ML20058A476
| ML20058A476 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 04/24/1981 |
| From: | Eilperin S NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20058A382 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-92-436, TASK-AIA, TASK-SE SECY-81-249, NUDOCS 8110280692 | |
| Download: ML20058A476 (48) | |
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SECY-81-249 ADJUDICATORY ISSUE (Affirmation)
For:
The Commissioners From:
Stephen F. Eilperin Solicitor
Subject:
MOTION FOR A STAY OF CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE FINAL RULE ON FIRE PROTECTION FOR OPERATING NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS Discussion:
Several utilities have jointly moved the Commis-sion to stay three items in the Final Rule on Fire Protection for Operating Nuclear Power Plants pending judicial review.
[ Attachment 1].
The items are: Item G (Fire Protection for Safe Shut-down Capability); Item L (Alternative and Dedi-cated Shutdown Capability); and Item 0 (011 Collec-tion System for Reactor Coolant Pump) of Appendix R.III to 10 CFR Part 50.
These same utilities have also petitioned the D.C.
Circuit to review these regulations and have delayed filing their brief pending the Commission's response to this stay motion.
The utilities challenge the rule on the following grounds: inadequacy of the record to support the measures selected; failure to make the findings requires by-10 CFR 50.109(a) for backfitting; failure to provide a hearing even though the rule
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B110280692 930412 PDR FOIA tion by the Commission's decision to issue a rule i
GILINSK92-436 PDR even though previous fire protection changes were made on a case-by-case basis; and unlawful adjud-ication by promulgation of an alleged rule which g "w~y 3,w
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is not really a rule.
The utilities also claim m.. :
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they will be irreparably injured if the rule is not stayed because they will be forced.to spend php c w u
substantial amounts of money to comply with items (g; a III.G and III.L.
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CONTACT:
Sheldon L. Trubatchi OGC SECY NOTE:
OGC has requested that this 1
034-3224 paper should not be made available to in!cn n. ' P _ m3) r3 S2d the public because it'is related to k
f '..N..- 1~ irtrmatida pending litigation on the fire protectj g
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rule.
Moreover, any questions regardir
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Our reasons for these conclusions are
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described in detail in the attached proposed Memorandum and Order [ Attachment 2].
Because_we_believe that i
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These recommendations
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Recommendation:
Issue the attached Memorandum and Order.
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Stephen F. E11perin Solicitor Attachments:
- 1. Final Rule on Fire Protection for Operating Nuclear Power Plants 2.
Proposed Memorandum and Order Commissioners' comments or consent should be provided directly to the Office of the Secretary by c.o.b. Friday, May 8, 1981.
Commission Staff office comments, if any, should be submitted to the Commissioners NLT May 1, 1981, with an information copy to the Office of the Secretary.
If the paper is of such a nature that it requires additional time for analytical review and comment, the Commissioners and the Secretariat should be apprised of when comments may be expected.
This paper is tentatively scheduled for affirmation at an open meeting during the week of May 11, 1981.
Please refer to the appropriate Weekly Commission Schedule, when published, f
for a specific date and time.
DISTRIBUTION Commissioners Commission Staff Offices Exec Dir for Operations Secretariat o
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WAS HIN G TO N. D. C.,7 C O3 8 TELEPMont (3 02) 8 57-34 0 0 January 16, 1981 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Re:
Final Rule on Fire Protection for Operating Nuclear Power Plants, 45 red. Rec. 76602 (No v. 19, 1980)
Dear Mr. Chilk:
Enclosed are an original and twenty copies of a Motion
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for Partial Stay Pending Judicial Review of the Commission's final rule on fire protection.
As discussed in the enclosed motion, the filing and implementation deadlines imposed by 10 C.F.R. 550.48 for compliance with the requirements of Appendix R will require the moving utilities to commence incurring extraordinary costs soon, unless the rule is partially stayed.
For that reason, we respectfully request the Commission to act on the enclosed motion no later than the rule's effective care, ZFebruarv 17, 1981.
Such action will permit movants to file a motion for stay with the Court of Appeals in time to be meaningful, if the Commission denies a stay.
We regret that movants were unable to file the enclosed motion earlier, but Appendix R is in significant respects technologically complex, and has required extended analysis.
In fact, as noted in the motion, several utilities have not yet been able precisely to identify the impacts of certain Appendix R requirements.
Very truly yours, McNeill Watkins II 1
Enclosures i
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kk;f ARGUMENT The Commission's rules do not set out the standards for a stay pending judicial review, but the elements of a stay are well established.
Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v.
4 FPC, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1950), fixed the criteria by which motions for stay are evaluated:
(1)
Has the movant made a strong showing that it is likely to prevail on the merits of its appeal?
(2)
Has the movant shown that, without such relief, it will be irreparably injured?
(3)
Would the issuance of a stay' substantially harm other parties interested in the proceeding?
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(4)
Where lies the public interest?
The Supreme Court.has cited the Vircinia Petroleum Jobbers test with approval, Atchinson, T.
& S.F.
Ry. Co.
v.
Board of Trade, 412 U.S.
800, 821 (1973); Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 773 (1969), and the Commission has adopted the test for' stays of decisions of presiding officers and Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards pending Commission review.
10 C.F.R. s2.788. 2/
2/
Indeed, Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards used the test even before $2.788 was promulgated.
E.g.,
Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2
& 2), ALAB-199, 7 A.E.C. 478, 480 (1974);. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 & 3), ALAB-221.
gjpgg 8 A.E.C.
95,96 (1974).
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The D.C. Circuit refined the first of the four criteria.
in Washincton Metropolitan Area Transit Commission v. Holiday Tours, Inc., 559 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1977), finding that where l
other factors favor interim relief, it is enough "if the t
movant has made a substantial case on the merits."
Id. at 843.
Indeed, a court--like the Commission- "may grant a stay even though its own approach may be contrary to movant's view of the merits."
Id.
The Court reasoned:
An order maintaining the status quo is appropriate when a serious legal question is presented, when little if any harm will befall other inter-i ested persons or the public and when denial of the order would inflict i
irreparable injury on the movant.
gg,2 There is substantial equity, and need for judicial protection, whether or not movant has shown a mathematical probability of success.
Id. at 844.
It is not necessary for the Commission to t
concede error to gradts~stayi as stated in Holiday Tours:
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Prior recourse to the" initial
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.decisionmaker.would hardly be required as a general matter if it could
-properly grant interim relief only on a prediction that it has rendered an erroneous decision.
- [T]ribunals may properly stay their own orders when they have ruled on an admittedly
~ difficult legal question and when the
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equities of the case suggest that the,
status quo should be maintained.
Id. at 844.
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The Commission must acknowledge that its premulgation of.
the fire protection rule involves difficult legal questions.
Given the severe impact of the rule and its problematic effect on the public health and safety, the Companies urge the i
Commission partially to stay its rule pending judicial review.
1.
The Commission's Fire Protection Rule Presents Serious Legal Questions.
Comments on the proposed rule identified several fundamental flaws in the Commission's approach to this matter.
The Com-mission gave these objections short shrift in the final rule, so we summarize them below.
Lack of Findings.
The Commission's regulations define fgackfif ting" as "the addition, elimination or modifi-
[
cation of structures, systems or components of the
[ production or utilization] facility after the construction permit has been issued."
10 C.F.R. $50.lO9(a).
With the exception of the administrative requirements, 3/ each of the E
provisions of Appendix R.III compels "backfittino" within the i
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The rule's administrative requirements are Appendix R.III.E, E and I (hydrostatic hose tests and fire brigade staffing and training), which arguably,do not affect structures, systems or components.
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. 'iI meaning of the Commission's definition. 4/
As such, under Section 50.109 the Commission may only order backfitting if (in addition to the other requirements of 10 C.F.R.
Chapter I) it finds "that such action will provide substantial, additional protection which is required for the public health and safety or the common defense and security. "
The Commission made no such finding here.
To the contrary,
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implementation of the rule in its present form may well com-j promise the public hdalth and safety.
Jhr emphasize in this connection that the finding required by Section 50.109 is not a matter of mere words.
The Commission adopted the provision precisely to govern its addition and modification of plant safety features, as here, after the issuance of the construction permit. 5/
The finding must be solidly based on the record.
The record of this proceeding does not support the required finding.
Necessity for Hearings.
Section 2.204 of the i
Commission's rules of practice, 10 C.F.R $2.204, gives each 4/
The rule identifies as "ba ck fit " items only the requirements
?or fire barriers (III. G),_emercency lichting (III. J) and I
oil collection systems (III.0).
To be sure, these standards
" require 'cackfitting within the meaning of $50.109, but the only difference between these and the other Appendix R standards is that they require modificatiens even if the staff had previously agreed that a licensee's measures were adequate to protect the public health and safety.
5/
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Backfitting of Production gf:.4 and Utilization Facilities; Construction Permits and Operating sfigy Licenses, 34 Fed. Reg. 6540 (Apr. 16, 1969).
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licensee the right to " demand a hearing with respect to all or any part of the [ license) amendment."
The Commission's fire protection " rule" is, in effect, a license amendment (or amendments).
For each licensee affected by one or more Appendix R requirements, its Technical Specifications are amended.
The Companies demanded a hearing following the proposed rulemaking.
The Commission's adoption of the final rule without hearing contravened Section 2.204.
Even if 'Section 2.204 did not require a hearing, due l
process did.
The " rule" is, in fact, an order requiring specific modifications at specific plants.
The rule concedes that its rationale is the summary resolution of individual fire protection issues at individual plants (45 Fed. Reg at 36083):
Most of the licensees have accepted most of the staff positions and interpretations of [BTP 9.5-13 Appendix A.
However, 17 generic issues exist in the fire protection safety analysis reports for 32 plants where agreement not has been reached.
The resolution of each discrete fire protection question, where issues remain open, depends upon the specific facts associated with the plant involved.
Such factual questions are most appropriately resolved in hearings.
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- Abuse of Discretion.
An administrative agency may validly choose to establish general standards by rule, rather
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than by adjudication.
Pacific & Southern Co.
v.
FCC, 405 F.2d 1371, 1372 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
Alternatively, the agency may formulate general policies in individual adjudicatory proceedings.
NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co.,
394 U.S.
759, 765 (1969).
Thus, "an administrative agency must be equipped to act either by general rule or by individual order.
To insist upon one form of action to the exclusion of the other is to exalt form over necessity."
SEC v.
Chenery Corp., 332 U.S.
194, 202 (1974).
. i Once the Commission made its choice, however, a radical p
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change of procedure is an abuse of discretion.
Appendix A was adopted as a guideline.
Pursuant to site-specific Safety Evaluation Reports, licensees were permitted, if not I
encouraged, to design alternative fire protection criteria that would fully satisfy the standards of the General Design Criteria.
Each Company negotiated with staff in good faith regarding specific requirements, and each reached agreement c
on the majority of Appendix A requirements.
Each Company understood that decisions on the remaining items would be based on facts peculiar to each plant.
Each Company stands ready to offer evidence that its proposed measures will
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to the plants ' unique conditions.
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The Commission's attempt summarily to dispose of these E
issues with a " rule" is an abuse of discretion.
i Unlawful Adjudication.
A validly prcmulgated rule l
has several characteristics, none of which is present here.
A rule is based on facts that affect the industry as a whole.
Patagonia Corp.
v.
Board of Governors, 517 F.2d 803, 816 (9th Cir. 1975).
The Commission's fire protection " rule" is based on the facts involved at only a few licensed plants.
A rule is generally prospective only.
Bell Telephone Co.
v.
FCC, 503 F.2d 1250, 1266 (3d Cir. 1974).
By its terms, the fire protection " rule" does not apply prospectively to future licensees; the " rule" looks backward to a few licensees on a few matters.
A rule announces general policy applicable to the regulated industry as a whole.
United States v.
Florida East Coast R.
Co.,
410 U.S.
224, 245-46 (1973).
The
" rule" here is specifically limited to a small number of j
licensees, who are exceptionally affected by its requirements.
See Londoner v.
Denver, 210 U.S.
373, 386 (1908).
A rule is appropriate where there are no material factual disagreements.
l Denver Union Stock Yard Co.
v.
Producers Livestock Marketing Ass'n, 356 U.S.
282 (1958).
Here there are material factual disputes regarding the requirements of Appendix R as to individual plants.
See Air Line Pilots Ass'n v.
CA3, 475 F.2d 900, 904 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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. j The Commission cannot do indirectly that which it cannot do directly.
See Richmond Power & Light v. FPC, 574 F.2d 610,
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620 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
An adjudicatory hearing is required here, and the Commission cannot sidestep the demands of due process and the regulations in the form of a " rule".
Basis and Purpose.
Even if the Commission had correctly selected rulemaking as the appropriate vehicle for a
establishing fire protection standards at the affected plants, the rule itself is defective. A rule must contain a concise general statement of basis and purpose.
5 U.S.C.
$553(c); Rodway v.
USDA, 514 F.2d 809, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
A rule's discussion of basis and purpose "should discuss both the factual premises, if any, and the policy considera-tions underlying the administrative action.'-
Weyerhaeuser Co.
v.
Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1024-25 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
t This requirement is especially important where, as here, the agency promulgates highly technical standards.
Id.
Moreover,-
the requirements of a rule are arbitrary and capricious if based on an insufficient record.
National Welfare Rights Organization v.
Mathews, 533 F.2d 637, 646 (D.C. Cir. 1976);
International Harvester Co.
v.
Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 628-47 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
The commission's apparent purpose in promulgating
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Appendix R appears plain:
to provide additional fire protection
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at operating plants.
The rule fails, however, generally or f
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why such measure are superior to alternatives, and whether the Appendix R requirements will in fact decrease any incremental risks to public health and safety remaining after implementation of other fire protection measures already proposed by the licensees.
Moreover, individual requirements of Appendix R.III lack basis in the record.
Indeed, one of the reasons that the Commission resorted to rulemaking in this case was the likelihood that Staff's proposals could not be sustained on the basis of a hearing record.
2.
The Companies and their Customers Will Be Irreparably Injured In The Absence Of A Stay.
Attached are the affidavits of W.G.
Counsil, Senior Vice President of the companies that own and operate the Haddam Neck Plant and Millstone Nuclear Power Stations, Units 1 and 2, and T.A. Venkataraman, Fire Protection Project Manager for Boston Edison Company, which owns and operates Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.
The affidavits describe the harm to Northeast Utilities and Boston Edison in the absence of a stay.
That harm is substantial, and irreparable. 6/
6/
Florida Power & Light and Arkansas Power & Light are conducting interdisciplinary analyses of the Appendix R require-ments.
Because the rule is technically complex, these companies have not yet reached specific conclusions regarding the magnitude of the rule's impact in terms of economic costs and the tLme
_;,? EE necessary for compliance.
Based on preliminary analysis,
- d7 hcVever, FP&L and AP&L believe that the impacts on their plants, especially the requirements of Items III.G and L, will be substantial.
As a practical matter, judicial review of the fire protection rule will consume time.
The compliance dea;11nes -
established by 10 C.F.R. 50.48(c), however, require that Northeast and Boston Edison commence planning and design for items III.G and L immediately; }50.48(c)(5) requires the Companies to submit design descriptions and implementation schedules within 30 days of the rule's effective date.
Long before judicial review of the rule is completed, the Companies will have been required to commence installation of required modifications.
Boston Edison's current estimate of the capital costs l
of design, procurement, engineering and installation of a system to comply with Appendix R.III.G is 30 million dollars.
Northeast estimates its cost of compliance with Items III.G L
and L to be 150 million dollars per plant.
These costs are extraordinary by any standard. 7/
They will be borne by the 7/
The attached affidavits also reflect the fact that with experience as a guide, 'these cost estimates will escalate 1
with the passage of time.
F These estimates of the cost of compliance may seem i
astonishing to the Commission.
They are the product of analysis by the utilities' technical experts, who are the persons most familiar with individual plants in the context of the Appendix R requirements.
If, as we believe is the case, these a'ticipated compliance costs are far beyond what.
the Commisad e had expected, then there is additional reason to grant a v st this time.
If, in other words, the fire protection ;#
- vill produce cost consequences that the Commission did t intend, then a stay would be appropriate to allow the C.:aission and the utilities time to reach an understanding on what was intended by the rule.
The Commission has long recognir.ed that it is not reasonable, beyond a certain point, to require massive licensee expen-ditures for safety to achieve a minimal reduction in residual risk to the public health and safety.
10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix 2.
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Companies' ratepayers.
Once the dollars are spent, they cannot be recovered.
Northeast, for example, projects the necessity for new containment penetrations, extensive nuclear Class I piping modifications, and new seismic firewalls.
Once these plant modifications are commenced, they cannot be recalled.
Absent a stay, design, engineering and construction must go forward to meet the Commission's compliance schedule.
Northeast and Boston Edison also estimate that l
additional plant outage time will be required to complete i
the modifications required by Appendix R.
Northeast, for example, will require one month of down time beyond that currently scheduled.
The cumulative cost of replacement power for Northeast's nuclear plants is $14,476,000 per week.
An outage of a month due to fire protection modifi-cations would therefore cost Northeast, and its customers, in excer f 58 million dollars.
These costs, of course, I
are irre._>+$able.
The costs of compliance with Items III.G and L for Northeast and Boston Edison will be exceptional.
Once the monies have been spent, they cannot be retrieved.
The Commission should avert this irreparable injury by granting partial stay of the rule pending judicial review.
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3.
A Partial Stay Would Not Harm Other Parties To The Proceedinc.
The Commission's "rulemaking" was not an adversary proceeding, and the only true parties other than commenters were the Commission and its Staff.
The latter will obviously not be harmed by a stay, nor will the Commission's ability otherwise to enforce Appendix R be ccmpromised by a partial stay.
The appropriate inquiry is, therefore, whether a stay would serve the public interest.
4.
A Partial Stay Wil'. Serve the Public Interest.
The Commission and the Companies share a common goal:
to implement those fire protection measures at operating nuclear power plants that will optimize the protection of the public health and safety.
The difference in approach to that common goal is that the Commission, in evident haste to i
neet a self-imposed deadline arbitrarily selected some time ago, would paint with a broad brush on the basis of an inadequate record without regard to the circumstances of individual plants.
The Companies, in contrast, would deliberately adapt fire protection standards to the config-urations of their individual plants.
Many of the Appendix R requirements do not pose insurmountable problems,in this regard.
For example, although the Companies believe that there is room for legitimate difference on the Commission's requirements for staffing and training of fire brigades,
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ff further dispute on the subject would serve no useful purpose.
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The Appendix R requirements for associated circuits, dedicated y.
shutdown capability, and oil collection systems, however, pose significant problems, to greater or lesser extent,- for each of the companies.
A limited stay of these provisions pending judicial review will not adversely affect the public interest.
Indeed, a stay may avoid adverse effects on the public health and safety. 8/
As Commissioners Hendrie and Kennedy commented regarding the rule when it was proposed,
"[w3e are concerned that the short implementation schedule i
proposed here for fire safety provisions, together with the
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1arge workload associated with the Three Mile Island require-ments, may make it impossible for licensees to complete all e
of_these measures in a carefully considered and thorough fashion."
45 Fed. Reg. at 36083 (May 29, 1980).
i The Browns Ferry report (NUREG-0050, supra $1.3) concluded that, although fire protection measures at operating plants should be reviewed, " urgent action in regard to reducing risks due to potential fires is not required."
Two years later, on the basis of the promulgation of Appendix A to BTP 9.5-1 and Staff's intensive fire protection review of all operating plants, the Commission found that "those plants j
I can continue to operate without undue risk to the public I
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see Counsil Affidavit,
- p. 3 ("of equal significance is l
the high probability that these modifications will make the plants less safe from an overall risk perspective.
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These modifications will invalidate previous safety analyses performed on these plants.").
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h health and safety." 9/
Most recently, the Commission stated:
Extensive fire protection measures have already been implemented at all operating plants.
- No public health and safety interest would be served by forcing only those licensees unable to meet deadlines preceding the effectiveness of the final rule to shut down for the brief interim.
To the contrary, the fire protection measures already implemented give reasonable assurance that all opera-ting nuclear plants may continue to operate safely even though the final rule will require additional fire protection measures at many plants. 10/
As the Ccmmission has noted, only a few of the Appendix R requirements are unresolved, at scattered plants.
The
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Companies will implement these remaining requirements r
whether or not stay of Items III.G, L and O is granted.
The Commission has already found the current status of implemen-tation not to comprcmise the public health and safety.
The Companies' ccmpliance with the remaining non-stay requirements will further reduce residual risk, if any.
A stay therefore presents no risk to public health and safety and will be fully consistent with the public interest.
In contrast, implementation under the current compliance deadlines may not be consistent with the public interest.
The associated circuits and safe shutdown requirements of Appendix R 9/
Petition for Emergency and Remedial Action, 7 N.R.C.
- 400, 2,..2.
I28 (1978).
10/
Fire Protection Schedules for Operatinc Nuclear Plants, II Fed. Reg. 71569 (Oct. 29, 1980).
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(III.G, L) are exceedingly complex, both as written and as applied to the particular configurations of each Company's plants.
Hasty planning and design to meet the rule's apparent requirements would serve neither the Commission, the Companies, nor the public.
CONCLUSION The Commission should grant the Companies ' motion for stay of Appendix R.III.G, L and O pending judicial review of the fire protection rule.
Respectfully submitted, NORTHEAST UTILITIES SERVICE COMPANY BOSTON EDISON COMPANY FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
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January 16, 1981 By
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I J.
Michael McGarry, III McNeill Watkins II Debevoise & Liberman 1200 Seventeenth St., N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20036 (202) 857-9800 Counsel for Movants 9
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i CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a copy of.the foregoing " Motion for Partial Stay Pending Judicial' Review" was this day I
served upon each of the following by hand delivery:
John F. Ahearne Leonard Bickwit, Esq.
Chairman General Counsel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Washington, D.C.
20555 Joseph M. Hendrie Stephen F.
Eilperin, Esq.
Commissioner Office of the General U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Counsel Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Washington, D.C.
20555 Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Peter A.
Eradford Commissioner U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Victor Gilinsky Cor=d s sioner U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 I
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'I r a m January 16, 1981 McNeill Watkins II se
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i UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BEFORE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Final Rule on Fire Protection
)
Docket Nos. 50-213 for Operating Nuclear
)
50-245 Power Plants
)
50-336 50-423 AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM G.
COUNSIL I
The undersigned
- affiant, being duly sworn, hereby attests and deposes as.follows:
1.
My name is William G. Counsil, Senior Vice President of Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, Northeast Utilities Service Company, The Connecticut Light and Power Company, The Hartford Electric Light Company, and Western Massachusetts Electric.
My business address is:
Northeast Utilities Service Company; P.
O.
Box 270; Hartford, Connecticut 06101.
2.
As Senior Vice President of the Companies which own, operate, and are the licensees for the Haddam Neck Plant and Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, I have corporate responsibility for all facets of the Nuclear Engineering and operations Group.
The jurisdiction of this Group includes the design, construction, and operation of the three operating nuclear power plants and one nuclear plant under construction.
As a former Site Superintendent and j
holder of a Senior Reactor Operator's License, I am familiar i
with NRC regulations in general, and I have retained involve-i ment in the evolution of NRC fire protection regulations through l
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2-frequent interactions with members of the technical staff within the Nuclear Engineering and Operations Group.
I have made inquiry of other employees of the Companies for the purposes of enabling myself to make the statements in this affidavit.
3.
Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company is the licensee for the Haddam Neck Plant, a 1825 MWt PWR located in Haddam, Connecticut.
4.
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company is the licensee for Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1, a*2011 MWt EWR located in Waterford, Connecticut, and for Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No.
2, a 2700 MWt PWR located in Waterford, Connecticut.
A Construction Permit has been issued for Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3, a 3411 MWt PWR located in Waterford, Connecticut.
This Unit is scheduled for ccmmercial operation in 1986.
5.
In February of 1977, each of the three operating plants docketed a Fire Hazards Analysis Report.
These reports were responsive to the provisions of Appendix A to BTP 9.5-1.
Subsequent reviews, discussions, and site inspections by the NRC Staff resulted in the issuance of plant-specific Safety Evaluation Reports in the fall of 1978.
Cumulatively, hundreds of modifications were implemented at a cost, to date, of approximately six million dollars.
As documented in letters dated November 24, 1980, from Darrell G. Eisenhut to each of the three operating plants, there remain three' open items at each facility.
Of the total of nine items, three involve the fire brigade issue, and four involve alternate shutdown capability.
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e 6.
The Nuclear Engineering and Operations staff has reviewed the revised 10CFR50.48 and the new Appendix R to 10CFRSO, including the specific requirements of Section III.
The portion of the review that has been completed to date identifies that further modifications or administrative measures will be necessary to achieve compliance for each of the following sections:
t Section III.G Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability Section III.H.
Fire Brigade Section III.I Fire Brigade Training Section III.J Emergency Lighting Section III.L Alternate and Dedicated Shutdown Capability Section III.O Oil Collection System for Reactor Coolant Pump 7.
Of particular significance are the costs associated with the implementation of Items III.G and III.L, which, based on the current status of our staff review, appear to be amenable to literal compliance with the requirements most of the Rule by the installation of a dedicated shutdown system.'
other alternatives for compliance involve an apparent prohibitive amount of plant outage time and are more expensive alternatives for that reason.
Of equal significance is the high probability that these modifica-
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t1}ons will make tK~ plants less safe from an overall risk e
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perspective.
^ AJP The modifications are so extensive that s
s i /O additional new~ containment penetrations must be provided, H ',
=fd'j extensive nuclear Class I piping modifications made-i.and
_new seismic firewalls added to existing seismic structures.
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These modifications will invalidate previous safety analyses s
performed en these plants.
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4 Cu..ent cost estimates for compliance with these two provisions
~
of Appendix R, including design, engineering, materials, and labor are approximately one hundred fifty million dollars per plant.
This estimate is preliminary anc will be refined during the evolution of our staff review of this regulation which is currently in progress.
This cost estimate is based upon literal compliance with the final wording of Appendix R and includes:
(1) the capability to achieve cold shutdown; (2) strict conformance with the separation criteria of Section III.G; and (3) compliance with t555) current inter-pretation of the term " associated circuits" in Section III.G,3.
To illustrate the exorbitant costs associated with nuclear plant backfit projects, it should be noted that installation of a reactor vessel head vent at the Haddam Neck Plant and Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No.
2, exceeded by a factor of ten the NRC cost estimates published in the TMI Action Plan, NUREG-0660.
It is also noted that implementation of modifications associated with several aspects of the environ-mental qualification issue at Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 have escalated in cost from an estimated three 2
million dollars in November of 1980 to over four times that value today, and the work is still not complete as of this writing.
The above expenditure estimates exclude the costs associated with replacement power.
Current conservative order-of-magn [tude
- estimates indicate that approximately one month of additional plant outage time may be required to complete these modifica-tions and make final corrections to existing plant components, s
5
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4 Current replacement power costs for one week are as follows:
(1)
Haddam Neck Plant 53,976,000 (2)
Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1.
54,550,000 J
(3)
Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2.
55,950,000 J
i These costs are lower cound estimates based on current volatile price structure cf replacement oil costs dictated by CPEC.
It should be noted that in New England, replacement power is generated almost exclusively with oil.
8.
The above information clearly demonstrates the very substantial l
costs and safety concerns associated with compliance with certain provisions of 10CFR50.48 and Appendix R to 10CTR50.
l For two of the three operating plants, these cost estimates exceed the initial capital cost of the entire facility.
The vast majority of the costs are directly related to j
Sections III.G and III.L.
Costs for implementation of the balance of the fire protection regulations, cumulatively, are a one-time expenditure of S300,000 and an annual recurring cost of 5750,000.
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Couns 1 Dated:
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STATE OF CONNECTICUT)
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Berlin o r.. / A,19 d*/
COUNTY OF HARTFORD
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Then personally appeared before me W.
G.
Counsil, who being duly J
sworn did state that he is Senior Vice President of Northeast Nuclear Energy Company and Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company, Licensees herein, that he is authorized to execute i
and file the foregoing information in the name and on behalf of the Licensees herein, and that the statements contained in said information are true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief.
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A Sotarh Public
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BEFORE THE
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
r i
Final Rule on Fire Protection
)
for Operating Nuclear
)
Docket No.
i Power Plants
)
AFFIDAVIT OF T.
A.
VENKATARAMAN 1.
My name is T. A. Venkataraman.
I am employed as Project '
Manager, Fire Protection, within the Nuclear Organization of Boston Edison Company.
My business address is 800 Boylston Street, Boston, Massachusetts 02199.
-1 2.
My professional qualifications and experience relative to nuclear safety, engineering and fire protection are as follows.
I hold baccalaureate degress in Physics and Electrical Engineering from the Indian Institute of i
Science and a Master of Science in Engineering Management f rom Northeastern University.
I am a registered professional
-i engineer in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
I am a full member of the Society of Fire Protection Engineers (SFPE).
I am a member of the Steering Committee of the Insulation Conductor Committee of the IEEE which deals i
with the qualification of fire barrier penetration seals, shields, etc.
I am a vice-chairman of the IEEE Technical Meeting Committee.
I am also a member of the 6h.,4 Edison Electric Institute Task Force on Appendix R.
taE Y
i i
i t
Prior to my employment by Boston Edison, I was employed for six years by Stone & Webster Engineering Co. in a i
variety of capacities dealing with the electrical design and engineering of nuclear power plants.
I have j
been employed by Boston Edison for the past three and a half years as a Senior Electrical Engineer, Proj ect Engineer and Project Manager.
I have held my present position since October of 1980. Over the past three years I have been particularly involved with the growing j
i field of nuclear power fire protection. I have worked in that field extensively since the very beginning of the NRC review process for operating nuclear power plants pursuant to Branch Technical Position 9.5-1.
Through this period I have closely followed the development of Commission regulations and policy on fire protection.
I have reviewed the Commission's final rule on fire protection published in the Federal Register on November 17, 1980 and I am f amiliar with all of its requirements l
and in particular with the requirements of Section III of Appendix R.
3.
In my position with Boston Edison Company as Project t
Manager, Fire Protection I report directly to the Nuclear Operations Support (NOS) Manager in the Nuclear Organization of Boston Edison Company.
The principal
.. _...;5?
responsibility of the Company's NOS Manager is support m=
of the operation of the Company's Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.
The NOS Manager reports, in turn, to the Company 's Vice President-Nuclear.
My responsibilities as Project Manager for Boston Edison include the interpretation of NRC fire protection regulations and requirements and s
the implementation of fire protection systems at Pilgrim Station.
It is my responsibility to coordinate the activities of Boston Edison personnel to assure compliance with the fire protection requirements of the NRC and to. implement those fire protection modifications I
that are mandated by regulatory authorities as well as those required to meet the Company's own internal technical evaluations. I am responsible to bring matters I
to the attention of the upper management at Boston Edison Company if I determine that there is a fire protection design condition which may have a detrimental e ffect on plant safety.
4.
The Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (Docket No. 50-293) is located on the western shore of Cape Cod Bay in the Town of Plymouth, Plymouth County, Massachusetts.
The station includes a single boiling water reactor of 670 MW capacity manuf actured by General E'lectric Co. which commenced commercial operation in December, 1972.
The gjf plant is wholly owned and operated by Boston Edison a mmu Comp any.
The plant supplies electricity to customers of Boston Edison and, in accordance with long term
contractual commitments, to customers of Montaup Electric
.,2
- 2 '
Company, New Bedford Gas and Edison Light Company and fourteen Massachusetts municipal systems located throughout the Commonwealth.
5.
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station was designed and constructed in the late 1960's and early 1970's in conformance with then-current applicable codes, standards and regulatory requirements.
Following the Browns Ferry fire and an extensive fire protection review process directed at all operating reactors, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued, in December, 1978, an Amendment No. 35 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-35 for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. This Amendment consisted of changes to the Technical Specifications for fire protection systems as well as a Safety Evaluation Report (SER) which supported Amendment No. 35.
The SER contained a summary of the fire protection modifications that were required and a list of incomplete items which were to be resolved.
Completion dates for the modifications were specified and were set forth in the SER.
Of the nineteen items identified in Table 3.1 of the SER as proposed modifications, Boston Edison Company had completed essentially all but two or three by the time of final promulgation of Appendix R.
Final completion l
of these items is underway and is not expected to be a problem.
With respect to the eight incomplete items 6
referred to in Table 3.2 of the SER, by November, 1980 3
Boston Edison Company had resolved five and the Staff had indicated through a subsequent SER that two of the remaining three were under review with the third requiring further inf orma tion. For each of those three issues, Boston Edison Company had submitted its analyses to the Staff well before the November, 1980 date when Appendix R was issued. The two issues which were under review were both included within the new requirements of Appendix R under Section III G which is discussed below.
Based upon the Commission's letter to Boston Edison dated November 24, 1980 it is our conclusion that there is thus only one remaining open item under Table 3.2 which deals with the CO2 test for the Cable Spreading Room.
In substance, we believe that as of November, 1980 Boston Edison Company had either substantially complied, or was in the process of achieving such compliance on an expeditious basis, with each Commission requirement or request in the area of fire protection.
A more detailed history of our efforts in this area, prepared as of June, 1980, was submitted to the Commission as Attachment A to a letter of Debevoise & Liberman dated June 30, 1980 commenting upon the Fire Protection Rulemaking.
A copy of that Attachment A entitled "The Boston Edison Company's Experience at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Unit-No. 1" is attached hereto and incorporated
=
" 2-herein.
=..
6.
With the promulgation of 10 CFR Section 50.48 and i
Appendix R in November, 1980 th_e principal impact upon
- Boston Edison Company is meeting the re w
Section III G of Appendix R.
Section III G, dealing w
with Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability is one of the requirements that the Commission specifically required to be backfitted in its entirety on all operating plants, regardless of whether or not alternative modifications had been previously approved by the NRC Staff.
In order to satisfy the specific requirements of Section III G and the schedule in Section 50.48(c)(5) for its implementation, Boston Edison Company must conduct extensive analyses and engineering design evaluation to determine what modifications should be performed and must be able to submit the findings to the Staff by March 19, 1981. Based upon a preliminary evaluation of the scope involved, I believe it would be extremely difficult to conduct a sufficiently thorough analysis and to make a proper engineering evaluation to select a final design option and then_. prepare a design description
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for such option, all by March 19, 1981.
Lacking sufficient l ' '7 time to develop any viable cost effective option, it 7""
- Ti would be necessary for Boston Edison Company conservatively to choose the only otherwise acceptable option as
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specified in Section III G.3 which is the installation c
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of a dedicated shutdown system satisfying the require-ments of Section III L.
As a preliminary estimate, the cost to design, engineer, procure end install such a
i 4
b dedicated shutdown system could run up to $30 million
)
in capital cost.
Based on past implementation experience _
for modificacions carried out at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station it would be prudent to assume that the actual capital cost would be much higher than the preliminary l
S 30 million estimate. Backfitting of such a dedicated s hutd own system would require a period of_approximately 4 months down time.
Assuming a normal planned refueling outage of two months, an additional two months for installation of a dedicated shutdown system would 1
result in replacement power costs of approximately S60 1
million.
These replacement power costs are borne i
l directly by those customers who normally. obtain electricity from Pilgrim Szation.
In the event the completion schedules required by Appendix R for a dedicated shutdown system do not coincide with a normal refueling outage i
schedule, a four month outage could be required, resulting in replacement power cost of approximately $120 million.
Of_ great concern to me as a professional engineer is the requirement that Boston Edison Ccmpany commit to and submit a design description for such a system by March 19,1981 at a time when we will have been unable to complete an analysis of other potentially preferable options and at a time when evaluations of a dedicated
,.47 UE==
shutdown system will have attained only a prelininary 1
state of engineering description.
Compounding this difficulty is the lack of guidance contained in Appendix sq R for interpreting certain key requirements such as i
those related to associated circuits.
Modifications to safety related systems need to be carefully evaluated, engineered and implemented so as to avoid changes which
(
inadvertently affect existing safety conditions in an I
adverse manner through subtle effects which might be overlooked under unreasonable schedule pressure.
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.A %;. t. u i !
i T. A. Venkataraman COMMONWE ALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS Suffolk, ss January 15, 1981 Then personally appeared before me the above-named l
T. A. Venkataraman and made oath that he is the Project Manager, Fire Protection for Boston Edison Company and that
~
he has read the foregoing affidavit and that the facts stated therein are true to the best of his knowledge, infonmation and belief.
./. t L.
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William S. Stowe, Notary Public My commission expires June 30, 1983 m:W:
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ATTACHMENT A The Boston Edison Company's Experience at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 The Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Unit No. 1, owned and operated by Boston Edison Company, commenced commercial oper-ation in July 1972.
The plant was designed and constructed in conformance sitz. th en-curr ent applicable' codes and standards which reflected " state cf the art" technology at that time.
Following a fire at Brown's Ferry Nuclear Station in March 1975, the NRC initiated an evaluation of the need for improving the fire protection programs at all nuclear power plants.
As part of this evaluation, the NRC in February 1976, published a report titled, " Recommendations Related to Brown's Ferry Fire," NUREG-OO50.
This report recommended that improvements in fire prevention and fire control be made in most existing facilities, and that con-sideration be given to design features which would increase the ability of nuclear plants to withstand fires without the loss of important functions.
To implement these recom-mendations, the NRC initiated a program for reevaluation of fire protection programs at all licensed nuclear power plants.
Subsecuently, the NRC issued new guidelines for fire protection which reflected the recommendations in NUREG-g73
,;h 0050.
These guidelines were contained in the following documents:
" Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis for Nuclear Power Plants," NUREG-75/087, Section Report 9.5.1, " Fire Protection," May 1976, which includes
" Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants" (BTP APCSB 9.5-1), May 1, 1976.
" Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants" (Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1), August 23, 1976.
" Supplementary Guidance on Information Needed for Fire Protection Program Evaluation," September 30, 1976.
As these documents were issued, all licensees were re-quested to:
(1) compare their fire protection programs with the new guidelines; and (2) analy=e the consequences 1
area. In response, a of a postulated fire in each plant compr ehensive evaluation of ihe Pilgrim facility was per-formed and the results were submitted to the NRC, in March 1977, as " Fire Protection System Review APCSB 9.5-1 for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station."
This report identified i
aspects which were both in conformance and not in confor-J mance with the Staff's guidelines.
Boston Edison agreed i
to take necessary steps to achieve conformance with many of these items.
Other aspects with which Boston Edison was not in conformance were believed to reflect adequately the
" state of the art" at that time, and Boston Edison sought to discuss these aspects with the Staff.
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xx A series of meetings was held between Boston Edison and the NRC Staf f to discuss all aspects of the evolving i
regulatory approach for fire protection. The Staff also visited the Pilgrim f acility to verify the adequacy of the information contained in the Boston Edison report and to resolve many of the items deemed open by the Staff.
As a result of the interaction between Boston Edison and the Staff, many of the items were resolved to the sat-isf action of the Staf f, while some remained outstanding.
Further interaction ensued, leading to a preliminary agree-ment between Boston Edison and the Staff.
That agree-resulted in imposition of the requirements which ment eventually appeared in Amendment No. 35 to Facility Oper-ating License No. DPR-35 for the Pilgrim facility, which was issued December 21, 1978.
Amendment No. 35 contained revised Technical Speci-fications and a Safety Evaluation Report (SER) which supported Amendment No. 35.
Tha SER contained a summary of the modifications that were required and a list of incomplete items which were to be resolved.
Completion dates were specified and are set forth below in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2.
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' 55..$._f TABLE 3.1 IMPLEMENTATION DATE FOR LICENSE PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS l
l ITEM DATE 3.1.1 Fire Detection Systems next refueling outage 3.1.2 Water Suppression Systems and Ecuipment 11-1-79 l
3.1.3 Gas Fire Suppression Systems 5-1-79 3.1.5 Lighting Systems 3-1-80 3.1.6 Fire Retardant Cable Coating and Fire Stops 3-1-80 3.1.7 Fife Doors 8-1-79 3.1.8 Fire Dampers 3-1-80 3.1.11 Control of Combustibles 9-1-79 l
3.1.12 Portable Extinguishers 1-1-79 3.1.13 Administrative controls and l
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Quality Assurance 9-1-79 l
3.1.14 Exposed Steel Protection
- 3-1-80 l
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3.1.15 Supervision of Detection and Acnuation Circuits 2-1-79 3.1.16 Self Contained Breathing Apparatus
- 12-1-78 3.1.17 Communication Systems
- 3-1-80 3.1.18 Alternate Shutdown capability
- 10-1-79 3.1.19 Penetration Seals
- 7-1-79
- NOTE:
The design for these modifications will be subject to further staff review prior to implementation, and will be submitted as soon as possible to allow sufficient time for the review.
Six months lead time is consid-ered appropriate, where possible.
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TABLE 3.2 COMPLETION DATES FOR INCOMPLETE ITEMS ITEM DATE 3.2.1 Safe Shutdown Analysis 10-1-79 3.2.2 Testing Fire Detectors 3-1-80 3.2.3 Battery Room Ventilation Air Flow Monitor 11-1-78 3.2.4 Cable Combustibility 3-1-80 3.2.5 Prevention of Spread of Combustible Liquid Fire via Drain Systems 3-1-79 3.2.6 Suppression of Charcoal Fire in Augmented off-Gas System 12-1-78 3.2.7 DC Power System Hazard Analysis 2-1-79 3.2.8 CO2 System Discharge Test 3-1-80 NOTE:
If analysis results indicate modifications are re-quired, the design details will be due within 6 months of the analysis submittal date and design implementation within 12 months of the analysis submittal date, with implementation no later than October 1980.
Extensions, consistent with attaining the October 1980 implementation date, were sought with respect to various items in Table 3.1 and are discussed below. (Items not referenced here had been completed and thus no extension was necessary).
(a)
Some items required plant shutdown-and it was con-sidered desirable to perform the necessary work at the next scheduled outage.
(Nos. 3.1.1, 3.1.6, 3.1.18 and 3.1.19)
(b) Eame items required additional time because of difficulties that would be encountered during implementation.
.=
(Nos.
3.1.2, 3.1.5, 3.1.14, and 3.1.19.)
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4 (c)
Some items required long lead time to procure i
material / equipment.
(Nos.
3.1.2, 3.1.7, and 3.1.19) 4 (d)
Some items were postponed because of special con-sideration such as ALARA,. availability of manpower, unavail-ability of testing facilities, time limitations necessitated by engineering research, etc. (Nos.
3.1.1, 3.1.2, 3.1.3, 3.1.6, 3.1.18 and 3.1.19).
At the current time, the enly items in Table 3.1 that remain to be completed are Nos.
3.1.1, 3.1.2 and 3.1.19.
Items 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 are in progress.
Item 3.1.1 is approximately sixty percent co=plete and will be completed I
by September 1, 1980.
Item 3.1.2 is approximately ninety percent complete and will be completed by August 1, 1980.
i As to Item 3.1.19, Boston Edison retained the Franklin Institute (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania) te concect qualifi-f cation tests of typical penetration seals thet exist a-Pilgrim.
A preliminary test report was submitted to the NRC i
in October 1979 and a final test report was submitted in May 4
1980.
The reports indicate that some of the seals would require upgrading to comply with the 3-hour fire rating.
Boston Edison requested a timely review of the findings of the 1
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. test reports so that the upgrading process could be completed by October 1,1980.
To date, Boston Edison A
Company has not received any official correspondence l
concerning these reports.
The above described lack of NRC review is not an isolated instance.
For example, with regard to Item 3.1.18, Alternate Shutdown Capability, Boston Edison submitted a conceptual design in October 19,79.
On October 22, 1979, the NRC requested additional information for Item 3.1.18. Boston Edison Company's final submittal for this l
1 item (January 1980) modified its earlier submittal to i
- 3..
reflect the additional information requested.
To date, no
=
=
official response has been received from the NRC.
The Alternate Shutdown Capability design submitted by Boston Edison was similar to the design developed for the Trojan Nuclear Power Station which had been favorably received i
and evaluated by the NRC.
Because this modification had to be completed during the recent outage (January 2nd to May 18th), Boston Edison expressed concern to the NRC that timely review by the Staff was necessary if the modifi-cation was to be completed on schedule.
Lacking any for-mal response, Boston Edison proceeded to implement the modification.
(The cost of this modification was approxi-
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With regard to the items listed in Table 3.2, Boston Edison did not request an extension of any of the initial completion dates as specified by the NRC.
The analyses j
required by Item 3.2.1 were submitted for NRC review on January 21, 1980.
No response has been received to date.
A report prepared by NUTECH for Boston Edison and four other utilities, was submitted to the NRC in October 1979.
Boston Ediron feels this report on in situ testing of fire detectors'was adequate to complete its responsibility in rega'rd to Item 3. 2. 2.
To date, no response has been I
?
received from the NRC.
Based on the NRC acceptance of the design of Item l
3.2.3, Boston Edison has completed the required fire modifications for the battery room ventilation.
In regard to Item 3.2.4, an analysis of the cable installed at Pilgrim was conducted in order to deter-mine compliance with IEEE 383-Flame Test.
Appropriate documents from the applicable cable manufacturers, i
which supported the analysis, were submitted to the j
NRC in March 1980.
To date, no response has been l
t received from the NRC.
D.64Wes t e gg
- r
The analyses for Items 3.2.5 and 3.2.6, and sub-
. sequent discussions between Boston Edison and the NRC staff, resulted in their acceptance.
A detailed analysis for Item 3.2.7 was submitted in
)
Feburary 1979; no official response has been received to date.
The CO2 dump test, Item 3.2.8, has been the subject of correspondence and telephone conversations between the NRC and Boston Edison.
Boston Edison presented engineer-ing justification for delaying conducting this test until all factors, such as thermal shock and spurj ous signals, resulting from tests conducted at other facilities, had been l
1 addressed.
During a telephone conversation, the NRC informed Eoston Edison that an extension would "probably" be granted in completing this item.
In summary, Boston Eiison will complete all items in Table 3.1, except Item 3.1.19.
As' stated earlier, completion of this item requires a response from the NRC.
In Table 3.2, Items 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.4, 3.2.7 and 3.2.8 require response from the NRC prior to completion.
On May 19, 1980, the NRC published proposed regula-i tions regarding fire protection.
If enacted, these re-
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gulations would be applicable to Pilgrim.
Boston Edison's
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-e7 examination of the requirements set forth in proposed
.a.
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Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 reflects that 2 of the items are totally new (III.P, III..Q) and that 12 of the items involve new matter, i.e.,
refinements (III.A, III.E, III.F, III.G, III.E, III.I, III.J, III.K, III.L, III.M, III.N, t
III.0). As reflected above, due to the Staff's silence on i
fire protection matters, Boston Edisen did not receive 1
sufficient advance warning as to these new matters.
Accord-ingly, despite its best efforts, Boston Edison does not see how it could be in complete compliance with the i=ple-mentatien schedules with respect to the 14 above identi-fied items.
(Boston Edison will be in compliance with items III.B, III.C, and III.D on November 1, 1980.)
This 1
situation results from delays in purchase of equipment, allocation of time and resources necessary to perform the design and analysis and the actual time necessary to imple-ment the items.
With the excep~ tion of items III.L, III.N, III.P, and III.0, Boston Edison contemplates th at, if necessary, it could complete the other 10 items on a rea-sonable extension of the implementation schedule.
As to items III.L, III.N, III.P, and III.0, it is extremely difficult to even begin to determine the timeframe, except to state that it will be lengthy.
i Boston Edison has endeavored to calculate the costs j
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that would be entailed in performing these proposed P
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' *.T back fitting requirements.
However, given the severe
-time constraints that have been imposed, these calcu-lations are far from precise.
It is Boston Edison's best judgment, under the circumstances, that the pro-posed modifications would necessitate the expenditure of S25-5100 million.
This figure does not include replacement power costs which are on the order of 5640,000 per day.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA "4'
BEFORE THE
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Final Rule on Fire Protection
)
for Operating Nuclear
)
Power Plants, 45 Fed. Reg.
)
76602 (Nov. 19, 1980).
)
MOTION FOR PARTI AL STAY PENDING JUDICIAL REVIEW Northeast Utilities Service Company 1/, Boston Edison Company, Florida Power & Light Company, and Arkansas Power &
Light Company move the Commission to stay Items G
' ire s
Protection for Safe Shutdown Capability), L (Alternative and Dedicated Shutdown Capability), and O (Oil Collection System for Reactor Coolant Pump) of Appendix R.III to 10 C.F.R. Part 50, issued November 17, 1980, pending judicial review.
To the extent rezevant, the Companies also request a stay of the effective and compliance dates for those items.
Each of the Companies is a Commission licensee, and each has participated in the fire protection rulemaking.
The Companies are today filing a petition for review of the fire protection rule in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
1/
Northeast Utilities Service Company joins this ' motion as agent for The Connecticut Light and Power Company, The Hartford Electric Light Company, Western Massachusetts Electric Company, and Northeast Nuclear Energy Company 9
(" Northeast Utilities").
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