ML20058A536
| ML20058A536 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 07/24/1981 |
| From: | Fitzgerald J NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20058A382 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-92-436, FOIA-93-436, TASK-AINV, TASK-SE SECY-81-447, NUDOCS 8201070025 | |
| Download: ML20058A536 (8) | |
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SECY-81-447 c.....,
ADJUDICATORY ISSUE (Notation Vote)
Fort The Commissioners From:
James A. Fitzgerald Assistant General Counsel S ubj ect:
ALAB-647 -- Duke Power Co. (William B. McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2)
Revidw Time Expires:
August 10, 1981 Discussion:
On July 1, 1981, the Appeal Board denied a request by Carolina Environmental Study Group (CESG) to" stay the effectiveness of the Licensing Board's Initial and supplemental Initial Decisions in. the McGuire OL proceeding (ALAB-647).
The purpose _of this paper is to inform the Commission of the Appeal Board's decision {and to recommend that'~
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===1.
Background===
On May 2 6, 19 81, the Licensing Board issued its Supplemental Initial Decision (SID).in the reopened McGuire operating license proceedings.
In the SID the Board decided the hydrogen-generation issues which had been _ raised by intervenor (CESG) in the OL proceeding, which was. reopened after the TMI accident.
The Licensing Board-found in favor of applicant and authorized issuance of full-power, full-term operating licenses for both Units 1 and 2.
Contact:
Pat Davis, OGC, 43224
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On June 6, 1981, CL3G filed with the Appeal Board a timely motion for a stay of effectiveness of the SID pending appeal.
Applicant, Duke Power, opposed the stay motion in its response filed June 16, 1981.
The staff chose not to file a response to intervenor's motion.
The Appeal Board denied the request for a stay on July 1,1981 in ALAB-647.
Intervenor has not filed with the Commission a petition for review of the Board's decision.
Any review of ALAB-647 would be on the Commission's own motion.
2.
Standard of Review Section '2.788 of Commission regulations sets out the standard to be applied in reviewing a request for a stay.
The following factors must be. con-sidered:
(1) whether the moving party has made a I
strong showing that it is likely to prevail on the merits; (2) whether the party will be irreparably injured unless a stay is granted; (3) whether the granting of a stay would harm other parties; and (4) where the public interest lies.
The Appeal Board applied these factors to CESG's request for a stay of the Licensing Board's decision and concluded that CESG did not make a sufficient showing to be entitled to a stay.
3.
Merits of Stav Motion a.
Likely to Prevail 0
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Board did not determino the consequences of an accident in which the McGuire containment is ruptured by hydrogen combustion the Board had no basis for a finding that operation of the plant would not expose the public to undue risk.
The Licensing Board found that the likelihood of occurrence of an event like TMI at McGuire has been substantie.11y reduced and that the possibility that the ECCS would be prematurely terminated by the McGuire control room staff is not credible.
In its fili ags before the Appeal Board, CESG did i
not specifically challenge the Board's conclusion that containment rupture by hydrogen combustion is not credible.
Instead, CESG argued that "not credible" and "substantially reduced" do not equal zero probability, and the Board must, therefore, consider consequences of such an accident in order to make a finding of no undue risk.1/
The Board did not hear evidence on CESG's contentions which dealt with consequences of such a rupture of containment accident at McGuire.
Second, CESG claims that the Licensing Board erred in limitin'g its consideration of likelihood of a hydrogen generation accident to TMI-2 type LOCA.
The Appeal Board concluded that CESG's stay papers do not contain t suf ficiently strong showing that the Licensing Board's finding of "' reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by the operating license can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in complinnee with [ Commission) regulations... '"
will be overturned on appeal.
In addition, j
although the Licensing Board's ultimate finding was cast in terms of a "THI-type accident", the Appeal Board stated that CESG's hydrogen conten-tions were of fered and accepted in the context of such an accident, 2/ and in its stay motion, CESG does not describe what other accidents should have been considered.
fWe believe.' '
t 1/
CESG asserts that the staff has defined " undue risk" as a combina-
~
tion of likelihood and consequences cf an accident.
t 2/
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The Licensing Board considered only n small break LTiCA wTtTFpremature termination of the ECCS. g,y i
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The staff has not generally defined
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undue ffsE~in the Atomic Energy Act as CESG claims in terms of likelihood and consequences of an accident.
It has been a longstanding NRC (and AEC) practice to focus initially on the likelihood of various severe accidents before dealing with the consequences of such accidents in the safety review under Parts 50 and 100. 3/
f
' 3/
The staff has considered likelihood and consequences in the
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context of a NEPA analysis, however.
I
9 5
I' b.
Irreparable Injury The only assertion of irreparable injury CESG makes is that unless the Supplemental Initial Decision is stayed there is a " potential for doing irreparable '
harm to CESG's members and to the general public."
(CESG's Request for Stay of Initial Decieion, p. 5.)
This potential harm arises, according to intervenor, from allowing McGuire to operate with significant safety issues unresolved.
The Appeal Board concluded that CES'G had not made the required showing on the irreparable injury factor because the only harm mentioned is the potential for such harm.
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Harm to Other Parties and Public Interest CESG asserts that granting the stay could harm neither Duke Power nor the NRC staff.
Intervenor states that, at the worst, Duke would " fail to gain some anticipated increase in earnings" through a favorable rate action.
CESG argues that the public interest lies in being protected from the consequences of extremely severe accidents.
Intervenor further argues that any public interest in having available the generating capacity of McGuire in time for the summer peak is unlikely to be served whether the stay is granted or not because the power generated by McGuire is not needed.
CESG states that because of Duke's expected power reserves and its connections with other-utility companies which also have power reserves, Duke Power and Duke's customers are not likely to be inconvenienced by delay in starting up McGuire.
In support of its position that it will have operating difficulties and increased costs if the stay is granted, applicant refers to its comments to the Commission on immediate effectiveness (filed pursuant to Section 2.764) which set out the costs which would result if operation of McGuire is delayed.
Duke asserts that the public interest is best served by the prompt licensing and operation of McGuire.
~
7 The Appeal Board found that the _ intervenor's -
unsupported assertion that the stay would 'cause no i
harm to' third parties was not sufficient to out-weigh applicant's averments (supported by affidavits l
by Duke Power.Co. vice president and the chairman j
of the North Carolina Public' Utilities Commission)
[
of operating difficulties and an increase in-i operating costs if Unit,1 is not availabla during the 1981 summer peak. (
in our view' I
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..4.
Conclusions t
The Appeal Board concluded that the intervenor had not made a sufficient 1'y strong showing on any of i
the four factors of 10 CFR 2.788(e) to justify grant-!
ing a stay of the LJcensing Board's, Supplemental i
Initial Decision.
l
<l Recommendation:
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James A. Fitzgerald 1
Assistant General Counsel Attachments:
DISTRIBUTION:
1.
ALAB-647 Comissioners
[
2.
CESG's Stay Motion Comission Staff Offices 3.
Applicant's opposition to Stay Secretariat l
Comissioners' coments should be provided directly to the Office of the Secretary by c.o.b. Monday. August 10, 1981_.
l l
Comission Staff Office-coments, if any, should be submitted to the Comissioners NLT August 3, 1981, with an information copy to'the10ffice of the Secretary.
If the paper is of such a nature that it requires. additional time for analytical review and'coment, the Commissioners and the Secretariat should be apprised of l
when coments may be expected.
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UNITED STATES OF AMIRICA 8
4 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD
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Administrative Judges:
JUl,,'.
19 81, '
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Alan S.
Rosenthal, Chairman
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l. '. 9 Dr. John H.
Buck 4~#
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Christine N. Kohl f
(
SGYED In the Matter of
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DUKE POkT.R COMPANY
)
Docket Nos. 50-369
)
50-370 (William B. McGuire Nuclear Station,")
Units 1 and 2)
)
)
t Mr. Jesse L.
Riley, Charlotte, North Carolina, for the.
intervenor, Carolina Environmental Study Group.
Messrs.
J.
Michael. McGarrv, III, Washington, D.
C.,
and William L.
Porter, Charlotte, North Carolina, for the applicant, Duke Power Company.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER July 1, 19 81 t
( ALAB-6 4 7)
I 1.
In April 19 79, the I,icensing meerd rendered an initial decision in this operating license proceeding involving Units 1 l
and 2 of the McGuire facility.
LBP-7 9-13, 9 NRC 489.
All matters which had been placed in controversy were determined in the ap-plicant's f avor.
The Board, however, stayed the ef fectiveness i
of the decision pending its further order after the NRC staff's j
issuance of a supplement to the safety Evaluation Report on the l
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significance of any _ unresolved generic safety issues.
Id. at 1
547-48.- /
i That supplement was issued in May 1980.
Shortly thereaf ter, on June 9,1980, intervenor Carolina Environmental Study Group j
(CESG) filed a motion seeking, by reason of the March 1979 ac-cidentatThreeMil[eIsland, the reopening of the evidentiary
[
record and the admission to the proceeding of certain new con-tentions concerned with hydrogen generation and control.
On November 25, 1980, the motion was granted and four additional CESG contentions were accepted for litigation.
In essence, those contentions addressed the possibilfty that, 'in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident at McGuire, substantial quantities
[
of' hydrogen would be generated within the reactor containment which, in turn, might combus t and bring about a rupture of the containmen: and the release of radioactive materials.
As the Board saw it, "CESG's proposed contentions related to the matter of hydrogen-generation' control arising out of the Three Mile Island 2 (TMI-2 ) accident may well. shed significant light upon j
1/
On June 21, 1979, the Appeal Panel Cha.irman entered an unpublished order which provided that the time for the i
filing of exceptions to the decision would not commence to run until the Licensing Board's further order was issued.
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e key safety findings which are required to be made before opera-tion of McGuire Units 1 and 2 could be authorized". 2 /
In the wake of fifteen days of evidentiary hearings con-ducted during the early part of this year, the Licensing Board c
on May 26 rendered a supplemental initial decision on the hydro-gen generation and control issues.
L3P-81-13, 13 NRC On the basis of the numerous findings contained in that decision, the Licensing Board concluded that reasonable assurance existed that, "in the event of a TMI-type accident at McGuire, s ubs tan-tial quantities of hydrogen (in excess of the design basis of 10 CFR 550.44) will not be generated".
Id. at (slip opinion, p.
31).
The Board went on to lift th'e stay of its 1979 initial l
l decision.
It thereby paved the way for the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to issue full-term operating licens,es for the i
McGuire units- / once the Director had made the findings required by 10 CFR 50. 57 (a) on those matters not considered in the adjudi-l l
catory proceeding.
Id. at (siip opinion, p.
32).
2/
November 25, 1980 Memorandum and Order Regarding CESG's
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Motion to Reopen Record, at p. 4.
3/
On November 25, 1980, the Licensing Board had entered an unpublished order autherizing the issuance of a license i
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for Unit 1 which would permit fuel loading, initial crit-icality and zero power physics testing.
See AIA3-626, 13 NRC 17 (1981).
a
2.
The Commission recently repealed Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 2, under which licensing board decisions such as those in-volved here were not to become effective pending certain action i
by both an appeal board and the Commission itself.
46 Fed. Rec.
28627 (May 2 8, 19 81).
Appendix B was simultaneously replaced by amendments to 10 CFR 2.764, the Rule of Practice concerned with immediate Affectiveness of initial decisions. 4 /
New sub-section (f) (2 ) of that Rule provides th at, upon its receipt of a licensing board decision authorizing issuance of an operating license, the Comdssion will undertake to determine on its own r
initiative whether to stay the effectiveness of the decision.
~
This deter =ination is to be based "on a consideration of the gr.avity of the substantive issue, the likelihood that it has been resolved incorrectly below, the degree to which correct resolu-tion of the issue would be prejudiced by operation pedding re-
)
view, and other, re, levant public interest factors".
In the case of a full-power operating license, the anticipation is that the 5
i determination will be made within thirty days.- /
Until the l
_4 /
Appendix B, promulgated in November 1979, had suspended the coeration of Section 2.764 insof ar as construction i
permits and operating licenses were involved.
At that time, the Section provided, inter alia, that an initial decision authorizing the issuance of an operating license to be effective i= mediately upon rendition unless was af firmatively stayed for good cause.
5/
With respect to fuel loading and icw-power testing li-censes, the Commission proposes to act within ten days.
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Commission speaks, the licensing board's decision is to be con-
'sidered automatically stayed.
See 46 Fed. Reg. 28627, 28628, 28630.
Section 2. 764 (f) (2) further stipulates that this Conadssion review sua sponte "is without prejudice to Appeal Board or other Commission decisions, including decisions on stay recuests filed under 10 CFR 2.788".
46 Fed. Reg. at 28630.
By virtue of Sec-tion
.,8 8 (a), an application for a stay of the effectiveness of a licensing board decision may be filed within 10 days of the service of that. decision.
In passing upon the application, we are to consider four factors:
(1)
Whether the moving pa~rty has made a strong showing that it is likely to prevail on the merits; (2)
Whether the party will be irreparably injured unless a stay is granted; (3)
Whether the granting of a stay would har= otKer p artie s ; and (4)
Where the public interest lies.
Section 2. 788 (e). 6 /
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These same factors have long governed ~ the grant or denial
~I of judicial stays.
See Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n.
v, FPC, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
As is readily apparent, they do not coincide with the considerations l
which the Commission is to take into account in making its S. ction 2. 764 determination.
This at least partially ex-plains the fact that, despite its subordinate status, an appeal board has been empowered to grant a Section 2.788 stay without regard to what the Ccmmission has done (or might do) under Section 2. 764.
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3.
Within the time prescribed by Section 2.788, CESG moved for a stay of the effectiveness of the initial and supplerental initial decisions pending the disposition of the exceptions which it has filed to those decisions under 10, CFR 2.762 (a).- /
The applicant opposes the motion.
For its part,. the staff has elected not to file a response.-8/
_/
The stay motion was filed and served on June 6; the excep-7 tions were filed and served two days later.
_8,/
Insof ar as we are aware, this is the first occasion upon which the staff has made such an election in connection with a stay _ request.
At the very least, a staff response customarily has been filed to a request by another party for certain relief.
This is not to say, of course, that the staf f has def aulted on an obligation imposed upon it by the Rules of Practice or oth'e'rwise.
An adjudicatory board may well have the inherent authority to direct a party to a proceeding before it to file a responsive pleading setting forth its views on the matter at hand.
Absent such a direction, however, the decision whether to respond is for the party to make.
In this instance, we will respect the staff's choice and determine the stay question on the' basis of the papers filed by CESG and the applicant.
Our willingness to do so rests in large measure on the assumption that, although not affirmatively urging that the initial decisions be allowed to become effective in advance of appellate review, at the same time the staff does not believe that reactor operation would pose a threat to the public health and safety for the reasons assigned by CESG.
Manifestly, had it reached a dif ferent conclusion, it would have become duty-bound in the fulfillment of its regulatory responsi-bilities so to inform us.
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Although not so required, we decided to hold the stay motion in abeyance to await Commission action under Section 2. 764 (f) (2). '-[
That action has just been taken in part.
In an order entered on June 29, the Commission unanimously approved the issuance of a full-power operating license for Unit 1 alone.
The order indi-cated (at p. 2) that "[t]his effectiveness decision is without prejudice to Commission effectiveness review for Unit 2".
Pre-sumably, completion of that review has been deferred in light of the fact that, unlike Unit 1, Unit 2 is not as yet fully con-st ucted.13/
d' 9/
As will be seen, the stay motion is directed to the hydro-gen generation and control issu5s resolved in the May 26 supplemental decision.
Those issues relate exclusively to full-power operation.
By June 11, 1_981 order, the Commission permitted the issuance of a license allowing operation of Unit 1 at steady state reactor core power levels up to 5% of rated pcwer.
But no matter wh'en full-power operation might have been authorized by the Commis-sion,several additional weeks necessarily would then elapse before that' unit rdght actually be placed in service.-
Thus, an immediate ruling on the stay motion before us was not mandated.
In a different set of circumstances, we might well conclude that a=ple reason existed to act more expeditiously on a Section 2. 788 stay motion presented to us -
i.e., ? review.
crior to the outcome of the contdssion's Section 2.764 (f) (2}
i 17 It accears from a recent RRC construction status report (NURI'G-00 30, Vol. 4, April 19 81, at p. 1-4 ) that Unit 2
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was approximately 75% constructed at the end of 1980 and will not be ready for fuel loading for another year.
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The stay motion is addressed to the entire Licensing Board supplemental initial decision -- and not simply to the authori-zation therein of a full-power operating license for Unit 1.
Moreover, none of the parties has suggested that, in pass-ing upon ths motion, we attach some significance to the dif-ferent current stages of construction of the two units.
Never-theless, in deciding whether a stay is warranted, we can like-wise confine our attention to Unit 1. ~ This is because, as a matter of certainty, the pending CESG appeal will be decided on the merits well before Unit 2 might be ready for full-power operation more an a year hence.
In that circumstance, a pendente lite stay of the effectiveness of the supplemental de-l cision is manifestly unnecessary insof ar as Unit 2 is concerned.
4.
There is no occasion to dwell at length here upon the foundation for the Licensing Board's concitsion respecting the likelihood that 'the generation of hydrogen in excess of permis-sible limits would res' ult from a Three Mile Island-type accident f
at McGuire.
For one thing, the several considerations which led the Board to that conclusion are adequately spelled out in the (slip opinion, supplemental initial decision.
13 NRC at e
p.
9 et sec.).
For another, at least for the purposes of its stay motion, CISG does not appear to challenge the conclusion.
1
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-9 Rather, as we read its papers, the claim that full-power operating
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Jicenses.should now be withheld rests principally upon two quite dif-ferent assertions:
(1) even if reasonable assurance exists daat excessive quantities of hydrogen will not be generated, the Li-censing Board nonetheless was obliged to explore.and determine the consequences of a containment rupture brought about by hydro-gen combustion; anEi (2) the Board erred in confining its scrutiny to loss-of-coolant accidents of the TMI type.
These assertions will receive full examination in our de-termination of CESG's pending appeal from the supplemental initial decision.
Without prejudging the outcome of that examination,
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we think that insufficient justification has been assigned in CESG's stay papers for precluding Unit 1 operation in the mean-time.
The relevant condition precedent to such operation is a finding of " reasonable assurance (i) that the activities author-j
~
ized by the operating license can be conducted without endanger-ing the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with [Commis sion) i regulations".
With regard to hydrogen gen-eration and control, that finding has been made and CESG's motion does not contain the required demonstration that it likely will be set aside on the appeal.
l
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Although the Board's ultimate finding was cast in terms of a "TMI-type accident", as previously noted CESG's hydrogen con-tentions were both tendered and accepted for litigation in the context of such an accident.
In any event, CESG's motion does not describe the other accidents which it believes should have also been considered, let alone explain why they might produce a greater hydrogen control problem than would result from a loss-of-coolant accident of the TMI variety.
In these circumstances, CESG has fallen far short of meet-inc its obligation to make a strong showing that it is likely
~
to prevail on the merits of the hydrogen generation and control
. issues.
Nor has it made the required demonstration on the ir-reparable injury factor.b On the other hand, the applicant insists that both it and its customers will sustain significant injury, if a Unit 1 operating license is withheld to await a de-cision on the pending appeal.
We are specifically referred to i
i the Ju.e 5,1981 comme'nts which the applicant suhrdtted to the Commission in connection with the Section 2. 764 (f) (2) sua sponte re view.(2,/
In a March 23, 1981 affidavit appended to the comments 11 /
Indeed, in CESG's only reference to irreparable harm (at
~~
- p. 5), it states that there is simply the " potential" for such harm.
12 /
That Section expressly authorizes the submission of such
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comments within 10 days of the Licensing Board's decision.
Both the applicant and CESG availed themselves of that opportunity.
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7 (at p.
- 3), the applicant's Senior Vice President for Production j
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l and Transmission averred that, absent the availability of Unit 1 power, the utility's reserve margin at the point of peak sur:ner demand will be reduced to 3.07% (without taking into account "possible extreme weather or possible forced outages of large units").
Also appended to the comments was a March 20, 1981 letter from the Chairman of the North Carolina Utilities Co==is-sion to the Chairman of this coradssion which confirmed the in-i adequacy of the applicant's reserves and represented that, unless Unit 1 were available "during the coming peak season", there i
1 would be a greater likelihood of operating difficulties and a certain increase in operating costs.13/
To be sure, considerations of this nature perforce must be subordinated to any serious safety concern.
But they are enti-j tied to substantial weight where, as here, the Licensing Board's findings negating 'the existence of reason for such concern (at 4
i least with regard to hydrogen generation and control) both are J
founded upon the product of a thorough evidentiary exploration and have gone essentially unchallenged.
)
The motion for a stay pendente lite of the Licensing Bo>td's initial and supplemental initial decisions is denied.
.13/
These aterments by responsible officials are not adequately countered by.CESG's unsupported assertion (motion, p. 6) that, at the time of " probable su=mer peak demand", the applicant "may be expected to have a' ncminal reserve cf 1000 to 1500 MW".
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' I This Board will, however, calendar the CESG appeal for oral argu-ment at as early a date as possible following the completion of briefing.
j It is so ORDERED.
i FOR THE APPEAL BOARD
=/'Nh Barbara A. Tompkins Secretary to the Appeal Board 9
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In the Matter of
)
)
. DUKE ?OWER 00M?ANY
)
Docket b'os. 50-3c9-OL
)
50-370-OL (William 3. McGuire Nuclear
)
Station, Units 1 and 2)
)
CESGts REC,UEST Fo?. STAY OF INITIAL DECISION In accordance with 10 CFR $2 788, intervenor, Carolina Environmental Study Group (CESG), hereby requests a stay of the Initial and S'upplemental Initial Decisions in the instant matter.
(1)
Initial and Supplemental Initial Decisions (ID and SID)
.have been issued in the subject matter.
Th e SID was served May 27,,'1981.
The SID was the result of reopening the hearing to consider natters related to hydrogen gene. ration and combustion (ASLS Order, Nov. 25, 1980).
Four CESG ' contentions were a dmitted for hearing ( SID U2).
Contentions 1 and 2, concerned with hydrogen generation, combustion, and containment breach as a result of a lo s s-of-coolant accident were heard and provide the record on which the. SID is based (SID M7 and 8).
Contentions 3 and h in regard to the health, safety, a3d environmental consequences of containment breach were not heard, the ASLE having reached the conclusion before the hearing ad journed that CESG had not " succeeded" in regard to Contention 1 (SID US).
(2)
The SID concludes that 1) there is reasonable assurance that substantial quantities of hydrogen will not be generated, i.e.
quantiti-es in excess of the design ' basis of 10 CFR' $50.hh;
,J)MDhd N/6846
-c-
- 2) that Duke Power Company (DPC) has taken actiens and adopt.ed procedures which provide reasonable assurance that ECOS operation will not be prematurely terminated in a TMI-2 type accident, or, if it is, will be reinstated to prevent hydrogen generation in excess of lo cF3 550 44; and 3) that McGuire can be operated without undue risk to the public health and safety with respect to hydrogen genera ion accidents (SID H32 and 33) [ emphasis supplied).
(3)
The SID also concludes that the premise for Contentions 3 and b had net been established, removing the need to make specific findings (SID 056(3)).
(4)
The ASL3 also concluded that '5Upplement 3 to the
'McGuire Safety Evaluation Report provided i reasonable foundation for Staff conclusions regarding certain ' generic matters (SID M56(4)).
(5)
CESG is taking exception to both the ID and the SID.
The SID removed the stay placed on the ID at the time of its issuance, April'16~, 1979, and thereby authorized the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Eegulation, to proceed in the matter of an' operating license (SID p. 32).
(6)
A stay is requested because, among other things, the hTari'ng"did not provide a bas'is for 'the fin' ding that the McGuire f acility "c2n be cperated without undue risk to the public health and safety with regard to the possible generation of hydrogen resulting from accident's of the type which occurred at TMI-2"
[ emphasis suppli ed ]'.-
(7)
The KRC Staff, because the question of risk is a centralene,p.asdevelopedanoperatingdefinitionofrisk
~(Draf t Environmental Statement related to the operation of Virgil C. Sund.er ' Nuclear Station Unit No. 1, NURIG-0534 Supplement, 6.1.E.6).
Staff recognizes, as dces CESG, that consideration of i
likelihood and consequences enters into.an esti=ation of the level of risk.
The ASL3 in the instant natter concerned itself oniv with the likelihood.
The ASLB finds that, specified changes "have substantially reduced the likelihood of recurrence of an event at McGuire such as TMI-2" (SID L32).
The ASL3 also finds that t
"eur likelihood of ECCS operatio,ns being prematurely terminated
~
by the control room staff is so remote that such an accident is not credible" (SID L33).
A reduced likelihood is not zero prob-ability.
A "not credible" finding is n6't equivalent to zero probability.
Before the accidents at Fermi, Browns Ferry, and
.TMI-2 occurred they were, depending on the mindset of the individ-l ual, "not credible".
The searching examination of NRC and nuclear
~
industry practices and attitudes by the. L'essons Learned Task Force raised cerious doubts about the saf e regulation of nuclear generation (NUREG-0578 and NUREG-05c5 as cited in CESG's Revised Motion to Reopen, Etc., of August 15, 1980, pp. 9-11).
Operations personnel in particular must not have a mindset that future accidents are impossible.
Sne experience of
- - Three Mile Island has not been sufficient to eradicste that mindset in all quarters and the effects of that experience will f ade with time.
This is probably the single most important human f actor with which this j
. industry and NRC'has to contend.
(EUREG-0585, p. 2-7)
These considerations appear equally applicable to decision makers.
(6)
CESG has raised the matter of the factors in risk (CESG's Motion to Permit Appeal of ASLB Order, May 15, 1951, pp. 2-E) in.
~
this context.
(9)
The consequences of containment breach due to a hydrogen deflagration or deto.natica were not cens'idered in the proceeding.
The ASLE did not admit CESG's Contention 6, which maintained that a supplemental Invironmenta'. Impact Statement considering the consequences of very severe accidents, including containmen't breach be required.
It is Commission policy to
{
require such consideration in the EIS as of June 13, 1960.
CESG has unsuccessfully sought to convince the ASLB that a special circumstance exists which requires preparation of such a supplement for McGuire; namely high population density and the close proximity of four thin-shell ice condenser containments j
to Charlotte, NC, the McGuire Nuclear SIation at 17; mil &s from the i
..c en t er, Catawba at 18 miles.
A sup,olementa1 IIS concerned with the offsite releases and consequences under severe accident condi-tions has been issued for the nearby Virgil C Summer plant which has a lower power level and a stronger containment than McGuire (Virgil C. Summ.er,Draf t Environmental Statement, NUP.EG-0534 supplement, Nove=ber, 1980).
(10)
The ASL5's findings are confined to hydrogen generation resulting from " accidents of the type which occurred at TMI-2"
( SID 'J56(2)(c)).
CESG's Contention 1 in no way limited consider-ation to one class of accident.
The licensee has not demonstrated that, in the even-of a losc-of-coolant eccident at McGuire:
[ Emphasis suppli e d. -)
(11)
CISG holds that the ignoring by the ASL3 of the spectru. of severe accidents now considered in licensing proceed-
'ings in arriving'ai its findings, and its failure to consider the
._.s.
' consequences of such severe accidente in finding that operation of the plant posed no undue risk to the hetith and safety of the public constitutes grave legal and factual error.
(cf.-10 C?R 2.756(e)(1))
(12)
The operation of McGuire with significant safety issues unresolved should not be permitted.
% Staff witness regarded the operation of the hydrogen mitigation system as
" fraught with din ~gr" (SID Staff Exhibit E, p. 5; also CESG e
Exhibit h0).
The SID unless stayed has the potential for doing irreparable harm to CESG's members and to the general public.
(.cf. 10 CFR 2.78S(e)(2)
(13)
The granting of a stay will. harm neither Duke Power
-Co=pany ner Staff.
Indeed a more adequato and appropriate decisional process will be a beneficial-example to Staff and the industry.
DPC will, at worst, fail to gain some anticipated
~
increase in earnings through a favorable rate action.
(cf E
(14)
The public' interest lies in being protected frem the consequences of extremely severe accidents.
Not only is McGuire i
17 miles from the center of Charlotte, it is in line with a
^
prevailing. wind direction which carries over the " golden crescent",
Concord, Kannspc11s, Salisbury, Lexington, Thomasville, Winston-Salen, Greensboro and Surlington, all vithin 100 miles.
There is.no indication in the record that a PWR-1 event could not take place in which significant damage could occur at very substantial distances.
The public interest will be protected by staying the I
effectiveness of the ID and S!D.
(cf.10 C?R 2.768(e)(h)
._.s.
1
I (15)
It may be argued that the public interest would be better served by making available the generating capacity of j
McGuire unit 1 in time for 1981 summer peak.
3ased on the 1
experience within the NRC as to the time required for low power testing and for power escalation, it is unlikely tha if a license were to issue ten days after Commission review, on or about July 6, McGuire unit 1 could be put on line during the period of probab-le" summer peak demand.
It is further unlike,1y that this generating capacity would be required.
D?C may be expected to have a nominal reserve of 1000 to 1500 MW.
If, as it has indicated, it shuts down Oconee unit 1 for refueling, and maint en anc e, at The start of the summer.. peak period, there will
.still remain a reserve of $00 MW.
y,ith SESC interconnections to Georgia ?cwer and Light, TVA, C?&L, and.SCIEG, all of which have substantial reserves, it is unlikely that D?C's customers will be exposed to any incoavenience.
CONCLUSION Because the ASL3 did not determine the consequences of the rupture of the thin shell McGuire containmeno by hydrogen deflag-ration or detona tion it lacks the basis for a finding that operation f
xculd 'nat.expcse the public health a.nd safety to undue risk.
The ASL3 by confining its consideration to a TMI-2 type LOCA as the cause of hydrogen generation has erred.
There is a spectrum of accidents as severe cr.more severe for which Duke Power Company
.made no provision.
Nor did the Supplemental Initial Decision take into account Staff's witness' opinion that operation of the i
j
)
I 4
~ c mitigation syste= could be dangerous.
Tne authorization of an operating license relies on erroneous findings.
In the public interes t these defects should be remedied.
I The Atomic Safety and Licensing ppeal Board is requested to stay the Initial and Supplemental Initial Decisions until adequate consideration is given these matters.
Respectfully submitted, L}Ys
-1 (j'h )
~ J[sseL.Riley
[
$$h Henley Place Charlotte, NC 25207 (70h) 375-4342 Of Counsel
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..i DUKE ?OWER COMPAP*
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Docket Nos. 50-369-OL x \\l..i' i
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50-370-OL (William 3. McGuire Kuclear
)
Station, Units 1 and 2)
)
ATFIRMATION OF SERVICE I hereby affirm that copies of "CESG's P.ecuest for Stay of Initial Decision", dated June 3, 1981, have been served on the Appeal Board and other NRC persons listed this %,
day of June, 1951, by deposit in U.S. Express Mail and served to other parties listed by deposit in the U.S. Mail:
l Chairman Atomic Safe y and Licensing Edward G.
Ke:che., Esq.
Appeal Board Panel-!: copies Counsel for MRe Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comnission S:aff Wa'shington, D.C.
20555 office of -he Executive Lecal Director Samuel Chilk, Secretary
..p. S. Nuclear Regulatory
~
U.S. Nuclear Regulato:y Commission Cor.mi s s icn Washine:cn, D. C.
20555 Washington, D.C.
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Willitm L.
Porter, Esq.
Rober: M.
Laro, Esq.
Associate General Counsel Chairman, Atcmic. Safety and Ouke ?cwor Company Licensing Soard Pos: Office Sex 2172 i
U.S.
Nuclear Regula:Ory Charlotte, Nor.th Carolina 25242 Cc mission Washinc. ten, D.C.
20555 Dr. John bcrry leOO _2ythe s.3ve.
m Dr. Emmeth A.
Lrebke Charlotte, NC 26207 Atcmic Safetv and Licensing
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-l UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g
BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOA
-e-9 f..e J. A-0' l
)
In the Matter of
)
DUKE POhT.R COMPANY
)
Docket Nos. 50-369 j
)
50-370 l
(William B. McGuire Nuclear. )
i Station, Units 1 and 2)
)
l APPLICANT'S OPPOSITION TO CESG'S REQUEST i
FOR STAY OF INITIAL DECISION l
j On June 6,.1981, Intervenor, Carolina Environmental Study j
i Group ("CESG"),. filed a request to stay the Atomic Safety and i
i Licensing Board *s (" Licensing Board") Initial and Supplemental
.f i
Initi'al Decisions of April 19,-1979 and May 26, 1981, respe'ctively.
l l
Applicant, Duke Power Company, pursuant -to 10 CFR {2.788(d) here-i by files its answer opposing the granting of a stay.
i i
CESG's request for stay focuses essentially on 3 factor,s,
e, i 4, the c*onsequences of containment breach,[-
't 1.
That were n,ot considered;
/
/ /p 2.
That the scope of the hearing was improper #'y
'I',_)
l 1
J(;;j y I19g7 g -'I limited,to TMI-type accidents; and t-h',,kIdpo,r 3.
That operation of the hydrogen mitigation
?
system remains unresolved.
G j
Applicant will respond to each as.follows.
{
A 1.
With respect.to consideration of consequences, CESG.
l challenges the Licensing Board's finding that the operation of j
McGuire will not pose an " undue risk" to the public health and j
safety.
CESG's allegation concerning consequences is improper
.]
for the following reasons:
The record fails to disc' lose any. instance where,
a.
V-in Applicant will be in violation of Commission regulations.
Irid e ed, with respect ter Contentions: 3 ' and 4 (i.e., the matters h$b$
. s nM35 g
s aj,
~
'I
allegedly addressing consequences), CESG's president, in his deposition of January 14, 1981, confirms.this point. See Depo-I sition Transcript at p. 138 wherein the following appears:
l 0
Let me ask the question in a different fashion. Given your understanding of the McGuire Emergency Response j
Plan and the negotiation that has taken place between and among the NRC, Duke Power Company and FEMA, do you j
or do you not feel that the McGuire Emergency Response Plan satisfies current emergency response planning regulations in the NRC7 A.
I think it satisfies regulations nominally.
I think that the regulations are inadequate. 1/
1/
CESG has alleged that, due to potential for hydrogen gen-eration and combustion, more is required in the area of emergency planning than is provided for by the regula-tions.
CESG maintains that the impact associated with the degraded core / core melt scenario it foresees developing from a hydrogen generation and combustion accident must be considered in this proceeding.
Applicant submits that CESG's contention is, pursuant to 10 CFR $2.758, an imper-miss'ible attack on the Commission regulations regarding emergency planning (i.e., Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50; 10 CFR $50.47, and 45 Fed. Reg. 55402 (August 19, 1980)).
Specifically, the amendments to 10 CFR $50.47 require that emergency planning zones of 10 and 50 miles be established for plume exposure and ingestion exposure pathways, respec-tively.
The basis for these standards, as set forth in 10 CFR $50.47 note 1, is contained in NUREG-0654:
FEMA-REP-1 entitled " Criteria For Preparation and Evaluation of Radio-logical Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Sup-port of Nuclear Power Plants" (January 1980).
Therein, the Commission determined that the appropriate emergency plan-ning zones are based upon consideration of a range of speci-fied potential accidents to include a worst case core melt I
accident involving a breach of containment.
NURIG-0654, supra.
In short, CESG's contention that degraded core / core melt accidents be considered has been encompassed by the emergency planning regulations, and any further discussion of the matter is a direct attack upon the basis of the Com-mission regulations.
Accordingly, CESG's position must fail.
Potomac Electric Power Company (Douglas Point Nucleak' Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAS-218, 8 AEC 79, 88-89 (1974).
See also,, Union of Concerned Scientists v. AEC, l
(Footnote continued on next page.)
-3 Commission regulations are based upon a statutory mandate to assure "the common defense and security" and to " provide l
adequate protection to the health and safety of the public."
See Atemic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, Sections 104d, 161b and 182a. 2/
Indeed, as the Supreme Court noted, the Atomic Energy Act " clearly contemplates that the Commission shall by regulation set horthwhatthepublicsafetyrequiresasapre-requisite to the issuance of any license or permit under the Act."
Power Reactor Development Co.
v.
Electricians, 367 U.S.
396, 404 (1961).
Therefore, absent a showing that a particular facility presents risks outside the parameters of the regu-lations, not present here, a demonstration of compliance with the regulations entitles a Board to find reasonable assurance that the facility will be operated without undue risk to the public health and safety. 3/
See Citizens For Safe Power v. 'NRC, 524 i
^
(Footnote continued from previous page.)
i 499 F.2d 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1974). CESG alleges that special circumstances exist for consideration of consequences, i.e.,
i the Commission's statement of Interim Policy regarding consideration of Class 9 accidents.
This matter has been i
thoroughly briefed by both the Applicant and Staff (see pleadings of February 2, 1981), and disposed of by the Licensing Board in its Memorandum and Order of February 13, l
i 1981.
2/
42 U.S.C. 2134(d), 42 U.S.C. 2201(b) and 42 U.S.C. 2232(a).
3/
See Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company (Maine Yankee Atomic
{
Power Station), ALAS-161, 6 AEC 1003, 1007 wherein the Appeal
~
Board stated:
Thus, in the safety sphere, the evaluatio' of the risks-
'.v-
' attendant to reactor operation is not undertaken as an element of a NEPA-type process by which costs may be traded of f against benefits.
Ra th e r.,
the function of the ' evalua-7 tion is to ascertain whether the ultimate, unconditional standards of the Atomic Energy Act and the regulations have
_ ~;
been met; e.g., whether the public health and safety will be adequately protected.
l
. 1 t 1
F.2d 1291, 1299-1301 (D.C. Cir. 1975);
see also, Maine Yankee,
~
supra. 6 AEC at 1009-10.
So postured, compliance with Commission regulations is supportive of the Licensin'g Board's finding regarding undue risk.
t b.
Neither the Atomic Energy Act as amended, nor the Commission regulations require an undue risk finding with respect l
l to operating lice'nses.
See Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amended, j
Sections 161b, 182a 4/ and 10 CFR {50.57(a).
Rather, the undue
. risk finding is reg'uired only for construction permits.
See 10 CFR {50.35(a).
The Licensing Board's undue risk fi_nding relates to public
~
health and safety.
"As such, it can be equated with the required findings of 10 CFR ((50.57(a)(3) and (6).
An examination of the extensive record developed in the instant reopened proceedin'g, as l
well as the Licensing Board's Supplemental Initial Decision, clearly provide the basis for the finding required by 10 CFR P
{50.57 and the Licensing Board's undue risk finding should.be so viewed.
j t
c.
The term " undue risk" is meaningful only in the context of the matters raised before the Licensing Board.
At issue in the instant reopened operating license proceeding was (i) whether hydrogen in excess of the limits of 10 CFR $50.44 could be generated and, if so, '(ii) whether such hydrogen would result in containment breach and doses in excess of the values 2V.
4/
42 U.S.C. 2201(b) and 42 U.S.C. 2232(a).
j
. T i m
e
,s -
set forth in 10,CFR Part 100.
The Licensing Board concluded that the generation of hydrogen in excess of 10 CFR 550.44 limits was so remote as to be incredible, i.e., highly improbable.
Supple-mental Initial Decision ("SID") at p. 20.
Continuing, the Board made findings with respect to the highly improbable situation wherein hydrogen was generated in excess of 10 CFR 550.44 limits.
SID at pp. 21-59.
The Licensing Board found that the systems in-stalled by Applicant to mitigate the effects of excessive hydro-gen generation would result in the burning of hydrogen in a manner that would yield a peak pressure of less than 16 psig.
SID at p. 25.
ite Licensing Board found that the containment would maintain its integrity when subjected to 48-67.5 psig.
SID at pp. 21-22.
On this basis it can be concluded that the McGuire containment would not breach in the event ' hydrogen in excess of the limits of 10 CFR $50.44 was generated. 5/
Absent a breach,,and absent any demonstration by Intervenor that Part 100 values.would be exceeded, it was logical for the Board to conclude that operation of McGuire does not pose an undue risk to public health and safety.
d.
CESG's reliance upon Contentions 3 and 4 as the basis for consideration of consequences is without support.
As 5/
The Licensing Board found that the probability of contain-ment failure at 48 psig was calculated to be 4 x 10-5 per
~
occurrence.
Given the probability of a TMI-type accident to be 10-5 to 10-6 per year the.overall pre,bability of failure due to a TMI-type accident is 10-10 to 10-11 ( i. e. f.s -
1 in 10 billion to 100 billion) per-reactor year.
SID at p.
22.
Even this figure is conservative in that it pre-sumes an event producing 48 psig.
The record is clear dnat a hypothetical hydrogen generation accident,will yield only
. i
+
16 psig.
a
i.
set forth in Applicant's pleading of June 1, 1981 at pp. 3-7, l
C'SG has expressly stated that Contentions 3 and 4 are premised i
E upon the occurrence of a breach of containment.
Inasmuch as the Licensing Board found that excessive quantities of hydrogen would not be generated, and, even if generated, systems installed by Applicant would clearly prevent containment breach, there is no basis for the consideration of Contentions 3 and 4.
2.
With respect to the scope of the accident, CESG main-tains that its contention 1 w'as not limited to consideration of one class of accidents and that it was improper for the Li-censing Board to focus on TMI-type accidents to the exclusion of others.
In opposition, Applicant advances the following:
The subject matter of CESG's stay request essen-a.
tially involves matters associated with* the reopened proceeding..
It is important to note that CESG h'ad moved that the proceeding be reopened.
The grounds advanced by CESG for reopening focused on the matter of hydrogen generation control arising out of the l
Three-Mile Island accident.
See "CESG's Motions To Admit New Contentions And To Reopen The McGuire Operating License Hearing" (June' 9, 1980) wherein CESG raises as the basis for its i
motion "... the reasonable likelihood that there are additional lessons to be learned in the case of a TMI-2 type of accident involving hydrogen release and rapid combustion in a pressure r
suppression station such as McGuire."
See also "CESU's Revised Motion To Reopen The Operating License Proceeding; Motion To
".L ".
~
Deny Applicant's Request For Fuel Loading, Etc.;
And Revised
.T 4
^
Content-ions" (August 15, 1980) wherein Intervenor states at p. 3 6
I
_7_
i "In view of these many considerations, and given the uncertainties in regard to the capability of the McGuire containment to with-stand the explosion of an amount of hydrogen no greater than that at THI-2, it is appropriata for this Board more fully to develop the record."
On the basis of these pleadings, the Licensing Board reopened the proceeding for the limited purpose of exploring "h9dhogen generation control arising out of the Three Mile Island 2 (TMI-2) accident'."
See Board Memorandum and Order of Nd' ember 25, 1980 at p. 4.
v In his deposition of January 14, 1981, CESG's president indicated that in addition to a TMI-type _ accident he wished to raise less of power, ATWS and equipment failure.
See Deposi-tion Transcript at pp. 55-56 wherein the following is set forth:
O.
So as to enable Duke to understand your concerns
[
and be able to address your concerns, I ask you is there any further matt'er in this regard, any further examples, that at this moment are of i
concern to you relative to the generation of hydrogen?
i A.
None ce=e to mind.
O.
As I understand your responses, each one of them resulted from the failure of ECCS, either through the Carottling (operator error), the loss of power to operate the motors, or the ATWS event, is that l
correct?
A.
Well, there is one other that I should have spelled out.
Motors don't always perform as expected; pumps sometimes jam; bearings go bad.
So that all vould have to do with the operation of the mobile, the dynamic, the electrically driven type equipment.
There are two ways that it could go out.
.'V Inasmuch as none of these matters pertain to TMI, CESG was. pre-cluded from raising these matters as issues in the reopened e
-=,
i
5 proceeding absent a showing that each met the reopening test set forth in Kansas Gas and Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1), ALA3-462, 7 NRC 320 (1978).
See Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 2),
ALAB-480, 8 NRC 9, 22 (1978).
CESG made no showing in this regard and, as noted, the Licensing Board did not base its deci-sion to reopen on these matters.
Purthermore, during the course of the adjudicatory proceeding Intervenor provided absolutely
~
no admissible evidence with respect to the establishment of these accidents.
Accordingly, it was appropriate for the Licensing Board to focus the adjudicatory hearing on TMI-type accidents.
j b.
The Commission decisions in the TMI-1 restart case 6/ state that hydrogen control matters can be litigat'ed provided that "it is determined that there is a credible loss-of-coolant accident."
The record reflects that the only accident to fall within this category was TMI 7/ and accordingly, it was appropriate for the Licensing Board to focus the proceed-l ing on TMI-type accidents.
3.
With respect to CESG 's allegation concerning the resolution of the hydrogen mitigation system, reference is made to statements.of a witness from Sandia~ National Labora-tory.
The Licensing Board found that the matter raised 6/
Metropolitan Edison Company (Three Mile Island Nuclear
~
Station, Unit No. 1), CLI-80-16,.11 NRC 674 (1980) and Order of September 26, 1980 (Docket No. 50-289 (Restart)).
'3 -] '
^
7/
With the exception of an Intervenor witness panel of psy-chologists, the only evidence concernin's TMI was presented by Applicant and Staff.
T. ~;
9-y the Sandia witness was not 'germaine to McGuire, both on the basis of hydrogen concentration and necessary geometry.
i See SID at p. 27.
An examination of the record, which is replete with direct, cross, redirect and rebuttal testimony on this matter (See, e.g.,
Hearing Transcript 4023-29, 4035-44, 4079-4182, 4198-4317, 5046-5104), clearly supports
/
the Licensing B5ard's finding in this regard.
4.
With respect to the four items to be addressed in a stay (10 CFR '{2.788 (d)) Applicant makes the following comments:
The Licensing Board's decision is e.mply supported a.
by'the record. 'The alleged errors raised by Intervenor have been addressed above.
On the basis of the Licensing Board's decision, the record and the above responses, it is clear that Intervenor '
cannot make a strong showing that it is likely to prevail on the merits.
b.
Commission case law indicates that a showing of irreparable injury is most crucial in deliberations with regard to stays pending appeal. public Service Co. of Indiana, Inc. (Harble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2)
ALAS-437, 6 NRC 630, 632 (1977).
The Appeal Board has noted that
~
it is the established rule that a party is not ordinarily granted a stay without an appropriate showing of irreparable in j ury. Id.
The extreme remoteness of an accident resulting in the generation of hydrogen in excess of the,.liInits of 10 CFR 550.44 (see SID at p. 20) cannot be viewed as establishing irreparable'.L',
injury.
See State of New York v. NRC, 550 F.2d 745, 755 (2nd T
Cir. 1977) wherein the court stated:
-t 9
M
f The case law informs us that the award of preliminary injunctive relief can and should be predicated only on the basis of a showing that the alleged threats of irreparable harm are not remote or speculative but are actual and f
imminent.
i The above takes on added significance inasmuch as Intervenor's stay request does not contest that aspect of the Li..nsing Board's decision regarding the remoteness of an accident giving rise to excessive amounts of hydrogen.
Rather, Intervenor focuses on the hypothetical situation wherein excessive hydro-gen would be generated.
As n6ted earlier, the Licensing Board also addressed this latter scenario and found the pro-
~1l bability of containment failure to be 10,10
~
to 10 (i.e.,
1 in'10 billion to 100 billion) 8/ per reactor year.
Such a speculative condition cannot support a claim of irre-parable injury.
See State of New York v. NRC, supra. 9/
The grant of a stay would adversely a,ffect l
c.
third parties, i.e.,
consumers, as discussed below.
j d.
The public interest is best served by the prompt licensing and operation of the McGuire facility.
In this regard see Applicant's comments to the Commission re-arding the Immediate Effectiveness issue at pp. 4-6 (June 5, 1981) which clearly sets forth the need for 'the facility, the costs associated with delay and the impact on consumers.
8/
See fn. 5, supra, for the conservatism of even these numbers.
~
~9/
Applicant notes that plants similar to McGuire are operating'.v' Accordingly, it cannot be said that the threat of harm Intervenor raises is so clear and immediate.
~
i m
l
)
I 9
- 11 _
)
,on the basis of the above ' Applicant respectfully urges this Appeal Board to promptly deny the stay request of CESG.
i Respectfully submitted,
~
- g. Michael McGa
, IIIp j
DEBEVOISE & LIB RMAN 1200 Seventeenth Street, N.W.
l Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 857-9833
- 6 of Counsel William L. Porter i
Associate General Counsel l
DUKE POWER COMPANY-j June 16, 1981 9
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f UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSIPG APPEAL BOARD o
In the Matter of
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DUKE POWER COMPANY
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Docket No. 50-369
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50-370 (William B.
McGuire Nuclear
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Station, Units 1 and 2)
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of " Applicant s opposition to CESG's Request For Stay Of Initial Decision" dated June 16, 1981 in the. captioned matter, have been served upon the following by deposit in the United States mail this 16 th day of June, 1981.
Alan S. Rosentha'1, Cha*irman Dr. Emmeth A. Luebke Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Washington, D.C.
20555 Dr. Richard F. Cole Dr. John H.
Buck Administrative Judge Administrative Judge U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Atomic Safety and Licensing Commission Appeal Board Washington, D.C.
20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Jesse L. Riley Washington, D.C.
20555 -
President Carolina Environmental Christine N.
Kohl Study Group Administrative Judge 854 Henley Place Atomic Safety and Licensing Charlotte, Nort.h Carolina 28207 Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Edward G. Ketchen, Esq.
Commission Counsel for NRC Regulatory Washington, D.C.
20555 Staff Office of the Executive Robert M.
Lazo, Esq.
Legal Director Chairman, Atomic Safety and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Licensing Board Commission 4
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Washington, D.C.
20S55 i
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Commission
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20555 i
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f William L. Porter, Esq.
Dr. John M. Barry Associate Ganeral Counsel Department of Environmental Duke Power Company Health Post Office Box 33189 Mecklenburg County Charlotte, North Carolina 28242 1200 Blythe Boulevard Charlotte, North Carolina 28203 Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Shelly Blum, Esq.
i 1402 Vickers Avenue Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Durham, North Carolina 27707.
Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Chase R. Stephens Docketing and Service Section l
Diane B. Cohn, Esq.
Office of the Secretary William B.
Schultz, Esq.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Public Citizen Litigation Group Commission Suite 700 Washington, D.C.
20555 2 000 ? Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.-
20036 Chairman, Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
' Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 1
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