Text

Application to Revise Technical Specifications Regarding Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation in Accordance with TSTF-306, Revision 2
	ML093080132
Person / Time
Site:	Brunswick
Issue date:	10/27/2009
From:	Waldrep B; Progress Energy Carolinas
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	BSEP 09-0019, TSC-2009-05, TSTF-306, Rev 2
	Download: ML093080132 (39)
	v • d • e

~ Progress Energy p Benjamin C.Waidrep Vicek PNuresident Brunswick Nuclear Plant Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc.

October 27, 2009 SERIAL: BSEP 09-0019 10 CFR 50.90 TSC-2009-05 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject:

Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-325 and 50-324/License Nos. DPR-71 and DPR-62 Application to Revise Technical Specifications Regarding Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation in Accordance with TSTF-306, Revision 2 Ladies and Gentlemen:

In accordance with the provisions of the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 50.90, Carolina Power & Light Company (CP&L), now doing business as Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc., is submitting a request for an amendment to the Technical Specifications (TS) for the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant (BSEP), Unit Nos. 1 and 2.

The proposed amendments would modify TS requirements related to primary containment isolation instrumentation. The changes are in accordance with Nuclear Regulatory Commission approved Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF), Improved Standard Technical Specifications change TSTF-306, Revision 2. CP&L has evaluated the proposed change in accordance with 10 CFR 50.91(a)(1), using the criteria in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and determined that this change involves no significant hazards considerations.

CP&L requests approval of the proposed License Amendment by October 31, 2010. Once approved, the amendment shall be implemented within 60 days.

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91(b), CP&L is providing a copy of this application, with attachments, to the designated representative of the State of North Carolina.

Enclosure 1 provides a description of the proposed changes. Enclosure 2 provides the existing Unit 1 TS pages marked-up to show the proposed changes. Since TS Section 3.3.6.1 is identical for Unit 1 and Unit 2, only the mark-up for Unit 1 is provided.

Enclosures 3 and 4 provide typed versions of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 revised TS pages, respectively. These typed TS pages are to be used for issuance of the proposed amendments. Enclosure 5 provides existing Unit 1 TS Bases pages marked-up to show the P.O.Box 10429 Southport, NC 28461 A T> 910.457.3698

Document Control Desk BSEP 09-0019 / Page 2 proposed changes. These pages are being submitted for information only and do not require issuance by the NRC.

No regulatory commitments are contained in this submittal. Please refer any questions regarding this submittal to Ms. Annette Pope, Supervisor - Licensing/Regulatory Programs, at (910) 457-2184.

I declare, under penalty of perjury, that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on October 27, 2009.

Sincerely, Benjamin C. drep LJG/ljg

Enclosures:

1. Evaluation of Proposed License Amendment Request

2. Marked-up Technical Specification Pages - Unit 1

3. Typed Technical Specification Pages - Unit 1

4. Typed Technical Specification Pages - Unit 2

5. Marked-up Technical Specification Bases Pages - Unit 1 (For Information Only)

Document Control Desk BSEP 09-0019 / Page 3 cc (with enclosures):

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II ATTN: Mr. Luis A. Reyes, Regional Administrator Sam Nunn Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth Street, SW, Suite 23T85 Atlanta, GA 30303-8931 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Mr. Philip B. O'Bryan, NRC Senior Resident Inspector 8470 River Road Southport, NC 28461-8869 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Electronic Copy Only)

ATTN: Mrs. Farideh E. Saba (Mail Stop OWFN 8G9A) 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 Chair - North Carolina Utilities Commission P.O. Box 29510 Raleigh, NC 27626-05 10 Ms. Beverly 0. Hall, Section Chief Radiation Protection Section, Division of Environmental Health North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources 3825 Barrett Drive Raleigh, NC 27609-7221

BSEP 09-0019 Enclosure 1 Page 1 of 5 Evaluation of Proposed License Amendment Request

Subject:

Application to Revise Technical Specifications Regarding Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation in Accordance with TSTF-306, Revision 2 1.0 Description This letter is a request by Carolina Power & Light Company (CP&L), now doing business as Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc., to amend the Technical Specifications (TS) for the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant (BSEP), Unit Nos. 1 and 2. The proposed license amendment revises TS requirements in TS 3.3.6.1, "Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation," by adding an ACTIONS note allowing intermittent opening, under administrative control, of penetration flow paths that are isolated. Additionally, the Traversing In-core Probe (TIP) system isolation will be added as a separate isolation Function with an associated Required Action to isolate the penetration within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months rather than immediately initiating a unit shutdown.

The changes are consistent with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approved Industry/Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Improved Standard Technical Specifications change TSTF-306, Revision 2.

2.0 Proposed Change The proposed change will add a NOTE to TS 3.3.6.1 ACTIONS, in which penetration flow paths may be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls. In addition, a new Condition G will be added for the Traversing In-core Probe (TIP) system with an associated Required Action to isolate the penetration within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months rather than immediately initiating a unit shutdown.

Existing Conditions Q H, and I, and the corresponding Required Actions, will be re-lettered to Conditions H, I, and J, respectively. The TIP system isolation will be added as a separate isolation Function in Table 3.3.6.1-1, as Function 7.a. (i.e., Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 1), and 7.b. (i.e., Drywell Pressure - High). Table 3.3.6.1-1 existing Conditions G, H, and I referenced from Required Action C. 1 will be re-lettered to H, I, and J, respectively.

For convenience, Enclosure 2 contains a marked-up version of the Unit 1 TSs showing the proposed changes. Since the changes for Unit 1 and Unit 2 are identical, only the mark-up for Unit 1 is provided. Enclosures 3 and 4 provide typed versions of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 TSs, respectively. These typed TS pages are to be used for issuance of the proposed amendment.

CP&L will make supporting changes to the TS Bases in accordance with TS 5.5.10, "Technical Specifications (TS) Bases Control Program." Enclosure 5 provides marked-up TS Bases pages for Unit 1. These pages are being submitted for information only and do not require issuance by the NRC.

BSEP 09-0019 Enclosure 1 Page 2 of 5 3.0 Background On July 13, 2000, the NRC approved TSTF-306, Revision 2. This traveler revised TS 3.3.6.1, "Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation," by changing the requirements for the two TIP containment isolation instrumentation functions. Previously, these functions had been included under Primary Containment Isolation Functions 2.a, "Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Level 1," and 2.b, "Drywell Pressure - High," respectively. The traveler also revised the Actions of TS 3.3.6.1 by listing the new function numbers in the two Completion Times for Required Action A. 1. To be consistent with a similar note in TS 3.6.1.3, "Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVS)," the traveler also added a note to TS 3.3.6.1 Actions Table that states: "Penetration flow paths may be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls."

The current BSEP TSs require a unit shutdown in the event of an inoperability of the TIP instrumentation. The proposed change would allow 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months to isolate the affected TIP penetration flow paths.

4.0 Technical Analysis The addition of the note that the penetration flow path may be unisolated under administrative control is appropriate since the instrumentation is a support system for Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs) that already contain this allowance in TS 3.6.1.3 (i.e., PCIVs). The addition of the note to TS 3.3.6.1 provides a consistency with TS 3.6.1.3. The administrative controls will ensure timely closure of the penetration if an event occurs that requires isolating primary containment. This addition is viewed as a correction of an inconsistency within TSs.

Additionally, the Actions for inoperable primary containment isolation instrumentation that require a unit shutdown is overly restrictive in the event the inoperability would only affect the TIP system isolation instrumentation. Creating a separate isolation instrumentation Function is appropriate for this isolation. The Action selected for inoperability of this Function is the same as for inoperable manual isolation Functions for the Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) discussed in NUREG-1433, "Standard Technical Specifications General Electric Plants, BWR/4," (i.e., isolate the penetration in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months ). The TIP system penetration is small bore piping and is isolated using isolation ball valves. The redundant TIP system isolation valves are manually initiated shear valves (i.e., squib detonation valves). The ability to manually isolate the TIP system by either the normal isolation ball valves or the shear valves would be unaffected by the inoperable instrumentation. Therefore, the same action as for manual isolation Functions for the PCIS found in NUREG-1433 provides an appropriate level of safety.

There are no significant deviations in BSEPs proposed TSs from the NRC approved TSTF. A new Condition G will be added to TS 3.3.6.1 Actions for the TIP system with an associated Required Action to isolate the penetration within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . Existing Conditions Q, H, and I, and the corresponding Required Actions, will be re-lettered to Conditions H, I, and J, respectively.

These changes are administrative in nature and have no effect on the technical adequacy.

BSEP 09-0019 Enclosure 1 Page 3 of 5 5.0 Regulatory Safety Analysis 5.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration CP&L has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards consideration is involved with the proposed amendments by focusing on the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, "Issuance of Amendment," as discussed below:

1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accidentpreviously evaluated?

Response: No The addition of the note that the penetration flow path may.be unisolated under administrative control simply provides consistency with what is already allowed elsewhere in TSs. The isolation function of the TIP valves is mitigative, and does not create any increased possibility of an accident. Also, the operation of the manual shear valves is unaffected by this activity. The ability to manually isolate the TIP system by either the normal isolation ball valves or the shear valves would be unaffected by the inoperable instrumentation. The Required Actions and their associated Completion Times are not initiating conditions for any accident previously evaluated. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accidentfrom any accidentpreviously evaluated?

Response: No No new accident scenarios, failure mechanisms, or limiting single failures are introduced as result of the proposed changes. All systems, structures, and components previously required for the mitigation of a transient remain capable of fulfilling their intendeddesign functions. The proposed changes have no adverse effects on any safety-related system or component and do not challenge the performance or integrity of any safety-related system.

As a result no new failure modes are being introduced. Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No The proposed change will not affect the operation of plant equipment or the function of any equipment assumed in the accident analysis. The allowance to unisolate a penetration flow path will not have a significant effect on the margin of safety because the penetration

BSEP 09-0019 Enclosure 1 Page 4 of 5 flow path can be isolated manually, if needed. This change simply provides consistency with what is already allowed elsewhere in TSs. The option to isolate a TIP penetration will ensure the penetration will perform as designed in the accident analysis. The ability to manually isolate the TIP system is unaffected by the inoperable instrumentation. The proposed change does not impact any safety analysis assumptions or results. Therefore, the proposed change does not result in a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

Based on the above, CP&L concludes that the proposed amendments present no significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and, accordingly, a finding of "no significant hazards consideration" is justified.

5.2 Applicable Regulatory Requirements/Criteria The proposed changes have been evaluated to determine whether applicable regulations and requirements continue to be met. As stated in the NRC's "Safety Evaluation of the Brunswick Steam Electric Station Units 1 and 2," dated November 1973 (i.e., Reference 1), BSEP meets the intent of the General Design Criteria (GDC), published in the Federal Register on May 21, 1971, as Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50. The proposed changes do not affect compliance with the GDCs.

CP&L has determined that the proposed changes do not require any exemptions or relief from regulatory requirements, other than the TSs. The proposed changes associated with the adoption of TSTF-306 are consistent with NUREG-1433, which provides guidance on TS Actions and Completion Times when a Limiting Conditions of Operation (LCO) is not met.

Based on these considerations, there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or the health and safety of the public.

6.0 Environmental Considerations The requested changes have no impact on the environment. The proposed amendment does not involve (i) a significant hazards consideration, (ii) a significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluent that may be released offsite, or (iii) a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Accordingly, the proposed amendment meets the eligibility criterion for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).

Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the proposed amendment.

BSEP 09-0019 Enclosure 1 Page 5 of 5 7.0 References

1. NRC "Safety Evaluation of the Brunswick Steam Electric Station Units 1 and 2," dated November 1973.

Precedents Adoption of TSTF-306, Revision 2, has been approved by the NRC at other nuclear facilities.

These amendments are considered suitable precedents as the implementation of TSTF-306 at those plants is consistent with that proposed at BSEP. Approved license amendments are referenced below.

2. Letter from Richard V. Guzman, Project Manager, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, to Mr. Christopher M. Crane, President and Chief Nuclear Officer, Exelon Nuclear, "Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3 - Issuance of Amendments Re:

Incorporation of Previously NRC-Approved Generic Technical Specification Changes,"

dated May 10, 2006, ADAMS Accession Number ML061070292.

3. Letter from Bhalchandra Vaidya, Project Manager, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, to Mr. George A. Williams, Site Vice President, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, "Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1 - Issuance of Amendment Re: Changes to Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation Requirements," dated January 8, 2004, ADAMS Accession Number ML040090316.

4. Letter from Richard V. Guzman, Project Manager, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, to Mr. Bryce L. Shriver, Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer, PPL Susquehanna, "Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2 - Issuance of Amendment Re: Intermittent Opening of Isolated Flow Paths and TIP Isolation," dated June 5, 2003, ADAMS Accession Number ML031560495.

BSEP 09-0019 Enclosure 2 Marked-up Technical Specification Pages - Unit 1 Strikeout/Shadowed Format Stikeo et Indicates Deleted Text Shadowed Tex Indicates Added Text

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.6.1 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation LCO 3.3.6.1 The primary containment isolation instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.6.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.6.1-1.

ACTIONS

NOTES- L 1 11.!Penetration flow paths may :be unisolated intermittently underadministrative controls.!

2Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel.

COMPLETION CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION TIME A. One or more required A.1 Place channel in trip. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for channels inoperable. Functions 2.a, 2.b, and 6.b7, 7ad AND 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months for Functions other than Functions 2.a, 2.b, afd 6.b7,a,

'and 7.'-'b B. One or more Functions with B.1 Restore isolation 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months isolation capability not capability.

maintained.

C. Required Action and C.1 Enter the Condition Immediately associated Completion Time referenced in of Condition A or B not met. Table 3.3.6.1-1 for the channel.

(continued)

Brunswick Unit 1 3.3-49 Amendment No. 203

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 ACTIONS (continued)

COMPLETION CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION TIME D. As required by Required D.1 Isolate associated main 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Action C.1 and referenced in steam line (MSL).

Table 3.3.6.1-1.

OR D.2.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months AND D.2.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months E. As required by Required E.1 Be in MODE 2. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months Action C.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.6.1-1.

F. As required by Required F.1 Isolate the affected 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Action C.1 and referenced in penetration flow path(s).

Table 3.3.6.1-1.

7G 'As irequired oby Required*

I Isolate the affected ihour*

(Action C.A1 and referencd in, fpenetration flow path_(s

[Table :3.3.6.1-i G H. Required Action and G H. 1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months associated Completion Time for Condition F 0 not met. AND OR G R.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months As required by Required Action C.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.6.1-1.

(continued)

Brunswick Unit 1 3.3-50 Amendment No. 243

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 ACTIONS (continued)

COMPLETION CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION TIME 1=1. As required by Required 14 ". 1 Declare associated 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Action C.1 and referenced in standby liquid control Table 3.3.6.1-1. subsystem (SLC) inoperable.

OR 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months 14.2 Isolate the Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System.

1 5. As required by Required 1 5.1 Initiate action to restore Immediately Action C.1 and referenced in channel to OPERABLE Table 3.3.6.1-1. status.

OR 15 .2 Initiate action to isolate the Immediately Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling (SDC) System.

Brunswick Unit 1 3.3-51 Amendment No. 203,

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 Table 3.3.6.1-1 (page 1 of 5)

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION C.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE 1 Main Steam Line Isolation

a. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low 1,2,3 D SR 3.3.6.1.1 >13 inches Level 3 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7 SR 3.3.6.1.8

b. Main Steam Line Pressure-Low SR 3.3.6.1.1 825 psig SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6. 1.7

c. Main Steam Line Flow-High 1,2,3 2 per SR 3.3.6.1.1

138% rated steam MSL SR 3.3.6.1.2 flow SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7 SR 3.3.6.1.8

d. Condenser Vacuum-Low 1, SR 3.3.6.1.1 2 7.5 inches 2('),3(') SR 3.3.6.1.2 Hg vacuum SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

e. Main Steam Isolation Valve Pit 1,2,3 2 D SR 3.3.6.1.2 ! 197°F Temperature-High SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

2. Primary Containment Isolation

a. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low 1,2,3 Gi SR 3.3.6.1.1 Ž 153 inches Level 1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

b. Drywell Pressure-High 1,2,3 GR SR 3.3.6.1.1

1.8 psig SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7 (continued)

(a) With any turbine stop valve not closed.

Brunswick Unit 1 3.3-54 Amendment No. 203

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 Table 3.3.6.1-1 (page 2 of 5)

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION C.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

2. Primary Containment Isolation (continued)

c. Main Stack Radiation-High 1,2,3 F SR 3.3.6.1.2 (b)

SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7 SR 3.3.6.1.8

d. Reactor Building Exhaust Radiation- 11,2,3 G -H SR 3.3.6.1.1 :16 mR/hr High SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

3. High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System Isolation

a. HPCI Steam Line Flow-High 1,2,3 FSR 3.3.6.1.1 !275% rated steam flow SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

b. HPCI Steam Line Flow-High Time Delay 1,2,3 F SR 3.3.6.1.6 4 seconds and Relay SR 3.3.6.1.7 12 seconds SR 3.3.6.1.9

c. HPCI Steam Supply Line Pressure-Low 1,2,3 2 F SR 3.3.6.1.2 104 psig SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.7

d. HPCI Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm 1,2,3 2 F SR 3.3.6.1.2

9 psig Pressure-High SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

e. Drywall Pressure-High 1,2,3 FSR 3.3.6.1.1 *1.8 psig SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

f. HPCI Steam Line Area Temperature- 1,2,3 SR 3.3.6.1.5

2001F High SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

g. HPCI Steam Line Tunnel Ambient 1,2,3 SR 3.3.6.1.5 200°F Temperature-High SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

h. HPCI Steam Line Tunnel Differential 1,2,3 SR 3.3.6.1.5 *501F Temperature-High SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7 (continued)

(b) Allowable Value established in accordance with the methodology in the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual.

Brunswick Unit 1 3.3-55 Amendment No. 203

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 Table 3.3.6.1-1 (page 4 of 5)

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION C.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

4. RCIC System Isolation (continued)

j. RCIC Equipment Area Temperature- 1,2,3 SR 3.3.6.1.5 < 175°F High SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

k. RCIC Equipment Area Differential 1,2,3 SR 3.3.6.1.5 < 501F Temperature-High SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

5. Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System Isolation

a. Differential Flow-High 1,2,3 F SR 3.3.6.1.5

73 gpm SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

b. Differential Flow-High Time Delay 1,2,3 F SR 3.3.6.1.5 < 30 minutes SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

c. Area Temperature-High 1,2,3 3 F SR 3.3.6.1.5 < 150°F 1 per room SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

d. Area Ventilation Differential 1,2,3 2 F SR 3.3.6.1.5 < 50OF Temperature-High SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

e. Piping Outside RWCU Rooms Area 1,2,3 1 F SR 3.3.6.1.5 ! 120OF Temperature-High SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

f. SLC System Initiation 1,2 HI SR 3.3.6.1.7 NA

g. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low 1,2,3 2, F SR 3.3.6.1.1 Ž 101 inches Level 2 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7 (continued)

(c) SLC System Initiation only inputs into one trip system.

Brunswick Unit 1 3.3-57 Amendment No. 2-03

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 Table 3.3.6.1-1 (page 5 of 5)

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION C.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

6. RHR Shutdown Cooling System Isolation

a. Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-High 1,2,3 1 F SR 3.3.6.1.2 <137 psig SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.7

b. Reactor Vessel Water Level- Low 3,4,5 2(d) I9 SR 3.3.6.1.1 > 153 inches Level 1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

17. Traversing In-coreProbe Isolation

a. Reactor Vessel Water Level -Low 2 _ SR 3.3.6..1 .11 Level 1 SR 3.3:6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1,.6, lb. Drywell Pressure- High l , 2 _ SR 3:3:6.1.7 SR 3.3.6.1.1 8 ýpig SR 3.3:6.1.2 SR 3:&6.1.3 SR 3:3.6.1.6 SR 3:3.6:1.7 (d) In MODES 4 and 5, provided RHR Shutdown Cooling System integrity maintained, only one channel per trip system with an isolation signal available to one RHR shutdown cooling pump suction isolation valve is required.

Brunswick Unit 1 3.3-58 Amendment No. 203

BSEP 09-0019 Enclosure 3 Typed Technical Specification Pages - Unit 1

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.6.1 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation LCO 3.3.6.1 The primary containment isolation instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.6.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.6.1-1.

ACTIONS

NOTES-------------------------------

1. Penetration flow paths may be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls.

2. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel.

COMPLETION CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION TIME A. One or more required A.1 Place channel in trip. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for channels inoperable. Functions 2.a, 2.b, 6.b, 7.a, and 7.b AND 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months for Functions other than Functions 2.a, 2.b, 6.b, 7.a, and 7.b B. One or more Functions with B.1 Restore isolation 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months isolation capability not capability.

maintained.

C. Required Action and C.1 Enter the Condition Immediately associated Completion Time referenced in of Condition A or B not met. Table 3.3.6.1-1 for the channel.

(continued)

Brunswick Unit 1 3.3-49 Amendment No. I

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 ACTIONS (continued)

COMPLETION CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION TIME D. As required by Required D.1 Isolate associated main 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Action C.1 and referenced in steam line (MSL).

Table 3.3.6.1-1.

OR D.2.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months AND D.2.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months E. As required by Required E.1 Be in MODE 2. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months Action C.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.6.1-1.

F. As required by Required F.1 Isolate the affected 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Action C.1 and referenced in penetration flow path(s).

Table 3.3.6.1-1.

G. As required by Required G.1 Isolate the affected 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Action C.1 and referenced in penetration flow path(s).

Table 3.3.6.1-1.

H. Required Action and H.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months associated Completion Time for Condition F or G not met. AND OR H.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months As required by Required Action C.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.6.1-1.

(continued)

Brunswick Unit 1 3.3-50 Amendment No.

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 ACTIONS (continued)

COMPLETION CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION TIME As required by Required 1.1 Declare associated 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Action C.1 and referenced in standby liquid control Table 3.3.6.1-1. subsystem (SLC) inoperable.

OR 1.2 Isolate the Reactor Water 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Cleanup (RWCU) System.

J. As required by Required J. I Initiate action to restore Immediately Action C.1 and referenced in channel to OPERABLE Table 3.3.6.1-1. status.

OR J.2 Initiate action to isolate the Immediately Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling (SDC) System.

Brunswick Unit 1 3.3-51 Amendment No.

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 Table 3.3.6.1-1 (page 1 of 5)

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION C.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE Main Steam Line Isolation

a. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low 1,2,3 D SR 3.3.6.1.1 Ž13 inches Level 3 SR 3.3.6,1,2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7 SR 3.3.6.1.8

b. Main Steam Line Pressure-Low 2 E SR 3.3.6.1.1 > 825 psig SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7 C. Main Steam Line Flow-High 1,2,3 2 per D SR 3.3.6.1.1

138% rated steam MSL SR 3.3.6.1.2 flow SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7 SR 3.3.6.1.8

d. Condenser Vacuum-Low 1, 2 D SR 3.3.6.1.1 2 7.5 inches 2 (), 3 (') SR 3.3.6.1.2 Hg vacuum SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

e. Main Steam Isolation Valve Pit 1,2,3 2 D SR 3.3.6.1.2 < 1971F Temperature-High SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

2. Primary Containment Isolation

a. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low 1,2,3 2 H SR 3.3.6.1.1 inchesct153 Level 1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

b. Drywell Pressure-H-igh 1,2,3 2 H SR 3.3.6.1.1 *ý1.8 psig SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7 (continued)

(a) With any turbine stop valve not closed.

Brunswick Unit 1 3.3-54 Amendment No. I

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 Table 3.3.6.1-1 (page 2 of 5)

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION C.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

2. Primary Containment Isolation (continued)

c. Main Stack Radiation-High 1,2,3 SR 3.3.6.1.2 (b)

SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7 SR 3.3.6.1.8

d. Reactor Building Exhaust Radiation- 1,2,3 SR 3.3.6.1.1 s 16 mR-hr High SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

3. High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System Isolation

a. HPCI Steam Line Flow-High 1,2,3 SR 3.3.6.1.1 5 275% rated steam flow SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

b. HPCI Steam Line Flow-High Time Delay 1,2.3 SR 3.3.6.1.6 a_4 seconds and Relay SR 3.3.6.1.7 *12 seconds SR 3.3.6.1.9 C. HPCt Steam Supply Line Pressure-Low 1,2,3 SR 3.3.6.1.2 > 104 psig SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.7

d. HPCI Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm 1.2,3 SR 3.3.6.1.2 < 9 psig Pressure-High SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

a. Drywall Pressure-High 1,2,3 SR 3.3.6.1.1 _ 1.8 psig SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

f. HPCI Steam Line Area Temperature- 1.2,3 SR 3.3.6.1.5 < 200OF High SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

g. HPCI Steam Line Tunnel Ambient 1,2,3 SR 3.3.6.1.5 < 200OF Temperature-High SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

h. HPCI Steam Line Tunnel Differential 1,2,3 F SR 3.3.6.1.5

50F Temperature-High SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7 (continued)

(b) Allowable Value established in accordance with the methodology in the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual.

Brunswick Unit 1 3.3-55 Amendment No.

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 Table 3.3.6.1-1 (page 4 of 5)

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION CA1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

4. RCIC System Isolation (continued)

j. RCIC Equipment Area Temperature- 1,2,3 2 F SR 3.3.6.1.5

1751F High SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

k. RCIC Equipment Area Differential 1,2,3 F SR 3.3.6.1.5

501F Temperature-High SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

5. Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System Isolation

a. Differential Flow-High 1,2,3 F SR 3.3.6.1.5 73 gpm SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

b. Differential Flow-High Time Delay 1,2,3 F SR 3.3.6.1.5 30 minutes SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

c. Area Temperature-High 1,2,3 3 F SR 3.3.6.1.5 " 150OF 1 per room SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

d. Area Ventilation Differential 1,2,3 2 F SR 3.3.6.1.5 " 50'F Temperature-High SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

a. Piping Outside RWCU Rooms Area 1,2,3 1 F SR 3.3.6.1.5 " 120OF Temperature-High SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7 1(c)

f. SLC System Initiation 1,2 I SR 3.3.6.1.7 NA Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low 1,2,3 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 > 101 inches Level 2 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7 (continued)

(c) SLC System Initiation only inputs into one trip system.

Brunswick Unit 1 3.3-57 Amendment No.

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 Table 3.3.6.1-1 (page 5 of 5)

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION C.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

6. RHR Shutdown Cooling System Isolation

a. Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-High 1,2,3 1 F SR 3.3.6.1.2

137 psig SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.7

b. Reactor Vessel Water Level- Low 3,4,5 2 (d) J SR 3.3.6.1.1 >153 inches Level I SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

7. Traversing In-core Probe Isolation

a. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low 1,2,3 2 G SR 3.3.6.1.1 >153 inches Level 1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

b. Drywell Pressure - High 1,2,3 2 G SR 3.3.6.1.1

1.8 psig SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7 (d) In MODES 4 and 5, provided RHR Shutdown Cooling System integrity maintained, only one channel per trip system with an isolation signal available to one RHR shutdown cooling pump suction isolation valve is required.

Brunswick Unit 1 3.3-58 Amendment No.

BSEP 09-0019 Enclosure 4 Typed Technical Specification Pages - Unit 2

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.6.1 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation LCO 3.3.6.1 The primary containment isolation instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.6.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.6.1-1.

ACTIONS

NOTES -------------------------------

1. Penetration flow paths may be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls.

2. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel.

COMPLETION CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION TIME A. One or more required A.1 Place channel in trip. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for channels inoperable. Functions 2.a, 2.b, 6.b, 7.a, and 7.b AND 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months for Functions other than Functions 2.a, 2.b, 6.b, 7.a, and 7.b I B. One or more Functions with B.1 Restore isolation 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months isolation capability not capability.

maintained.

C. Required Action and C.1 Enter the Condition Immediately associated Completion Time referenced in of Condition A or B not met. Table 3.3.6.1-1 for the channel.

(continued)

Brunswick Unit 2 3.3-49 Amendment No.

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 ACTIONS (continued)

COMPLETION CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION TIME D. As required by Required D.1 Isolate associated main 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Action C.1 and referenced in steam line (MSL).

Table 3.3.6.1-1.

OR D.2.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months AND D.2.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months E. As required by Required E.1 Be in MODE 2. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months Action C.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.6.1-1.

F. As required by Required F.1 Isolate the affected 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Action C.1 and referenced in penetration flow path(s).

Table 3.3.6.1-1.

G. As required by Required G.1 Isolate the affected 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Action C.1 and referenced in penetration flow path(s).

Table 3.3.6.1-1.

H. Required Action and H.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months I associated Completion Time I for Condition F or G not met. AND OR H.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months As required by Required Action C.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.6.1-1.

(continued)

Brunswick Unit 2 3.3-50 Amendment No. I

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 ACTIONS (continued)

COMPLETION CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION TIME As required by Required 1.1 Declare associated 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Action C.1 and referenced in standby liquid control Table 3.3.6.1-1. subsystem (SLC) inoperable.

OR 1.2 Isolate the Reactor Water 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Cleanup (RWCU) System.

J. As required by Required J.1 Initiate action to restore Immediately I Action C.1 and referenced in channel to OPERABLE Table 3.3.6.1-1. status.

OR J.2 Initiate action to isolate the Immediately Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling (SDC) System.

Brunswick Unit 2 3.3-51 Amendment No. I

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 Table 3.3.6.1-1 (page 1 of 5)

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION C.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

1. Main Steam Line Isolation

a. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low 1,2,3 D SR 3.3.6.1.1 > 13 inches Level 3 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7 SR 3.3.6.1.8

b. Main Steam Line Pressure-Low E SR 3.3.6.1.1 Ž 825 psig SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

c. Main Steam Line Flow-High 1,2,3 2 per D SR 3.3.6.1.1

138% rated steam MSL SR 3.3.6.1.2 flow SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7 SR 3.3.6.1.8

d. Condenser Vacuum-Low 1, 2 D SR 3.3.6.1.1 Ž7.5 inches 2(a),3(a) SR 3.3.6.1.2 Hg vacuum SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

e. Main Steam Isolation Valve Pit 1,2,3 2 D SR 3.3.6.1.2 < 1971F Temperature-High SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

f. Main Steam Line 2,3 2 D SR 3.3.6.1.1

33% rated steam Flow-High (Not in Run) SR 3.3.6.1.2 flow SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7 SR 3.3.6.1.8

2. Primary Containment Isolation

a. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low 1,2,3 2 H SR 3.3.6.1.1 Ž 153 inches I Level 1 SR 3.3,6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

b. Drywell Pressure-High 1,2,3 2 H SR 3.3.6.1.1 *gn1.8psig SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7 (continued)

(a) With any turbine stop valve not closed.

Brunswick Unit 2 3.3-54 Amendment No. I

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 Table 3.3.6.1-1 (page 2 of 5)

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION C.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

2. Primary Containment Isolation (continued)

c. Main Stack Radiation-High 1,2,3 F SR 3.3.6.1.2 (b)

SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7 SR 3.3.6.1.8

d. Reactor Building Exhaust Radiation- 1,2,3 1 H SR 3.3.6.1.1 *16 mR/hr High SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

3. High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System Isolation

a. HPCI Steam Line Flow-High 1,2,3 SR 3.3.6.1.1 275% rated steam flow SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

b. HPCI Steam Line Flow-High Time Delay 1,2,3 SR 3.3.6.1.6 Ž4 seconds and Relay SR 3.3.6.1.7 *12 seconds SR 3.3.6.1.9

c. HPCI Steam Supply Line Pressure-Low 1,2,3 SR 3.3.6.1.2 Ž104 psig SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.7

d. HPCI Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm 1,2,3 SR 3.3.6.1.2 ! 9 psig Pressure-High SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

e. Drywell Pressure-High 1,2,3 SR 3,3.6.1.1

1.8 psig SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

f. HPCI Steam Line Area Temperature- 1,2,3 SR 3.3.6.1.5 s 2001F High SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

g. HPCI Steam Line Tunnel Ambient 1,2,3 SR 3.3.6.1.5 ! 2001F Temperature-High SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

h. HPCI Steam Line Tunnel Differential 1,2,3 I F SR 3.3.6.1.5 (o t0nF Temperature-High SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7 (continued)

(b) Allowable Value established in accordance with the methodology in the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual.

Brunswick Unit 2 3.3-55 Amendment No.

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 Table 3.3.6.1-1 (page 4 of 5)

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION C.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

4. RCIC System Isolation (continued)

j. RCIC Equipment Area Temperature- 1,2,3 2 F SR 3.3.6.1.5 *1751F High SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

k. RCIC Equipment Area Differential 1,2,3 F SR 3.3.6.1.5 *50*F Temperature-High SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

5. Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System Isolation

a. Differential Flow-High 1,2,3 F SR 3.3.6.1.5 < 73 gpm SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

b. Differential Flow-High Time Delay 1,2,3 F SR 3.3.6.1.5 < 30 minutes SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

c. Area Temperature-High 1,2,3 3 F SR 3.3.6.1.5 1501F 1 per room SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

d. Area Ventilation Differential 1,2,3 2 F SR 3.3.6.1.5 < 50OF Temperature-High SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

e. Piping Outside RWCU Rooms Area 1,2,3 F SR 3.3.6.1.5 < 1201F Temperature-High SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7 1'

f. SLC System Initiation 1,2 I SR 3.3.6.1.7 NA I

g, Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low 1,2,3 2 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 2!101 inches Level 2 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7 (continued)

(c) SLC System Initiation only inputs into one trip system.

Brunswick Unit 2 3.3-57 Amendment No. I

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 Table 3.3.6.1-1 (page 5 of 5)

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION C.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

6. RHR Shutdown Cooling System Isolation

a. Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-High 1,2,3 1 F SR 3.3.6.1.2 <137 psig SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.7

b. Reactor Vessel Water Level- Low 3,4,5 2(d) J SR 3.3.6.1.1 Ž153 inches Level 1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

7. Traversing In-core Probe Isolation

a. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low 1,2,3 2 G SR 3.3.6.1.1 " 153 inches Level 1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

b. Drywall Pressure - High 1,2,3 2 G SR 3.3.6.1.1 <1.8 psig SR 3.3.6.1.2 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7 (d) In MODES 4 and 5, provided RHR Shutdown Cooling System integrity maintained, only one channel per trip system with an isolation signal available to one RHR shutdown cooling pump suction isolation valve is required.

Brunswick Unit 2 3.3-58 Amendment No.

! I * '¸ ' ! ' !

BSEP 09-0019 Enclosure 5 Marked-up Technical Specification Bases Pages - Unit 1 (For Information Only)

Strikeout/Shadowed Format Stikeet Text Indicates Deleted Text Shadowed Indicates Added Text

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES BACKGROUND 6. Shutdown Cooling System Isolation (continued)

The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Level 1 Function receives input from four reactor vessel water level channels. The outputs from the reactor vessel water level channels are connected to two one-out-of-two taken twice logic trip systems. The Reactor Vessel Pressure-High Function receives input from two channels, with each channel in one trip system using a one-out-of-one logic. Each of the two trip systems is connected to one of the two valves on each shutdown cooling penetration.

Shutdown Cooling System Isolation Functions isolate the Group 8 valves.

V7.Traversin.g ln-'Core.'Probe '(TIP) Isolation 1The Reactor Vessel Water 'Level - 'Low, Level 1 'Isolation ;Functiiod receives 'input from two reactor vessel, water level ,channels. ,The ioutputs from the ,reactor vessel waterlevel *dharnels are connected linto :one two-'

put-oftwo 'logic trip system. The DQrell Pressure -High Isdlation!

Function receives 'input from two drywell pressure channels. The outputsi from the drywell ,pressure channelssare connected into ýone two-,out-of twq logic trip.systemj

INheneitherIsolation iFunction actuates, the TIP drive imechanisms will

,withdraw the TIPs, if:inserted, ,and close the inboard TIP system *lsolation ball valves-whentithe TIPs are fully withdrawn. The outboardllP systemI isolation valves ýare imanual shear'valves!

ITIP System lsIation 'Functions iisolate the 'Group 2 valves1(inboard isoIation ball 'valves)J APPLICABLE The isolation signals generated by the primary containment isolation SAFETY ANALYSES, instrumentation are implicitly assumed in the safety analyses of LCO, and References 1,2, and 3 to initiate closure of valves to limit offsite doses.

APPLICABILITY Refer to LCO 3.6.1.3, "Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs),"

Applicable Safety Analyses Bases for more detail of the safety analyses.

Primary containment isolation instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) (Ref. 4). Certain instrumentation Functions are retained for other reasons and are described below in the individual Functions discussion.

The OPERABILITY of the primary containment instrumentation is dependent on the OPERABILITY of the individual instrumentation channel Functions specified in Table 3.3.6.1-1. Each Function must have a required number of OPERABLE channels, with their setpoints within the specified Allowable Values, where appropriate. The actual setpoint is calibrated consistent with applicable setpoint methodology assumptions.

Each channel must also respond within its assumed response time, where appropriate.

(continued)

Brunswick Unit 1 B 3.3.6.1-5 Revision No. 3-- I

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES APPLICABLE 6.b. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Level 1 (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Level 1 Allowable Value was APPLICABILITY chosen to be the same as the RPS Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Level 1 Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.1.1), since the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. The Allowable Values is referenced from reference level zero. Reference level zero is 367 inches above the vessel zero point.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Level 1 Function is only required to be OPERABLE in MODES 3, 4, and 5 to prevent this potential flow path from lowering the reactor vessel level to the top of the fuel. In MODES 1 and 2, another isolation (i.e., Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-High) and administrative controls ensure that this flow path remains isolated to prevent unexpected loss of inventory via this flow path.

This Function isolates the Group 8 valves.

pimary cOn mesNarel isolated tm-ev.oelimite rla f i o MRa~ieator Vessel W0ateor fLevyelffifLow evelI Function asoitdwt islto implicitlyassmein-If-I~Mi,,

isni UP SARaayi- s hs th ek pats ae assumeditobasltdps-@A (cniued Brunswick Unit 1 B 3.3.6.1-22 Revision No. 34 I

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES APPLICABLE i7.b. 'Drywell Pressure -'High -(continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and *alves~on highdywell ,pressure supports actions to ensure'thatoffsit*

APPLICABILITY dose'limits~of, 1i',(CFR '50.67 4re 'not exceeded. The 'Drywell Pressure High Function, associated with isolation of the primary containment, !is implicitly assumed in the UFSAR accident analysis as these :leakage-paths are assumed to be :isolated post-LOCA."

High drywell 'pressure signals, are initiated from pressure transmitters that sense the pressure in thedrywell. Furchannels ofDrywell Pressure--

High Function are;available and are required to 'be OPERABLE to ensure that no single'instrument failure can preclude the ýisolation function. The isolation function is ensured ,by the imanual shear valve in eachr penetration.I The Allowable Value was selected to ,be the same as the ECC_

Drywell Pressure; High Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.5.1), since this mayJb~e indicative of a 'LOCAjinside ,,prima'ry-containment.-

rThis!Function :isolatesthe Group 2 and 6 valves 'This 'Function iid

'Pcjunction with reactor low pressure also ,isoiates rouwp 1!0 ,valves.

ACTIONS The ACTIONS are ýmodified by two:NOTES. -"Note 1 ýallows penetratiord flow path(s) ýtobebunirSolated intermiftently under, administrativecontrolsL jThese controls consist :of :stationing a dedicated operator at the (controls(of

,thevalve, wlho is' in, continuous communication*,with theconttrl ,room. in this ;way, 'the*,penetration can be'rapidly'isolated*when a ,need for pimirary ontainmentisolatibn i& s indicated.l A Note 2 has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to primary containment isolation instrumentation channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition, discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable primary containment isolation instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable primary containment isolation instrumentation channel.

A.1 Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide isolation signals and the redundancy of the isolation design, an allowable out of service time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for Functions 2.a, 2.b, afd-6.b, 7.;a, !and7.'b, and 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months for Functions other than Functions 2.a, 2.b, and 6.b, 1, and 7*.'

has been shown to be (continued)

Brunswick Unit 1 B 3.3.6.1-23 Revision No. 34 I

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES ACTIONS A.1 (continued) acceptable (Refs. 7 and 8) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. This out of service time is only acceptable provided the associated Function is still maintaining isolation capability (refer to Required Action B.1 Bases). If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Action A.1.

Placing the inoperable channel in trip would conservatively compensate for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow operation to continue with no further restrictions. Alternately, if it is not desired to place the channel in trip (e.g., as in the case where placing the inoperable channel in trip would result in an isolation),

Condition C must be entered and its Required Action taken.

B.1 Required Action B. 1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function result in redundant automatic isolation capability being lost for the associated penetration flow path(s). The MSL Isolation Functions are considered to be maintaining isolation capability when sufficient channels are OPERABLE or in trip, such that both trip systems will generate a trip signal from the given Function on a valid signal. The other isolation functions are considered to be maintaining isolation capability when sufficient channels are OPERABLE or in trip, such that one trip system will generate a trip signal from the given Function on a valid signal. This ensures that one of the two PCIVs in the associated penetration flow path can receive an isolation signal from the given Function. For Functions 1 .a, 1 .b, 1 .d, and 1 .e, this would require both trip systems to have a total of three channels OPERABLE or in trip. For Functions 2.a, 2.b, and 6.b, Z.a, ýand' 7.b,) this would require both trip systems to have one channel OPERABLE or in trip. For Function 1.c, this would require both trip systems to have a total of three channels, associated with each MSL, OPERABLE or in trip. For Functions 3.c, 3.d, 4.c, 4.d, and 5.g, this would require one trip system to have two channels, each OPERABLE or in trip.

For Functions 2.c, 2.d, 3.a, 3.b, 3.e, 3.f, 3.g, 3.h, 3.i, 4.a, 4.b, 4.e, 4.f, 4.g, 4.h, 4.i, 4.j, 4.k, 5.a, 5.b, 5.e, 5.f, and 6.a, this would require one trip (continued)

Brunswick Unit 1 B 3.3.6.1-24 Revision No. 34 I

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES ACTIONS E.1 (continued)

If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply. This is done by placing the plant in at least MODE 2 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

The allowed Completion Time of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 2 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

F. 1 If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Completion Time, plant operations may continue if the affected penetration flow path(s) is isolated. Isolating the affected penetration flow path(s) accomplishes the safety function of the inoperable channels.

For the RWCU Area and Area Ventilation Differential Temperature-High Functions, the affected penetration flow path(s) may be considered isolated by isolating only that portion of the system in the associated room monitored by the inoperable channel. That is, if the RWCU pump room A area channel is inoperable, the pump room A area can be isolated while allowing continued RWCU operation utilizing the B RWCU pump.

Alternately, if it is not desired to isolate the affected penetration flow path(s) (e.g., as in the case where isolating the penetration flow path(s) could result in a reactor scram), Condition G Et must be entered and its Required Actions taken.

The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing sufficient time for plant operations personnel to isolate the affected penetration flow path(s).

If ýthe'chann!is.ý,not*stored'to:OPREABLE status or placed, in itrip withlin aff~cted no ispi~netrationýýflýý,pati'(s),iiisdlated.

loselatiinmgte;affected penetration flow ! )! r saccomplishes thei, safett function 6fthde inoperbliechanrm.l' Th' 24! hour'Completion, Timeiis acceptable rdue to thiact athat thesFunctiun-s are'ether not assumed, in any accident ori tatsie aralysis i:nithe rUFSAR r,iinwithecaseof the TIP systern islation, the TIlP .system' perietration is a ýsmall lborei(apprximatey__;2

,.h),itsisolatio'n"ina design ,aEIs levent .,(w*ith loss of offsite ýpower).would bevia the manually oetated 'shear valves, (and the abilityito (manually__

isolate by either the inormael iiSOlation vailve or the shear valve lisunaffected bythe inoperable instrumentation. Alternately, if it :isnotdesired to isolate theaffected penetration flow ,pathi(s):(e.g., ,as in the .case where isolating the penetration flow path(s)ýcould iresult !in,a reactor scram),, Condition G.

must beentered ,and its Required Actions take.

(continued)

Brunswick Unit 1 B 3.3.6.1-26 Revision No. 34

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES ACTIONS GH.1 and GRi.2 (continued)

If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Completion Time, or the Required Action of Condition F is not met and the associated Completion Time has expired, the plant must be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply. This is done by placing the plant in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

9 "1.1 and 14.2 If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Completion Time, the associated SLC subsystem(s) is declared inoperable or the RWCU System is isolated. Since this Function is required to ensure that the SLC System performs its intended function, sufficient remedial measures are provided by declaring the associated SLC subsystems inoperable or isolating the RWCU System.

The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing sufficient time for personnel to isolate the RWCU System.

Wi-.1 and W1.2 If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Completion Time, the associated penetration flow path should be closed. However, if the shutdown cooling function is needed to provide core cooling, these Required Actions allow the penetration flow path to remain unisolated provided action is immediately initiated to restore the channel to OPERABLE status or to isolate the RHR Shutdown Cooling System (i.e., provide alternate decay heat removal capabilities so the penetration flow path can be isolated). Actions must continue until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status or the RHR Shutdown Cooling System is isolated.

(continued)

Brunswick Unit 1 B 3.3.6.1-27 Revision No. ,31- I

BSEP 09-0019, Application to Revise Technical Specifications Regarding Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation in Accordance with TSTF-306, Revision 2

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BSEP 09-0019, Application to Revise Technical Specifications Regarding Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation in Accordance with TSTF-306, Revision 2

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