ML20058A393
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l 0-May 19, 1981 p '* "4 SECY-81-315
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e' ADJUDICATORY ISSUE (Affirmation)
For:
The Commissioners From:
Leonard Bickwit, Jr.
General Counsel
Subject:
GPU FEDERAL TORT CLAIM -- DRAFT DECISION e
Purpose:
To recommend i
Discussion:
3 Recommendation:
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A.
Leonard Bickwit, Jr.
J General Counsel Attachments:
{l) Draft Memo & Order iCTV,m P<
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Contact:
C.W.
Reamer, OGC 634-1491 h
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Commissioners' comments or consent should be provided directly to the Office of the Secretary by c.o.b. June 1, 1981.
Commission Staff office comments, if any, should be submitted to the Commissioners NLT May 26, 1981, with an information copy to the Office of the Secretary.
If the paper is of such a nature that it requires additional time for analytical review and comment, the Commissioners and the Secretariat should be apprised of when comments may be expected.
This paper is tentatively scheduled for consideration at an open meeting during the week of June 1, 1981.
Please refer to the appropriate weekly Commission schedule, when published, for a sepcific date and time.
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SECY NOTE:
OGC HAS RECOMMENDED THE ORDER BE APPROVED AND ISSUED
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PRIOR TO JUNE 8, 1981.
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INJURY, OR DEATH
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1.SunesT To:
- 2. Nwt AND ADCat15 C8 CLAiMAsti (Number, sterrt, rity. 31 sir.
0 andZip Codel Public Utilities Corp.
General Counsel Genera Nuclear Regulatory Co::rnission 100 Interpace Parkway Washington, D.C.
20555 Parsippanv, NJ 07054 et. al Isee attachment)
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I a r. sitert. enr. Jeoir.. sed le f.uics NAa43 AN 4008!!5 OF CwNit ip Q:=ta T>Am A wAN1 4 unev r s sv.e SEit*LY CtsCaitt UND AND sGC47aCae OF Pa celair AND maf sg A%; E ?tu? Of LAMAGE drr muem somi.at errreir a.Jr for mer4..J u/ wA manunne ela,ma t i See Attachment i ) ? 13 Pt R50N Ai INJURY j, STatt HAT'.st Amt Ex* twt cf iN;uay wm.:n pcaus T>t LAsis Of Tws CLA# NA l 1 A. WiTNES515 5b esAnt l ADDetsS 0%emther strert. rurs. 5nne. snJ Zip C..Jes Due to the nature of this. claim based on the March 28 1979 accicent at 'M-a, {ergthird are hunc. eds o+ oersons, inhmitM tci the Babcock r.-ludine em::lovees of the u. , of the claimants anc o 'i parties, inclu3ihg but not 1 ccx Co. anc Teleco EC!1 son Co., The 17 is alreadv a o' the are witnesses mssessime relevant infornation.orthesewitnessesasaresulto,ItsSp?vis lal w i ntity of manv H not all, "Three Mile Islin,d - A Fleport to lthe CCnmissicners and to the Public ' (1980) lf. ClaT6FY TmAT Tkt AMOUNT or CLAiv Covins ONLY DAMA015 AND iN>uaits CAusto SY THE ACCIDENT A80Vt AND AGREE TO ACCEPT 5 AID 5 i AuouNT N suit SAT:58 ACTION AND 7 NAL stTTLEV!NT OF TMr5 CLAiu i 15 SnGNATURE OF CLAIMANT 17 hts sigrictsure should be used m allfuture currespondences
- 16. CATE OF CLAtu I
{ A rA.'n, g n%"' '/ei n December 8, 1980 l. . f CIVIL PEN ALTY FOR PRESENTING CRIMINAL PEN ALTY FOR PRESENTING FR AUDULENT s// FRAUDULENT CLAIM CLAIM OR MAKING FALSE STATEMENTS I The claimant shall forfest and pay to the United States the sum Fine of not more thart 510.000 or imprisonment for not more .o .t c.- of $2.000. plus double the amount of damages sustamed by the than 5 years or both (Ser 62 5 tor. 698. 7491 88 U.S C.187. /001.3 i [?{. c Unned Swes. 85re R.S.13490.3436.31 U.S C.231 o -.I rra,cae.o= n m l s AG%dMW 33pf v = " ~ ' ' ~
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-.y,. a;.: w ( ? e PRIVACY ACT NOTICE This Nence a provided an accordance wuh the Pnwacy Act $ U 5 C
- 3. /nacys/ fvparr The anformataos requested a to be used la evaluaneg 332atej(3), and concerna the informauon requessed in tb 'ener to which snia cWas Nouce a attachea C. Amin =< Ur See the Nouces of Systems of Records for the agency to whom you are submattet stas form for tras informauon.
A AarAeatry The requested anformat on ta soltened pursuant to one or more of, D EJeet 4 /adre m /tespoed Dtselosure a voluntary, However. faJure to / tbc folio.mg S U 5 C. 301. 28 U.5 C 501 eiseg. 28 U S C. 2671 er seg. 23. supply the requested informauon or to saecute the fcrm may render your C f R.10 a claun %eveW. INSTRUCTIONS Complete oil items-Insert the woral NONE where opplicable Claur.s for damage to or for low or destnicnon of prepe ty, er for personal (Al la support of claims for damage to property wiuch has been or can be asjury. meal be signed by the o*ser of the propeny damaged or sont or the econoancally repured. the staarnant stiouid submit at least two stem:2ed signed injured person it. by reasim cf death, ot.ner d.sabihty or for ressons dee ned 8:AtC: Dents or esurt. ales by fthabit, dataterested Concernk or, if papDent has sausfactory by the Government the foregomg require: tent cannot be fulf.jiet j been made, the itemtred a.gned receipta endenctag payment Lbe slaam may be (Ded by a duty authorued agens or otter legaJ rrptncatatne, (c) la support of staams for damage to propeny stuch as not econonucally prended endence sau.sisctory to the Gowe-r. ment a submined wuh sa.d cia.m reparabic, or af the property as loss or destroyed. the claunaat should subaut estabhatuzg authonry to act l ssatementa as to the ongmal cost of the property, the date of purchase. and Lbs If cimaat etends to fue cla.m for both perwr.a1 an;ury and property damage. sajur of the property. both Defore and after the accident such state nents should claam for both must be showr a nem 10 of tha form 5eparate c! sts zor ' be by daariteresiec competent persons. prefertoly reputable dealers or ofLems personalinjury and propeny ca r.sge are not acceptable 8 far.Lar mauh the r>pe of propry damaged. or by two or more compeuove The air,ount cWmed shou!d be suostart;sted by cottpetent enJence as tadce s. and sheutd be ceMed as tiemg just and correct fobows Ar'y further instructior.: or snforwanon necestry a the preparsuon of yon.r (a> In support ot'ckm for pc sona] injuay or death. the cla.rnant should sucmat cWrr miJI be fenansd. upon request by Lt.e office ancicateo m nem al ovi the a onnen repo t by the anen;brg pripc.an. showarg the nature and entent cf reverse sace injury, the nature and entent of tresiment the orgree of penr.ar.cnt disacd2:s if td> Fadiare to completely enecute tha forts of to supply the requested matena! any, ice pregnoast and tr.e penod of hesp6ianzauorL or scapacitat. ort. attacning waha two years from the case the abeganons accrbad osay render your che nemized b4ha for med. cal. hospitat or bunal empenses acru.sdy inc6rred l Snvaad". INSURANCE COVERAGE
- n order that sut*roganon c!cums may be adjuJacated. it is esaential that the cLi+mant preside the following information regarding the insurance coserage of nn 6 chicle or propert).
17 00 vos CAE8v ACC10ENt #N5L.8 AN0f' % YE5 if vi5. Grw! Navt ANO ADOEf 55 C8 IN5st ANCE COvPANY N umscr. strret. rety. 5 sate. und i Z:p CMer AND *ovCr Nuvste 7 NO (1) knerican Nuclear Insurers, 270 Famingten Ave., Fa=ingten Ct. Policy No.1353 (2) Keger Insur. Co. Long Grove, Illincis Policy No. TA1084 1 1 16 MAVI YOU Fitf D CLAiv ON vCUG IN$UR ANC{ CAIRiff IN TH.5 IN5f ANCt. AND if 50.15 if 19 if CfDUCTIB.I. STAf t AMOUNT Fuu Covta AGE Ce Cf DUCTiBit' I nNI - S100,000.00 Dedu tible Ke per - 5100,000.00 i n a :Lw -A5 erin s.u: e vous : Ass.es wntt acicN.a.5 vous m5una sacrN ce racec5:5 to tua et minucero vous C.Ase? til s1 nes esnry that.wu usi rrtwo these fus ts t Papents to date (as of 12/2/80) Nt Ed S96,256,228.00 JCP&L S48,128,114.01 Penelec 548,128,113.99 21.DC YOU CAsev PyguC Lia8:Li'Y AND *& cpl #TV CAMAGE IN5va&N0t$ 2 YE5 17 vi5 GIVE NAvi A7 0 AC0eg55 Os IN5Un tN t CAR-nisa nnsa r. sircru. t sr. siuse. ua zor cuaes C No Property camage - as above No. 20 Public I.iability Insurance: (1) n:tual A C m c Energy Liability Undereriters, 919 N. Michigan Ave., Chicago, Ill, (2) Nuclear Ibergy Liability Insur. Assoc. 270 Famington Ave., Fa=ington, CT , c,o, nr. o_ ar-a n swe.anoa. es am... a., e ~ kn* a- +e== sp
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j = \\ l I' t i i BEF0FI THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION L CT THE UNITED STATES i i I. l j---------------------------------------x I t General Public Utilities Corporation, Jersey Central Power & Light Company, j a 1 Metropolitan Edison Company and l Pennsylvania Electric Company CLAIM l Docket No. v. 3 Nuclear Regulatory Commission. I ........................___.........__.x General Public Utilities Corporation (" GPU * ) and its I cperating subsidiaries, Jersey Central Power & Light Company l ("JCP & L" ), Metropolitan Edison Company-(* Met-Ed") and Pennsyl-vania Electric Company ("Penele="), bring this claim against the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") alleging as follows: s i 1. This is a claim arising out of the March 28, 1979 i accident at the nuclear electric generating facility known as Three Mile Island Unit No. 2 ("TMI-2"). Claimants seek damages against the NRC under the Tederal Tort Clains Act, 2B U.S.C. 5 2.71 el se=,. F Jurisdiction 2. Jurisdiction is based en the Federal Tort Claims A:t, 25 U.S.C. S 1346(b), and regulaticn 10 C.F.R. $ 14.1 (1975). This is a claim against the United States fer coney damages fer injury to and loss of property caused by the negligent and wrongful acts and omissions of employees of the NRC while acting within the scope of their employment. This claim is filed before the NRC for disposition in i accordance with the provisions of 2B U.S.C. S 2675 and 10 C.T.F. g 14.1 et seg. The Parties 3. Claimant GPU is incorporated in Pennsylvania and B i w t l J l l i t p jhasitsprincipalplaceofbusinessinNet sersey. GPU is an t investor-owned public utility holding ;ompany, operating pur-3 suant to the Public Utility Holding Jempany Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C.! f l ~ 5 79 et seg., and owning all of the common stock of three operating electric company subsidiaries, claimants JCP&L, Met-Ed and Penelee. As used herein, GPU refers to GPU and all of its operating subsidiaries. 4. Clat: ant JCP&L is incorporated in New Jersey and f has its principal place of business in New Jersey. JCP&L sells electrical energy to retail customers in north-central,- east-central, northwestern and western New Jersey and to other l electric companies and entities for resale. 5. Claimant Net-Ed is incorporated in Pennsylvania and has its principal place of business in Pennsylvania. Het-Ed j sells ele:trical energy to retail customers in eastern, east-central and southeastern Pennsylvania and to other electric co=panies and entities for resale. 6. Claimant Penele: is incorporated in Pennsylvania and has its principal place of business in Pennsylvania. Penelee sells electrieel energy to retail customers located in western, northern and south-central Pennsylvania and to other electric companies and entities for resale. 7. JCPEL, Met-Ed and Penele: are co-owners of the nuclear electric generating facility known as Three Mile Island Unit No. 2 ("TMI-2' ), which is located in Londonderry Township, Pennsylvania. Met-Ed owns an undivided 50% interest in TMI-2, i t and JCP&L and Penelee each own an undivided 25% interest in TMI-2. Het-Ed is the operator of IMI-2. The Atomic Energy Commission irsued an operating License, DPR-73, to Met-Ed for 1 i TMI-2 on February 8,1978. The nuclear stet = supply system in TMI-2, including the nuclear reactor and substantially all of 2 i e \\ i 1 .i i I l the engineered safety systems that control the nuclear reactor, were supplied by The Babecek & Wilecx Company (*B&W"). l t 8 8. All of the major electric generation, transmission, s R
- and distribution facilities of the claimants are physically interconnected. The operations of these electric facilities are centrally coordinated within GPU to function as a single, integrated electric utility system known as the GPU System. The energy generated by TMI-2, when operating, is commingled with the energy generated throughout the GPU System and is transmitted i
throughout the GPU System and distributed to retail customers er sold to cther electric' companies and entities for resale. f S. The NRO is a federal executive agency, established by the Energy Recrganizaticn Act of 1974, FL 93-438, BB Stat. 1233, 42 U.S.C. $ 5814 et seg., as a successor agency to the l' Atomic Energy Commission. As used herein, NRC refers to the I present agency, its prede:ess:r, the At:mic Energy Commission, and all present and fer:er divisions, offices, employees and agents of the NRO. By statute, the NRO is charged with the establishment cf
- standards and instructions to' govern the pos -
session and use of special nuclear material, source material, and byprodu: material as the Ccmmission may deem necessary or desirable to promote the cc ::n defense and security or to prete:t health er to minimize danger to life er property." 42 U.S.C. $ 2201(b). 10. Tne NRO has the authority and duty to regulate the design and operation of c =mercial nuclear power plants within the United States. In the 1974 Energy Reorganization Act, supra, Congress authorized the NRO to " prescribe such regulations l or orders as it may deem necessary... to govern any activity autherized pursuant to this chapter, including standards and i ,. restrictions governing the design, location, and operation of 1 i a 3 l I b ~ 1 J i I .1 4 1 ) 1 j e 4 h I facilities used in the conduct of such activity.. 42 l l
- U.S.C.
5 2201(i). The.NRO has promulgated regulations setting l 4 i e i forth mandatery agency operating procedures which are set forth Ij in the Code of Federal Regulations, the NRC Regulatory Guide, the NRC Manual, the Office of Inspection and Enforcement Manual, the l 1 Standard Review Plan and other guides, manuals and publications which, in relevant part, are described below. 11. In the operational exercise of its statutory and regulatory duties, the NRO induced GPU and Met-Ed.to raly and GPU and Met-Ed did rely upon the NRO to warn of defects in. equipment, analyses, procedures and training affecting the operation of THI-f 2 of which the NRC was or should have been aware. The NRC, in the operational exercise of its statutcry and regulatory duties, induced GPU and Met-Ed to rely and GPU and Met-Ed did rely upon j the NRC to review with due care the equipoent, analyses, pro- 'l cedures and training fer nu: lear plant operatien submitted to the~ t j i NRO by nuclear equipnent vend rs and nuclear plant licensees. The March 28, 1979 Accident at TMI-2 i 12. On March 29, 1979, beginning at 4:00 A.M., while TMI-2 was operating at about 97% of full power, the turbine i 4 generater shut down c " tripped" due to sudden less of feed-I water. Under NRC regulations, such an unscheduled turbine generatcr trip is an " anticipated operational occurrence" which j is required to be planned for in the design of a nuclear plant. As with any such shutdown, the removal of heat from the primary i loep by the secondary loop was reduced substantially. Nithin j l g seconds, the centinuing buildup of heat in the primary loop raised the pressure in the reactor coolant system. In turn, this caused a relief valve on the pressurizer (the " pilot-l l operated relief valve") to open, as it was designed to do, in t 1 1 4 l l l 1 l i i { l 4 order to relieve the excess pressure. i 13. Several seconds after the pilot-operated relief valve had opened, the reactor shut down or "scrarr.ed,* causing the pressure in the reactor cociant system to drop to within }its normal range. At that point, the pilot-operated relief 3 valve should have closed. i s 1 14. In fact, the pilot-operated relief valve improp-i ) erly failed to close and, because cf a lack of instrumentation to " ndicate clearly either the open position of the valve or the i existence of flow through the valve, the opera tors at TMI-2 I I twere unaware that the valve had f ailed to elese. Thereafter, i L i significant quantities of coolant water and steam escaped through the stack-cpen valve, and a "less-of-coolant accident
- was in
..Iprogress. k 15. As core coolant water and steam escaped, the pressure in the reacter coelant syste: centinued to drep. Within appr ximately two ninutes, the pressure fell to a level i at which an engineered safety system began providing high-pressure in;e:tien of water into the reactor coelant systen to replace the 1 cst coolant and ensure that the nuclear core was
- vered and protected by coolant.
16. Appreximately five minutes af ter the 4 :00 A.M. turhine generater trip, the TMI-2 operaters substantially reduced i f l the high-pressure injection of replace =ent cociant into the re-actor, in accordance with B&W-supplied limits and precautiens, procedures and training, which the NRC had reviewed as described ~ l herein. l 17. As a result of the loss of coolant thrpugh the a c l stuck-open pilot-cperated relief valve and the lack of replace-i ment coolant, the nuclear fuel core overheated, severely l damaging the protective cladding on the nuclear fuel and substan-. L 2 I e ? = h l i 5 E r i e l I + ! tially destroying portions of the nuclear fuel core. Radioactive i !. material from the ruptured nuclear fuel core spread throughout f,the surrounding reactor equipment, further damaging and contamin-l i 1' ating large portions of the auclear steam supply system and other ': equipment and structures in the THI-2 containment building and f i l in the adjacent fuel auxiliary and intermediate buildings. i THE NRO'S NIGLIGENT PERTORMANCE AND OMISSIONS OF ITS OPERATIONAL FtHOTIONS 18. Prior to the March 28, 1979 accident at TMI-2, NRC both had reason to know and actually knew that there .tne were defects in the equipment, analyses, procedures and training supplied by E&W for TMI-2. Notwithstanding the statutory and regulatory duties of the NRC to warn nuclear plant licensees of j = such defects, and notwithstanding the reliance by CPU and Met-Ed I I on the NRO for the dissemination of such warnings, the NR t negligently f ailed to warn CPU or Met-Ed of such defects in + TMI-2. That f ailure to warn by the NRO was a proximate cause e of the March 28, 1979 accident. 19. Pursuant to NRO regulaticns, the NRO of fice of i Inspecticn and Infercement is specifically required to inspect' nuclear plant licensees to " ascertain the status of compliance with NPC requirements including rules, regulations, orders and I license provisions," and to
- Ii]nvestigate incidents, accidents, allegations, and other unusual circumstances involving matters in the nuclear industry which may be subject to NRO jurisdic-i tien to ascertain the facts and to take or recommend appropriate actions." NRC Manual Ch. 0127 (1978).
20. The NRC regulations mandate that the NRO dissemi-f nate among licensees of nuclear power plants information derived a I from operating e.cperience at all nuclear plants in the United t States, including data on component failures and procedure I f f 6 4 e w s, ,a ~ - -r -c,-, w s I I i f I hchanges. 10 C.F.R. $ 1.64 (1977); NRC Manual Ch. 0127 (1978), i h I e i 'The NRC requires licensees to report unscheduled incidents or 9 events which involve variations from regulations, technical f P specifications or license conditions. 10 C.F.R. $ 21 (1977) r NRC I Regulatory Guide 1.16 (1975). The reports, called Licensee Event Reperts, are submitted to the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement to aid the NRC in obtaining corrective action at the reporting plant and in preventing a similar occurrence at other nuclear plants. The director of each division within the Office of Inspecticn and Enforcement is required to "!elvaluate licensee reports and Regional reperts to identify generic problems event and to determine the significance of individual incidents. NRC Manual Ch. 0127 (1976). 21. The KRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement is i + i responsible for evaluating licensee and NRC responses to inci-dents or accidents to " assure adequacy of the. overall response to the incident er accident." The Regional Director must review significant events, allegations and investigatory findings l for matters having generic applicability. Regional Inspection and Enforcement Directers are required to review all reports mandated by NRC regulations, including all Licensee Event Reperts. NRC Manual Ch. 0127 (1976); Inspection and Enforcement l Manual Ch. 1110-051 (1978). 22. As the primary recipient of plant operating data, the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement is required by regulations to analyte and disseminate important safety informa-1 tion to other NRC offices and to all nuclear plant licensees. l NRC Manual Ch. 0127 (1978). One of the principal methods used by the NRC Of fice of Inspection and Enforcement for advising I licensees of important saf ety matters is through the issuance of Bulletins and Circulars. Because of the importance of these S I 7 1 1 3 I ? k-t Enetices for warning licensees of possible defects and safety l problems, NRO offices other than Inspection and Enforcement, ,such as Nuclear Reactor Regulation and Nuclear Materials Safety 4 1 i and safeguards, also recommend the issuance of Bulletins and Circulars on particular subjects. Inspection and Enforcement Manual Ch. 1125-052 (1978). NRO regulations direct all NRO l staff to be alert to any information which has potential safety significance. The regulations require every member of the NRO i staff "to be alert to the emergence of information -- from l outside sources or within the staff -- which is new, potentially l 1 6 important, and potentially relevant to one or more pending proceedings." Inspection and Enforcement Manual Ch. 1530 (1978). 23. NRO regulations impose a duty on the NRO Of fice , of Inspection and Enforcement to issue Bulletins regarding l matters of ' safety, safeguards and environmental significance" for nuclear plants and to require that licensees take specific actions as a result of safety-related design inadequacies, equipment defects, operating inadequacies, malf an:tions, or any otner failures of a generic nature that have occurred at a sL:1-lar facility cr operation. A Bulletin requires licensees to inspect fer and correct the inadequacies described in the Bulletin. The Inspection and Enforce:ent Manual requires the issuance of Bulletins when an event or condition is generic l and important to safety. Inspection and Enforcement Manual i l Ch. 1125-031, 1125-041 (1978). 1 i 24. GPU and Met-Ed relied on the NRO to comply with Ii j the comprehensive requirements of data collection, analysis and dissemination set forth in statutes and regulations. GPU and Met-Ed relied on the NRO to issue warnings as required by NRC regulations. Met-Ed maintained a formal program for the review of communications from the office of Inspection and Enforcement to determine whetner any adverse condition reported by the NRC 8 v i t . required corrective action at TMI-2. Met-Ed, the operator of y TMI-2, promptly disseminated information from NRC Bulletins I fwithinMet-Edandrequiredpromptrepliesandappropriate action. TEE NRO's NEGLIGENT TAILURI TO GIVE MARNING BASED ON THE DAVIL-BESSE INCIDENT 25. In September 1977, a loss-of-coolant accident occurred at the B&W-supplied Davis-Besse I nuclear power plant of the Toledo Edison Ocepany. That accident clcsely paralleled the events which occurred IB nenths later at TMI-2. I 26. Following the September 1977 incident at Davis-Besse, the NRO negligently f ailed to perfQrn its duty (a) to adequately to investigate and ascertain the facts, (b) to take and rece==end appropriate action and (c) to warn Met-Id and l i i other licersees of B&W-supplied nuclear plants of defects in equipment, analyses, procedures and training which the NRO had discovered or should have discovered as a result of the Davis-Besse incident. These negligent failures contravened NRO t duties imposed by statute and regulations and were inconsistent with duties previously undertaken by the NRC. The NRO thus negligently performed and negligently ohitted to perform opera-ticnal functions mandated by statute, NRC regulations and past agency practice. If a proper warning had been given by the NRO, the TMI-2 accident on :tarch 28, 1979 would have been avoided. 27. On Se. ember 24, 1977, while the Davis-Besse plant was operating at 9% of full power, a sudden loss of f eedwater caused a turbine generator trip. When the pilot-operated relief valve subsequently opened and failed to close, the Davis-Besse plant experienced a loss-of-coc.lant accident. i i As reactor coolant pressure dropped, the high-pressure injection of replacement coolant activated automatically. The Davis-Besse l 9 I m I t f t t I 4' i
- nuclear steam supply system design did not have a direct indi-cator of whether the pilot-operated relief valve was open or i
n ' closed or whether there was a flow of coolant through the l I relief valve. Just as happened later at TMI-2, the water level I in the pressurizer began to rise, misleading the operators into concluding that there was no less-of-coolant accident in pro-gress. Acting pursuant tc NRO-reviewed limits and precautions, procedures and training, the operators at Davis-Basse then terminated the high-pressure injection of replacement coolant into the reacter coolant systam. t 28. I=nediately following the September 1977 Davis-g Besse incident, the NF.C began an investigation, as required by t 10 0.T.R. $ 1.64 (1977), which included operator interviews and reviews of plant operating data, equipment and operator action, j f 29. The NRO conducted another investigation of the September 1977 Davis-Besse incident during 1978, which resulted ' in the NRC implementing a revised Operating Procedure for Davis-Besse, described nere fully below at paragraph 34. 30. As a result of the investigatien and analyses of f acts, which regulations required the URO to perform following the Davis-Bes s-incident, the NRO knew or should have known the following: (a) There were defects in equipt.ent application and instrumentatien cf the Davis-Besse plant, includzng exces-sive reliance on the B&w-supplied pilot-operated relief valve to i ~ open and close and a lacx of instrumentation to indicate the valve position; l lb) There were defects in the transient analyses previously supplied by B&W and reviewed by the NRO, including a i failure to analyze adequately potential breaks in the coolant j system as s=all as a stuck-open pilot-operated relief valve and 10 b f ? I I l a failure to analyze adequately potential breaks located at the f top of the pressurizer; r t (c) There were defects in the limits and pre- [ l icautions, procedures and training reviewed by the NRC which { i= properly directed plant operators not to permit the pressuri-jzertobecomefilledwithwaterer'gosolidr* I a (d) There were defects in the operating and l 3emergency procedures, including procedures which improperly l r t fpermitted premature termination of high-pressure injection I before the operators had identified and arrested a less-of- .i . coolant accident; (e ) Unanticipated boiliry of the water in the reactor coolant system at Davis-Besse had caused a rise.in t pressurizer water level which misled plant operaters into con-f !.cluding that there was no loss of water f rom the reactor coolant i 1 l ' system. 31. Iach of the defects and operating problems set l r forth in paragraph 30 were generic problems affecting TMI-2 [ 'and other B&W-supplied nuclear plants because those plants con-i tained similar equipment and instrurentation and relied upon-similar procedures and analyses. NRO regulations required the Commission te * (nctify] licensees regarding generic problems i so as to achieve appropriate precautionary or ectrective action." j t t l10C.T.R. $ 1.64 (1977). Nevertheless, the NRO negligently ^ I i failed to notify licensees, including Met-Ed, of these
- generic l
problems," which it knew about or should have known about as a { i result of the ravis-Besse i.rident. That failure was a prcximate { cause of the accident at TMI-2 on March 2B,1979. l j 32. The NRO negligently disseminated to nuclear plant l
- 1icensees, including Met-Ed, summaries of Licensee Event Reports l
t i i ,regarding the Davis-Besse incident which failed to warn that the l 1 3 i i I h l l i l i l i E i 1 l [ l i ? l' operators at Davis-Besse had prematurely terminated high-6 >pressure injection before determining whether a loss-of-coolant I I ' accident was in progress. Toledo Edison Corp., " Licensee Event I 2 Reports NP-32-77-16," Docket 50-346, October 1977. 33. The NRO negligently disseminated to nuclear plant t licensees, including Met-Ed, a summary of an erroneous supple-I cental Licensee Event Report on the Davis-Besse incident. That j i i report erroneously concluded that "[o]perator action was timely f i and proper throughout the sequence of events." As a result, the l i NRO f' to warn Met-Ed that the Davis-Besse operator action had agg2..ated the loss-of-coolant accident by terminating high-pressare injection of coolant. Toledo Edison Corp., " Licensee Event Peport: NP-32-77-16 Supplement," Docket 50-346, Nove=ber f 1977. 3 I 34. M:re than a year after the Davis-Besse incident, l the NRO implemented new operating procedures for Davis-Besse i to prevent a recurrence of the September 1977. accident. Ihese procedures stated: " NOTE: Prior to securing EP: [high-pressure injection), insure that a leak does not exist in the pressurizer such as a safety i valve or an electromagnetic [i.e., pilot-i operated) relief valve stuck cien. A minisc= de:ay heat flow cf 2200 gpm is required prior to securing high-pressure injection. If the leak has been isolated, the high-pressure injection pump can be shut down after RCS trea ter coolant syste=] pressure I increases above the shutoff head of the l pump." 3 4 5 Davis-Besse No. 1, E=ergency Procedure EP 1202. 06,
- Less of l
Reactor Coolant and Reactor Coolant Pressure." The NRO negli-i l gently f ailed to direct the i=plementation of this new operating i procedure by licensees of other B&W-supplied nuclear plants, e including Met-Ed. 35. In addition to releasing incomplete, erroneous i and misleading Licensee Event Reports regarding the less-of-3 l I i 12 l I i i' i i s i i ? i f f coolant. accident at Davis-Besse, the NRC Office of Inspection j l-I i p, and Enforcement negligently failed to issue any Bulletin or j j ' Circular warning licensees of B&W-supplied nuclear plants, i j including Met-Ed, of the deficiencies in the equipment, analyses, procedtres and training which the NRC had discovered or should l i .l have discovered as a result of the September 1977 Davis-Besse incident. As a result of its investigations of the Davis-tesse incident, the NRC knew that the equipment and procedural deft-ciencies were generic to B&W-supplied plants and that the sub-I 1 stituted operating procedure was important to the safe operation [ t of the plant in that it instructed operators to take steps t which would avoid core uncovery. Thus, the NRO knew that a t Eulletin was mandated by NRO regulations, see paragraphs 22-23, supra. Nevertheless, the NRC negligently failed to issue a 1 t Bulletin. I f 36. Secti:n 20E of the Energy Reorganization Act cf ,c, r 1974, as amended, requires the NRO to determine which incidents and events represent Abnormal occurrences and to report those l Abner =al occurrences to Congress. The NRC aust disseminate informatien relating to an Abnormal Occurrence to the publi 7 within 15 days af ter the NRO has learned of its occurrence. { Inspection and Enforcement Manual Ch. 1110. ' Abnormal occur-rences* include 1 ' Design or Safety Analysis Deficiency, Personnel Error, or Procedural or Ad=inistrative inadequacy: i j
- 1. Discovery of a majer condition not spe:ifi-l g
cally considered in the Safety Analysis l Repcrt (SAR) or technical specifications g that require immediate remedial action.
- 2. Personnel error er procedural deficiencies which result in loss of plant capability l
to perform essential safety functions such i that a potential release of radioactivity i in excess of 10 CTR Part 100 guidelines l could result from a postulated transient l or accident (e.g., less of emergency core cooling system, loss of control rod s ys t em). " i 13 i i l l 4 i ~ t 1 l i I r l Inspection and Enforcement Manual Ch. 1110, Appendix A. The NRC I
- knew that the procedure which misled operators at Davis-Besse t
" prematurely to terminate high-pressure injection was a "proced-e I f ural deficionely)," as defined by the Manual. l f 37. In violation of NRC regulations (Inspection and Enforcement Kanual Ch. 1110, Appendix A), the NRO negligently failed to classify the September 1977 Davis-Besse incident as an. Abnormal occurrence in its subsequent quarterly or annual report to Congress, thereby failing te warn licensees of other B&W-supplied nuclear power plants, including Met-Ed, of the defects i t t and cperating proble=s revealed by this event which required i 3 zmmediate remedial action at similar plants, such as TMI-2. [ 3E. In addition to the failure of the NR to warn , licensees of B&W-supplied nuclear plants of defects and problems, j of which the NEC was aware as a result of the Davis-Besse incid-ent, the NR; negligently f ailed to act in other ways to inves-tigate, discover and warn licensees of defects of which the NRO t r should have been aware as a result of the Davis-Besse incident. i These negligent failures by the NRC have been documented by the l l NRC in a four volume repert which the NRC approved, published and released in January 1980 to the public, entitled "Three Mile l 1sland -- A Report to the Commissieners and to the 'Public" [ } (hereinafter *Special Inquiry"). The NRC, in its Special Inquiry, j ~ admtts thats (a) NRC staff persennel incorrectly advised the I t NRO Adviscry Committee on Reacter Safety (ACRS) that the conse-quences of a less-of-coclant accident, such as had occurred at ( e j Lavis-Besse, did not need to be examined for a reactor operating i i at full power -- as TMI-2 would be on March 28, 1979 -- because of the low probability of such an event occurring at full power. i (Special Inquiry, vol. II, Part 1 at 154) I i w i 14 I l I I 9 i 3: t = i I \\ h i (b) While the NRO recognized that it should ex-lbaminethebasisforthedecisionbytheoperatorsatDavis-l I ' Besse to terminate high-pressure injection, the NRO failed to j i I direct its inspectors to resolve this issue. (Special Inquiry, l vol. II, Part I at 152) 39. Even though the NRO knew or should have known '{ d that there was an unreasonably high rate of failure of pilot-eperated relief valves supplied by various manufacturers for nuclear plants, the NRC erroneously concluded that the failure of the pilot-operated relief valve at Davis-Besse in September l 1977 had no safety implications for other nuclear plants con-l taining pilot-operated relief valves designed by different manufacturers. Another f ailure of the pilot-operated relief r 1
- valve occurred at Davis-Besse in october 1977, while the NRO I
f I was investigating the September 24 incident. The NRO, in its Special Inquiry, admits that the NRO knew that "similar pieces of equipment with cemparable probabilities of f ailure and similar failure modes were installed on other B&W plants and, in some cases en all pressurized water reactors." (special Inquiry, i vol. 2, Part 1 at 156) l 40. The final report of the NRC Inspection and i Enforcement inspectors in Region III, where Davis-Besse is located, failed to identify the generic implications cf the l t Davis-Besse incident, including the misleading rise in pressur-i l iter water level, the incorrect operator response to pressurizer level and the misleading limits and precautions, procedures and ii training, reviewed by the NRO, which had directed ~that erroneous l operator response. 41. Prior to the September 1977 Davis-Besse Jneident, the NRC knew or with due care abould have known from other reports which it had received that its previous evaluations of i I k f 15 -l e 9 4 ~ f I B&W equiprrat, analyses, procedures and training were ina6 equate. As the NRC Special Incuiry admits, the NRC omitted to heed these Iearly" precursors,*justastheCommissionlaterfailedto v i (respondwithduecaretotheDavis-Besseincident, as described r i 5 ~ at paragraphs 25-40, supra. These earlier precursors included: i 4 l j (a) In 1971, the Atomic Energy Commission, the j predecessor agency to the NRO, was specifically advised that a small-break less-of-coolant accident at the top of a pressurizer-as was to occur at TMI-2 on March 28, 1979 -- could create misleading signals, thereby interfering with high-pressure injection of coolant. Although the NRC was thus on notice that it should analyre misleading signals of water level caused by such an accident, the NRO negligently failed to perform that I
- analysis or require suppliers of nuclear equipment, such as B&W, l
i r to perform that analysis. [S ecial Ineuiry, vol. II, Part 1 at 139-40) t 4 (t) In 1975, the NRC completed a cce.prehersive report on nuclear reactor safety, "The Reactor Safety Study (WASE-1400),* which concluded that small-break less-of-coolant t accidents -- such as the failure of a pilot-operated relief valve to c1cse -- were among the highest probabil!ty risks in i a nuclear plant. (Special Incuirv, vol. II, Part 1 at 142)
- Yet, t
the NRO f ailed to analyce er require nuclear equipment suppliers, + such as B&W, to provide adequate analyses of small breaks. (c) In 1977, the NRO substantially ignored a l 5 j report prepared by Carlyle Michelson, a consultant to its Advis-cry Co=mittee or Peactor Safeguards, which put the NRC on notice i i that neither the small-break analyses. supplied by nuclear equip-ment suppliers nor the computer models then used to predict r reactor-coolant-system behavior were valid for analyzing small-j r i ' break less-of-coolant accidents. (special Ineuiry, vol. II, l I i Part I at 144-46) 16 l I I l i ( l l 1 i ETTECTS CT NRC'S NEGLIGENT l PERTCRMANCE AND CMISSICNS OF ITS CPERATIONAL TUNOTIONS g g 42. GPU and Met-Ed relied on the NRC to issue warnings r 1 of defects in equipment, analysee, procedures and training in l l t accordance with the NRO's statutory and regulatory duties. 43. If the NRO had exercised due care in investigating the Davis-Besse incident and analyzing other precursors, and if the NRO had issued correct warnings of generic problems in B&W equipment, analyses, procedures and training, CPU and Met-Ed would have had the equipment, instrumentation, procedures and
- e. training reasonably needed to avoid the accident on March 28, 3
i 1979. 44. The negligent failure by the NRC to issue Bullet-ins, Abnor=al occurrence Reports and other warnings required by l statute and NRO regulations was a proximate cause of the March 28, t 1979 accidant at T::I-2. NRO'S NEGLIGENT IMPLEMENTATICN CT REVIEW REOUIREMINTS 45. A proximate cause of the March 28, 1979 accident at inI-2 was the f ailure of the NRC to review with due care, or in accordance with statutes and regulations, the equipment, analyses, procedures and training supplied by B&W for TMI-2. 46, pursuant to statutory and regulatory authority, the NRO issues licenses for the construction and operation of I eacn commercial nuclear power plant in the United States. r (4 2 U.S.C. S 2133(b)). The NRC 1
- is responsible for managing safety reviews of applications for construction permits and operating licenses for reactors and evalua-tions of standard plant designs; evaluates technical specifications.
[and) performs i technical reviews and analyses of mechanical, structural, and materials engineering aspects of reactor systems, core performance, auxiliary systa=s, control systems, mechanical components, reactor structures, and power systams.* 10 C.T.R. 5 1.61 (1977). i 17 l f I k t e l l [ The NRO Cffice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation " reviews a applications Ifor licenses) and issues licenses... and i k . evaluates the health, safety, and environmental aspects" of a f plant prior to the approval of a Preliminary Safety Analysis [ l Report or a Final Safety Analysis Report, which incorporate the l equipment vendors' analyses, evaluations and descriptions of { f cperation of all ecmpenents and systems. 10 C.F.R. S 1.61 (1977), 5 50.34 (1978). i i 47. The NRO Cffice of Nuclear Regulation is required by statute to a s
- !r} eview the saf ety and safeguards of all such facilities, materials, and activities, and 3
such review functions shall include, but not a be limited to monitering, testing and recom-mending upgrading of systems designed to pre-vent substantial health or safety hazards. j i 42 U.S.C. 5 5B43(b). i I 48. Applicants fer nuclear plant construction permits must submit for NRC review and approval " principal design criter-ia* for the proposed facility. 10 C.T.R. 5 50.34 (1978). These principal design criteria " establish the necessary design, f abri-catien, construction, testing, and performance requirements for structures, systems, and co=ponents important to safety.. 10 C.F.R. 5 50, Appendix A. The NRO has promulgated General t Design Criteria and has a duty to review equipment and designs 4 I for conformance to the General Design Criteria which
- establish s
I miniman requ'rements for the principal design criteria
- for i
all commercial nuclear power plants; id. The NRO h.s further i pry.;ulgated and has a duty to enferee additional design require-I ments described throughout the appendices to 10 C.F.R. 5 50. 6 e I 49. GPD and Met-Ed relied on the NRO review of B&W i f equipment, analyses, procedures and training to provide for the safe operation of TMI-2. L d O L .l 18 9 r 4 t a e 1 Negligent Review and Approval of B&W Tepical Reperts and B&W Generie Desiens 50. Prior to any licensing submission by Met-Ed for
- TMI-2, the NRC has already reviewed and negligently approved l
l numerous topical reports and generic models prepared by B&W for l: nuclear plant design and operation. These topical reports j l described generic systems in and the operation of B&W nuclear plants and were a means by which the NRC was able to review e ' generic features once, rather than repetitiously for each succeeding B&W plant. Licensees, such as Met-Ed, have no input . in the creatien of topical reports and rely on the NRC to review the repcrts with due care prier to approving them for use in ? subsequent nuclear platt licensing proceedings. In reliance upon the prior review and approval by the NRC of topical reports, I prcspective licensees, such as Met-Ed, incorperate such reports I
- by reference into the Safety Analysis Report fer specific ncelear plants.
[ 51. During the licensing of TMI-2, the NRC acknowl-edged that: Many features cf the design of TMI-2 are similar to these we have evaluated and approved previously for other nuclear plants new under constructicn or in operation. To the extent feasible and appropriate we have relied on our earlier reviews for those fea-tures which were shown to be substantially the sane as these previously censidered. Where this has been done, the appropriate section of this report identifies the l facility involved. i NRC Safety Evaluation Report for the Operating License en TMI j Unit 2 (1976). 52. GPU and Met-Id relied upon and incorporated by l reference in the TMI-2 Final Safety Analysis Report, a number of i f D&W topical reports previously reviewed and negligently approved by the NRC. GPU and Met-Ed reasonably relied on the NRC to have I 4 i ^ These included i reviewed these sub=issions with due care. i l 19 I I 4 i L I [ 8 4 4 4 ii i previously approved topical reports, relating to amall-break 4 - ; analysis, less-of-coolant accident analysis and emergency core a cooling system performance in B&W plants of substantially the same design type as TMI-2, specifically the B&W type 177-TA j ' lowered-loop
- nuclear plants. prior to the licensing of TMI-2, i
the NRO had licensed eight B&W plants, including seven which contained a 177-TA lowered-loop design. The earliest lowered-I loop plant was oconee I, licensed in 1973. Transient Analyses p 53. The NRC negligently approved B&W transient analy-i ses for TMI-2, including those for small-break loss-of-coolant accidents and for loss of normal feedwater, even though those analyses failed to comply with NRO regulations. The NRC knew '. that transient analyses in compliance with NRO regulations are l* necessary for proper plant design and operation. A transient t is an unintended change in power level or system condition in a t nuclear plant, and includes anticipated operational occurrences i a suen as a loss-ef-ncrmal-feedwater transient, which occurred at TMI-2 on March 28, 1979. 54. As set forth in paragraphs 55 and 56, below, the i NRO failed to evaluate with due care B&W transient analyses and failed to compel B&W, either durang the TMI-2 plant licensing process or as part of B&W's prior submission of topical reports, j to submit transient analyses which complied with NRO regulations, including the standard Review Plan and the General Design Cri- ~ + I teria. As a result, the NRC negligently failed to require B&W I J to submit the transient analyses necessary for proper design and [ operation of TMI-2. 55. The NRO has admitted, with respect to the tran-t. sient analyses submitted by B&W prior to and in support of the licensing of TMI-2, that the NRC failed to enfcrce compliance i f 9 20 i i i i-w ,e- 9 l 3 ~ I / with the requirements of its Standard Review Plan, Section 15. As the NRC has stated: "The TMI-2 accident started with a loss of t feedwater transient and, because of the i stuck-open power operated relief valve, a small break loss-of-coolant accident I resulted. According to the Standard Review Plan, such a sequence should have been analyzed in the licensing process, but it was not." NURIG 0560, Staff Report on the Generic Assessment of Feedwater i Transients in the PWR's Designed by The Babcock & Wilcox Co. (1979) at 5-4. 56. The NRC has admitted in the respects described in i paragraph 57, below, that it failed to comply with the require- ' ments of its General Design Criteria. As the Commiss Aon has stated: f "Teedwater transients are anticipated operational occurrences (A00s ), since they are expected to occur cne or more times during the life of a nuclear plant. The basic requirements for A00's are given in General Design Criteria (GOC) 10 and 15. GDC-10 requires that specified accept-able fuel design limits not be exceeded daring AOos. GDC-14 and GDC-15 require that the design of the reactor coolant pressure boundary should preclude abnormal leakage and the design conditiens of the boundary should not be exceeded during A00's. Additional requirements specified in G00-13 are: 'Instrcnentation shall be provided to monitor variables and systems over their anticipated ranges... for anticipated opera-tional occurrences. . as appropriate to assure adequate safety. Appropriate controls shall be provided to maintain these variables and systems within prescribed operating ranges. ' GDC-20 states the general requirements for protec-tion systems, including the following: 'The protecticn system shall be designed (1) to initiate i automatically the operation of appropriate systems l including the reactivity control systems, to assure i that specific acceptable fuel design limits are l not exceeded as a result of anticipated operational lA ~ occurrences. In the licht of the TMI-2 experience, it is apparent that applicable criteria were not cet." I Id. at 5-8 (emphasis added). 57. The NRO negligently failed to comply with the e a regulations described in paragraphs 55 and 56, above, in that 5. 21 e m g b 1 i the feedwater transient analyses and small-break loss-of-coolant analyses sub=itted by B&W and approved by the NRC vere inadequate to provide a proper basis for plant design and for the develop-iment of operator training programs and operating procedures. f lSpecifically: l t (a) The NRC failed to require B&W to submit the l 2 i r necessary analysis of any break size smaller than 0.040 square i
- feet. As a result, the NRC f ailed to require the necessary A
to the size of a pilot-operated -t . analyses of breaks equivalent l ' relief valve (0.007 square feet) which had failed to close. c. [ (b) The NRC failed to require B&W to submit the I I
- necessary analysis of a srall break occurring in the steam space l 4
at the top of the pressurizer, where the pilot-operated relief valve is located. I (c) The NRC failed to require B&W to submit the l l ' necessary analysis of a pilot-operated relief valve f ailing to close, even though such a failure should have been assumed since ' the valve was designated as non-safety grade equipment. i ? (d) The URC f ailed to require B&W to submit analyses which examined more than the initial minutes cf a transient, whereas such analyses should have covered the time period until a stable system had been assured. (e) The NRC failed to require B&W to submit ' analyses of the sensitivity of the foregoing small-break loss-of-coclant analyses (subparagraphs a-c, adosa), to reaeter coolant pump operation or non-operation. t l 58. As set forth in paragraph 41(b), supra, the NRC f knew, at least at the time that it reviewed and published in 1 that small-break 6.975 the " Reactor Safety Study (WASE-1400)," loss-of-coolant accidents were substantially more likely to l L l j r occur in a nuclear plant than large-break less-of-coolant i t f I f l l 3 1 22 l .i t 9 s m p 7-- l
- l. accidents.
Yet, the NRO failed to examine the B&W design and l procedures with due care to ascertain the likelihood of small-break less-of-coolant accidents and their consequences evan after the Davis-Besse incident, which was a sr.all-break loss-of-krcoolant accident. I 59. The NRC has admitted in post-accident reports I that the B&W analyses submitted to the NRC had failed to provide I i . necessary infor=ation needed for cperater action following a I e small break. Generie Evaluation cf small Break and Loss cf Coolant Accident Behavior in Babcock & Wilcox Desiened 177-TA G3Doerating Plants, NUREG 0565 (1980) at 1-1. l 60. If the NRC had reviewed B&W topical reports and i license submissions with due care, and had required B&W to i provide the transient analyses required by NRC regulaticns, the f March 28, 1979 accident at TMI-2 would have been aveided. Precedures 61. Pric to the issuance of the TMI-2 operating t I license, the NRO Cffice of Inspection and Inforcenent cenducted I an extensive audit of the TMI-2 procedures which were draf tti by l B&W. The audit included a review cf the procedures which were later used by the operaters during the March 28, 1979 accident. The NRC negligently failed to identify deficiencies in these L
- B&W-draf ted procedures and instead found that the " technical t
' centeni. [of the procedures) was adequate to assure satisfactory I ' performance of intended functions." Inspection and Inforcement Report No. 77-26, August 1977. I 62. The NRO negligently reviewed procedures for operating TMI-2 which incorrectly prohibited permitting the 'pressuriser to "go solid." The TMI-2 operating procedure l 2103.1.3 (Revision 0, 1977), supplied by B&W, contained the l t i 1 i l 1 l 23 i I l i r i I I i following prohibitions l "2.1.8 The pressuriser/RC System must not be filled with coolant to solid conditions (400 inches) at any time except as required for system hydrostatic tests." i .This procedure c5ntained no exception for amergency conditions l-even if there were risks of' core uncovery. l 63. The NRC knew or should have known as a result of I 6 [itsinvestigationoftheDavis-Besseincidentwhichconfirmed f earlier precursors, that the failure of a pilot-operated relief I valve to close would cause the water level in the pressurizer to ' rise even though the reacter coolant system was not " going ? solid," see paragraphs 25-41, supra. Nevertheless, in the I 18 months following the September 1977 incident at Davis-Besse, c the NRC negligently f ailed to modify or direct a modification of the procedures for TMI-2. As a result, Met-Ed and CPU continued I to rely on the NRO-reviewed procedures, which incorrectly pro-l scribed filling the pressurizer
- solid
- with water and risked f
i uncevering the core during small-break loss-of-coolant accidents. 64 The f ailure of the NRC to warn GPU and Met-Ed of r defects in the TMI-2 procedures was a proximate cause of the j accident on March 26, 1979. On March 28, 1979, almost im=ed-l 4 iately after a turbine generator trip occurred at TMI-2, the TMI-2 operators observed that the water level in the pressuriser was rising higher than allowed by the procedures reviewed by the i !NRO. i 1 i ( 65. The TMI-2 procedures, negligently reviewed by the i \\ NRO-had prescribed the wrong course of action. Although the water level in the pressurizer was high, the entire reactor coolant system was not " solid
- with water. Instead, the indic-Y t
, ated water level in the pressurizer remained high due both to l ? increasing amounts of steam elsewhere in the reactor coolant i i system and to the stuck-cpen pilot-operated relief valve at the i l i l r s 24 g I s a i f J i n ~ -- _ _~ ~ _ l 9 l I I top of the pressurizer through which coolant water and steam continued to escape. Rather than improving the situation, the . reduction of high-pressure injection, as prescribed by the procedures negligently reviewed by the NRC, resulted in a failure
- to replace the coolant es:: aping through the stuck-open valve, i
Pilot-Coerated Relief Valve l k 66. The NRC f ailed to exercise due care in reviewing
- B&W equipment, analyses and procedures, including the deter
- ni-nation of reactor trip points, and other operating procedures r
,which placed heavy reliance on the repeated and correct opera-tion of the pilot-operated relief valve. The NRC negligently krfailed to rev.iew prcperly B&W transient analyses, as set forth in paragraphs $3-58, above, to determine the frequency with which the pilot-operated relief valve would be required to i function or to determine the probability of failure of that valve. From its investigation of the Davis-Besse incident and l 5 analysis of operational data from other plantr, the NRC knew or j t .'should have known of prior failures related to pilot-operated relief valves. Therefore the NRC should not have approved B&W's equipment, analyses and procedures which relied on repeated open-j ing and closing of that valve. Staf f Reports to the President's Cor..issien en the Accident at Three Mile Island (Kemeny Cor:Eis-f i sion), Reports of the Technical Assessment Task Force, Vol. IV I g I , a t 193-9 9. Training and operator I.ieensing l 67. The NRC, in the implementation of regulations -l l ,, requiring it to license operators, failed to axercise due care I in assuring that licensed cperators were properly trained to i 1 8 frespondtotransientssuchasoccurredatTMI-2onMarch28, s I i 1979. NRC regulations require examinations by the NRC and 25 6 i e-i P !i j h i I i ( encourage the use of simulators by vendors. 10 C.F.R. 5 55.11 (1963): 10 C.F.R. 5 55.20 (1975); 10 C.F.R. 5 55.22 (1975): 10 t C.F.R. $ 55.23 (1963): ID C.F.R. S 55, Appendix A (1976). i ( i 68. NRC regulations require that candidates for i i operating licenses take an operating test which includes a l ireactor startup from shutdown to power. 10 C.F.R. 5 55.23 I l
- (1963). In fulfillment of the requirements of 10 C.F.R. $ 55.23 L
((1963), t the NRC specifica111 sanctioned the ' se of a
- cold'
[ u 4 \\ licensing program which included a minimum of one week of training 1 + on a nuclear plant simulator. The initial TMI-2 staff of control i 1 room operators were trained in a " cold" licensing program, I tutilizing B&W's simulator, which was reviewed by the NRC Opera I t ' ting Licensing Branch for ecmpliance with established standards t j and was for= ally approved. Tne training program for TMI-2 operators included eight weeks of training cn the B&W simulator. i Staff Peports to the President's Commission on The Accident at [ThreeMileIsland (Kemeny Ccmmission), Reports of The Technical f I Assessment Task Terce, Vol. III at 15-16; NRO operater Licensing { Guide. NURIG 0094. i 69. The NRO negligently certified the B&W simulator used in training the TMI-2 cperators even though the NRO knew or with due care should have known that the B&W simulator was
- defectively designed and programmed. The NRC negligently failed I'to detect or correct f
h the f act that B&W's training of TMI-2 i 4 operators by simulator end otherwise was inadequate in the j l i l following respects, among others: j (a) The B&W simulator could not simulate the i , presence of a "two-phase
- mixture, i.e.,
steam and water, in the f reactor coolant system, and therefore was incapable of simulat-f j ing many loss-of-coolant accidents (b) The B&W simulator failed to simulate the , Davis-Besse Septar.ber 1977 incident, or any transient in which a i n 26 2 a e ) , pilot-operated relief valve failed to close or in which de l reactor coolant system pressure dropped as prt.ssu-iter vatn I level rose, even though the NRC knew, based on its investf.gwtion Iof the Davis-Besse transient and from the Reactor Safety Study t that such a transient was part of a class of likely l(WASE-1400), j I small-break accidents, see paragraph 41(b) supra G (c) operators were given insufficient instruc- { etien in saturation conditions I l. The B&W simulater training program did not use, (d) I the actual operating precedures for TMI-2 supplied by B&W. A 70. GPU and Met-Ed relied on the proper ittplementa-l tion by the NRC of its regulatiens regarding operator training ito assure that the TMI-2 operators were prepared to operate the ' plant safely, and they relied specifically on the fact that the TMI-2 operators had scored above the national average for all If the NRC had operators who had passed the NRO licensing test. perfer:ned its investigation of the Davis-Lesse incident required ..by regulations with due care and had reviewed B&W topical re- '4 ports and small-break less-of-coolant accident analyses with due care, it would have known that the training programs it approved did not reflect what the NRO knew or should have known were actual operating conditions and potential safety proble=s cf 21W plants. t i k IrrICTS CT NRC NICI7CINT PIVIEW AND APPPOVAI. t 71. If the NRC had exercised due care in reviewing i and evaluating B&W submissions and had recognized their failure to co:tply with the NRC General Design Criteria and other regula-tions, and if the NRO had required B&W to submit complete and correct analyses of transients, CPU and Met-Ed would have had Lthe equipment, instrumentation, procedures and training reason-l ably needed to avoid the accident on P. Arch 28, 1979 and the i l I j jaccident would not have occurred. l l l 27 i l i 4 J 'I i i 1 l . _ -. _ -. _ _ = - 72. If the NRC had complied with NRC regulations and axercised due care in reviewing and evaluating B&W submis-siens, the NRC would have anticipated the circumstances under which a small-break loss-of-coolant accident at the top of the pressurizer would result in a pressure drop in the reactor
- coolant system while the water level rose in the pressurizer and i
i I j the NRC would have required B&W equipment, analyses, procedures i . and training to deal properly with such conditions, i 73. The negligent review and approval by the NRC 'of E&W equipment, analyses, procedures and training, which it I knew or should have known were deficient and not in compliance n i with NRC regulations, was a, proximate etuse of the March 28, ,j s i '1979 accident at TMI-2. s DAMAGES f 74. i As a proximate result of the foregoing, the Karch 28, 1979 accident at TMI-2 occurred and caused and will ' centinue to cause claimants to suffer damages and losses in the I i folicwing respects, together with other ite=s of damage inciden-i i tal thereto. (a) Claimants have incurred and will continue to incur expenses fer deconta=ination and debris removal -- 1 51,000,000,000. (b) Clair.antshaveincurredandwillincurexpen-l ses fer repair or replacement of damaged and defective plant and I s equipment, refueling, upgrading of equipment and systams, re-I training operators and additional arpenses for personnel and consultants necessitated by the accident -- $430,000,000. 'i (c) In order to meet the needs of their customers, l ' for electric power, claimants have had to purchase and continue f i 1 I 4 to purchase from other utilities additional capacity and s j energy and have had to operate and continue to oparate their l l 28 3 l 1 s = y .0 r I less cost-efficient plants longer than they otherwise would have in order to replace the loss of capacity and energy result-ing from the March 26, 1979 accident at TMI-2, which caused the shutdown of TMI-2 and prevented the restart of TKI-1 -- 51,590,000,000. (d) Claimants have Icst and will continue to l lose revenues based on the removal from the rate base of I< the capital invested in TMI-2, which revenues they would have i 1 a [otherwise earned during the period for which that unit is not I i r in the rate base -- $950,000,000. I k (e) Claimants have had to and will continue to l l incur increased borrowing of capital and at higher rates of y . interest than they would have otherwise incurred were it not for the accident -- 540,000,000. (f) In the event that claimants are not able to I restore TMI-2 to operation, claimants will lose all of the capital invested in TMI-2 -- 5600,000,000, f b A schedule of damages is attached hereto as f Appendix A. l t LEGAL AUTHORITY 75. The NRO has recognized in its regulations that it has the specific duty of ' notifying licensees regard-ing generic problems se as to achieve appropriate precautionary b 10 C.T.R. 5 1.64 (1977). j i ,or corrective action." 76. Where a government agency has a statutory duty to-a t warn, or undertakes to warn and thereby induces a reliance by a private party on government action, the government is liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act if it f ails to provide such i iwarning. Indian Towing Co., Inc. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 { i2(1955), Inghan v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 373 T.2d 227 (2d Cir.), I teert. denied, 3B9 U.S. 931 (1967): Gill v. United States, 429 i !T.2d 1072 (5th Cir.1970). 29 I d 1 s 4 e a .n 0 l l 77. In licensing a reacter for operation, the NRC decides that 'a reactor whose ECCS [ emergency ecre cooling system) meets the criteria vill i control a LOCA [ loss-of-coolant accident] and is, therefore, safe for operation. l 4 Union of Concerned Scientists v. Atomic Energy Commission, I f499T.2d1069,1087 (D.C. Cir. 1974). A government agency such as the NRC which f ails to exercise due care in its licensing and ' fails to comply with its regulations is liable under the Federal t + Cort Claims Act. Griffin v. United States, 500 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1974); Ingham v. Eastern Air Lines, 373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir.), cert. Edenied, 389 U.S. 931 (1967); United Airlines, Inc. v. Weiner, t 335 T.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed sub nom., United Airlines I.e. v. United States, 379 U.S. 951 (1964); Hartz v. United 3 States, 387 T.2d 670 (5th Cir.1960). l 4 N 1 a t ) i. t i ~ I (continued on page 31) l l i ) i 30 1 ^ i 3. i ~ nw 0 I 9 4 l I i 1 1 4 I i l WEREFORE, claimants pray for an award in the amount I I .!of $4,010,000,000, i I. ' Dated: New York, New York y ^^^ amber 8, 1980 KAYE, SCHOLER, FIERMAN, HAYS & MANDLER By V David Klingsberg 425 Park Avenue New York, New York 10022 (212) 759-8400 <Of Counsels i + 1 i Milton Handler Richard C. Seltzer { BERLACK ISRAELS & LIBERMAN -l By r James B. Liber: nan 26 Broadway New York, New York 10004 (212) 268-6900 Attorneys for Claimants 1 of Counsel: Jesse R. Meer i z ( e O t f e t E i f b 9 ==a 7 F { 1 l s 3 Appendix A SCHEDULE OF DAMAGES .e i 1 I Description loss to Data Fut:1 e bee-Tbtal t ~ Decents.ination and debris nmwal. $185,000,000 5815,000,000 51,000,000,000 Repair or replaosmant of draged and defective opti; rant, upgradi q of eqai;w.t and systams and additional expe.w for pe.h and censultants necessitated by t!w accident, retrofitting, retraining operators. 0 430,000,000 430,000,000 9 Increases ccst of electric To er dae to purease of powar frtzn other utilities and costs of operatin; clairants' less cost-t efficient plants. 465,000,000 1,125,000,000 1,590,000,000 + t Icss cf trenae en capital investad in DC-2 remwed fr:xt rate base 165,000,000 785,000,000 950,000,000 I.h cost of terr:ui:q 15,000,000 25,000,008 40,000,000 i Capital investad in DC-2 800,000,000 t i i _1/ Fut.:re lesses are calculated on the asnrption that ".VJ-2 ars! ".MI-2 vill i j res.r:ie c$ention on the follcwing dates: I 2C-1 January 1, 1982 DC-2 Janua:y 1, 1988 2/ Assres award and payment on Decer.bar 31, 1982. h I ~- l f l r 3 l h l ? [ 32 t i f ~ + .