencies in Wnp,Unit 2,10CFR50,App R High Impedance Fault Calculations | | | 05000397/LER-1998-007, :on 980530,inadvertent Full Scram & Division 1 ECCS Injection Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Meet Mgt Work Practice Expectation When Encountering Deficient Procedure. Incident Review Board Convened to Review Event |
- on 980530,inadvertent Full Scram & Division 1 ECCS Injection Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Meet Mgt Work Practice Expectation When Encountering Deficient Procedure. Incident Review Board Convened to Review Event
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000397/LER-1998-008, :on 980531,inadvertent Full Scram During RPV Leak Testing in Mode 4 Was Noted.Caused by Change in Mgt Techniques.Revised Procedures to Take Into Account Addl Water Head in Pressure Sensing Lines |
- on 980531,inadvertent Full Scram During RPV Leak Testing in Mode 4 Was Noted.Caused by Change in Mgt Techniques.Revised Procedures to Take Into Account Addl Water Head in Pressure Sensing Lines
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(s)(2)(vii) 10 CFR 50.73(s)(2)(iv) 10 CFR 50.73(s)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(s)(2)(iii) | | 05000397/LER-1998-009, :on 980606,nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff Sys Group 3 & 4 Isolations During Testing Was Noted.Caused by Procedural Deficiency.Counseled Individuals Involved in Preparation |
- on 980606,nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff Sys Group 3 & 4 Isolations During Testing Was Noted.Caused by Procedural Deficiency.Counseled Individuals Involved in Preparation
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000397/LER-1998-010, :on 980615,TS Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of TIP Sys Isolation Valve Was Noted.Caused by Improper Installation of TIP Tubing.Reattached Affected Tubing & Inspected Other TIP Tubing |
- on 980615,TS Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of TIP Sys Isolation Valve Was Noted.Caused by Improper Installation of TIP Tubing.Reattached Affected Tubing & Inspected Other TIP Tubing
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown | | 05000397/LER-1998-011, :on 980617,ECCS Pump Room Flooding Was Noted Due to FP Sys Pipe Break.Caused by Inadequate Design of FP Sys.Detailed Review of FP Sys Design Was Conducted |
- on 980617,ECCS Pump Room Flooding Was Noted Due to FP Sys Pipe Break.Caused by Inadequate Design of FP Sys.Detailed Review of FP Sys Design Was Conducted
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000397/LER-1998-012, :on 980715,failure to Comply with Requirements of TS SR 3.8.4.7 Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Training Session Was Held with Personnel.With |
- on 980715,failure to Comply with Requirements of TS SR 3.8.4.7 Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Training Session Was Held with Personnel.With
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(s)(2)(vii) 10 CFR 50.73(s)(2)(viii)(A) | | 05000397/LER-1998-013, :on 980805,ESF Actuations Were Noted Due to Deenergization of Vital Electrical Bus SM-8.Caused by Inadequate Direction in Troubleshooting Plan.Will Conduct Training for Engineering Personnel.With |
- on 980805,ESF Actuations Were Noted Due to Deenergization of Vital Electrical Bus SM-8.Caused by Inadequate Direction in Troubleshooting Plan.Will Conduct Training for Engineering Personnel.With
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000397/LER-1998-014, :on 980807,completion of TS 3.8.1.F Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of EDG-2 Was Noted.Caused by Degraded Voltage Regulator for DG-2.Replaced Voltage Regulator & Associated Scrs.With |
- on 980807,completion of TS 3.8.1.F Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of EDG-2 Was Noted.Caused by Degraded Voltage Regulator for DG-2.Replaced Voltage Regulator & Associated Scrs.With
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000397/LER-1998-015, :on 980808,discovered Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leak During Shutdown Conditions.Caused by Leakage from Socket Weld (Fwb 63) on Elbow Connection.Failed Piping Connection Was Replaced.With |
- on 980808,discovered Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leak During Shutdown Conditions.Caused by Leakage from Socket Weld (Fwb 63) on Elbow Connection.Failed Piping Connection Was Replaced.With
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) |
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