ML20058A590
| ML20058A590 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 10/29/1981 |
| From: | Bickwit L NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20058A382 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-92-436, FOIA-93-436, TASK-AICM, TASK-SE SECY-81-622, NUDOCS 8201110277 | |
| Download: ML20058A590 (15) | |
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SECY-81-622 October 29, 1981 5,;;I!GL) e f
%... +.r ADJUDICATORY ISSUE 1
(Commission Meeting) j For:
The Commissioners i
From:
Leonard Bickwit, Jr.
l General Counsel t
Forrest Remick, Director i
Office of Policy Evaluation
Subject:
SAN ONOFRE SUA SPdNTE ISSUE Discussion:
This issue was first raised in the Licensing Board's July 29, 1981 order and modified and clarified by subsequent Licensing Board orders dated August 7, September 14, and October 2, 1981.
The issue as framed-by the Board in its September 14, 1981 order essentially 1
asks what effect the occurrence of an earthquake in excess of the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) would have on
-i a plant's emergency response if it also caused a radiological emergency.
The Board's concern centered on the impact on emergency response from the damage to l
essential commun' cations systems, transportation routes and structures that might otherwise be used for
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sheltering.
The September 14 Board order and the October 2 Board response to the Commission's September 18 order describe fully the Board's rationale for taking up this issue and will not be junc.m s
}.g ;,3 sy.marized further.
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hile couching its questions in terms of d[
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SSE, the Board does not seem to be l
limited to that definition of its 8201110277 930412 concern.
In footnote 8 on p. 12 of its
$ d N -436 September 14, 1981 Order, the Board PDR explains:
CONTACT:
Marian E. Moe, OGC TMs paper is identical to advance
- ,;, @ ; SECY tl0TE
634-1493 copies which were distributed by OGC to o et Q g om Commission offices on October 29, 1981.
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" Arguably our basic question about the adequacy of the Applicants' emergency plans might have been raised in a different way, namely by postulating an earthquake of a magnitude slightly below the SSE which causes a major facility accident and highway damage precluding rapid evacuation.
Although there is no issue in this case about the actual integrity of the facility, a Board might hypothesize such a failure for the sole purpose of testing emergency planning capabilities.
Although we have not chosen to frame the issue in this way, either approach presumably would raise the planning issues that concern us."
The issue raised by the Licensing Board 1
involves a question heretofore unexamined by the Commission, i.e., how seismic questions should be considered in making findings of emergency planning cdequacy.
As noted by the Licensing E:ard, the emergency planning rule and tne seismic design criteria of 10 CFR Part IOC do n:t specifically refer to each other and there is no direct guidance on how the two factors should be integrated in making the necessary determinations of safety.
In, OPE has addressed the question of how the Commission could j/'
deal with emergency planning for areas r
p of high seismic activity.
gf Ecth the staff and the applicant objected to the Board's order. 1/
The staff's approach to the question
-1/
The applicant's objections were similar to the staff's, except that they also asserted that there is no factual basis or regulatory reason for postulating a " multiple disaster" scenario -- an earthquake occurring coincidently with an independently caused radiological emergency.
However, in its September 14, 1981 order, the Board reiterated that it was not postulating a
" multiple disaster" sequence of events from indecendent causes (conceded by the Board as being extremely unlikely), but the more plausible situation where a severe earthquake causes the radiological emergency.
4-3 contemplates a versatile emergency response plan which would be capable of responding to a wide spectrum'of events, without specifying what magnitude of earthquake or what level of damage emergency plans'must respond to.
The staff's view is best expressed in Brian Grimes' affidhvit in support of the June 22, 1981 Staff Views (Attachment 2) on this issue:
The more difficult question is the extent to which earthquake effects are to be taken into account in emergency planning.
The answer to this question is dependent upon the nature of the risk and the nature of the remedy to deal with the risk.
In areas of low seismicity, the nature c
- risk is such that the NRC Staff does not require any explicit consideration of earthquake effects in emergency planni:.g.
In areas of high seismicity (high earthquake frequency and magnitude),
specifically California, the nature of the risk warrants specific consideration of earthquake effects.
To this end, the NRC Staff has made requests to the Applicants on December 17, 1981, and May 13, 1981, to consider earthquake ef fects in its emergency planning, and the NRC Staff has also requested FEMA to consider earthquake effects in its evaluation of off-site plans.
The Staff has, however, concluded that additional requirements such as the design of additional facilities, structures and systems to specifically withstand earthquakes is not necessary.
In particular, no special seismic design of public notification systems, environmental monitoring capability or communications equipment is contemplated.
Also, consideration need not be given to a seismic event coincident with a significant accident at the plant due to the very low likelihood of such a-coincidence.
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o-With respect to on-site effects, consideration should be given to the ability to transport necessary personnel to the plant to cope with degraded modes of plant operation possibly resulting from the earthquake.
In addition, there should be assurance of continued communication between the plant and off-site agencies.
j With respect to off-site effects, it is our understanding that the FEMA Radiological Emergency Praparedness staff believes that t,.e Emergency Operation Centers (EOCs) of each of the jurisdictions involved in the emergency planning effort for a specific nuclear facility should have suitably i
distant backup facilities to permit continued functioning of a jurisdiction's emergency response given the possible failure of its primary EOC.
t In addition, the capability should exist to obtain damage estimates both to the plant and to transportation and communication facilities off-site to provide a data base to factor into the decisionmaking process.
- Finally, the Applicants should have available a range of recommendations to off-site authorities, taking into account the degree of damage to the plant caused by the' earthquake and to transportation and communication facilities off-site.
The specific size or magnitude of earthquake to be considered for emergency planning purposes is not a critical element as long as the magnitude-postulated is less than or equal to the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE), because such earthquakes are accounted for in the plant design.
A moderate size earthquake, something less than the SSE, will produce impacts on transportation and communication e
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facilities which, if' considered in emergency planning, would also provide an emergency response capability useful in coping with any less likely larger earthquakes.
As noted above, the planning basis for emergency preparedness does not include explicit planning for any-specific event or events, but rather is a base capability which 1'
can be expanded or contracted to address an actual emergency.
The measures which cope with consequences of moderate earthquakes (e.g., backup l
communications and EOCs, and feedback of damage estimates regarding transportation routes to decisionmakers) would be equally applicable in the event of a large earthquake.
Explicit consideration of less than worst-case effects t
suffices to give confidence that 1
the occurrence of any of a spectrum of events, including very low likelihood events, provide decisionmakers with a planning base
.from which specific actions could be chosen from among available alternatives.
However, the magnitude of the earthquake does become critical
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when one considers the SSE with its potential for a sudden radiological i
release from the plant itself.
Presumably, if one postulates an earthquake less than or equal to the SSE, while one could have impacts upon communications and transportation as a consequence of the earthquake, nonetheless the plant would not pose an immediate radiological hazard.
If, however, one postulates an earthquake in excess of the SSE, then one has the potential.for a very real radiological hazard complicated by the nonradiological impacts posed by a major earthquake.
In both FEMA's and Staff's view, such a contingency does not warrant specific emergency planning' efforts 3
due to the remote likelihood of its
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In addition, the characteristics of an accident l
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which could theoretically be l
created by an earthquake larger than the SSE would not be outside the spectrum of accidents considered f. NUREG-0396 upon which the judgment on planning zone sizes and other planning elements were l
based.
Also, to provide an adequate emergency response for i
such an occurrence would require a commitment of societal resources of great magnitude.
Such a commitment is not warranted given the low 4
likelihood of occurrence of-earthquakes in excess of the SSE.
l Consequently, due to the remote likelihood of its occurrence and l
due to the great commitment of resources required, both FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness Staff and the NRC Staff are of the j
view that earthquakes more_ severe 1
than the SSE need not be explicitly considered for emergency planning purposes.
As noted.above, however, as a consequence of planning for moderate earthquakes, a planning base is available in the event of the less likely larger earthquake..
[End of quotation.]
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Recommendation:
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In light of this recommendation, I
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P _-(2 1 W Leonard Bickwit, Jr.
General Counsel i
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Remick, Director o
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' - Ice of Policy Evaluation Attachments:
1.
OPE Memo 2.
Grimes Affidavit dated 6/22/81 3.
October 2, 1981 Board Order 4.
Draft Commission Order DISTRIBUTION Comissioners Comission Staff Offices Secretariat D
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i ATTACFJENT 1
I EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANNING FOR AREAS OF HIGH SEISMICITY:
OPE COMMENTS Staff Position In a memorandum dated November 3, 1980, Brian Grimes requested FEMA to review the state and local planning efforts for the areas around California nuclear power plants with respect to earthquakes and around the Trojan site (Oregon) with respect to volcani be addressed in the planning process.__/ phenomena and how these can best FEMA has directed the appro-priate FEMA regional offices to take such factors into account in tneir review of off-site preparedness.2/
R. Jaske, in a June 22, 1981 affidavit in the San Onofre hearing described the FEMA position:
"With respect to earthquakes it is the FEMA REP [ Radiological Emergency Preparedness] staff view that earthquake effects must be taken into account in the off-site emergency plans, given the seismic situation in California.
The FEMA REP staff accepts as adequate for planning purposes an earthquake not more severe than the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) as defined in 10 CFR Part 100.
"No special seismic design of public alerting and notificaticn systems cr environmental cap 6bility is contemplated.
In its evaluation, the FEMA REP staff believes there should be assurance of :ontinued communication between the power station and outside agencies in order to obtain damage estimates both to the site and to transportation and communication facilities off-site as cart of the coordinated response.
Emergency Operating Centers (EOC) of each of the jurisdictions involved in the emercency planning effort should have suitably distant backup f acilities to permit continued functioning of a jurisdiction's emergency response including notification to the public, given the possibility of failure of a primary EOC or its associated communications."
Consistent witn the foregoing the staff has reouested California licensees and applicants to evaluate the effects earthquakes would have ontheiremergencyrespongecapabilitiesandincludetheseconsiderations in their emergency plans.._/ For purposes of this evaluation, the staff indicated licensees and applicants could assume that the plant site
.1/ emorandum of November 3, 1980 from B.K. Grimes (NRC) to J. McConnell M
(FEMA), " Request for FEMA Assistance to Review Effects of Earthquake and volcanic Eruption on State / Local Emergency Plans."
2_/ emorandum of May 20, 1981 from W.J. Dircks to J.C. Marks, " Emergency M
Planning at Nuclear Facilities During and Following Natural Events."
3/ etter of May 13, 1981 from R.L. Tedesco to R. Deitch (Southern California L
Edison) and D.W. Gilman (San Diego Gas and Electric), Docket 50-361/362.
2-would experience earthquake effects no more' severe than the Safe Shutdown Earthquake; while they would not need to assume a reactor accident occurs simultaneously with the earthquake event, they should include in their planning basis the consideration that the plant might have been adversely affected by the earthquake and may, therefore, be more prone to the potential for an incident that might result in off-site releases of radioactive material.
The staff further requested the following items be considered in the evaluation of the effect of earthquakes on emergency plans:
. Ability to transport necessary personnel to the plant to cope with degraded modes of plant operation, assuming roads are disrupted.
The staff has indicated that arrangements should be such that equipment to be used in such circumstances, such as helicopters, off-road vehicles, etc., will be dedicated for use by the plant even under pressing and competing needs such as off-site rescue missions.
. Communication between the plant and outside agencies. The staff expects licensees will need to show that communications to off-site authorities are available after moderate earthquakes.
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. Ability to obtain damage estimates, both to the plant and to trans-portation/comnunication facilities off-site.
This information should be available to factor into the decision-making process, including recommendations to off-site authorities for protective actions after an earthquake.
. Development of a range of recommendations to off-site authorities that I
take into account various degrees and locations of damage to the plant i
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OPE Recommendations The staff and FEMA are giving consideration to earthquake effects in emergency planning in areas of high seismicity. However, the staff position, as stated in References 2 and 3 and in the San Onofre testimony,d/
with respect to the severity of earthquakes and their time relationship to the release of radioactivit has not been considered previousiv by i
the Commission.
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i A/une22,1981, August 4, 1981, and August 31, 1981 staff filings with J
San Onofre Licensing Board.
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OPE recomends that We believe OPE recommends that l
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i Our recommended position is reasonably well stated by the NRC/ EPA Task I
Force on Emergency Planning ("Planniag Bases for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants," NUREG-0396, December 1978, page III-3):
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l "The Task Force has to decide whether to place reliance on general emergency plans for coping with the events of Class 9 accidents for l
emergency planning purposes, or whether to recommend developing specific plans and organizational capabilities to contend with such accidents.
The Task Force believes that it is not appropriate to develop specific plans for the most severe and most improbable Class 9 events.
The Task Force, however, does believe that con-sideration should be given to the characteristics of Class 9 events in judging whether emergency plans based primarily on smaller accidents can be expanded to cope with larger events.
This is a means of providing flexibility of response capability and at the same time giving reasonable assurance that some capability exists to minimize the impacts of even the most severe accidents."
OPE recommends that i
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3 OPE believes hat t
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Consistent with the above generic recommendations. OPE reconrnends that f
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.o, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION a
BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
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SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY.
Docket Nos. 50-351 OL LT, A1
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50-362 OL
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(San Onofre Nuclear Generating
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Station, Units 2 and 3)
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AFFIDAVIT OF BRI AN X. GRIMES My name is Srian K. Grimes.
I am Director, Division of Emergency Preparedness, Office of Inspection and Enforce:ent, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C.
My professional qualifications are attached as part of this affidavit.
This affidavit is submitted to address the EEeas cf erergency planning earthquake considerations and selection of Emegen:y Fianning Zcne (EFZ) sice.
I.
Emer:ency Plannine Earthouake Considerations A fundamental premise in the apprcach to emergency planning utilized by the Federal Erergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Nuclear egulatory Commission (NRC) is that the energency planning basis must be capable of responding to a wide spectrum of accidents.
This was the conclusion reached by the Task Force which authored NUREG-0395.1/
If NUREG-0396, EPA 520/1-78-016, " Planning Sasis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Li.ghCdater Nuclear Power Plants," December 1978, pp. 4-6.
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2 That Task Force report was subsequently endorsed by the Commission in its Policy Statenent with respect to the Planning Basis for Emergency Responses to Nuclear Power Reactor Accidents (Policy Statement). 44 F ed.
Reg. 61123 (C,ctober 23,1979).
The concept is reiterated in NUREG-0554. 2/ Consequently, as a single specific accident sequence for a light water reactor nuclear power plant could not be identified as a i
planning basis, both NUREG-0396 and NUREG-0654 emphasized that the most important element of any planning basis is the distance from the nuclear f acility which defines the area over which planning fer predetennined action should be carried out.5/
Not only is this area, termed the Energency Planning Zone or EPI, crucial but the characteristics of the EPZ a re significant.
The need for specification of areas for rajo.
exposure pathways is evident.
The 1ccatien cf the
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popGlition for whom protective measures may be needed, responsible authorities who would carry out proter,tive actions and the means of car.manication to j
th*5c authorities and to the population are all l
dependent on the characteristics of the olanninc 3
areas.
(Emphasis supplied).
NUREG-0554, p. c.
9 It is, therefore, inherent in the planning apprcach utili:ed by FEMA and the Commission, i.e., the Emergency Planning Zone concept, that the characteristics of the Emergency Planning Zones themselves must be f actored into emergency planning considerations.
For example, if an EP2 2/
NUREG-055a FEMA-Rep-1, Rev.1. " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, November 1980, pp. 5-7.
3/
NUREG-0396, p. E, NUREG-0654, p. 7.
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is an area with singular adverse weather attributes,. those attributes must be considered in ecergency planning'.
This reascning 'would extend to all attributes that might adversely affect an Emergency Planning Zone.
Appendix 4 of NUREG-0554 speaks to this point directly.
Evacuation time estimates are required to consider adverse conditions which =ight
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reasonably be expected to occur during the plant lifetime at a particular j
i site and be severe enough to affect the time estimates for a particular 4
event.
i Two conditiens--normal and adv'erse--are considered in the analyses.
Adverse conditions would decend on the characteristics cf a soecific site anc could include floccine, snow, ice, foe or rain.
(Empnasis suppli ed. ) NUREG-0554, Rev.1 pp. 4-6.
l It should be stressed that this reference is to NUREG-0554 which the I
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Commissien has adepted to previde guidance in developing plans for coping witn emergenci'e~s?L/
It is clear then that the characteristics cf a particular Erergency Planning Ione must be taken into account to give
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meaning to Cancission's energency planning regulatier.s.
In the case of San Oncfre Units 2 & 3, the site is in California l
which has a substantial earthquake pctential, a fact that is recogni:ed J
j in the seismic cesign of these units.
Consequently, high seismicity is a i
characteristic which affects the E Is around the San Onofre site and is t
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j to be considered in emergency planning.
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The more difficult question is the extent to which earthquake effects are to be taken into account in emergency planning. The answer e
to this question is dependent upon the nature of the risk and the nature f/
10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, foctnote 1.
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4 of the remedy to deal with the risk.
In areas of lew seismicity, the l
nature of risk is such that the NRC Staff dees not require any explicit l
4 consideration cf earthquake effects in emergency planning.
In areas of l
l high seismicity (high earthquake frequency and magnitude), specifically l
California, the nature cf the risk warrants specific consideration of earthquake effects.
To this end, the NRC Staff has made requests to the I
l Applicants on December 17, 1981, and May 13,19S1, to consider earthquake effects in its emergency planning, and the NRC Staff has also requested l
4 FDM to consider earthquake effects in its evaluation of off-site plans.
l The Staff has, however, concluded that additional requirements such as f
the design of addi tienal facilities, structures and systens to i
specifically withstand earthquakes is not necessary.
In particular, no t
i special seisEii design of public netification syste:s, enviren ental monitoring capability er c:ramunications equipment is contemplated.
- Also, l
consideration need net be given to a seismic event coincident with a i
significant accident at the plant due to the very 1:w likeliheed cf such a coincidence.
l With respect to on-site effects, consideratien should be given to i
the ability to transport necessary personnel to the plant to cope with degraded redes of plant operatien pos'sibly resulting fran the earthquake.
In addition, there should be assurance of continued connunication between the plant and off-site agencies, j
i With respect to eff-site ef fects, it is cur understanding that the j
FE"A Raciological Emergency Preparedness staff believes that the 1
- Emergency Operation Centers (ECCs) of each l
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ef the jurisdictions involved in the emergency planning effort for a l
t specific nuclear facility should have suitably distant badiup facilities l
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to permit c:r$inued functioning cf a jurisdicti:n's energency response given the possible failure of its primary EOC.
r In addition, the capability should exist t: obtain damage estimates
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site to provide a data base to facter into the decision:aking process.
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Finally, the Applicants should have available t range Of recommendations to eff-site authorities, taking into account the degree of damage to the l
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a plant caused by the earthquake and to transportation and excunication f acilities ef f-site.
1 The specific sice er r.acnic.de cf earth uake to be considered for l
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i emergency planning purp:ses is n:t a critical element as long as the l
magnitude pcstulated is less tha.. or equal to the Safe Shutdcwn I
i Earthcuake (SSE), because such earthquakes are accounted for in the plant t
design.
A node. rate sice earthquake, secething less than the SSE, will 4
I produce impacts en transportation and ccccunicatica facilities which, if i
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i censidered in emergency planning, wculd also pr: vide an emergency 4
J response capability useful in c; ping with any less likely larger j
e a rt.hqua k es.
As noted ab:ve, the planning basis for e,ergency
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preparedness does not include explicit planning for any specific event or l
events, but rather is a base capability which can be expanded or i
centracted to address an actual energency.
The reasures which cepe with l
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consequences cf moderate earthquakes (e.g., backup can unications and i
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l ECCs,. an:L feedback of da: e;e estimete_s regarding. tra.nsportatien routes; :
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decisi:rcakers) would be-equally applicabie; in the eye.t Of a 1r.rge-
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Explicit consideration of less-than worst-case effects suffices to give confidence that-the occurrence of any of' a spectrum of events, including very low likelihood events, provide decisionmakers with a planning base from which specific actions could be chosen from among available alternatives.
However, the magnitude of the earthquake does be:cne critical when one considers the SSE with its potential for a sudden radiological release from the plant itself.
Presumably, if one postulates an eartnquake less than or equal to the STE, while one could have impa:ts upcn communicati:ns and trar.sportation as a consequen:e of the earthquake, nonetheless the f. ant would not pose an immediate radiological ht:ard.
If, ho ever, one postulates an earthquake in excess cf the SSE, then one has the ;ctential fer a very real radiclogical
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ha: erd cc:plic'a't?' by the nenradiclogical impe:ts posed a major earthquake.
In both FE".A's and Staff's view, sucr. a contingency does net l
warrant specific ener;ency planning efforts due to the remote likelihood of its occurren:e.
In addition, the characterisites of an at:ident which could theoreticelly be created by an earthquake larger than the SSE would not be outside the spectrum cf accidents considered in NUREG-0395 upon which the judgrent on planning zone sizes and other planning elemer.ts 1
were based.
Also, to provide an adequate emergency response for such an i
occurrence would require a commitment of societal rescurces of grea magnitude.
Such a commitment is not warranted given the low likelihood of occurrence of earthquakes in excess of the SSE.
Cons equently, due to the reacte likeithcod of its occurrence and due to the great cammitrent of resources required both the FEMA i
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9 Radiciogical Dnergency Preparedness Staff and the NRC Staff are of the vi et that earthquakes rcre severe than the SSE need not te explicitly considered for energency planning purposes.
As noted above, however, as a consequence of planning for roderate earthquakes, a planning base is available in the event of the less likely larger earthquake.
l 11.
Selection of Emercency Planninc Zone (EPZ) Size The size of the EF2s are substantially set by regulation. The Commission's regulations on this point read:
Generally, the plume exposure pathsay EPZ for nuclear t
po er plants shall consist cf an area of about 10 miles (15 km.) in radius.
And the ingestion pathsay EFZ shail consist of an area of about 50 miles (80 km.) in radius.
The exact si:e and configuration of the EPI surroundin; _ p.: ticular nuclear power reactor shall be cetermined in relation to local energency response r.eecs and the capabilities as they are affected by such conditions as demography, topography, land characteristics, access roads and jurisdic-ional boundaries. The size of EPIs may also l
be determined en a case-by-case basis for gas-cooled nuclear reactors and for reactors with an authori:ed power level less than 250 MW thermal.
10 C.F.R.
e 50.47(c)(2).
Consecuently, while the size and configuration of EPIs may be affected by the conditions indicated, it is the NRC Staff's position that the Commission's intent was that variability in size would be minimal, i.e., perhaps 11 miles, perhaps 9 miles.
However, in no case was the determination of an EPZ to be considered ajt initic on a case-by-case basis.
Such considerations were reserved for gas-cooled reactors or for reactors with limited power levels.
With respect to large power reactors such as those at San Onofre, only minimal variation of the 10 mile and 50 mile limits was intendey to j
suit the peculiarities of a local site.
Cons equently, some judgment e
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must be employed to firmly set the shape of the EPIs but the Cy mission's regulations place a limit to the degree of judgment needed. The regulations would not mandate EPIs substantially different from the 10-and 50-mile EPIs which have been set by regulation.
Under the regulations, it is then the task of energency planning officials to consider the specific conditions at each site and to delimit the EPIs to be used for energency planning within the above constraints.
Should offsite authorities choose to expend resources to extend EPIs i
- large distances, compliance with the regulations would not be affected as long as such planning did not reduce the level of preparedness called t
fer by the Commission's regulations within :ne EPIs called for by the Ca: mission regulations.
Information relative to the factors considered in setting EPZ size is evaluated bycFEMA during its review cf the off-site plans.
No site-specific studies are required to de ; ermine EPZ size.
The point's of signi-ficance for the determination of the actual boundaries is whether the boundary is clearly defined, can be readily communicated to the public, and accounts for local conditions near the nominal 10 mile or 50 mile boundary so that these members of the public within the EPIs who would be affected by protective action recommendations would be planned for.
j I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
E%eCuted on June 2 Z,1981.
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ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOAR 0 BEFORE ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGES James L. Kelley, Chairman Elizabeth B. Johnson Cadet H. Hand
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In the Matter of
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Docket Nos. 50-361-OL
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50-362-OL 500TliERN CALIFORNI; EDISON COMPANY,
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_ET _AL.
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(San Onofre Nuclear Generating
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Station, Units 2 and 3
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October 2, 1981
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ORDER (Respondinc to the Commission's Orde-of Sectec er 18, 19811 1.
Acoropriateness of the issue.
The Commission's Order of Septecer 18, 1981 directed this Board to provide an explanation of why we believe the root issue raised by our Orders of July 29, August 7, and Septecer 14, 1981 is an appropriate issue in this case. We have attempted to address this questien, either directly or indirectly, in our earlier orders.
However, a brief summary of our reasons for raising the issue may provide a clearer perspective.
Before we can approve issuance of operating licenses for Units 2 and 3 of the San Onofre f acility, we must find that the state of on and offsite emergency planning "provides reasonable assurance that adequate protective a
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2-measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency."
10 CFR 50.47(a)(1). As we stated in our September 14 Order, "many aspects of emergency plans, particularly evacuation routes, are by their very nature site specific.... And when, as here, a particular f acility is built in a seismically active area we read,__tastrule as requiring us to consider p
the poss.ible effects on emergency plans of a very large earthquake."
Order, p.10.
Our basic concern is that if an earthquake larger than the safe shutdcan earthquake for San Onofre were to occur, "substatial numbers of people might be trapped by the damaged highways in the populated areas of the EPI and unable to evacuate until after some of them receive injurious or lethal doses cf radiation." Order, p.2.
We e not believe f,
that we can make the " reasonable assurance" finding about the adequacy of the Applicants' plans until we have before us the specific information
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about this earthquate hazard called for in our September 14 Order.
In addition to what we have said in our earlier orders on the question of appropriateness, we also think it significant that the determinatien of tne correct " safe snutdown earthquake" is an inherently uncertain matter, much more uncertain than many design and other determinations boards are called upon to make.
Indeed, if that determination were relatively simple and straightforward, we would not have spent 25 days in hearings, generating some 7,000 pages of testimony, to reexamine the safe shutdown earthquake for San Oncfre.
As reflected in that record, seismic experts agree that~ trere data -- particularly on near-field ground motion -- would be desirable; and there are sharp disagreements among those experts over how the limited data availaole should be interpreted.
Given these considerations, we do rtot think that the safe shutdown earthcuake concept a
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should be uccritically extended from design requirements to emergency
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planning requirements to bar any consideration of larger earthquakes in the r
planning process for individual facilities.:, Emergency plans should be a
' N "f ailsafe" mechanism if the safe shutdown earthquake determination turns out to be wrong.
2.
Criteria for acceotability. The Commission's Order also directs us to provide an explanation of what criteria we intend to use to judge acceptability or adequacy of emergency plans with respect to the earthquake and accident we have postulated.
(a)
General criteria. We earlier quoted the overall criterion applicable here -- the finding required by 10 CFR 50.47(a)(1) that the plans give " reasonable assurance" about " adequate protective measures"
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being taken.
In addition, to the extent they are applicable to the problem we have raised, we would apply the more specific standards in subsection (b). And we would consider the adcitional standards in NUREG-0654, whien embody the expert judgment of the NRC Staff and FEMA.
However, these standards do not address the kind of site-specific problem that confronts us here, where evacuation may be delayed for a long time, and the only other substantial protective action -- taking shelter -- may not be effective, either because sheltering is only effective for a few hours, or because of earthquake damage to shelters, or both.
In such a case, a board needs some additional criteria in order to determine adequacy.
As explained b low, certain helpful corollary criteria are f airly inferable from the " reasonable assurance" and " adequacy" criteria, and from the overall emergency planning context.
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Plannino responsibilities decrease with decreasino accident probabilities. As indicated in many regulatory contexts, including the
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probability-based,10-mile plume exposure pathway EPZ for emergency plans (10 CFR 50.47(c)(2)), there is a relationship between " adequacy" of emergency plans and accident risk; levels of risk, in turn, depend both upon consequences and probabilities.
Plans should be fully adequate to deal with accidents and consequences that are reasonably to be anticipated.
At the other end of the spectrum, we "do not believe that full scale emergency planning is necessary to deal fully with the possible consequences of a very low probability-high consequence accident.
For example, the final environmental statement in this case postulates a very
- remote possibility of accident dose levels from San Onofre that mignt cause 30,000 f atalities and "100,000 peccle to receive whole body doses of core than 200 rems. See FES at Table 7.4, NUREG-0490.
Full scale planning for such a scenario might suggest to some a.need for ad' itional medical l
d f acilities, staffs and_.logistir.alsupport, standing by waiting for the accident in hgn.
Perhaps this is what the Applicants have in mind in suggesting that the Board's approach will require them to make " massive I
excenditures" en a "new emergency plan." Memorandum in Support of Certification, pp. 3-4 That is not what we have in mind.
g As a corollary of the preceding poi t(costs to the l
(c) Cost.
Applicant can be considered, under a rule of reason in determining the
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adequacy of energency plans for remote contingencies.
This is in contrast 3
to the general rule for reactor design requirements, which must be met regardless of cost.
(d) Possibility of f atalities and infuries.
We agree with the 5taff that "in the worst case accidents (from whatever scenario) f atalities
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cannot be ruled out even with emergency preparedness measures that fully meet the Comission regulations." Affidavit of Brian K. Grimes, dated August 4, 1981.
It af,
~s that such worst case accidents were factored into the generic emergency planning rules to some extent (see NUREG-0654, pp. 6-7), and need not necessarily be reexamined in individual cases. We also believe, however, that if a particular case presents a significant, atypical risk -- for example, a seismic risk that could take away both the evscuation and sheltering options -- a board should take a close look at it; such atypical risks are unlikely to have received careful scrutiny in the development cf generic planning standards.
And if a plan is to be
" approved notwithstanding such a risk, a board should fully acknowledge tnat fact, in terms of possible f atalities and injuries, in making its adequacy determination.
(e)
Best efforts.
We do not yet know the full dimensions of this site-specific problem, and therefore we also do not know whether any specific additional planning should be done. As we have stressed before, we are only at the sthge of finding out.
But we must reject, at least until we do find out, arguments tnat our concerns da not even have to be considered, and that wholly ad hoc responses will be adequate. The record indicates that some useful additional planning steps might be taken -- for
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example, more detailed consideration of how the Marines at Camp Pendleton a
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mignt assist in an evacuation.
See Order of September 14, 1981, p.5,
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- note 3.
We believe that such possibilities should be explored on the i
record, and that the Applicants should be required to meet a "best efforts" planning standard.
FOR THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD Im(s L. Kelley, Chairmh INISTRATIVE JUDGE Dated at Bethesda, MD, this 2nd day of October,1981 enup a
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