IR 05000416/2020010
| ML20077M348 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
| Issue date: | 03/19/2020 |
| From: | Ami Agrawal Division of Reactor Safety IV |
| To: | Emily Larson Entergy Operations |
| Agrawal A | |
| References | |
| EPID I-2020-010-0007 IR 2020010 | |
| Download: ML20077M348 (16) | |
Text
March 19, 2020
SUBJECT:
GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION - BIENNIAL PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000416/2020010
Dear Mr. Larson:
On January 30, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a problem identification and resolution inspection at your Grand Gulf Nuclear Station and discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
The NRC inspection team reviewed the stations corrective action program and the stations implementation of the program to evaluate its effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems and to confirm that the station was complying with NRC regulations and licensee standards for corrective action programs. Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staffs performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.
The team also evaluated the stations processes for use of industry and NRC operating experience information and the effectiveness of the stations self-assessments and audits.
Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staffs performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.
Finally, the team reviewed the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment and interviewed station personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs. The NRC found that the station has established and maintains a work environment where staff employees indicated that they felt free to raise and pursue resolution of safety concerns without fear of retaliation. However, the team also found evidence of challenges within your primary contractor organizations safety-conscious work environment. These morale issues could have a deleterious effect on contractor performance if allowed to continue.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy. If you contest the violation, or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Ami Agrawal Digitally signed by Ami Agrawal Date: 2020.03.19 08:47:05 -05'00'
Ami N. Agrawal, Team Leader Inspection Program and Assessment Team Division of Reactor Safety Docket No. 05000416 License No. NPF-29
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Number: 05000416 License Number: NPF-29 Report Number: 05000416/2020010 Enterprise Identifier: I-2020-010-0007 Licensee: Entergy Operations, Inc.
Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Location: Port Gibson, MS Inspection Dates: January 13, 2020, to January 30, 2020 Inspectors: R. Azua, Senior Reactor Inspector B. Correll, Reactor Inspector H. Freeman, Senior Project Engineer S. Hedger, Emergency Preparedness Inspector T. Steadham, Senior Resident Inspector Approved By: Ami N. Agrawal, Team Leader Inspection Program and Assessment Team Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a biennial problem identification and resolution inspection at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Correct Conditions Adverse to Quality Associated with Oil Traceability Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green [P.3] - 71152B Systems NCV 05000416/2020010-01 Resolution Open The NRC inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the licensee's failure to restore the traceability of oil in safety-related components. Specifically, in September 2018 NRC inspectors had identified 10 safety-related components where the licensee failed to maintain adequate records of oil additions. In each case, maintenance records were missing the required issue tickets as a record of the source and quality of the oil that had been added. As of January 29, 2020, the inspectors determined that the licensee had failed to take corrective actions to restore the quality classification of the oil additions for 9 of the 10 components.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs)in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html.
Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
71152B - Problem Identification and Resolution Biennial Team Inspection (IP Section 02.04)
The inspectors performed a biennial assessment of the licensees corrective action program, use of operating experience, self-assessments and audits, and safety-conscious work environment.
- Corrective Action Program Effectiveness: The inspectors assessed the corrective action programs effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems. The inspectors also conducted a 5-year review of condition reports associated with the station service water system. The inspectors reviewed approximately 150 condition reports from those that had been issued since the last biennial problem identification and resolution inspection completed in November 2018.
- Operating Experience, Self-Assessments and Audits: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the stations processes for use of operating experience, self-assessments and audits. The inspectors reviewed 5 examples of industry operating experience that the licensee received during the assessment period and 15 examples of self-assessments and audits that had been performed during the assessment period.
- Safety-Conscious Work Environment: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment. The inspectors interviewed 39 licensee employees in focus group interviews of members from operations, engineering, radiation protection, and electrical maintenance. Additionally, the inspectors conducted seven additional focus groups and individual interviews with the primary contractor organization onsite (Day & Zimmerman). The inspectors interviewed the employee concerns coordinator and reviewed the results of the most recent safety-culture survey.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Assessment - Corrective Action Program Effectiveness 71152B Overall, based upon the condition reports reviewed and the meetings attended, the team concluded that the licensee's corrective action program met regulatory requirements and self-imposed standards that support nuclear safety. The team's overall impression is that performance has continued to improve over the past two assessments, but identified areas that may warrant management attention and action as deemed appropriate.
Effectiveness of Problem Identification:
Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that the licensee was identifying and documenting problems at an appropriately low threshold that supported nuclear safety. Over the 15-month assessment period, the licensee had initiated over 12,500 condition reports - an average of about 830 per month. During the inspection, the team noted that the licensee typically documented potential deficiencies and observations that were identified during the inspection without hesitation when they could not promptly provide an answer or a basis for acceptability for the condition. However, the team did note that one observation regarding the acceptability of dissimilar connectors on a whitey valve could not be immediately answered in which the on-shift operating crew did not initiate a condition report until 4-days after being raised. While this delay did not meet the licensee managements expectations, ultimately, the team found the condition was acceptable.
Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation:
The team found that the licensee was appropriately prioritizing issues in accordance with licensee standards. The team observed management appropriately providing guidance and oversight during the management performance review group (PRG) meetings. The team observed members raising questions about classifications and recommending actions during the PRG meetings without any apparent reservations. The team found that the licensee had classified just over 25 percent of the condition reports as adverse conditions. The team's review of sample of condition reports classified as non-adverse did not identify any that should have been classified as adverse and addressed under the corrective action program, as required.
The team did note several instances where the use of effectiveness reviews was not conducted in an expected manner. Effectiveness reviews are specified by the licensee's program to evaluate whether corrective actions to prevent recurrence (CAPR) for significant conditions adverse to quality are effective. Examples include a few effectiveness reviews that accepted less than 100 percent (i.e., 90 percent) as being acceptable. The team concluded this was inconsistent with the purpose of measuring the effectiveness of a corrective action to prevent recurrence. The team found one effectiveness review that was not performed (i.e. cancelled), because as it stated, the effectiveness review was not based upon a CAPR and was therefore not required; however, the assignee did not obtain management's approval to cancel the action. Finally, the team noted some effectiveness reviews that were not completed in the time-frame or frequency that had been specified by management. The team concluded that none of the examples impacted the evaluation to correct conditions adverse to quality.
Effectiveness of Corrective Actions:
Based upon the samples reviewed, the team found that the corrective actions associated with adverse conditions were generally appropriate and implemented in a timeframe appropriate to the significance of the condition. However, the team did find examples where the licensee's corrective actions did not adequately address the condition. As documented in NRC Inspection Report 05000416/2019004, the licensee missed a number of opportunities to adequately correct a condition adverse to quality associated with containment airlock inner door (NCV 05000416/2019004-04). As documented in that inspection, the inspectors found that the work performed to correct previously identified conditions were inadequate to correct the identified conditions. Additionally, the team documented a finding in this report where the licensee failed to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality associated with oil traceability. These types of findings indicate a need for increased management oversight to ensure conditions adverse to quality are appropriately addressed.
Assessment - Operating Experience, Self-Assessments and Audits 71152B The inspectors found that the licensee routinely shared operating experience with all departments as part of the weekly PRG meetings. The licensee typically assigned operating experience that may have an impact on the station to specific organizations for relevance and evaluation. The inspectors concluded that the licensees use of operating experience was appropriate.
The inspectors found that the self-assessments that were reviewed were critical, identified weaknesses and issues, and corrective actions were taken.
Assessment - Safety-Conscious Work Environment 71152B The licensee had established and maintained a work environment where staff employees felt free to raise and pursue resolution of safety concern using a variety of options including: the condition report process, supervision, open-door policy, employee concerns program, ethics hotline, and the NRC. Nearly all indicated that they had never found a need to go beyond the condition reporting process or to their supervision to get an issue resolved. Many individuals expressed confidence that the plants performance was headed in the right direction under the current leadership's oversight and that management focus was on the safe operation of the plant rather than the perception from previous years where that focus was on production.
However, the team also found some work environment challenges within the primary contractor workforce (Day and Zimmerman). Through interviews with the contractor staff employees, the team identified morale issues in some of the departments. These issues seem to stem from a perception that contractor management would take actions against them for such things as reporting work issues outside of their management chain-of-command, for appearing to be sitting idle in their breakroom, or for slowing down a work effort (even if the reason was for personnel or equipment safety). The team brought these observations to senior plant managements attention. While the team did not identify any safety issue that had not or would not be raised by the contractor workforce during these interviews, the team concluded that if not addressed, contractor staff morale could negatively impact performance in this area.
Overall, the team concluded that all the licensee work groups interviewed at the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station maintained a healthy safety-conscious work environment. However, the inspectors found that morale issues within the contractor workforce could have a deleterious effect on staff performance and potentially on plant safety if allowed to continue.
Failure to Correct Conditions Adverse to Quality Associated with Oil Traceability Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Systems Green [P.3] - Resolution 71152B NCV 05000416/2020010-01 Open The NRC inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the licensee's failure to restore the traceability of oil in safety-related components. Specifically, in September 2018 NRC inspectors had identified 10 safety-related components where the licensee failed to maintain adequate records of oil additions. In each case, maintenance records were missing the required issue tickets as a record of the source and quality of the oil that had been added. As of January 29, 2020, the inspectors determined that the licensee had failed to take corrective actions to restore the quality classification of the oil additions for 9 of the 10 components.
Description:
As described in NRC Inspection Report 05000416/2018004 (ML19038A437), NRC inspectors had identified that the licensee failed to maintain adequate quality records of oil additions to 10 safety-related components in 4 different systems. At that time, the licensee entered the issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report CR-2018-10179, and performed an adverse condition analysis which identified 19 corrective actions to address the programmatic and human performance causes that contributed to the improper oil additions. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective actions for this non-cited violation.
Because the original issue was related to oil contamination of the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC)turbine, the licensees corrective actions had focused on restoring the oil quality in the RCIC turbine only. For the other nine components (residual heat removal pumps, standby service water pumps, emergency diesel generators), the licensee verified that the predictive maintenance levels were within specification (contaminants and viscosity). The licensee did not implement any corrective actions to restore the quality level of the oil in these remaining components. The inspectors noted that while oil sample results for contaminants and viscosity are important in determining component operability, they do not reestablish either traceability or quality.
The inspectors reviewed the work order history for the residual heat removal pumps (since the last untraceable oil addition in each pump), and did not identify any instances where the licensee completely drained and filled the systems with traceable oil. The licensee confirmed that, except for the RCIC turbine, none of the other nine identified components have been drained and filled with traceable oil.
Corrective Actions: Licensee corrective actions included entering the issue into their corrective action program.
Corrective Action References: Condition Report CR-GGN-2020-00915
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to restore the traceability of oil in safety-related components is a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, the quality level requirements of the oil ensure that components important to safety are properly lubricated. The failure to maintain those quality requirements in the absence of interim corrective actions adversely affects equipment reliability and thus could have the potential to create a more significant safety concern.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Since the finding does not represent a loss of system function, the finding screens to a Green significance.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: P.3 - Resolution: The organization takes effective corrective actions to address issues in a timely manner commensurate with their safety significance.
Enforcement:
Violation: As required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as deficiencies and deviations, are promptly identified and corrected.
Contrary to the above, from September 2018 through January 29, 2020, the licensee failed to promptly correct conditions adverse to quality. Specifically, the licensee failed to either restore or implement plans to restore the required quality level of oil after it was identified that oil of unknown quality (undocumented) had been added to the following safety-related components:
- Divisions 1, 2, and 3, residual heat removal pumps
- Divisions 1, 2, and 3, standby service water pumps
- Divisions 1, 2, and 3, emergency diesel generators Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Observations - Corrective Action Program Observations 71152B During the inspection, the team had the following observations associated with the implementation of the corrective action program that warrant additional management attention:
1. Accuracy of Documents - The team noted examples within one root cause evaluation associated with a secondary containment door that had either inconclusive or inaccurate information within the evaluation. The inspectors found that the root cause was inclusive because it did not specifically identify the cause of the failure, but left it to the reader as to infer whether the failure was due to the design of the hinge(s) or to an unorthodox installation. Root causes should specify the cause so a CAPR can be developed to address the cause. A second example within this root cause evaluation concluded that a contributing cause was that air pressure differences caused the door to open uncontrollably hitting the door stops and causing subsequent impact vibrations. The inspectors review of the door's layout revealed that the door stop was too low to hit the personnel access door (the personnel access door is located within a larger equipment door) even if the door could swing far enough to reach it (prevented by the closing device). Because the document was a high-level document with management oversight, this should have been caught and addressed during the review process. The licensee wrote Condition Report CR-2020-00873.
2. Identification and verification - During the walk down of the secondary containment
door, the team noted that the mounting hardware of the bottom hinge was different than the upper hinges. This was apparently caused during the repair process and was not an approve design change. The licensee wrote Condition Report CR-2020-00916.
3. Address Issues as Documented - The team identified a cause evaluation of a failed component stating that the failure was likely to have been caused by a manufacturing defect, but the condition report did not address or evaluate the need to issue a Part 21 notification. The failed part had been in service for a number of years, but apparently was disposed of before it could be evaluated. When identified by the NRC, the licensee re-evaluated the statement and chose to remove it because the part's operating history. During the inspection, the team noted that the licensee staff did identify other issues during PRG meetings that should be evaluated for Part 21 notification.
None of these observations impacted the licensees overall evaluations or implementation of corrective actions.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On January 30, 2020, the inspectors presented the biennial problem identification and resolution inspection results to Mr. E. Larson and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
71152B Calculations Calculation GGNS Level-1 Model Revision 3 PSA Summary Report 0
PRA-GG-01-001
XC-N1111-01007 GGNS Level 1 PSA, Revision 2 0
Corrective Action Condition Reports 2015-04067, 2015-07209, 2016-00572, 2016-02950,
Documents (CR-GGN-) 2016-03178, 2016-04834, 2016-08997, 2017-01559,
2017-03404, 2017-06021, 2017-06705, 2018-01595,
2018-04934, 2018-06543, 2018-07783, 2018-09679,
2018-09705, 2018-10179, 2018-10441, 2018-10852,
2018-10947, 2018-11276, 2018-11371, 2018-11492,
2018-11960, 2018-12031, 2018-12069, 2018-12101,
2018-12103, 2018-12302, 2018-13032, 2018-13038,
2018-13042, 2018-13050, 2018-13206, 2018-13234,
2019-00042, 2019-00096, 2019-00222, 2019-00223,
2019-00285, 2019-00485, 2019-00710, 2019-00968,
2019-01048, 2019-01049, 2019-01050, 2019-01051,
2019-01052, 2019-01504, 2019-02009, 2019-02309,
2019-02489, 2019-02717, 2019-03060, 2019-03562,
2019-03822, 2019-03877, 2019-03940, 2019-03971,
2019-04821, 2019-05198, 2019-05538, 2019-05539,
2019-05936, 2019-06009, 2019-06159, 2019-06252,
2019-06295, 2019-06699, 2019-07477, 2019-09175,
2019-09528, 2019-09810, 2019-09933, 2019-10084,
20-00280, 2020-00794, 2020-00802, 2020-00968,
20-00978, 2020-00984
Corrective Action Condition Reports 2020-00358, 2020-00375, 2020-00380, 2020-00389,
Documents (CR-GGN-) 2020-00448, 2020-00481, 2020-00509, 2020-00512,
Resulting from 2020-00557, 2020-00736, 2020-00853, 2020-00873,
Inspection 2020-00879, 2020-00888, 2020-00915, 2020-00916,
20-00933, 2020-00958, 2020-00968, 2020-00974,
20-00984
Engineering PSA-GGNS-01 Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Probabilistic Risk Assessment 0
Evaluations Summary Report
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
PSA-GGNS-08- GGNS PRA Model Corrections and Refinements for 0
Revision 4B
Miscellaneous Fire Drill Report, Date: 6-28-19, Time: 14:00, Shift/Team: C 6/28/2019
Operations High Intensity Oversight Plan, Grand Gulf 7/13/2017
Nuclear Station Operations Department
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Standard Audit Template, Audit: 11
Emergency Preparedness Program QA-7-2019-GGNS-01
9.10, CR Number: CR-GGN-2019-1052, Title: NCV for Failure to 3/25/2019
Organizational & Follow Emergency Plan
Programmatic
Screening
Combustible Unit 1, Building: SSW A (Pump House, Valve Room, Basin), 1/30/2020
Control Permit Fire Area: 64
Number: 978
Combustible Unit 1, Building: SSW B (Pump House, Valve Room, Basin), 1/30/2020
Control Permit Fire Area: 65
Number: 979
CR Number CR- Condition Analysis, Event Title: Security Equipment 0
GGN-2019-10364 Preventative Maintenance Strategies
CR-GGN-2016- Apparent Cause Evaluation, Event Title: Inadequate 1
00572 Procedures Lead to NRC-Identified Performance Deficiency
CR-GGN-2016- Root Cause Evaluation, Event Title: Startup from RF 20 "B" 2, 3, 4
2950 Phase Current Differential Relay Scram
CR-GGN-2016- Root Cause Evaluation, Event Title: OPRM Reactor Scram; 1, 2, 3, 4, 5
04834 Operator Response to Equipment Failure Evaluation
CR-GGN-2018- Root Cause Evaluation, Event Title: Manual RX Scram from 2
10441 Heater Drain System
CR-GGN-2019- Human Performance Evaluation, Title: Unexpected Door 9/11/2019
06699 Alarm/Secure Area Boundary Violation
CR-GGN-2019- Adverse Condition Analysis, Event Title: Green NCV on 0
9175 EN-DC-161 Implementation
Effectiveness 2018-00193, 2018-00194, 2019-0009
Review
(LO-GLO-)
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
ES-04 Electrical Terminations and Splices 05
FLP-GM- Maintenance Fundamentals 0
MNTFUND
GLP-SEC- Personnel Searches 0
PERSCH
GNRO- Supplemental Licensee Event Report 2018-009-01, Reactor 8/7/2019
2019/00033 Manual Shutdown Due to Feedwater Level Control Changes
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Docket No. 50-416,
License No. NPF-29
GPCS-EM-INIT Electrical Maintenance Training Program Description 11
GPCS-IC-INIT I&C Maintenance Training Program Description 16
GSMS-LOR- Conservative Decision-Making Scenario 1 0
285
LO-CA# LO-GLO- CR# CR-GGN-2016-04834 11/13/2018
2016-0009, CA-
LO-CA# LO-GLO- CR# CR-GGN-2016-04834 10/18/2018
2016-0009,
CA-37
LO-CA# LO-GLO- CR# CR-GGN-2016-04834
2016-0009-CA-
34/35
LO-CA# LO-GLO- CR# CR-GGN-2016-02950 6/11/2019
2018-00081 CA
LO-CA# LO-GLO- CR# CR-GGN-2016-02950 2/26/2019
2018-80 CA-15
OE-NOE-2019- [OE review of ...] NRC-2-2017-032-IA-19-027, Confirmatory
267 Order Mechanical Planner at Vogtle was the Subject of
Employment Discrimination
OE-NOE-2019- [OE review of ...] CR-WF3-2018-00054 - NCV GREEN
269 Failure to Meet RG 1.9 Emergency Diesel Testing
Requirements during Surveillance Test Results in
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
OE-NOE-2019- [OE review of ...] NRC Information Notice 2019-09: Spent
2 Fuel Cask Movement Issues
Procedure 2015-00777
Request
(PR-PRGGN-)
SEG-04 System Engineering Strategy 006
Standing Order Procedure Changes Associated with 12/12/2018 Reactor 0, 1
18-0023 Scram
Work Tracker 2018-0311
Document
(WT-WTGGN-)
Procedures 01-S-11-10 GGNS Employee's Security Responsibilities 055
2-S-01-27 Operations Section Procedure - Operation's Philosophy 72
04-1-01-E51-1 System Operating Instruction, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling 141
System
05-1-02-I-1 Reactor Scram 126
05-1-02-V-018 Electrical System Grounds 0
05-1-02-V-019 Loss of 125 VDC 0
05-1-02-V-020 Loss of Control Room Annunciators 0
05-1-02-V-21 Reactor Pressure Control Malfunctions 1
06-OP-1T48-M- Secondary Containment Integrity Check 112
0003
11-S-51-3 Personnel, Packages, and Vehicle Searches 37
14-S-02-21 Preparer's Guide for Simulator Evaluation Scenarios 10
EN-DC-115 Engineering Change Process 21
EN-DC-117 Post-Modification Testing and Special Instructions 14
EN-DC-151 PSA Maintenance and Update 6, 7
EN-DC-159 System and Component Monitoring 16
EN-FAP-LI-001 Performance Improvement Review Group (PRG) Process 13, 14
EN-LI-102 Corrective Action Program 35, 38
EN-LI-104 Self-Assessment and Benchmark Process 14, 15
EN-LI-118 Cause Evaluation Process 28, 30
EN-LI-121 Trending and Performance Review Process 25, 26
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
EN-MA-100 Maintenance Fundamentals Program 3
EN-NS-232 General Employee Security Responsibilities 2
EN-OM-126 Management and Oversight of Supplemental Personnel 4
EN-OM-126-3 Qualification of Supplemental Supervisors 4
EN-TQ-125 Fire Brigade Drills 8, 9, 10
Self-Assessments LO-GLO-2019- Pre-NRC IP 92723 Inspection Assessment 10/10/2019
00198-CA-1
13