ML18005A016

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Rev 1 to Procedures Generation Package,Part Iii, Verification/Validation for Donald C Cook Nuclear Plant Emergency Operating Procedures.
ML18005A016
Person / Time
Site: Cook  American Electric Power icon.png
Issue date: 05/01/1986
From:
INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG
To:
Shared Package
ML17324A896 List:
References
AEP:NRC:0773Q, AEP:NRC:773Q, PROC-860501-02, NUDOCS 8605210271
Download: ML18005A016 (9)


Text

ATTACHMENTTOAEP:NRC:0773QPROCEDURESGENERATIONPACKAGEPARTIIIVERIFICATION/VALIDATIONFORDONALDC.COOKNUCLEARPLANTEMERGENCYOPERATINGPROCEDURESREVISION1MAY1,1986 1li"1IJ0 EOPVERIFICATION/VALIDATIONPROGRAMOverviewVerification/Validation(V&V)ofEOPsistheevaluationperformedtodeterminethattheactionsspecifiedintheprocedurecanbecarriedoutbytheoperatortomanageemergencyconditionseffectively.Thisevaluationwillbecarriedoutintwophases.Thefirstphase,TableTopReview,willaddressobjectivesthataregearedtowardverifyingtheTechnicaladequacyoftheEOPs.Thesecondphase,ControlRoomWalk-Through,willaddressobjectivesfocusedonthehumanengineeringaspectsofthewrittendocument'susability.Problemareas(hereafterreferredtoasdiscrepancies)identifiedbytheV&Vprocesswillbedocumented,investigated,andresolved.ItistheintentionofD.C.CooktoperformV&VofallsignificantmodificationtotheEOP'safterinitialimplementation.AportionoftheDetailedControlRoomRevieweffortwillbeperformedconcurrentlywiththeV&VprocesstoaddressthehumanengineeringaspectsoftheEOP-operator-hardwareinterface.OBJECTIVESThescopeoftheevaluationaccomplishedbyV&Vwillbedefinedbyaddressingseveralcriteria.Thesecriteriaorobjectivesarepresentedasfollows,listedundertheprogramphaseduringwhichtheyareaddressed:TableToReviewThattheEOP'saretechnicallycorrect,i.e.,theyaccuratelyreflecttheTechnicalGuidelines(includingsourcedocumentsandEOPDocumentationForm).ThattheEOPsarewrittencorrectly,i.e.,theyaccuratelyreflectthewritersguide.ThatthelanguageandlevelofinformationpresentationintheEOP'siscompatiblewiththeminimumnumber,qualification,training,andexperienceoftheoperatingstaff.

ControlRoomWalk-Throuh(Validation)ThattheEOPsareusable,i.e.,theycanbeunder-stoodandfollowedwithoutconfusion,delays,errors,etc.ThatthereisacorrespondencebetweentheEOPsandthecontrolroom/planthardware,i.e.,control/equipment/indicationsthatarereferencedareavail-able(insideandoutsideofthecontrolroom),usethesamedesignation,usethesameunitsofmeasure,andoperateasspecifiedintheEOPs.ThatthereisahighlevelofassurancethattheEOPswillwork,i.e.,theprocedureguidestheoperatorinmitigatingtransientsandaccidents.NOTE:SincetheD.C.CookEOP'swillbebasedonthegenericWesting-houseOwnersGroupEmergencyResponseGuidelines(ERGs)andagenericvalidationhasbeenperformedontheERGs,thiscriteriawillnotbespecificallyaddressed.However,aselectedsetofplantspecificEOPswillbeexercisedattheSNUPPSsimulatorinZion,Illinois.Inthisway,anindependentcheckofthegenericprogramcanbemadetoinsuretheplantspecificconversiondidnotdetractfromtheoverallworkabilityof.theEOP's.TheEOP'schosenforsimulatorvalidationmettheselectioncriteriawhichcomplieswiththerecommenda-tionsofNUREG0700(Section3.4.2.2)aswellasthoseneededtoaddresstheimportantareasofemergencyoperations(eg.,eventdiagnosis,criticalsafetyfunctionmonitoring,highriskeventsequences,etc.)forsystemreviewandtaskanalysispurposes.Theeventsequencesare:SpurioussafetyinjectionLossofreactorcoolant(smallbreakapproximately1"diameter)Lossofreactorcoolant(smallbreakapproximately4"diameter)Lossofreactorcoolant(largebreak)LossofsecondarycoolantCombinedlossofreactorandsecondarycoolantSteamgeneratortuberupture(designbasis)Steamgeneratortuberupture(multiplerupturesinonegenerator)AnticipatedtransientwithoutscramInadequatecorecooling(resultingfromfailuresinemergencycorecoolingsystemInadequatecorecooling(resultingfromlossofsecondaryheatsink)Pressurizedthermalshock.

AlloftheeventsequencesabovearewithinthecapabilitiesandlimitationsoftheSNUPPSsimulatorwhenprogrammedwithD.C.CookPlantspecificsoftware.PROGRAMDESCRIPTIONEachEOPwillbeexaminedandevaluatedstepbystepforcompliancewiththeobjectivespresentedabove.Theobjectivesarebrokendownintospecificitemstocreateasystematicchecklist.Inorderforanobjectivetobesatisfied,eachspecificitemmustbeacharacteristicoftheEOP.Eachobjectiveisbrokendownasfollows:ThattheEOPsaretechnicallycorrect,i.e.,theyaccuratelyreflecttheTechnicalGuidelines(includingsourcedocumentsandEOPDocumentationForm).-Areentryconditionsorsymptomscorrectlystated?Isthearrangementandcontentofsteps,cautions,andnotessupportedbyinformationfromsourcedocuments?-Arecalculatedortranslatedquantitativevaluescorrect?Istheplant,hardwareidentifiedbytheEOPavailablefortheoperatortouse?ThattheEOPsarewrittencorrectly,i.e.,accuratelyreflectthewritersguide.-AretheEOPslegible,i.e.,aregraphsandtablesclearlyreadable,isprintedmaterialvisiblewithinthebordersonallpages?Istheformatconsistentthroughouttheprocedureset?IsEOPidentificationcompleteandcorrect?Aresteps,cautions,andnotesclearlyandconsistentlypresented,understandable,anddistinguishablefromeachother?AretransitionswithintheEOPsconsistentandincompliancewiththerulesofreferencingandbranchingcontainedinthewritersguide?

That.thelanguageandlevelofinformationpresentactionintheEOPsiscompatiblewiththeminimumnumber,qualification,training,andexperienceoftheoperatingstaffwhenwalkthroughandsimulatorexercisesareconductedwiththeminimum(orless)controlroomstaffsizerequiredbyD.C.Cooktechnicalspecifications.-AretheEOPsincompatiblewith.shift,manninglevelsandpolicies?0ThattheEOPsareusable,i.e.,theycanbeunderstoodandfollowedwithoutconfusion,delays,errors,etc.-DotheEOPscontainsufficientinformation,consistentwithtraining,toenabletheoperatortoproperlyexecutetheEOPinstructions?-DoestheoperatorcomprehendtheinformationpresentedintheEOPs?0Thatthereisacorrespondencebetweentheproceduresandthecontrolroom/planthardware,i.e.,control/equipment/indicationsthatarereferencedavailable(insideandoutsidetheofcontrolroom),usethesamedesignation,usethesameunitsofmeasure,andoperateasspecifiedintheEOPs.-AretheEOPscompatiblewithplanthardwareandplantresponse?0ThatthereisahighlevelofassurancethattheEOP'swillwork,i.e.,theproceduresguidetheoperatorinmitigatingtransientsandaccidents.-Again,sincetheD.C.CookplantEOP'sarebasedontheWestinghouseGroupERG's,credit.istakenforvalidation/verificationofthisobjectivebasedonthegenericERGvalidation.D.C.CookwillcheckthisobjectivebyusingaselectedsetofplantspecificproceduresattheSNUPPSsimulatorinZion,Illinois.TheverificationandvalidationprocessshallbeconductedontheentiresetofUnitoneEOPs.DuringthegenerationoftheUnittwosetofEOPs,areaswheresignificantdifferencesbetweentheunitsresultedindifferentoperatorinstructionswillbenoted.Theseareaswillthenbesubjectedtotheentireverification/validationprocessasdescribedabove.

RESPONSIBILITIESTheOperationsDepartmentSuperintendent(O.S.)willhavetheresponsibilityforimplementingtheVGVprogramatD.C.Cook.TheOperationsDepartmentProcedureCoordinator(P.C)willhavetheresponsibilityforconductingtheVGVprogram.Departmentengineers,procedurecoordinatorandlicensedoperatorswilltakepartineveryfacetoftheprocess.Theengineerswillparticipate(asteammember)inthetabletopreviewsegmentofthereview.Licensedoperators,bothSROandRO,willparticipate(asteammembers)inthetabletopreviewandwalkthroughsegmentsofthereview.TheProcedureCoordinator(SROlicensed)willconducttheVandVprogramassessmentandbeateammemberforboththetablereviewandcontrolroomwalkthroughsegments.Inaddition,wheneverpossible,depart-mentengineerswithhumanfactorsbackgroundwillpartici-pateasteammembersforthetabletopreviewandcontrolroomwalkthrough.Thereviewteamswillberesponsibleforverifyingobjectivesaremetanddiscrepanciesaredocu-mented.ThePlantNuclearSafetyReviewCommittee(PNSRC)isresponsibleforfinalapprovaloftheEOPs.Additionaltaskresponsibilitiesareasfollows:TheP.CwilltrainthereviewteamsintheuseoftheV6Uprocedure.TheP.C.willinterfacewiththeDetailedControl-RoomDesignReviewCoordinator.TheO.S.andP.C.willresolvealldiscrepancies.(TheP.CwillensurethatallresolutionsareincorporatedasnecessaryintotheEOPs.)DISCREPANCYIDENTIFICATIONTheultimategoaloftheV&VprogramistoidentifyareaswheretheplantspecificEOPsmaydeviatefromthegenericprocedures,criteriainthewriterguide,andtechnicalguidelines,and/orplantcharacteristicsorpolicies.Itistheresponsibilityofthereviewteams,throughtheuseoftheV&Vprocedure,toensurethatobjectivesaremet,and/ordiscrepanciesdocumented.Thereviewteamsshouldalsomakerecommendationstoresolvediscrepancieswhenappropriate.

6.DISCREPANCYRESOLUTIONOnceadiscrepancyisidentifiedanddocumented,aresolu-tionmustbedeveloped.Thesolutionwhichresolvesthediscrepancymaytakeanyofvariousforms,e.g.,procedurechange,increasedoperatortraining,hardwaremodification,etc.Inallcases,theresolutionwillbedocumented.Whenachangetoaprocedureorhardwareismadetoresolveadiscrepancy,adeterminationmustbemadetoindicatewhetherornotthesechangesshouldbereverifiedorrevalidated.Thecriteriausedtodeterminethiswillbewhetherornotthechangehasamajorimpactonitemsonthechecklist.Ifthechangehadamajorimpactonthechecklistitemtheareaoftheprocedureaffectedbythechangewillberevalidated/reverified.Forexample,ifitisdeterminedthatasetpointisincorrect,thenthenewsetpointshouldberevalidatedtoensureitmeetsthewalkthroughchecklistcriteriawhichrequires"instrumentranges/scales/unitsandtolerances"tobe"consistentwiththeinstrumentvaluesstated".Changesthathaveaminorimpact(eg.,typo's,spellingerrors,etc.)onchecklistitemswillnotberevalidated/reverified.TheV&VonanygivenEOPwillnotbeconsideredcomplete.untilalldiscrepanciesapplicabletoitareresolved.Proposedchangeswillbeevaluatedfortheirimpactonotheremergencyresponsecapabilities.7.RECORDRETENTIONAlldocumentationformsgeneratedduringtheV&VprogramwillbeconsideredpartoftheEmergencyProceduresandretainedinaccordancewithPlantManagersInstruction-2130,PlantRecords.