IR 05000263/1996012

Insp Rept 50-263/96-12 on 961128-970108.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Engineering,Maintenance & Plant Support

ML20134G078
Person / Time
Site:	Monticello
Issue date:	01/31/1997
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20134G077	List: IR 05000263/1996012 ML20134G074
References
50-263-96-12, NUDOCS 9702100265
Download: ML20134G078 (15)

Text

-- .. . . . .. . .

-

,. .

!

,

l U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Docket No: 50-263 License No: OPR-22 Report No: 50-263/96012(DRP)

l Licensee: Northern States Power Company l l

Facility: Monticello Nuclear Generating Station !

Location: 414 Nicollet Mall Minneapolis, MN 55401 Dates: November 28, 1996 - January 8, 1997 Inspectors: A. M. Stone Senior Resident Inspector J. Lara. Resident Inspector Approved by: J. Jacobson. Chief. Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects

.

9702100265 970131 PDR ADOCK 05000263 G PDR

'

. .

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY l Monticello Nuclear Generating Station. Unit 1 NRC Inspection Report 50-263/96012 l This inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering, maintenance, and plant support. The report covers a 6-week period of resident inspectio Operations

.

Operations personnel performance during the shutdown and startup activities was acceptable. Good communication and control of evolutions were observed. (Section 02.1)

. Operator error during the performance of surveillance activities caused a dual recirculation pump trip, requiring a manual SCRAM. This occurred during the last inspection period and is considered a Non-Cited Violation. (Section 08.2)

.

The licensee's response to the January 7 rapid reactor power reduction due to a decreasing condenser vacuum condition will be reviewed during the next NRC inspection period. (Section 02.2)

. The inspectors concluded that the standby liquid control-(SBLC) system was operated and tested in accordance with technical specification (TS)

requirements.and as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). (Section 02.3)

Maintenance

. Overall outage planning and performance of maintenance activities were observed to be well performed, included consideration of previously identified material condition issues, and appropriately included probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) and maintenance rule consideration (Section M1.1)

. The licensee identified a reportable event concerning an unqualified cable splice in the "B" standby gas treatment (SBGT) system. This condition resulted in the plant being outside its design basi (Section M1.1)

. Material condition of plant equipment was acceptable. The inspectors verified that the existing conditions did not violate technical s)ecifications (TS). The operators interviewed were knowledgeable of tle conditions. (Section M2.1)

. Minor discrepancies were noted in post-maintenance testing. An inspection follow-up item was o)ened to track the results of a planned quality control (OC) audit of t1e post-maintenance test (PMT) proces (Section M3.1)

,. .

.

OC inspection activities were observed to be performed in accordance !

with work documents and inspection results were properly documente l (Section M7.1) l Plant Support  ;

e Corrective actions to a previously NRC-identified non-cited violation resulted in the licensee's identification of additional examples of improper radiological postings. (Section R1.1) ,

.

The licensee identified a reportable event concerning fitness for dut (Section S6.1)

--

.

.

.

.

.. i

i l

I Summary of P1 ant Siat+;

i The unit operated " oc c 1 the period. Ho. "D" main steam line saleLy reliel vu ,oi+ ,, -

a oare c so to be

'

higher than expected. Thic re n +i t '

- i md <

'

i<

inspection period on cove.. .. n , ,, ,. , p m <

tailpipe temperature would approach a MT "r0 4

-

I u a and m 0 .e ' er 6 decided to manually shut do?n ': -

-

issue is discussed in sect,un u- - .

. s m and the plant resumed operation at 10' n'rc W n c>r on A m v ). N/

plant operators perfor~ rc

' condenser vacuum co.loil r u,.

cold temperature effect- 1 ,

"

discussed in S- -

_

01 Conduct c' "- I

. 01.1 General Comments ('/H u7)

.

Using Inspection Pr(

reviews of ongoir operations was acceptaoi are detailed in t!' > v 02 Operational S Aus u, r i. ; , n m o ,

.

'

02.1 Response to in-rm eim "D" criot' '

,b4 -

"- Inspection Scone OHOLAnto' '

As discussed in u . c ;co kw ou . ,. . # ::1 noted the ta11 pipe a mparature ior thc ' re i r ;!v 'SRV) vis higher than expected. lhe in~

after the November 19" '

1P temperature was cgs <. .

the temperature would l delv .

December 6. deci-SRV repair. The int . ea 1 4 n

equipment proble lne 101 n; >

,cu ont .

. Technicai Spa,~.o . .

• Abnormal procedure C.4-B.3.a.B. "keilet Valve Leeking"

. Operations ibnual B 3.? Not o re ^ . Mv

, .

,

. Operations Manual C.1. "Startup Procedure"

. Operations Manual C.3, " Shutdown Procedure"

. Generation Quality Services Observation Report 1996458, " Plant Shutdown and Startup Activities in the Control Room"

{ Observations and Findinos The inspectors observed portions of the shutdown and startup activitie Good communication and control of evolutions were observed. Specific observations included:

l

. De-inerting and inerting the drywell space was conducted in accordance with procedures TS, and as described in the UFSA . The shutdown and approach to criticality were conducted in a j controlled manner. Nuclear engineers provided technical guidance i to the ope ~3 tors and shift management. Activities which-could I distract the operators were minimize l

. Problems noted during shutdown and startup were promptly identified and prioritized for resolution. For example, the shift manager initiated a Condition Report (CR) to address why the High Energy Line Break barrier check was not incorporated into the restart checklis ,

Generation Quality Services (GOS) personnel were present in the control room during the shutdown and startup of the unit. The inspectors reviewed the GOS observation report and had no concern I Conclusions Operations personnel performance during the shutdown and startup l activities was acceptable. Good communication and control c.~ evolutions i were observe .2 Rapid Power Reduction (93702)

!

On January 7, 1997, system engineering personnel conducted a test which !

required the turbine building railway doors to be o)ened for about 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> Extreme cold temperatures in the turbine )uilding resulted in l erratic hotwell level indication and an inoperative off-gas system ,

pressure control valve. Control room operators noted a decreasing condenser vacuum condition and performed a rapid reactor power '

reduction. This event is considered an Unresolved Item (50-263/96012-01) pending review of the root cause and corrective action .

_.__. _ _ _ ._ _ _ ._ _ . _ _ __. _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . _ . . _ _ _ . _ .

'

l,. .

,

l 02.3 Standby Licaid Control System Review i Inspection Scope (71707) i During this ins)ection period, the inspectors performed a review of the SBLC syste T1e purpose of this review was to verify various operational and design features including the following:

.

Operation of the system in accordance with applicable TS requirements

.

Operation of the system in accordance with UFSAR description

.

System alignment in accordance with plant requirements l . Surveillance procedures met the TS requirements for surveillance l testing l

l The inspectors reviewed the following documents:

~~

i . Technical Specifications 3.4 and 4.4

,

'

. Design Bases Document: Standby Liquid Control Section . Test 0085. "SBLC System Operability Test" i . Test 0086 "SBLC Refueling Tests" l

'

. Test 0089 " Boron Concentration - Standby Liquid Control System"

. Test 0451, "SBLC Pump Flow Rate Comparison to ATWS Design Basis" l

'

. UFSAR Sections 6.6 and relevant portions of 1 . Portions of SBLC system work orders (WO) completed since 1994

.

l Observations and Findings . .

,

'

i .

l The irispectors verified that periodic surveillance testing was accomplished in accordance with TS. Explosive valve testing and replacements were performed each outage on alternating trains as required. Concerns regarding test control were discussed in Inspection Report 50-263/9600 ).

Tiie material condition of the system was acceptable. Outstanding work orders did not impact system operability. The inspectors reviewed

'

previous surveillance tests and confirmed that acceptance criteria were met. The bcron concentration and current tank level were within s 3ecification Valves and electrical equipment were verified to be in tie correct position The inspectors also verified that the SBLC system operation was as described in the UFSAR. The system was an engineered safety feature and l was included in the quality assurance program. However, the licensee described the SBLC system as non-safety related in their Design Basis Document. The classification of SBLC as non-safety related will be reviewed in conjunction with the inspection follow-up item discussed in l Inspection Report 50-263/96009.

i

.

- -

-

-or+ - - - -

_

'

,. . .

c. Conclusions-The inspectors concluded that the SBLC system was operated and tested in accordance with TS requirements and as described in the UFSA Miscellaneous Operations Issues i 08.1 (Closed) Violation (50-263/94014-01): Failure to provide measures for the material control of spare 4160V circuit breakers to protect them from environmental conditions in accordance with equipment Level B storage requirement The licensee res)onded to the violation in a letter dated March 24, 1995 and descri)ed corrective actions. Permanent enclosures were built in the turbine building 911-foot elevation to provide for long-term storage of spare circuit breakers. Access to the circuit breakers was limited to authorized personnel. The inspectors verified acceptable implementation of the corrective actions. This item is close .2 (Closed) Licensee Event ReDort (50-263/96011. Revision 0): Jumper Placement Error During Surveillance Procedure Causes Dual Recirculation Pump Trip. Requiring A Manual Scram. As discussed in Inspection Report 50-263/96011, an operator and system engineer failed to follow surveillance procedure 1448 when they inadvertently placed a jumper across the incorrect relay. Preventative actions included discussing the event with operations and engineering staff, revising the surveillance procedure, and increasing labeling efforts in this and similar relay cabinets. Failure to follow procedure constituted a licensee-identified violation and is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section VII of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50-263/96012-02). This LER is close l

II. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 General Comments a. Insoection Scone (62703) ,

The inspectors observed all or portions of the following work activities:

. Test 0133 " Daily Jet Pump Operability Check"

. Test 0255-07-1A-1, " Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Exercise"

. WO 9602175, " Pressurizing Valve for FT-2-110C"

. WO 9602474, " Replace Charcoal Adsorbers and Perform System PM"

. WO 9602701, " Repair / Replace Power Supp y to SJAE Instruments"

. WO 9602702, " Repair / Replace Power Sup) y to SJAE Instruments"

.

i ectrical Equipment"

. WO 9602920, WO 9603069, "Re-supp#11 DG Air Start Tank U-bolts" ort Raceways and

" Torque

.

,. .

.

WO 9603095. " Replace Unqualified Splice in B SBGT"

. WO 9603129. " Repair RHR Valve Intermittent Annunciator"

.

WO 9603177. " Troubleshoot Division 1 SPOTMOS Indication Failure" Observations and Findinas The inspectors found the work performed under these activities to be professional and thorough. All work observed was performed with the l work package present and in active use. The inspectors frequently observed supervisors and system engineers monitoring job 3rogress, and quality control personnel were present whenever required )y procedur When applicable, appropriate radiation control measures were in plac The inspectors also verified that redundant equipment remained operable during the maintenance activities and that operations personnel 1 documented entries into applicable TS limiting condition for operations I (LCO).

__

WO 9603095. Reolace Unaualified Solice in "B" SBGT l

On December 16, 1996, the licensee notified the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 of a condition where the "B" SBGT system was inoperable due to an unqualified cable s) lice. The unqualified splice placed the plant in a condition outside t1e design basis. This condition was identified during on-line maintenance. Preliminary reviews indicated that the splice was installed in the "B" heater )ower cable and had existed for l an undetermined tim The inspectors o) served the removal of the

' unqualified cable splice and subsequent termination of the affected power cable directly on a terminal stud. No deficiencies were identified during the rework of the cable splic Conclusions Overall outage planning and performance of maintenance activities were observed to be well performed. Immediate corrective actions associated with maintenance-related condition reports were determined acceptabl M1.2 Forced Outage Maintenance Work Activities Insoection Scope (62703)

As discussed in section 02.1. the licensee performed a reactor shutdown to repair a leaking SRV. The inspectors reviewed the planning of maintenance activities to be perfora.ed during the forced outag Observations and Findinas Prior to the forced outage, the licensee maintained a ready backlog list of work activities which required plant shutdown. The licensee used this ready backlog list during the planning of work activities to be performed during this forced outage. The planning of outage and routine maintenance activities also included consideration of previously

.dentified material condition issues, and appropriately included PRA and

'

,. .

maintenance rule considerations. The inspectors observed the performance of WO 9602084. " Repair / Replace C Inboard MSIV Limit Switch" and WO 9601906. "IRM 13 Reading Downscale" during the outage. Adequate radiation protection controls were also observed during work activities in the drywel c. Conclusions The planning and implementation work activities performed during the forced outage adequately considered maintenance rule and PRA impac M2 Maintenance and Matarial Condition of Facilities and Equipment M2.1 Current Material Conditions and Imoact on Ooerations Personnel Insoection Scooe (71707 and 62703)

.-

The inspectors conducted control room and plant inspections and interviewed operations personnel to assess the material condition of plant equipmen b. Observations and Findinas During inspections in the plant and control room, the inspectors noted the following degraded conditions:

'

.

Discharae canal samole oumo losina crim This condition.re'sulted

.

in several unex3ected TS LCOs. Operators were able to restart the pump within a slort time perio . Hydroaen water chemistry system concern This condition also resulted in several unexpected TS LCOs and additional operator actions to restore the system to normal. Engineering personnel continued efforts to resolve this issue since its placement on the

" Operator Workaround" list in 199 The inspectors also noted that the licensee resolved some previously discussed material condition concerns during the December forced outage as discussed in M Conclusions The inspectors verified that the above conditions did not violate T The operators interviewed were knowledgeable of the conditions. The inspectors verified that work orders were initiated to repair the degraded equipmen .

__

.- -

1 M3 Maintenance Procedures and Documentation M3.1 Minor Discreoancies Noted in Post-Maintenance Testina Insoection Scooe (62703 and 40500)

-

The inspectors reviewed the following:

< . WO 9602885. "Possible Failing Diaphragm" 4 . WO 9601886 "MS-37-2 Leaking Past Seat" l

.

Test 0112. " Safety Relief Valves Operability Checks" b. Observations and Findinas l

During the forced outage. the licensee replaced the "D" SRV under WO

9602885. The post-maintenance testing included specific steps of test

0112. Prior to performing the PMT. the inspectors noted thata tep 20 i

was inadvertently excluded from the test. Step 20 required that the I o)erator verify that the SRV was closed, the annunciator was reset, and

! t1e temperature recorder indicated a decreasing trend once the valve was

closed. The shift supervisor initiated a temporary procedure change to

include ste) 20. The step 20 requirements reflected basic operator i

'

response; t1erefore, the inspectors believed the actions would have been accomplished, This discrepancy was a minor omission.

i

The inspectors also reviewed the PMT requirements for WO 9601886.

Maintenance personnel removed and reinstalled sealant and a drain end

! cap downstream of a leaking valve. MS-37-2. The PMT required .

! verification of no leakage past MS-37-2 The ins since no work was performed on the leaking valvethe pectors noted PMT did not that j reflect the work performed. The licensee revised the PMT accordingl c. Conclusion

As discussed in previous inspection reports, quality control personnel j performed an audit on the PMT process in late 1995. The examples

.

discussed above were of minor significance compared to the previous

-

audit results. A follow-up Quality Control audit was initiated prior to the end of this period to review the licensee's corrective actions.

J Review of the follow-up audit findings is considered an Inspection

Follow-up Item (50-263/96012-03).

M7 Quality Assurance in Maintenance Activities

{

! M7.1 Ouality Control Insoections of Work Activities

a. Insoection Scope (62703)

The inspectors performed reviews of Quality Control (OC) activitie ,

li 10

.

,.

-

.

I

l b. Observations and Findinas 1 Inspection of maintenance and OC work activities indicated that OC inspections were properly performed and documented on work document The work documents accurately reflected the status of work activities and the results of OC inspections. This inspection effort was performed following a previous NRC identification of OC inspections not being properly documente The inspectors also reviewed conditiun reports (CR) 96002513 and 96002580 related to incorrectly sized wear rings due to an out-of -

tolerance micrometer. The licensee identified that the micrometer was

]reviously used during the rebuilding of a saare RHRSW Jump assembly. A lold tag was immediately placed on the assem)1y until t1e assessment of the out-of-calibration micrometer was completed. The inspectors noted that the hold tag placed on the spare RHRSW pump assembly did not specify the reason for the hold. This information was later-adde c. Conclusions OC inspection activities were observed to be performed in accordance with work documents and inspection results were properly documente III. Enaineerina

.

El Conduct of Engineering Engineering support to plant operations and maintenance organizations l was observed during the course of plant work activities. Observations ,

were made in the areas of CRs. plant surveillances. maintenance work l orders, and plant scheduling. No problems were noted. However, an unreviewed safety question and concerns with safety evaluations were identified during an NRC Region III Safety System 03erational Performance Inspection as documented in Inspection Report 50-263/9600 E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment E2.1 Results of UFSAR Review While performing the inspections discussed in this report, the inspectors reviewed the applicable portions of the UFSAR that related to the areas inspected. The inspectors verified that the UFSAR wording was consistent with the observed plant practices, procedures, and parameter E7 Quality Assurance in Engineering Activities E7.1 Routine Enaineerina Issues Meetina On December 6. 1996, the inspectors and the NRR project manager met with the Superintendent of Engineering and others to discuss outstanding

.

,. .

engineering issues. Topics included status of the rerate project, current equipment concerns, modifications proposed for the 1998 refueling outage, and review of two generic letter E8 Hiscellaneous Engineering Issues E (Closed) Insoection Follow-uo Item (50-263/94013-02): Unexpected check valves discovered in flexible air hoses for the alternate nitrogen system following a system modification. The licensee identified small check valves on the outlet flexible hose adapters of the bottles which were not shown on system drawings. Of the eight bottles examined. one of the hoses was installed such that the check valve was reversed. The licensee concluded that the Train A alternate nitrogen system, which contained the reversed hose, was only sup) lied with three bottles instead of four. However, the system leac rate was below the design leak rate: therefore, the system was operable. The licensee initiated Nonconformance Report N94-347 to document the condition and develop corrective action The reversed flexible hose was corrected. Additionally the licensee initiated W0s (94-05841 and 94-05972) to remove the hose insert which contained the internal check valves. The flexible hoses were then re-installed without the check valves. The flexible hoses with internal check valves (model PF-92CV) were also removed from the warehouse and new hoses without valves have been procured (model PF-92). The inspectors performed an inspection of the flexible hoses in the warehouse and verified that the inventory consisted of model PF-92 hoses. This item is close IV. Plant Support R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls R1.1 General Comments (71750)

The inspectors conducted frequent reviews of the radiological protection area. In general, plant personnel followed good radiological worker practices. The inspectors reviewed several condition reports which described improper radiological postings. Discussions with the radiation protection supervisor indicated that the reports were generated as a result of their corrective actions to a Non-Cited Violation discussed in Inspection Report 50-263/9601 F8 Hiscellaneous Fire Protection Issues F8.1 (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-263/96007-05): Licensee identified concerns with fire brigade mask fit requirements. In August 1996. the licensee determined that mask fit qualifications for three individuals expired in June 1996. Mask fits and other required requalification information were maintained on a computer database; however, this information was not readily available to supervisors. The individuals

'

.- -

were successfully retested with no significant changes in mask fi Therefore, they.could have responded to an event if necessary. Also, the licersee reviewed-shift coverage and determined that fire brigade requirements would have been met without these individuals. This issue was documented in CR 96001857 and is considered close S6 Security Organization and Administration S6.1 Routine Meetina with Security Manaaement (71750)

'On January 9,1997, the inspectors met with the corporate security supervisor, the site security superintendent, and others to discuss the licensee's quarterly self-assessment report. Topics included training initiatives, recent quality assurance audits, and other departmental change The security supervisor also discussed a recent reportable event concerning fitness for duty. The licensee identified in December 1996 that one individual's access should have been revoked in August 199 The root cause and corrective actions will be evaluated during review of LER 50-263/96-01 V. Manacement Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Summary On January 10, 1997, the inspectors presented the inspection results to - -

members of licensee management. The licensee acknowledged the findings presente The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identifie I

,

i

.

13  ;

I

-. -. .. .

. --_ i,

,

,.

.

.

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee E. Watzl Vice President Nuclear W. Hill. Plant Manager M. Hammer. General Superintendent Maintenance i K. Jepson. Superintendent. Chemistry & Environmental Protection l L. Nolan. General Superintendent Safety Assessment M. Onnen. General Superintendent 0)erations E. Reilly. Superintendent Plant Scleduling C. Schibonski, General Superintendent Engineering W. Shamla. Manager Quality Services J. Windschill General Superintendent. Radiation Protection L. Wilkerson. Superintendent Security B. Day. Training Manager l

..

INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 40500: Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying. Resolving, and ;

Preventing Problems IP 62703: Maintenance Observations IP 71707: Plant Operations IP 71750: Plant Support IP 93702: Prompt Onsite Response to Events at Operating Power Reactors I

'

ITEMS OPENED. CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened 50-263/96012-01 URI Test caused freezing conditions in turbine building resulting in inoperable equipment 50-263/96012-02 NCV Licensee-identified failure to follow surveillance 3rocedure resulting in manual scra /96012-03 IFI Follow Quality Services audit regarding post-maintenance testing Closed 50-263/94013-02 IFI Unexpected check valves discovered in flexible air hoses 50-263/94014-01 VIO Failure to protect spare 4160V circuit breakers 50-263/96007-05 URI Fire brigade mask fit requirements 50-263/96011 LER Jumper placement error causes dual recirculation pump trip

.

• e l

LIST OF ACRONYHS USED ATWS Anticipated Transient Without Scram CFR Code of Federal Regulations  !

'

CR Condition Report GOS Generation Quality Services IFI Inspection Follow-up Item LCO Limiting Condition for Operation LER Licensee Event Report MSIV Main Steam Isolation Valve NCV Non-Cited Violation i NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission l

' PM Preventive Maintenance PMT Post-Maintenance Test PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment OC Ouality Control RHRSW Residual Heat Removal Service Water SBLC Standby Liquid Control --

TS Technical Specification UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report VIO Violation .

I

.

WO Work Order I

l

.

l

!

15