ML22091A316
| ML22091A316 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 04/01/2022 |
| From: | Bradley Davis NRC/RGN-II |
| To: | Coleman J Southern Nuclear Operating Co |
| Bradley Davis, RII/DCO | |
| References | |
| IR 2022002 | |
| Download: ML22091A316 (62) | |
Text
Enclosure Ms. Jamie Coleman Regulatory Affairs Director Southern Nuclear Operating Company 7825 River Road, BIN 63031 Waynesboro, GA 30830
SUBJECT:
VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 3 AND 4 - NRC INITIAL TEST PROGRAM AND OPERATIONAL PROGRAMS INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORTS 05200025/2022002, 05200026/2022002
Dear Ms. Coleman:
On March 31, 2022, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which the inspectors discussed on April 1, 2022, with Mr. Glen Chick, Vogtle 3 & 4 Executive Vice President, and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined a sample of construction activities conducted under your Combined License (COL) as it relates to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of these documents. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any), will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system ADAMS. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room). April 1, 2022 J. Coleman 2 EnclosureShould you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact us.
Sincerely, Bradley J. Davis, Chief Construction Inspection Branch 2 Division of Construction Oversight Docket Nos.: 5200025, 5200026 License Nos: NPF-91, NPF-92
Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report (IR) 05200025/2022002, 05200026/2022002 w/attachment: Supplemental Information cc w/ encl: Distribution via LISTSERV Signed by Davis, Bradley on 04/01/22
J. Coleman 3
SUBJECT:
VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 3 AND 4 - NRC INITIAL TEST PROGRAM AND OPERATIONAL PROGRAMS INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORTS 05200025/2022002, 05200026/2022002 - Dated April 1, 2022
DISTRIBUTION:
N. Doiley, RII M. Kowal, RII S. Price, RII PUBLIC
ACCESSION NUMBER: ML22091A316 OFFICE RII: DCO RII: DCO RII: DCO RII: DCO NAME J Eargle J Parent C Even B Davis DATE 3/31/2022 3/31/2022 3/31/2022 4/1/2022 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Region II
Docket Numbers: 5200025 5200026
License Numbers: NPF-91 NPF-92
Report Numbers: 05200025/2022002 05200026/2022002
Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Facility: Vogtle Unit 3 & 4 Combined License
Location: Waynesboro, GA
Inspection Dates: January 1, 2022 through March 31, 2022
Inspectors: J. Eargle, Senior Resident Inspector - Testing, Division of Construction Oversight (DCO)
C. Even, Senior Construction Inspector, DCO G. Galletti, Vendor Inspector, Nuclear Reactor Regulation B. Griman, Construction Inspector, DCO B. Kellner, Senior Health Physicist, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS)
B. Kemker, Senior Resident Inspector, DCO J. Montgomery, Senior Reactor Inspector, DRS T. Morrissey, Senior Construction Inspector, DCO A. Nielsen, Senior Health Physicist, DRS J. Parent, Resident Inspector, DCO R. Patterson, Physical Security Inspector, DRS M. Riley, Senior Construction Inspector, DCO S. Sanchez, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector, DRS W. Schuster, Resident Inspector, DCO
Approved by: Bradley J. Davis, Chief Construction Inspection Branch 2 Division of Construction Oversight
Enclosure
SUMMARY
OF FINDINGS
Inspection Report (IR) 05200025/2022002, 05200026/2022002; January 1-March 31, 2022; Vogtle Units 3 & 4 COL, initial test program and operational programs integrated inspection report.
This report covers a three-month period of announced inspections of Inspections, Tests, Analysis, and Inspection Criteria (ITAAC), preoperational test program, startup test program, and operational program inspections by resident and regional inspectors. The significance of most findings are indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, or Red), using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2519, Construction Significance Determination Process. Cross-cutting aspects are determined using IMC 0613, Appendix F, Construction Cross-Cutting Areas and Aspects. All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy and the temporary enforcement guidance outlined in enforcement guidance memorandum 11-006. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe construction of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in IMC 2506, Construction Reactor Oversight Process General Guidance and Basis Document.
A. NRC-Identified and Self Revealed Findings
None
B. Licensee-Identified Violations
None
2 REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Construction Status
During this report period for Unit 3, the licensee completed various activities to satisfy aspects of the Vogtle Unit 3 operational programs and initial test program. Post work verification was performed on safety-related and non-safety-related SSCs following the completion of repair and remediation of electrical systems. Class 1E direct current and uninterruptible power supply system (IDS), electrical distribution system, and standby onsite power system testing was performed to verify the functional capability of those systems to support electrical loads during normal and off-normal conditions. Additionally, preoperational testing of the protection and monitoring system and IDS was performed after component testing to demonstrate that the equipment and systems performed in accordance with the design criteria.
During this report period for Unit 4, the licensee continued with integrated flush activities by flushing portions of chemical volume and control, spent fuel cooling, reactor coolant, residual heat removal, and passive core cooling systems. The licensee continued with open vessel testing activities which included taking a suction from the spent fuel pool and cask loading pit and discharging to the reactor vessel through the direct vessel injection line. The integrated leak rate test was performed to verify the ability of the containment system to perform its safety-related function of providing containment integrity as a barrier against the release of fission products to the atmosphere.
- 1. CONSTRUCTION REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Design/Engineering, Procurement/Fabrication, Construction/Installation, Inspection/Testing
IMC 2503, Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) - Related Work Inspections
1A01 (Unit 3) ITAAC Number 2.1.02.11a.i (46) / Family 10C
The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.1.02.11a.i (46). The inspectors used the appropriate portions of the following NRC inspection procedure (IP)/sections to perform this inspection:
65001.C-02.02 - Construction Test Observation 65001.C-A4.13 - Instrumentation & Control Components & Systems
The inspectors used appropriate portions of the IP to observe the licensee's performance of the following component test procedures to verify if controls in the main control room (MCR) operated to cause a signal at the squib valve electrical leads which were capable of actuating the squib valve. The tests were observed to verify if they satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) and the ITAAC.
3 B-GEN-ITPCI-039-F131, RCS-PL-V004B-I1-A Component Test 1, Rev. 1 B-GEN-ITPCI-039-F135, RCS-PL-V004B-I2-A Component Test 1, Rev. 1 B-GEN-ITPCI-039-F147, RCS-PL-V004D-I1-A Component Test 1, Rev. 1
1A02 (Unit 3) ITAAC Number 2.1.02.11a.ii (47) / Family 10C
- a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.1.02.11a.ii (47). The inspectors used the following NRC IP/section to perform this inspection:
65001.C-02.02 - Construction Test Observation
The inspectors used the appropriate portions of the IP to observe the licensee's performance of the following component test work orders (WOs) used to verify if the remotely operated valves having protection and monitoring system (PMS) control performed their active function after receiving a signal from the PMS. The test was observed to verify if the test satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the UFSAR and the ITAAC.
SV3-PMS-T0W-1261022, PMS CIM Component Retest - ILCA01 Components, Rev. 0 SV3-RCS-T0W-1254779, PMS CIM Component Test - SV3-RCS-PL-V150A, Rev. 0 SV3-RCS-T0W-1254780, PMS CIM Component Test - SV3-RCS-PL-V150B, Rev. 0 SV3-RCS-T0W-1254781, PMS CIM Component Test - SV3-RCS-PL-V150C, Rev. 0 SV3-RCS-T0W-1254782, PMS CIM Component Test - SV3-RCS-PL-V150D, Rev. 0
- b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1A03 (Unit 3) ITAAC Number 2.1.02.11a.ii (47) / Family 10C
- a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.1.02.11a.ii (47). The inspectors used the following NRC IP/section to perform this inspection:
65001.C-02.02 - Construction Test Observation
The inspectors used the appropriate portions of the IP to observe the licensees performance of the following component test procedures used to verify if PMS cabinet and divisional diagnostics tests assessed that the software was loaded on to the
4 cabinets successfully, no software or hardware errors were present, intra cabinet communication links were operable, and the cabinets were communicating the cabinet health status to the interface test processor. The tests were observed to verify if the test satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the UFSAR and the ITAAC.
B-GEN-ITPCI-001-011, PMS Cabinets, Rev. 4 B-GEN-ITPCI-001, PMS Cabinets - Cabinet Diagnostics, Rev. 1.2 B-GEN-ITPCI-001-012, PMS Cabinets - Division Diagnostics, Rev. 1
1A04 (Unit 3) ITAAC Number 2.1.02.11b.i (48) / Family 10C
- a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.1.02.11b.i (48). The inspectors used the following NRC IP/section to perform this inspection:
65001.C-02.02 - Construction Test Observation
The inspectors used the appropriate portions of the IP to observe the licensees performance of the following component test procedures used to verify if PMS cabinet and divisional diagnostics tests assessed that the software was loaded on to the cabinets successfully, no software or hardware errors were present, intra cabinet communication links were operable, and the cabinets were communicating the cabinet health status to the interface test processor. The tests were observed to verify if the test satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the UFSAR and the ITAAC.
B-GEN-ITPCI-001-011, PMS Cabinets, Rev. 4 B-GEN-ITPCI-001, PMS Cabinets - Cabinet Diagnostics, Rev. 1.2 B-GEN-ITPCI-001-012, PMS Cabinets - Division Diagnostics, Rev. 1
1A05 (Unit 3) ITAAC Number 2.1.02.13b (64) / Family 10D
- a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.1.02.13b (64). The inspectors used the following NRC IP/section to perform this inspection:
65001.C-02.02 - Construction Test Observation
The inspectors used the appropriate portions of the IP to observe the licensee's performance of the following component test WOs to verify if the reactor coolant pump (RCP) breaker trips after receiving a signal from the PMS. The test was observed to verify if the test satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the UFSAR and the ITAAC.
SV3-PMS-T0W-1261029, PMS CIM Component Retest - 1LCC01 Components, Section 4.5, ECS-ES-31 (RCP 1A DIV C Switchgear), Rev. 1
5 SV3-PMS-T0W-1261029, PMS CIM Component Retest - 1LCC01 Components, Section 4.6, ECS-ES-31 (RCP 1B DIV C Switchgear), Rev. 1 SV3-PMS-T0W-1261029, PMS CIM Component Retest - 1LCC01 Components, Section 4.7, ECS-ES-31 (RCP 2A DIV C Switchgear) Rev. 1 SV3-PMS-T0W-1261029, PMS CIM Component Retest - 1LCC01 Components, Section 4.8, ECS-ES-31 (RCP 2B DIV C Switchgear), Rev. 1
- b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1A06 (Unit 3) ITAAC Number 2.2.01.09 (110) / Family 10A
- a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.2.01.09 (110). The inspectors used the following NRC IP/sections to perform this inspection:
65001.C-02.02 - Construction Test Observation 65001.C-02.03 - Construction Test Record Review
The inspectors used the appropriate portions of the IP to observe the licensee's performance of the following component test WO and test procedure used to verify if the remotely operated containment isolation valves having PMS control performed their active function after receiving a signal from the PMS. The test was observed to verify if the test satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the UFSAR and the ITAAC.
SV3-PMS-T0W-1261022, PMS CIM Component Retest - ILCA01 Components, Rev. 0 B-GEN-ITPCI-039-F003, CAS-PL-V014 Component Test, Rev. 2
The inspectors used the appropriate portions of the IP to review the licensee's test results to verify if these remotely operated containment isolation valves having PMS control performed their active function after receiving a signal from the PMS. The test packages were reviewed as part of the ITAAC Technical Report to verify if the test results satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the UFSAR and ITAAC.
SV3-CNS-ITR-802110, Unit 3 Testing Results of Containment Isolation Valves, ITAAC 2.2.01.09 (Item 10.b), Rev. 0
- b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1A07 (Unit 3) ITAAC Number 2.2.03.10 (206) / Family 10A
6
- a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.2.03.10 (206). The inspectors used the following NRC IP/sections to perform this inspection:
65001.C-02.02 - Construction Test Observation 65001.C-02.03 - Construction Test Record Review
The inspectors used the appropriate portions of the IP to observe the licensee's performance of the following component test procedure used to verify if remotely operated valves other than squib valves could perform their active safety function. The test was observed to verify if the test satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the UFSAR and the ITAAC.
B-GEN-ITPCI-039-F074, PXS-PL-V014B-S1 Component Test, Rev. 1
The inspectors used the appropriate portions of the IP to review the licensee's test results of the passive core cooling system valves to verify the remotely operated valves having PMS control performed their active function and opened within 20 seconds after receiving a signal from PMS and assumed the loss of motive power position. The test packages were reviewed as part of the ITAAC Technical Report to verify if the test results satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the UFSAR and ITAAC.
SV3-PXS-ITR-802206, Unit 3 Inspection results of ITAAC 2.2.03.10 (Item 11b),
Rev. 0 SV3-PXS-ITR-803206, Unit 3 Recorded Results of Remotely Operated PXS Valves Response to Loss of Motive Power: ITAAC 2.2.03.10 (Item 12b), Rev. 0 ND-21-1129, ITAAC Closure Notice on Completion of ITAAC Item 2.2.03.10
[Index Number 206], 03/08/2022
- b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1A08 (Unit 3) ITAAC Number 2.5.02.06a.ii (530) / Family 10D
- a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.5.02.06a.ii (530). The inspectors used the following NRC IP/section to perform this inspection:
65001.C-02.02 - Construction Test Observation
The inspectors used the appropriate portions of the IP to observe the licensees performance of the following component test WOs used to verify if the PMS blocks were automatically removed when the test signal reached the specified limit. The test
7 was observed to verify if the test satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the UFSAR and the ITAAC.
SV3-PMS-T0W-1229658 Attachment B, P-19 Automatic Block Removal Test, Rev. 1 SV3-PMS-T0W-1229658, Attachment A, P-11 / P-12 Automatic Block Removal Test, Rev. 2 SV3-PMS-T0W-1229658, Attachment A, P-11 / P-12 Automatic Block Removal Test, Rev. 3
- b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1A09 (Unit 3) ITAAC Number 2.5.02.06a.ii (530) / Family 10D
- a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.5.02.06a.ii (530). The inspectors used the following NRC IP/section to perform this inspection:
65001.C-02.02 - Construction Test Observation
The inspectors used the appropriate portions of the IP to observe the licensee's performance of the following component test procedure used to verify if an actuation signal to the actuated device(s) was generated by the MCR fixed position controls. The test was observed to verify if the test satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the UFSAR and the ITAAC.
B-GEN-ITPCI-006, Main Control Room & Remote Shutdown Room, Rev. 3
- b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1A10 (Unit 3) ITAAC Number 2.5.02.06a.ii (530) / Family 10C
- a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.5.02.06a.ii (530). The inspectors used the following NRC IP/section to perform this inspection:
65001.C-02.02 - Construction Test Observation
The inspectors used the appropriate portions of the IP to observe the licensees performance of the following component test procedures used to verify if PMS cabinet and divisional diagnostics tests assessed that the software was loaded on to the
8 cabinets successfully, no software or hardware errors were present, intra cabinet communication links were operable, and the cabinets were communicating the cabinet health status to the interface test processor. The tests were observed to verify if the test satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the UFSAR and the ITAAC.
B-GEN-ITPCI-001-011, PMS Cabinets, Rev. 4 B-GEN-ITPCI-001, PMS Cabinets - Cabinet Diagnostics, Rev. 1.2 B-GEN-ITPCI-001-012, PMS Cabinets - Division Diagnostics, Rev. 1
1A11 (Unit 3) ITAAC Number 2.5.02.08a.ii (540) / Family 10C
- a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.5.02.08a.ii (540). The inspectors used the following NRC IP/section to perform this inspection:
65001.C-02.02 - Construction Test Observation
The inspectors used the appropriate portions of the IP to observe the licensees performance of the following component test procedures used to verify if PMS cabinet and divisional diagnostics tests assessed the software was loaded on to the cabinets successfully, no software or hardware errors were present, intra cabinet communication links were operable, and the cabinets were communicating the cabinet health status to the interface test processor. The tests were observed to verify if the test satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the UFSAR and the ITAAC.
B-GEN-ITPCI-001-011, PMS Cabinets, Rev. 4 B-GEN-ITPCI-001, PMS Cabinets - Cabinet Diagnostics, Rev. 1.2 B-GEN-ITPCI-001-012, PMS Cabinets - Division Diagnostics, Rev. 1
1A12 (Unit 3) ITAAC Number 2.5.02.08b.ii (543) / Family 10C
- a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.5.02.08b.ii (543). The inspectors used the following NRC IP/section to perform this inspection:
65001.C-02.02 - Construction Test Observation
The inspectors used the appropriate portions of the IP to observe the licensees performance of the following component test procedures used to verify if PMS cabinet and divisional diagnostics tests assessed that the software was loaded on to the cabinets successfully, no software or hardware errors were present, intra cabinet communication links were operable, and the cabinets were communicating the cabinet health status to the interface test processor. The tests were observed to verify if the test satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the UFSAR and the ITAAC.
9 B-GEN-ITPCI-001-011, PMS Cabinets, Rev. 4 B-GEN-ITPCI-001, PMS Cabinets - Cabinet Diagnostics, Rev. 1.2 B-GEN-ITPCI-001-012, PMS Cabinets - Division Diagnostics, Rev. 1
1A13 (Unit 3) ITAAC Number 2.5.02.09d (548) / Family 10C
- a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.5.02.09d (548). The inspectors used the following NRC IP/section to perform this inspection:
65001.C-02.02 - Construction Test Observation
The inspectors used the appropriate portions of the IP to observe the licensees performance of the following component test procedures used to verify if PMS cabinet and divisional diagnostics tests assessed that the software was loaded on to the cabinets successfully, no software or hardware errors were present, intra cabinet communication links were operable, and the cabinets were communicating the cabinet health status to the interface test processor. The tests were observed to verify if the test satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the UFSAR and the ITAAC.
B-GEN-ITPCI-001-011, PMS Cabinets, Rev. 4 B-GEN-ITPCI-001, PMS Cabinets - Cabinet Diagnostics, Rev. 1.2 B-GEN-ITPCI-001-012, PMS Cabinets - Division Diagnostics, Rev. 1
1A14 (Unit 3) ITAAC Number 2.6.09.05c (646) / Family 17F
- a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.6.09.05c (646). The inspectors used the following NRC IP/section to perform this inspection:
65001.17-02.17 - Communication Requirements
The inspectors used appropriate portions of the IP to observe the licensees performance of the procedures used to test the security radios and communications systems to verify if the alarm stations were able to communicate with onsite and offsite response personnel. The following were observed to verify if the central and secondary alarm stations satisfied the Vogtle 3 security plan and the ITAAC.
SV3-SES-ITR-800646, ITAAC 646-SES Alarm Station Single Act Survivability, Rev. 0 SV3-SES-ITR-800647, ITAAC 647 Vehicle Barrier System Inspection, Rev. 1 SV3-SES-ITR-800645, Unit 3 ITAAC 645 Walkdown Inspection: ITAAC 2.6.09.05b, Rev. 0 SVO-SES-ZOC-8000000, Vogtle Site Security Vehicle Barrier System Analysis, Rev. 1
10 DOEJ-V34-VBS-SEC001, Comparative Analysis of Vogtle 3 Current Topography Grade Configuration to the Design Requirements for the Vehicle Barrier System (VBS), Rev. 1 90017-C, Security Radio and Communication Systems, Rev. 34
The inspectors used appropriate portions of the IP to perform walkdowns and review acceptance testing documents to determine if the central and secondary alarm stations were designed and equipped such that, in the event of a single act, that the design enables the survivability of equipment needed to maintain the functional capability of either alarm station to detect and assess alarms and communicate with onsite and offsite response personnel in accordance with the design basis threat of radiological sabotage. The following test results were reviewed to verify if they satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the Vogtle 3 security plan, and the ITAAC.
Acceptance Testing documentation for Vehicle Barrier Systems (VBS) and Communications Systems SV3-SES-ITR-800646, ITAAC 646-SES Alarm Station Single Act Survivability, Rev. 0 SV3-SES-ITR-800647, ITAAC 647 Vehicle Barrier System Inspection, Rev. 1 SV3-SES-ITR-800645, Unit 3 ITAAC 645 Walkdown Inspection: ITAAC 2.6.09.05b, Rev. 0 SVO-SES-ZOC-8000000, Vogtle Site Security Vehicle Barrier System Analysis, Rev. 1 DOEJ-V34-VBS-SEC001, Comparative Analysis of Vogtle 3 Current Topography Grade Configuration to the Design Requirements for the Vehicle Barrier System, Rev. 1 90017-C, Security Radio and Communication Systems, Rev. 34
- b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1A15 (Unit 3) ITAAC Number 2.6.09.06 (647) / Family 17A
- a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.6.09.06 (647). The inspectors used the following NRC IP/section to perform this inspection:
65001.17-02.08 - Vehicle Control Measures
The inspectors used appropriate portions of the IP to review the blast analysis and acceptance testing documents to determine if the vehicle barrier system will protect against the design basis threat vehicle bombs based upon the stand-off distance of the system. The following documents were reviewed to verify if they satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the Vogtle 3 security plan, and the ITAAC.
Acceptance Testing documentation for Vehicle Barrier System
11 SV3-SES-ITR-800647-ITAAC 647 Vehicle Barrier System Inspection, Rev. 1 APP-XV01-ZOC-001-AP 1000 VBS Standoff Distances for a Range of Blast Scenarios, Rev. 0 SVO-SES-ZOC-8000000- Vogtle Site Security Vehicle Barrier System Analysis, Rev. 1 DOEJ-V34-VBS-SEC001-Comparative Analysis of Vogtle 3 Current Topography Grade Configuration to the Design Requirements for the Vehicle Barrier System, Rev. 1.0 ABS-Consulting Calculation ID 4212670-C-102, Units 3 & 4 Vehicle Barrier Design for Pedestrian Bridge, Rev. 2 ABS-Consulting Calculation ID 4212670-C-103-VBID Blast Effects Assessment of Security Assets, Rev. 1 Thornton Tomasetti Calculation ID-SCAL-001-Kontek MBRE Blast Analysis, Rev. 1
- b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1A16 (Unit 3) ITAAC Number 2.6.09.08 (650) / Family 17C
- a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.6.09.08 (650). The inspectors used the following NRC IP/section to perform this inspection:
65001.17-02.06 - Illumination
The inspectors used appropriate portions of the IP to observe the acceptance testing of the illumination in isolation zones within the protected area to verify if they were 0.2-foot candles measured horizontally at ground level or, alternatively, sufficient to permit observation. The inspectors observed these activities to verify if the illumination zones within the protected area satisfied the applicable technical and quality requirements of the Vogtle 3 security plan and the ITAAC.
SV3-SES-ITR-800650, ITAAC 650 SES Isolation Zone and Protected Area Illumination, Rev. 0 Vogtle Electric Generating Units 3 and 4 Physical Security Plan, Rev. 6 90206-C, Protected Area Lighting Systems, Rev. 15 Security Standing Order-V-SSO-2021-04, ITAAC Test for Protected Area Lighting Systems, dated December 16, 2021
The inspectors used appropriate portions of the IP to review the acceptance testing documents to determine if the illumination in isolation zones and exterior areas within the protected area were 0.2-foot candles measured horizontally at ground level or, alternatively, sufficient to permit observation. The test results were reviewed to verify if they satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the Vogtle 3 security plan and the ITAAC.
12 SV3-SES-ITR-800650, ITAAC 650 SES Isolation Zone and Protected Area Illumination, Rev. 0 Vogtle Electric Generating Units 3 and 4 Physical Security Plan. Rev. 6 90206-C, Protected Area Lighting Systems, Rev. 15 Security Standing Order-V-SSO-2021-04, ITAAC Test for Protected Area Lighting Systems, dated December 16, 2021
- b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1A17 (Unit 3) ITAAC Number 2.6.09.13a (652) / Family 17D
- a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.6.09.13a (652). The inspectors used the following NRC IP/section to perform this inspection:
65001.17-02.17 - Communication Requirements
The inspectors used appropriate portions of the IP to observe the licensees performance and review the following acceptance testing results to determine if the (a) the central and secondary alarm stations were equipped with conventional (landline) telephone service with the MCR and local law enforcement authorities and (b) the central and secondary alarm stations were equipped with the capability to continuously communicate with security officers, watchman, armed response individuals, or any security personnel that have responsibilities during a contingency event. The inspectors reviewed acceptance testing documents to verify if they satisfied the technical and quality requirements of the Vogtle 3 security plan and the ITAAC.
SV3-SES-ITR-800652, ITAAC 652 SES Communications, Rev. 0 3-SES-ITAAC 652/654, UPS01-SES Communications on UPS, Rev. 1 90017-C, Security Radio and Communications Systems, Rev. 34
- b. Findings
No findings were identified.
13 1A18 (Unit 3) ITAAC Number 2.6.09.13c (654) / Family 17D
- a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.6.09.13c (654). The inspectors used the following NRC IP/section to perform this inspection:
65001.17-02.17 - Communication Requirements
The inspectors used appropriate portions of the IP to review the acceptance testing results to verify if the non-portable communication devices (including conventional telephones systems) in the central and secondary alarm stations were wired to an independent power supply that enabled the system to remain operational in the event of loss of normal power. The results were reviewed to verify if they satisfied the technical and quality requirements of the Vogtle 3 security plan and the ITAAC.
SV3-SES-ITR-800654, SES Communications on UPS: ITAAC 2.6.09.13c, Rev.
0 SV3-SES-ITR-800652, ITAAC 652 SES Communications, Rev. 0 3-SES-ITAAC 652/654, UPS01-SES Communications on UPS, Rev. 1 90017-C, Security Radio and Communications Systems, Rev. 34
- b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1A19 (Unit 3) ITAAC Number 2.6.09.15a (655) / Family 17D
- a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.6.09.15a (655). The inspectors used the following NRC IP/sections to perform this inspection:
65001.17-02.14 - Intrusion Detection System Console Display 65001.17-02.15 - Intrusion Detection System Recording
The inspectors used appropriate portions of the IP to observe acceptance testing and review acceptance testing documents to determine if (a) a report existed and concluded that security alarm devices, including transmission lines to annunciators, were tamper indicating and self-checking (e.g., an automatic indication was provided when failure of the alarm system or a component occurs, or when the system was on standby power) and that alarm annunciation indicated the type of alarm (e.g., intrusion alarms and emergency exit alarms) and location and (b) a report existed and concluded that equipment was capable of recording each onsite security alarm annunciation, including the location of the alarm, false alarm, alarm check, and tamper indication; and the type of alarm, location, alarm circuit, date, and time. The tests were observed, and
14 documents were reviewed to verify if they satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the Vogtle 3 security plan, and the ITAAC.
SV3-SES-ITR-800655, ITAAC 655 Alarm and Circuit Supervision Testing, Rev.
0 SV3-SES-ITR-800644, Intrusion Detection/Video Assessment Testing, Rev. 0 SV3-SES-ITR-800670, Protected Area Perimeter and Vital Area Boundary Emergency Exit Test, Rev. 0 3-SES-ITAAC-655 FEP-U3, FEP Alarm and Circuit Supervision Test, Rev. 1 90200-C, Security Seven Day Vital Area Portal Inspections, Rev. 36 V-SSO-2021-01-7, Day Testing of the Security Perimeter and Duress Alarm Systems, Rev. 1.1 3-SES-MIS-001, Site Security System Perimeter Intrusion Detection Tests, Rev. 4
- b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1A20 (Unit 3) ITAAC Number C.2.6.09.07 (667) / Family 17A
- a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number C.2.6.09.07 (667). The inspectors used the following NRC IP/sections to perform this inspection:
65001.17-02.02 - Vital Areas/Vital Area Barriers 65001.17-02.11 - Vital Area Access Controls
The inspectors used appropriate portions of the IP to perform walkdowns and review the following acceptance testing documents to determine if (a) vital equipment was located within a protected area such that access to vital equipment physical barriers requires passage through the protected area perimeter barrier, (b) all vital equipment was located only within a vital area, and (c) vital equipment was located within a protected area such that access to vital equipment requires passage through the vital area barrier. The walkdowns were performed and documents were reviewed to verify if they satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the Vogtle 3 security plan, and the ITAAC.
SV3-SES-ITR-800667, Vital Equipment Location and Access Inspections, Rev.
0 ND-20-0913, ITACC Closure Notification on Completion of ITAAC C.2.6.09.02, dated August 11, 2020 ND-21-0715, Resubmittal of ITAAC Closure Notification on Completion of ITAAC C.2.6.09.05a, dated August 3, 2021 ND-21-0886, ITAAC Closure Notification of Completion of ITAAC C.2.6.09.3b, dated August 8, 2021 SV3-SES-ITR-800822, Vital Area Portal Inspections, Rev. 0
15
- b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1A21 (Unit 3) ITAAC Number 3.2.00.01e (744) / Family 16F
- a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 3.2.00.01e (744). The inspectors used the following NRC IP/section to perform this inspection:
65001.23 - Inspection of Human Factors Engineering Verification and Validation ITAAC
The inspectors reviewed the licensees human factors engineering (HFE) program processes as well as the licensees engineering change process to verify if the processes adequately considered human factor deficiencies in accordance with the Westinghouse Electric Companys and the licensees design control processes and procedures. The inspectors sampled the licensees engineering change (RECs) and engineering service requests (ESRs) to verify if the licensees process for reviewing, evaluating, and dispositioning proposed engineering modifications or other service requests to address human engineering deficiencies (HEDs) or other design considerations was conducted in conformance with the Westinghouse Electric Company (WEC) and the licensees design control processes and procedures.
The inspectors discussed the human factors engineering verification and validation (V&V) impact review conducted by WEC and the licensee staff to understand the methodology used to assess design change driver impact on the HFE V&V results. This impact review consisted of a review of the change description, RECs, ESRs, impacted documents or the design change proposals or engineering and design coordination reports to determine detailed impact to HFE and a comparison of the detailed impacts against the ISV results reports and ISV retest detailed scenario descriptions to determine if the affected HSI was used as a success path in a scenario or used to resolve an HED. Changes that had no negative impacts to ISV or ISV Retest were dispositioned and documented. Those with potential negative impacts on ISV or ISV retest conclusions were evaluated to determine if additional ISV retest was needed. Additionally, WEC and the licensee performed an independent quality review by selecting a sample of 10% of the RECs that were previously designated as either having an impact on ISV or not having an impact and determining if the documented resolution path was satisfactory.
The inspectors reviewed letters LTR-GIC-WAPP-21-019 Rev. 1, List ESRs and RECs requiring review by the Westinghouse Human Factors Engineering team and their review, and LTR-GIC-WAPP-20-008, 10% Quality Review of the impact reviews for the Instrumentation and Controls Projects with regards to the Human Factors Engineering Integrated System Validation, Rev. 1, which captured the results of the HFE Integrated V&V impact reviews, to determine if adequate implementation of the HFE Integrated V&V impact review processes and the independent assessment of those results were performed in accordance with established administrative
16 requirements. The inspectors independently reviewed a sample of RECs and ESRs, including the proposed or completed dispositions, potential impacts on the ISV testing and ISV retesting results, and planned resolution for remaining issues, to verify if they provided adequate objective evidence to justify and support the conclusions made in the task letters and summary report.
- b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1A22 (Unit 3) ITAAC Number C.2.6.09.08a (668) / Family 17A
- a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number C.2.6.09.08a (668). The inspectors used the following NRC IP/section to perform this inspection:
65001.17-02.03 - Protected Area Barrier
The inspectors used appropriate portions of the IP to conduct walkdowns and review acceptance testing documents to determine if (a) penetrations and openings through the protected area barrier are secured and monitored and (b) unattended openings (such as underground pathways) that intersect the protected area boundary or vital area boundary are protected by a physical barrier and monitored by intrusion detection equipment or provided surveillance at a frequency sufficient to detect exploitation. The walkdowns were conducted and documents were reviewed to verify if they satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the Vogtle 3 security plan, and the ITAAC.
SV3-SES-ITR-800668, Inspection of Unattended Openings Intersecting the Protected Area or Vital Area Boundaries, Rev. 0 SV3-SES-ITR-800668, Inspection of Unattended Openings Intersecting the Protected Area or Vital Area Boundaries, Attachment A, Rev. 0 SV3-SES-ITR-800646, SES Alarm Station Single Act Survivability-ITAAC 2.6.09.05c, Rev. 0
- b. Findings
No findings were identified.
17 1A23 (Unit 3) ITAAC Number 2.2.05.09c (877) / Family 08C
- a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.2.05.09c (877). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:
65001.C-02.02 - Construction Test Observation
The inspectors used the appropriate portions of the IP to observe the licensee's performance of the following procedure used to partially verify MCR load shed panels could perform their active safety function to deenergize MCR loads after receiving a signal from the PMS. The test was observed to verify if the test satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the UFSAR and the ITAAC.
B-GEN-ITPCI-039-F226, VES-EP-01A Component Test, Rev. 3 B-GEN-ITPCI-039-F228, VES-EP-02A Component Test, Rev. 3
- b. Findings
No findings were identified.
IMC 2504, Construction Inspection Program - Inspection of Construction and Operational Programs
1P01 Pre-operational Testing
70702-02.04 - Test Witnessing
- a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors used appropriate portions of the IP to observe the licensees performance of the following procedure to test if the passive containment cooling system was capable of transferring heat to the safety-related heat sink for events resulting in significant increase in containment pressure and temperature. The tests were observed to verify if they satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the UFSAR.
3-PCS-ITPP-502, Passive Containment Cooling System Preoperational Test Procedure, Section 4.6, Long-Term Containment Cooling to SFP, Rev. 2 3-PCS-ITPP-502, Passive Containment Cooling System Preoperational Test Procedure, Section 4.7.1, Long-Term Containment Cooling to Distribution Bucket, Rev. 2 3-PCS-ITPP-502, Passive Containment Cooling System Preoperational Test Procedure, Section 4.10, PCCWST 72 Hour Drain Down Test, Rev. 2 SV3-PCS-ITPP-502, Passive Containment Cooling System Preoperational Test Procedure, Section 4.1, PCS Annulus Drain Test, Version 2.0
18
- b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1P02 Pre-operational Testing
70702-02.04 - Test Witnessing
- a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors used appropriate portions of the IP to observe the licensees performance of the following procedures for performing the channel calibrations for passive core cooling system level transmitters. The tests were observed to verify if they satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the UFSAR.
B-GEN-ITPCI-019-209, PMS Channel Calibration Test for 3-PXS-LT051, Rev.
3 B-GEN-ITPCI-019-237, PMS Channel Calibration Test for 3-PXS-LT052, Rev.
2
- b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1P03 Pre-operational Testing
70702-02.05 - Test Results Review
- a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors used the appropriate portions of the IP to review the results of the following procedures to determine whether appropriate leakage testing performed on each containment penetration satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the UFSAR.
3-CNS-ITPP-502, Containment Penetration Leak Rate (Type B) Preoperational Test, Rev. 3 3-CNS-ITPP-503, LLRT Containment Leak Rate Type C, Rev. 3
- b. Findings
No findings were identified.
19 1P04 Pre-operational Testing
70702-02.04 - Test Witnessing
- a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors used the appropriate portions of the IP to observe the licensees performance of the following test package used to verify if the residual heat removal pumps had adequate net positive suction head and flow rate to recirculate water to and from the spent fuel pool and circulate water from the cask loading pit to the spent fuel pool. The test was observed to verify if the test satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the UFSAR.
4-RNS-ITPP-501, Normal Residual Heat Removal System Preoperational Test Procedure, Section 4.5, Spent Fuel Pool Flow Test, Rev. 1 4-RNS-ITPP-501, Normal Residual Heat Removal System Preoperational Test Procedure, Section 4.6, Cask Loading Pit Recirculation Flow Test, Rev. 1 4-RNS-ITPP-501, Normal Residual Heat Removal System Preoperational Test Procedure, Section 4.4.1, Residual Heat Removal Pump A RCS Recirculation, Rev. 1.0 4-RNS-ITPP-501, Normal Residual Heat Removal System Preoperational Test Procedure, Section 4.4.3, Dual Residual Heat Removal Pump Recirculation of the RCS, Rev. 1.0
- b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1P05 Pre-operational Testing
70702-02.04 - Test Witnessing
- a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors used appropriate portions of the IP to observe the licensees performance of the following procedure used to test if the leakage for each containment isolation valve or set of isolation valves was appropriately captured. The tests were observed to verify if they satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the UFSAR.
4-CNS-ITPP-503, LLRT Containment Leak Rate Test Type C, Attachment 7, 4-CVS-PY-C03 (CVS Makeup Ctmt Pen) Type C Test, Rev. 1 4-CNS-ITPP-503, LLRT Containment Leak Rate Test Type C, Attachment 22, 4-VFS-PY-C02 (VFS Exh Ctmt Pen) Type C Test, Rev. 1 4-CNS-ITPP-503, LLRT Containment Leak Rate Test Type C, Attachment 23, 4-VWS-PY-C01 (VWS Chilled Water Return) Type C Test, Rev. 1 4-CNS-ITPP-503, LLRT Containment Leak Rate Test Type C, Attachment 24, 4-VWS-PY-C02 (VWS Chilled Water Supply) Type C Test, Rev. 1
20 4-CNS-IPTT-503, LLRT Containment Leak Rate Test Type C, Attachment 8, 4-CVS-PY-C04 (CVS Addition CTMT Pen) Type C Test, Rev. 1 4-CNS-IPTT-503, LLRT Containment Leak Rate Test Type C, Attachment 6, 4-CVS-PY-C02 (CVS Letdown CTMT Pen) Type C Test, Rev. 1 4-CNS-IPTT-503, LLRT Containment Leak Rate Test Type C, Attachment 1, 4-CAS-PY-C02 (Instrument air CNMT Pen) Type C Test, Rev. 1
- b. Findings
No findings were identified.
- 2. SAFEGUARDS PROGRAMS
Cornerstones: Security Programs for Construction Inspection and Operations
IMC 2504, Construction Inspection Program - Inspection of Construction and Operational Programs
2P01 Security (operational)
- a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed 39 samples across the licensees equipment performance, testing, and maintenance program to verify and assess implementation of the licensees testing and maintenance program for security equipment in accordance with NRC-approved security plans and regulatory requirements. The inspectors reviewed the licensees testing and maintenance program to verify if had been appropriately developed and is being effectively implemented to assure the functionality and reliability of all security equipment necessary for intrusion detection and assessment, the search process, and a rapid response to a design basis threat and other contingencies. The inspectors reviewed the licensees physical protection program associated with this sample to verify if the program was designed and implemented, or was prepared to be implemented, to meet the general performance objective of 10 CFR 73.55(b).
- b. Findings
No findings were identified.
- 3. OPERATIONAL READINESS
Cornerstones: Inspection/Testing, Operational Programs
IMC 2503, ITAAC - Related Work Inspections
3T01 (Unit 3) ITAAC Number 2.1.02.11a.i (46) / Family 07D
21
- a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.1.02.11a.i (46). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:
65001.D-02.02-Test Witnessing
The inspectors used the appropriate portions of the IP to observe the licensee's performance of the following preoperational test procedure used to verify if the PMS squib valve controllers functioned as designed. The test was observed to verify if the test satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the UFSAR and the ITAAC.
3-PMS-ITPP-522, PMS Squib Valve Controller Performance Preoperational Test, Rev. 2
- b. Findings
No findings were identified.
3T02 (Unit 3) ITAAC Number 2.1.02.11b.i (48) / Family 07D
- a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.1.02.11b.i (48). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:
65001.D-02.02 - Test Witnessing
The inspectors used the appropriate portions of the IP to observe the licensee's performance of the following preoperational test procedure used to verify if the PMS squib valve controllers functioned as designed. The test was observed to verify if the test satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the UFSAR and the ITAAC.
3-PMS-ITPP-522, PMS Squib Valve Controller Performance Preoperational Test, Rev. 2
- b. Findings
No findings were identified.
3T03 (Unit 3) ITAAC Number 2.2.01.11a.iii (116) / Family 07D
- a. Inspection Scope
22 The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.2.01.11a.iii (116). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:
65001.D-02.02 - Test Witnessing
The inspectors used the appropriate portions of the IP to observe the licensee's performance of the following preoperational test procedure used to verify if motor operated valves performed their safety function to change position under preoperational test conditions. The test was observed to verify if the test satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the UFSAR and the ITAAC.
3-VFS-ITPP-501, Containment Air Filtration System Preoperational Test Procedure, Rev. 1
- b. Findings
No findings were identified.
3T04 (Unit 3) ITAAC Number 2.2.01.11a.iv (117) / Family 07D
- a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.2.01.11a.iv (117). The inspectors used the following NRC IP/sections to perform this inspection:
65001.D-02.02 - Test Witnessing 65001.D-02.03 - Test Results Review
The inspectors used the appropriate portions of the IP to observe the licensee's performance of the following preoperational test procedures used to verify if check valves CCS-PL-V201, VWS-PL-V062, VFS-V803A, and VFS-V803B performed their safety function to change position. The tests were observed to verify if the test satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the UFSAR and the ITAAC.
3-DWS-OTS-17-001, Demineralized Water Transfer and Storage System Check Valve Exercise, Rev. 0 3-VWS-ITPP-501-V4.0-01, TPC for Central Chilled Water System Preoperational Test, Rev. 4 3-VFS-TOP-001, Containment Air Filtration System Check Valve Set Pressure Test and Exercise Test, Rev. 1
The inspectors used the appropriate portions of the IP to review the licensee's test results of check valves CCS-PL-V201, FPS-PL-V052, and SFS-PL-V037 to verify if they performed their safety function to change position. The test packages were reviewed as part of the ITAAC Technical Report to verify if the test results satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the UFSAR and ITAAC.
23 SV3-CNS-ITR-801117, Unit 3 Recorded Results of CCS Check Valves Position: ITAAC 2.2.01.11a.iv, NRC Index Number: 117, Rev. 0
- b. Findings
No findings were identified.
3T05 (Unit 3) ITAAC Number 2.2.02.07b.i (138) / Family 06D
- a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.2.02.07b.i (138). The inspectors used the following NRC IP/section to perform this inspection:
65001.D-02.02 - Test Witnessing
The inspectors used the appropriate portions of the IP to observe the licensees performance of the following preoperational test procedure used to verify if there was adequate wetted coverage measured at the spring line for each of the three standpipe levels. The test was observed to verify if the test satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the UFSAR and the ITAAC.
3-PCS-ITPP-502, Passive Containment Cooling System Preoperational Test Procedure, Rev. 2
- b. Findings
No findings were identified.
3T06 (Unit 3) ITAAC Number 2.2.03.11b.i (209) / Family 07D
- a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.2.03.11b.i (209). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:
65001.D-02.02 - Test Witnessing
The inspectors used the appropriate portions of the IP to observe the licensee's performance of the following preoperational test procedure used to verify if the PMS squib valve controllers functioned as designed. The test was observed to verify if the test satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the UFSAR and the ITAAC.
3-PMS-ITPP-522, PMS Squib Valve Controller Performance Preoperational Test, Rev. 2
24
- b. Findings
No findings were identified.
3T07 (Unit 3) ITAAC Number 2.3.04.04.ii (331) / Family 15D
- a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.3.04.04.ii (331). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:
65001.D-02.02 - Test Witnessing
The inspectors used the appropriate portions of the IP to observe the licensee's performance of the following preoperational test procedure used to verify if water is simultaneously discharged from each of the two highest fire-hose stations in plant areas containing safety-related equipment at not less than 75 gpm when supplied from the passive containment cooling system water storage tank. The test was observed to verify if the test satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the UFSAR and the ITAAC.
3-PCS-ITPP-502, Passive Containment Cooling System PCCWST Preoperational Test Procedure, Rev. 2
- b. Findings
No findings were identified.
3T08 (Unit 3) ITAAC Number 2.5.02.06a.ii (530) / Family 15D
- a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.5.02.06a.ii (530). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:
65001.D-02.02 - Test Witnessing
The inspectors used the appropriate portions of the IP to observe the licensee's performance of the following preoperational test procedure used to verify if the PMS two-out-of-four initiation logic reverted to a two-out-of-three coincidence logic if one of the four channels was bypassed. The test was observed to verify if the test satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the UFSAR and the ITAAC.
3-PMS-ITPP-521, Protection and Safety Monitoring System Logic Test Preoperational Test Procedure, Rev. 3
25
- b. Findings
No findings were identified.
3T09 (Unit 3) ITAAC Number 2.6.03.04c (603) / Family 08D
- a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.6.03.04c (603). The inspectors used the following NRC IP/section to perform this inspection:
65001.D-02.03 - Test Results Review
The inspectors used the appropriate portions of the IP to review the licensee's test results of the IDS to determine whether capacity testing performed on each IDS battery satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the UFSAR and ITAAC.
3-IDS-ITPP-501, Class 1E DC and UPS Preoperational Test, Rev. 6
- b. Findings
No findings were identified.
3T10 (Unit 3) ITAAC Number 2.6.03.04.i (609) / Family (08D)
- a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.6.03.04.i (609). The inspectors used the following NRC inspection procedures (IPs)/sections to perform this inspection:
65001.D-02.02 - Test Witnessing
The inspectors used the appropriate portions of the IP to observe the licensee's performance of the following preoperational test procedure used to verify if the operating voltage at each Class 1E motor operated valve was greater than or equal to the minimum design voltage requirements necessary to start and operate the valve. The test was observed to verify if the test satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the UFSAR and the ITAAC.
3-IDS-ITPP-503, Class 1E DC and UPS System MOV Voltage Test, Rev. 2
- b. Findings
No findings were identified.
26 3T11 (Unit 3) ITAAC Number E.3.9.03.00.02 (848) / Family 18D
- a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number E.3.9.03.00.02 (848). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:
65001.D-02.02 - Test Witnessing
The inspectors used the appropriate portions of the IP to observe if the emergency response data system was able to successfully complete a data transfer to the NRC operations center. The test was observed to verify if the test it had satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the UFSAR and the ITAAC.
3T12 (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 2.2.01.07.i (107) / Family 11D
- a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.2.01.07.i (107). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:
65001.11-02.10 - Containment Testing 65001.D-02.02 - Test Witnessing
The inspectors used appropriate portions of the IPs to observe the licensee's performance of the following preoperational test procedure used to verify if the leakage from containment for the integrated leak rate test was less than the allowable leak rate. The test was observed to verify if the test satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the UFSAR and the ITAAC.
4-CNS-ITPP-501, Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test (Type A), Rev. 1
- b. Findings
No findings were identified.
3T13 (Unit 4) ITAAC Number 2.2.03.08c.i.02 (178) / Family 06D
- a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a direct inspection of construction activities associated with ITAAC Number 2.2.03.08c.i.02 (178). The inspectors used the following NRC IPs/sections to perform this inspection:
65001.D-02.02 - Test Witnessing
27 The inspectors used the appropriate portions of the IP to observe the licensee's performance of the following preoperational test procedure used to verify if the injection line flow resistance from the accumulator to the reactor vessel was within specified limits. The test was observed to verify if the test satisfied the applicable quality and technical requirements of the UFSAR and the ITAAC.
4-PXS-ITPP-502, PXS Accumulator Mapping and Line Resistance Test, Rev. 1
- b. Findings
No findings were identified.
IMC 2504, Construction Inspection Program - Inspection of Construction and Operational Programs
64705-02.01 - Implemented Operational Feature of the FPP 64705-02.02 - Adequacy and operational readiness
- a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed aspects of the licensees fire protection program (FPP) to determine if reasonable assurance existed at the time of the inspection to verify if the reviewed aspects of the program will meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.48, Fire Protection, once fully implemented after the 10 CFR 52.103(g) finding. The inspectors reviewed the sites FPP document, fire hazards analysis (FHA), and fleet and site-specific procedures to determine if the requirements of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 were incorporated into the FPP.
Specifically, the inspectors reviewed various aspects of the FPP to determine that:
the fire hazards analysis (FHA) properly identifies the fire hazards, quantifies combustibles, and identifies ignition sources, the sites FPP contains requirements to perform periodic surveillances on FP and post-fire safe shutdown equipment, systems, or features, and the surveillances contain adequate requirements to verify functionality of fire protection structures, systems, and components (SSCs),
the sites FPP requires the implementation of compensatory measures for FP SSCs that are considered nonfunctional, circuit breaker coordination and fuse protection have been properly analyzed and could protect the power source of the designated redundant or alternative safe shutdown system/equipment, the staffing levels and qualifications are appropriate and in accordance with the approved FPP, the fire brigade is appropriately equipped and that the program is adequate to ensure that the fire brigade equipment is adequately tested and maintained.
28 firefighting pre-plans identify the plant areas containing SSCs important to safety and the locations and layout of equipment, and that the pre-fire planning identifies hazards as necessary, and firefighting pre-plans prepares the fire brigade members to overcome potential security related access problems and health physics related issues affecting access for fires in radiologically controlled/high radiation areas.
- b. Findings
No findings were identified.
3P02 Process and Effluent Monitoring
84527 - Part 52, Solid Waste Management System
- a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed walkdowns of selected portions of the Unit 3 solid radioactive waste system and discussed system operation with licensee staff to determine if WSS components were installed and configured as described in UFSAR, Chapter 11, Radioactive Waste Management. Specifically, the inspectors traced the spent resin transfer piping from the demineralizer beds to the system termination in the waste dewatering/packaging area. The inspectors directly observed the following radioactive waste system, liquid radioactive waste system (WLS), spent fuel pool cooling system, and chemical and volume control system(CVS) components:
WLS deep bed carbon filter, WLS ion exchangers, spent fuel pool cooling system, liquid radioactive waste system, CVS common resin headers, valves and piping associated with spent resin Tanks A & B (behind shield walls),
resin transfer pump, and resin sampler package.
3P03 Process and Effluent Monitoring
84528 - Part 52, Liquid Waste Management Program
- a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed walkdowns of selected portions of the Unit 3 WLS and discussed system operation with licensee staff to determine if WLS components were installed and configured as described in UFSAR Chapter 11. Specifically, the inspectors traced system piping from the in-board chemical and volume control system containment isolation valve to system termination at the liquid waste discharge valve in the radioactive waste building. The inspectors directly observed the following WLS and CVS components:
29 CVS V045 and CVS V047 containment isolation valves, degasifier package, chemical waste tank, Monitor Tanks A, B, C, D, E, and F, WLS-JE-RE229 liquid radwaste discharge radiation monitor, and WLS V223 automatic isolation valve.
3P04 Process and Effluent Monitoring
84529 - Part 52, Gaseous Waste Management Program
- a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed walkdowns of selected portions of the Unit 3 gaseous radioactive waste system (WGS) and discussed system operation with licensee staff to determine if WGS components were installed and configured as described in UFSAR Chapter 11, Radioactive Waste Management. Specifically, the inspectors traced system piping and ductwork from the inboard containment isolation valve to the discharge point in the Plant Vent. This included observation of several installed airborne effluent monitors and their associated sample lines. The sample piping was inspected to verify the licensees capability of collecting representative samples of airborne particulate, iodine, and noble gas effluents released through the Plant Vent during routine and accident conditions. The inspectors directly observed the following WGS, WLS, containment air filtration system (VFS), and health physics and hot machine shop HVAC system components:
WLS V067 and WLS V068 containment isolation valves VFS high efficiency particulate air and charcoal filter banks, Trains A & B WGS-JE-RE017 gaseous radwaste discharge radiation monitor WGS V051 automatic isolation valve VFS-JE-RE-101 plant vent particulate radiation monitor VFS-JE-RE-102 plant vent iodine radiation monitor VFS-JE-RE-103 plant vent gas radiation monitor (normal range)
VFS-JE-RE-104A plant vent extended range gas radiation monitor (accident mid-range)
VFS-JE-RE-104B plant vent extended range gas radiation monitor (accident high-range)
VHS-JE-RE001 health physics and hot machine shop exhaust radiation monitor
- b. Findings
No findings were identified.
3P05 Preservice Testing
73758-App A.02.02 Preservice and Inservice Testing Program
30 73758-App C Implementation of PST/IST Program for Pumps, Valves, and Dynamic Restraints
- a. Inspection Scope
Preservice Testing (PST) Program
The inspectors performed the following activities related to the development of the Vogtle Units 3 & 4 PST programs for pumps, valves, and dynamic restraints that will perform safety-related functions at Vogtle Units 3 & 4:
The inspectors reviewed procedure B-GEN-ENG-039 for pyrotechnic charge testing of a sample of squib valves as part of the PST Program. In response to inspector questions, the licensee compared the squib valve charge testing procedure to the sample testing required by Alternative Request PST-Alt-01 as authorized by the NRC staff on March 26, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19071A241).
The inspectors reviewed Work Package SV3-CVS-T0W-1067850 (completion package dated 9-30-2021), Perform Dynamic Testing of AOV SV3-CVS-PL-V084, to determine if the dynamic test report demonstrated that the auxiliary pressurizer spray line isolation AOV performed satisfactory with full open and close strokes under normal CVS pressure of 2235 pounds per square inch gauge.
Inservice Testing (IST) Program
The inspectors performed the following activities related to the development of the Vogtle Units 3 & 4 IST programs for pumps, valves, and dynamic restraints that will perform safety-related functions at Vogtle Units 3 & 4:
The inspectors reviewed the following IST procedures to verify if they meet the applicable testing requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a and the ASME OM Code, and support the implementation of the IST program:
CAS-OTS-10-001, Compressed Air System Valve Stroke Test, 12 2021 CVS-OTS-10-001, Chemical and Volume Control System Valve Stroke Test, 05-13-2021 PXS-OTS-10-001, Passive Core Cooling System Train A Valves Stroke Test, 1-4-2022 PXS-OTS-10-002, Passive Core Cooling System Train B Valves Stroke Test, 02-11-2022 RCS-OTS-10-001, Reactor Coolant System Valve Stroke Test, 07 2021 RNS-OTS-10-003, Normal Residual Heat Removal System Valve Stroke Test, 12-22-2021 SGS-OTS-10-003, Steam Generating System Valve Stroke Test Train A: Modes 3-6, 12/29/2020
31 SGS-OTS-10-004, Steam Generating System Valve Stroke Test Train B: Modes 3-6, 12/29/2020
- B-GEN-ITPCM-017, Air-Operated Valve Test, 3-13-2019
The inspectors reviewed the air-operated valve (AOV) program to be implemented for the startup of Vogtle Units 3 & 4, including the implementation checklist, SNC fleet procedures, plant-specific procedures, and licensee responses to inspector questions. The inspectors reviewed the AOV program and procedures for Vogtle Units 3 & 4 to determine if they met the 2012 Edition of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Plants Code as incorporated by reference in 10 CFR 50.55a; the Joint Owners Group AOV Program NX-1018; and NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2000-03, Resolution of Generic Safety Issue 158: Performance of Safety-Related Power-Operated Valves under Design Basis Conditions.
- 4. OTHER INSPECTION RESULTS
4OA5 Other Activities
.01 The inspectors reviewed corrective actions developed and implemented by the licensee to verify if the violation identified as05200025/2021008-01, Failure to Prescribe Instructions or Procedures for ITAAC Activities that Affect Quality, was corrected. The inspectors reviewed the analysis to verify if the vehicle barrier system could protect against a design basis threat vehicle bomb.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
.01 Exit Meeting.
On April 1, 2022, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. G. Chick, Vogtle 3 & 4 Executive Vice President, and other licensee and contractor staff members.
Proprietary information was reviewed during the inspection period but was not included in the inspection report.
32 SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensees and Contractor Personnel
A. Nix, NI Manager K. Roberts, ITAAC Manager M. Hickox, Test Support Manager C. Alexander, Milestone Manager S. Boyle, Milestone Manager D. Pagan-Diaz, ITP Turnover. Manager J. Olsen, NI Supervisor N. Kellenberger, SNC Licensing Supervisor C. Castell, SNC Licensing Engineer N. Patel, SNC Licensing Engineer N. Chapman, SNC Licensing Engineer J. Weathersby, SNC Licensing Engineer C. Main, ITAAC Project Manager D. Wade, ITAAC Project Manager B. Macioce, Principle Engineer Digital Testing R. McKay, ITP Test Engineer S. Turner, ITP Test Engineer G. Weaver, ITP Test Engineer R. Nicoletto, ITP Test Engineer W. Pipkins, ITP Test Engineer D. Melton, ITP Test Engineer R. Espara, ITP Test Engineer J. Clark, ITP Test Engineer K. Morgan, ITP Test Engineer
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Item Number Type Status Description
05200025/2021008-01 NCV Closed Failure to Prescribe Instructions or Procedures for ITAAC Activities that Affect Quality
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Section 1A02 B-GEN-ITPCI-039-F165, RCS-PL-V150A Component Test, Rev. 3 B-GEN-ITPCI-039-F166, RCS-PL-V150B Component Test, Rev. 3 B-GEN-ITPCI-039-F167, RCS-PL-V150C Component Test, Rev. 3 B-GEN-ITPCI-039-F168, RCS-PL-V150D Component Test, Rev. 3
33 Section 1A03 WO 1272570 WO 1272565
Section 1A04 WO 1272570 WO 1272565
Section 1A010 WO 1272570 WO 1272565
Section 1A11 WO 1272570 WO 1272565
Section 1A12 WO 1272570 WO 1272565
Section 1A13 WO 1272570 WO 1272565
Section 1A05 WO 1261029
Section 1A06 WO 1241511
Section 1A07 SV3-PXS-ITR-802206, Unit 3 Inspection results of : ITAAC 2.2.03.10 (Item 11b), Rev. 0 SV3-PXS-ITR-803206, Unit 3 Recorded Results of Remotely Operated PXS Valves Response to Loss of Motive Power: ITAAC 2.2.03.10 (Item 12b), Rev. 0
Section 1A08 WO 1229658
Section 1A14 Vogtle Electric Generating (VEGP) Units 3 and 4 Physical Security Plan, Rev. 6 SVO-SES-OOX-800000- Vogtle Plant Security System Database, Rev. 8 3-SES-ITAAC 644-FEP01-Intrusion Detection/Video Assessment-FEP01, Rev. 1.0 3-SES-ITAAC 644-FEP02-Intrusion Detection/Video Assessment-FEP02, Rev. 1.0 3-SES-ITAAC 661-UPS01-PA IDS/Assessment-UPS01, Rev. 1.1
34 Section 1A20 Vogtle Electric Generating (VEGP) Units 3 and 4 Physical Security Plan. Rev. 6 NMP-SE-015 Target Set Identification, Development, and Maintenance, Rev. 8.0 SV3-SES-ITR-800668, Inspection of Unattended Openings Intersecting the Protected Area or Vital Area Boundaries, Rev. 0 Unit 3 & 4 Vital Equipment List, dated September 7, 2021 APP-SES-M3C-001, AP 1000 Vital Equipment List, Rev. 1
Section 1A21 APP-GW-GEE-5162, Changes to PMS Logic to Address Human Factors Concerns, Rev. 0, dated October 9, 2015 APP-GW-GEE-4485, Revision of Diverse Actuation System (DAS) Interface with Hydrogen Igniters, Rev. 0, APP-GW-GAP-420, Engineering and Design Coordination Reports (E&DCR), Rev. 20, dated June 11, 2020 APP-OCS-GEH-420, AP1000 Human Factors Engineering Discrepancy Resolution Process, Rev. 20 APP-OCS-GEH-520, AP1000 Plant Startup Human Factors Engineering Design Verification Plan, Rev. 4 B-GEN-ENG-025-001, Human Factors Engineering Verification Instruction, Version 3., dated August 20, 2020 ESR 50037985, TCPS Maintenance Screens do not Include Function to Bypass Chest Warming ESR 50038089, Soft controls not implemented for some VBS components (8 heaters)
ESR 50039084, TMOD SV3-PMS-TM-002-01 Engineering Review ESR 50048674, CMS Pressure Transmitter Calibration Range LTR-GIC-WAPP-21-019 Rev. 1, List ESRs and RECs requiring review by the Westinghouse Human Factors Engineering team and their review, Revision 1, dated December 2, 2021 LTR-GIC-WAPP-20-008, 10% Quality Review of the impact reviews for the Instrumentation and Controls Projects with regards to the Human Factors Engineering Integrated System Validation, dated April 9, 2020 ND-EN-VNP-024, Engineering Service Request, Version 5.0, dated August 27, 2021 ND-EN-VNP-018, Plant Startup Human Factors Engineering Design Verification Work Instruction, Version 3.0, dated August 31, 2020 REC AP1000-06934, APP-GW-GEE-5162A, Changes to PMS Logic to Address Human Factors Concerns REC AP1000-05904, APP-RCS-GEF-100 - Modification to ADS Stage 1 Jog Mode REC AP1000-05344, APP-GW-GEE-4485 - Revision of Diverse Actuation System (DAS)
Interface with Hydrogen Igniters REC AP1000-05232 Calculation APP-TDS-M3C-005 E and DCR APP-TDS-GEF-875007 REC AP1000-05344, Revision of Diverse Actuation System (DAS) Interface with Hydrogen Igniters (DCP 4485 RA/0), Revision 0, dated June 14, 2013 REC AP1000-06068, Detailed Description of RMCS Operation (E and DCR APP-CVS-GEF-188), dated Apr 17, 2014 REC AP1000-06983, WLS MP05 Stop Control Logic Addition, dated October 20, 2015 REC AP1000-07536, E&DCR No. APP-CCS-GEF-265 - Revision to Valve CCS-PL-V221 Setpoints, dated August 11, 2016 WNA-WI-00451-WAPP, HFE ISV Impacts for a Request for Engineering Change, Revision 1, dated March 2016
35 Section 1A22 Vogtle Electric Generating (VEGP) Units 3 and 4 Physical Security Plan. Rev. 6 SV0-0000-XD-800000 Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Power Block Drainage Plan, Rev. 11 SV0-0000-XD-800001 Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Power Block Drainage Plan, Rev. 7 SV0-CWS-XE-001 Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 3&4 Circulating Water System Piping Excavation and Backfill Plan, Rev. 5 Underground Pathways UAO Unit 3, dated May 31, 2021
Section 1A23 WO 11098888 Condition Report (CR) 50127327, Unable to Perform Test Step in PMS CIM VES-EP-01A, 02/23/2022
Section 1P01 3-PCS-ITPP-502, Passive Containment Cooling System Preoperational Test Procedure, Rev. 2 CR 50128844, 3-PCS-ITPP-502 TDR-009 Distribution Trough No Flow, 03/06/2022 CR 50128843, 3-PCS-ITPP-502 TDR-008 PCS-FT003 and PCS-FT004, 03/06/2022 CR 50128849, 3-PCS-ITPP-502 TDR-010 PCS 72-hour Insufficient Flow, 03/06/2022
Section 1P02 WO 1243359 B-GEN-ITPA-004, Conduct of Test, Ver. 26 CR 50124523, NRC Procedure Use and Adherence Challenge, 02/04/2022 Ultrasonic Calibrator ID# 34VP301, calibration due date 01/21/2023
Section 1P03 4-CNS-ITPP-503, LLRT Containment Leak Rate Test Type C, Rev. 1 WO 1198239 WO 1270678
Section 1P04 Measuring and Test Equipment Traveler Mets Activity Number: 489803
SAFEGUARDS PROGRAMS Section 2P01 90017-C-Security Radio and Communications Systems, Version 34.0 90200-C-Security Seven Day Vital Area Portal Inspections, Version 36.0 90201-C-Closed Circuit Television Camera System Testing, Version 21.0 90202-C-Testing Explosive Detector Units 90203-C-Metal Detector Testing, Version 19.0 90204-C-X-Ray Equipment Test Procedure, Version 16.0 90206-C-Protected Area Lighting Systems, Version 15.0 90207-C-Security Barrier Inspection, Version 22.0 90318-C-Testing and Maintenance of Security Personnel Equipment, Version 21.1 V-SSO-2021 7 Day Testing of the Security Perimeter and Duress Alarms Systems, Version 1.1 V-SSO-2021 Startup, Operation, and Termination of the Unit 3 Interim Boundary Exit Terminal, Version 1.0 V-SSO-2021 ITAAC Test for Protected Area Lighting Systems, Version 1.0 Security ITAAC Acceptance Testing Documentation
36
- 3. OPERATIONAL READINESS Section 3T03 WO 1063395
Section 3T04 WO 1068270 WO 1272361 B-GEN-ITPA-015, Temporary Operating Plan (TOP) Cover Sheet, Rev. 4. Signed/dated 3/3 2022
Section 3T07 WO 1056002 APP-PY89-Z0-001, Fire Hose Stations, Rev. 6 ESR 50124411, Insufficient PCCWST Flow to FPS, Rev. 001 CR 50124410, 3-PCS-ITPP-501 TDR-007 (Insufficient Flow to FPS), 02/03/2022
Section 3T08 WO 1225188
Section 3T09 3-IDS-ITPP-501, Class 1E DC and UPS Preoperational Test, Rev. 6
Section 3T10 WO 1071704 B-GEN-ITPCM-001, Limitorque SMB/SB Motor Operated Valve Component Testing, Attachment 7, Rev. 4 CR 50132840
Section 3T12 Procedures:
165766-830-05-PR-000011, Pneumatic Testing of Unit 4 Containment, Rev. 1 4-CNS-ITPP-501, Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test (Type A), Rev. 1 4-CNS-ITPP-502, Containment Penetration Leak Rate (Type B) Preoperational Test, Rev. 1 4-CNS-ITPP-503, LLRT Containment Leak Rate Test Type C, Rev. 1 NMP-AD-006, Infrequently Performed Tests and Evolutions, Rev. 13.1
Drawings:
165766-830-05-FM-046015, Pressure Test Safety Distance Map, Rev. 3 165766-830-05-FM-046016, Pressure Test Safety Distance Map, Rev. 2 165766-830-05-FM-046117, Vertical Vessel Pneumatic Test Layout, Rev. 1 165766-830-05-FM-046114, Vertical Vessel Pneumatic Test Layout, Rev. 1 165766-830-05-SK-46211, Instrument Locations, Rev. 2
Section 3T13 4-PXS-ITPP-502, PXS Accumulator Mapping and Line Resistance Test, Rev. 1 WO 1191256
37 Section 3P01 Drawings APP-1030-AF-001 Fire Area Drawing Nuclear Island Plan AT EL. 100-0 & 107-2 Rev. 6 APP-1040-AF-001 Fire Area Drawing Nuclear Island Plan AT EL. 117-6 Rev. 5 APP-1010-AF-001 Fire Area Drawing Nuclear Island Plan AT EL. 66-6 Rev. 5 APP-1020-AF-001 Fire Area Drawing Nuclear Island Plan AT EL. 82-6 Rev. 6 APP-VBS-M6-005 PIPING AND INSTRUMENTATION DIAGRAM NI NONRADIOACTIVE VENTILATION SYSTEM REV. 12 APP-VBS-M6-006 PIPING AND INSTRUMENTATION DIAGRAM NI NONRADIOACTIVE VENTILATION SYSTEM REV. 11
Calculations APP-IDS-E0C-011, Class 1E (IDS) 250V DC System - Coordination Study, Rev. 4 APP-GW-E0X-050, Class 1E 250 VDC and UPS Load List (Automatically Generated from Smart Plant Electrical), Rev. 4 APP-IDSA-E3-DD101, Panel Schedule IDSA-DD-1 250 VDC Distribution Panel, Rev. 6 APP-IDSB-E3-DD101, Panel Schedule IDSB-DD-1 250 VDC Distribution Panel, Rev. 5 APP-IDSD-E3-DD101, Panel Schedule IDSD-DD-1 250 VDC Distribution Panel, Rev. 5 SV0-AW20-AWR-800019, Baumert Groupe Gorge Company - Non-Loadbearing Composite Partition Assembly ASTM E119 - 3 Hours, 2/23/2021
Licensing & Design Basis Docs B-GEN-ENG-008 Fire Equipment Functionality and Fire Protection Impairments (FPI)
Requirements - NRC REQUIRED FIRE DAMPERS Version 2.0 APP-AB01-Z0-001, Block-outs and Barriers (Penetrations, Seals, and Fire Stops), Rev. 8
Procedures 3-EFS-ITPP-501, Communications System (EFS) Preoperational Test, Version 1.0 B-GEN-OPS-004, Fire Brigade Equipment - Quarterly Inspection, Version 2.2 3-AOP-601, Evacuation of Main Control Room, Rev. 2.0 B-GEN-ENG-008, Fire Protection Functionality and Fire Protection Impairments (FPI)
Requirements, Version 2.0 B-GEN-ENG-008-GL02, Fire Equipment Functionality and Fire Protection Impairments (FPI)
Basis, Version 1.0
Miscellaneous B-PFP-ENG-001-F3113 Pre-Fire Plan - Auxiliary Building Non-RCA El 100-0 B-PFP-ENG-001-F3114 Pre-Fire Plan - Auxiliary Building Non-RCA El 117-6 B-PFP-ENG-001-F3110 Pre-Fire Plan - Auxiliary Building Non-RCA El 66-6 B-PFP-ENG-001-F3111 Pre-Fire Plan - Auxiliary Building Non-RCA El 82-6
Condition Reports Reviewed During Inspection 50124410, 3-PCS-ITPP-502 TDR-007 (Insufficient Flow to FPS), 2/3/2022
Condition Reports Generated During Inspection 50126132, Update Phone Locations on Pre-Fire Plans To Show As-Built, 2/16/2022 50125872, Update B-PFP-ENG-001-F3113 to Correct Fire Wall Rating for 12312, 2/14/2022 50125503, Need Clarification of Which Penetration Seals Detail Have Been Replaced By New Details, 2/11/2022 50126228, Typos in Fire Door Locations in B-GEN-ENG-008, 2/16/2022
38 50126358, NRC Identified Issue: Missing Seal Detail for I-Beam in ITAAC Fire Barrier Wall, 2/17/2022
Section 3P05 Procedures 3-SGS-OTS-10-003, Steam Generating System Valve Stroke Test Train A Modes 3-6, 12 2020 3-SGS-OTS-10-004, Steam Generating System Valve Stroke Test Train B Modes 3-6,12 2020 B-GEN-ADM-001-F06, Air Operated Valve Program Implementation Checklist, 10-20-2021 B-GEN-ENG-039, PST Squib Valve Charge Test, 1-7-2022 NMP-ES-014, Air Operated Valve (AOV) Program, 3-12-2021 NMP-ES-014-001, Air Operated Valve (AOV) Scoping and Categorization, 3-12-2021 NMP-ES-014-002, Air Operated Valve (AOV) Design Basis Review and Setpoint Control, 9 2021 NMP-ES-014-003, Air Operated Valve (AOV) Datasheet Preparation and Testing, 7/9/2021 NMP-ES-014-004, Air Operated Valve (AOV) Tracking and Trending, 4-5-2021
Work Orders Work Package #SV3-CVS-T0W-1067850, Perform Dynamic Testing of AOV SV3-CVS-PL-V084, 9/30/2021
Miscellaneous RER SNC1173137-01, Justification for Excluding DDS Master Time Server (MTS) Atomic Clock from M&TE Requirements, 2/10/2022
Corrective Action Documents CR 8005635 TE 60036478.
39 LIST OF ACRONYMS
AOV air operated valve COL Combined License CVS chemical and volume control system ESR engineering service request FHA fire hazard analysis FPP fire protection program HED human engineering deficiencies HFE human factors engineering IDS Class IE direct current and uninterruptable power supply system IMC inspection manual chapter IST inservice testing IP inspection procedure ITAAC inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria MCR main control room NRC Nuclear Regulator Commission PARS Publicly Available Records PMS protection and monitoring system PST preservice testing RCP reactor coolant pump REC engineering change Rev revision UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report V&V verification and validation VFS containment air filtration system WEC Westinghouse Electric Company WGS gaseous radioactive waste system WLS liquid radioactive waste system WO work order 40 ITAAC INSPECTED
No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Acceptance Criteria Analysis 47 2.1.02.11a.ii 10. Safety-related Inspection will be Safety-related displays identified in performed for displays identified in Table 2.1.2-1 can be retrievability of the Table 2.1.2-1 can be retrieved in the MCR. safety-related displays retrieved in the MCR.
11.a) Controls exist in the MCR. ii) Stroke ii) Controls in the in the MCR to cause testing will be MCR operate to the remotely performed on the cause the remotely operated valves other remotely operated valves identified in Table operated valves listed (other than squib 2.1.2-1 to perform in Table 2.1.2-1 using valves) to perform active functions. controls in the MCR. active functions. ii) 11.b) The valves ii) Testing will be The other remotely identified in Table performed on the operated valves 2.1.2-1 as having other remotely identified in Table PMS control perform operated valves 2.1.2-1 as having an active safety identified in Table PMS control perform function after 2.1.2-1 using real or the active function receiving a signal simulated signals into identified in the table from the PMS. 12.b) the PMS. iii) Testing after receiving a After loss of motive will be performed to signal from PMS. iii) power, the remotely demonstrate that These valves open operated valves remotely operated within the following identified in Table RCS valves times after receipt of 2.1.2-1 assume the RCSV001A/B, an actuation signal:
indicated loss of V002A/B, V003A/B, V001A/B < 40 sec motive power V011A/B, V012A/B, V002A/B, V003A/B <
position. V013A/B open within 100 sec V011A/B <
the required response 30 sec V012A/B, times. Testing of the V013A/B < 60 sec remotely operated Upon loss of motive valves will be power, each remotely performed under the operated valve conditions of loss of identified in Table motive power. 2.1.2-1 assumes the indicated loss of motive power position.
64 2.1.02.13b 13.b) The RCPs trip Testing will be The RCPs trip after after receiving a performed using real receiving a signal signal from the PMS. or simulated signals from the PMS.
into the PMS.
41 No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Acceptance Criteria Analysis 107 2.2.01.07.i 7. The CNS provides i) A containment i) The leakage rate the safety-related integrated leak rate from containment for function of test will be performed. the integrated leak containment isolation rate test is less than for containment La.
boundary integrity and provides a barrier against the release of fission products to the atmosphere.
110 2.2.01.09 9. Safety-related Inspection will be Safety-related displays identified in performed for displays identified in Table 2.2.1-1 can be retrievability of the Table 2.2.1-1 can be retrieved in the MCR. safety-related displays retrieved in the MCR.
10.a) Controls exist in the MCR. Stroke Controls in the MCR in the MCR to cause testing will be operate to cause those remotely performed on remotely remotely operated operated valves operated valves valves identified in identified in Table identified in Table Table 2.2.1-1 to 2.2.1-1 to perform 2.2.1-1 using the perform active safety active functions. controls in the MCR. functions. The 10.b) The valves Testing will be remotely operated identified in Table performed on remotely valves identified in 2.2.1-1 as having operated valves listed Table 2.2.1-1 as PMS control perform in Table 2.2.1-1 using having PMS control an active safety real or simulated perform the active function after signals into the PMS. function identified in receiving a signal the table after from the PMS. receiving a signal from PMS.
116 2.2.01.11a.iii 11.a) The motor-iii) Tests of the motor-iii) Each motor-operated and check operated valves will operated valve valves identified in be performed under changes position as Table 2.2.1-1 perform preoperational flow, indicated in Table an active safety-differential pressure, 2.2.1-1 under pre-related function to and temperature operational test change position as conditions. conditions.
indicated in the table.
117 2.2.01.11a.iv 11.a) The motor-iv) Exercise testing of iv) Each check valve operated and check the check valves with changes position as valves identified in active safety functions indicated in Table Table 2.2.1-1 perform identified in Table 2.2.11.
an active safety-2.2.11 will be related function to performed under change position as preoperational test indicated in the table. pressure, temperature and fluid flow conditions.
42 No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Acceptance Criteria Analysis 138 2.2.02.07b.i 7.a) The PCS i) Testing will be i) When tested, each delivers water from performed to measure one of the three flow the PCCWST to the the PCCWST delivery paths delivers water outside, top of the rate from each one of at greater than or containment vessel. the three parallel flow equal to: - 469.1 7.b) The PCS wets paths. ii) Testing and gpm at a PCCWST the outside surface of or analysis will be water level of 27.4 ft the containment performed to + 0.2, - 0.0 ft above vessel. The inside demonstrate the the tank floor -
and the outside of the PCCWST inventory 226.6 gpm when the containment vessel provides 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of PCCWST water level above the operating adequate water flow. uncovers the first (i.e.
deck are coated with i) Testing will be tallest) standpipe -
an inorganic zinc performed to measure 176.3 gpm when the material. 7.c) The the outside wetted PCCWST water level PCS provides air flow surface of the uncovers the second over the outside of containment vessel tallest standpipe -
the containment with one of the three 144.2 gpm when the vessel by a natural parallel flow paths PCCWST water level circulation air flow delivering water to the uncovers the third path from the air top of the containment tallest standpipe - or inlets to the air vessel. ii) Inspection a report exists and discharge structure. of the containment concludes that the 7.d) The PCS drains vessel exterior coating as-measured flow the excess water will be conducted. iii) rates delivered by the from the outside of Inspection of the PCCWST to the the containment containment vessel containment vessel vessel through the interior coating will be provides sufficient two upper annulus conducted. heat removal drains. 7.e) The Inspections of the air capability such that PCS provides a flow flow path segments the limiting path for long-term will be performed. containment water makeup to the Testing will be pressure and PCCWST. 9. performed to verify the temperature values Safety-related upper annulus drain are not affected and displays identified in flow performance. ii) the PCS is able to Table 2.2.2-1 can be Testing will be perform its safety retrieved in the MCR. performed to measure function to remove 10.a) Controls exist the delivery rate from heat from in the MCR to cause the long-term makeup containment to the remotely connection to the maintain plant safety.
operated valves PCCWST. Inspection ii) When tested identified in Table will be performed for and/or analyzed with 2.2.2-1 to perform retrievability of the all flow paths active functions. safety-related displays delivering and an 10.b) The valves in the MCR. Stroke initial water level at identified in Table testing will be 27.4 + 0.2, 0.00 ft, 2.2.2-1 as having performed on the the PCCWST water PMS control perform remotely operated inventory provides
43 No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Acceptance Criteria Analysis an active safety valves identified in greater than or equal function after Table 2.2.2-1 using to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of flow, receiving a signal the controls in the and the flow rate at from the PMS. 11.a) MCR. Testing will be 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> is greater The motor-operated performed on the than or equal to valves identified in remotely operated 100.7 gpm or a Table 2.2.2-1 perform valves in Table 2.2.2-1 report exists and an active safety-using real or simulated concludes that the related function to signals into the PMS. as-measured flow change position as iii) Tests of the motor-rates delivered by the indicated in the table. operated valves will PCCWST to the 11.b) After loss of be performed under containment vessel motive power, the preoperational flow, provides sufficient remotely operated differential pressure, heat removal valves identified in and temperature capability such that Table 2.2.2-1 conditions. Testing of the limiting assume the indicated the remotely operated containment loss of motive power valves will be pressure and position. performed under the temperature values conditions of loss of are not affected and motive power. the PCS is able to perform its safety function to remove heat from containment to maintain plant safety.
i) A report exists and concludes that when the water in the PCCWST uncovers the standpipes at the following levels, the water delivered by one of the three parallel flow paths to the containment shell provides coverage measured at the spring line that is equal to or greater than the stated coverages. - 24.1 +/-
0.2 ft above the tank floor; at least 90% of the perimeter is wetted. - 20.3 +/- 0.2 ft above the tank floor; at least 72.9% of the perimeter is wetted. -
44 No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Acceptance Criteria Analysis 16.8 +/- 0.2 ft above the tank floor; at least 59.6% of the perimeter is wetted.
ii) A report exists and concludes that the containment vessel exterior surface is coated with an inorganic zinc coating above elevation 135'3". iii)
A report exists and concludes that the containment vessel interior surface is coated with an inorganic zinc coating above the operating deck. Flow paths exist at each of the following locations: - Air inlets
- Base of the outer annulus - Base of the inner annulus -
Discharge structure With a water level within the upper annulus 10" + 1" above the annulus drain inlet, the flow rate through each drain is greater than or equal to 525 gpm.
ii) With a water supply connected to the PCS long-term makeup connection, each PCS recirculation pump delivers greater than or equal to 100 gpm when tested separately. Safety-related displays identified in Table 2.2.2-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.
45 No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Acceptance Criteria Analysis Controls in the MCR operate to cause remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.2.2-1 to perform active functions. The remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.2.2-1 as having PMS control perform the active function identified in the table after receiving a signal from the PMS. iii)
Each motor-operated valve changes position as indicated in Table 2.2.2-1 under preoperational test conditions. After loss of motive power, each remotely operated valve identified in Table 2.2.2-1 assumes the indicated loss of motive power position.
46 No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Acceptance Criteria Analysis 178 2.2.03.08c.i.02 8.c) The PXS i) A low-pressure i) The injection line provides RCS injection test and flow resistance from makeup, boration, analysis for each each source is as and safety injection CMT, each follows: 2.
during design basis accumulator, each Accumulators: The events. IRWST injection line, calculated flow and each containment resistance between recirculation line will each accumulator be conducted. Each and the reactor test is initiated by vessel is 1.47 x opening isolation 105 ft/gpm2 and valve(s) in the line 1.83 x 10-5 ft/gpm2.
being tested. Test fixtures may be used to simulate squib valves. 2.
Accumulators: Each accumulator will be partially filled with water and pressurized with nitrogen. All valves in these lines will be open during the test. Sufficient flow will be provided to fully open the check valves.
47 No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Acceptance Criteria Analysis 206 2.2.03.10 10. Safety-related Inspection will be Safety-related displays of the performed for the displays identified in parameters identified retrievability of the Table 2.2.3-1 can be in Table 2.2.31 can safety-related displays retrieved in the MCR.
be retrieved in the in the MCR. ii) Stroke ii) Controls in the MCR. 11.a) testing will be MCR operate to Controls exist in the performed on remotely cause remotely MCR to cause the operated valves other operated valves remotely operated than squib valves other than squib valves identified in identified in Table valves to perform Table 2.2.3-1 to 2.2.3-1 using the their active functions.
perform their active controls in the MCR. ii) Remotely function(s). 11.b) ii) Testing will be operated valves The valves identified performed on the other than squib in Table 2.2.3-1 as remotely operated valves perform the having PMS control valves other than active function perform their active squib valves identified identified in the table function after in Table 2.2.3-1 using after a signal is input receiving a signal real or simulated to the PMS. iii) from the PMS. 12.b) signals into the PMS. These valves open After loss of motive iii) Testing will be within 20 seconds power, the remotely performed to after receipt of an operated valves demonstrate that actuation signal.
identified in Table remotely operated After loss of motive 2.2.3-1 assume the PXS isolation valves power, each remotely indicated loss of PXS-V014A/B, operated valve motive power V015A/B, V108A/B identified in Table position. 13. open within the 2.2.3-1 assumes the Displays of the required response indicated loss of parameters identified times. Testing of the motive power in Table 2.2.3-3 can remotely operated position. Displays be retrieved in the valves will be identified in Table MCR. performed under the 2.2.3-3 can be conditions of loss of retrieved in the MCR.
motive power.
Inspection will be performed for retrievability of the displays identified in Table 2.2.3-3 in the MCR.
48 No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Acceptance Criteria Analysis 331 2.3.04.04.ii 4. The FPS provides ii) Testing will be ii) Water is for manual fire performed by simultaneously fighting capability in measuring the water discharged from plant areas flow rate as it is each of the two containing safety-simultaneously highest fire-hose related equipment. discharged from the stations in plant two highest fire-hose areas containing stations and when the safety-related water for the fire is equipment at not less supplied from the PCS than 75 gpm.
storage tank.
49 No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Acceptance Criteria Analysis 530 2.5.02.06a.ii 6.a) The PMS An operational test of ii) PMS output initiates an automatic the as-built PMS will signals to the reactor reactor trip, as be performed using trip switchgear are identified in Table real or simulated test generated after the 2.5.22, when plant signals. An test signal reaches process signals operational test of the the specified limit.
reach specified limits. as-built PMS will be This needs to be 6.b) The PMS performed using real verified for each initiates automatic or simulated test automatic reactor trip actuation of signals. An function. Appropriate engineered safety operational test of the PMS output signals features, as identified as-built PMS will be are generated after in Table 2.5.2-3, performed using the the test signal when plant process PMS manual actuation reaches the specified signals reach controls. i) An limit. These output specified limits. 6.c) inspection will be signals remain The PMS provides performed for following removal of manual initiation of retrievability of plant the test signal. Tests reactor trip and parameters in the from the actuation selected engineered MCR. iii) An signal to the actuated safety features as operational test of the device(s) are identified in Table asbuilt system will be performed as part of 2.5.2-4. 8.a) The performed using each the system-related PMS provides for the MCR fixed position inspection, test, minimum inventory of control. Inspection will analysis, and displays, visual be performed for acceptance criteria.
alerts, and fixed retrievability of ii) PMS output position controls, as displays of the signals are identified in Table open/closed status of generated for reactor 2.5.2-5. The plant the reactor trip trip and selected parameters listed breakers in the MCR. engineered safety with a "Yes" in the An operational test of features as identified "Display" column and the as-built PMS will in Table 2.5.2-4 after visual alerts listed be performed using the manual initiation with a "Yes" in the real or simulated test controls are "Alert" column can be signals. An actuated. i) The retrieved in the MCR. operational test of the plant parameters The fixed position as-built PMS will be listed in Table 2.5.2-5 controls listed with a performed. An with a "Yes" in the "Yes" in the "Control" operational test of the "Display" column, column are provided as-built PMS will be can be retrieved in in the MCR. 8.c) performed. With one the MCR. iii) For Displays of the channel in bypass, an each test of an as-open/closed status of attempt will be made built fixed position the reactor trip to place a redundant control listed in Table breakers can be channel in bypass. 2.5.2-5 with a "Yes" retrieved in the MCR. in the "Control" 9.a) The PMS column, an actuation automatically signal is generated.
50 No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Acceptance Criteria Analysis removes blocks of Tests from the reactor trip and actuation signal to engineered safety the actuated features actuation device(s) are when the plant performed as part of approaches the system-related conditions for which inspection, test, the associated analysis and function is designed acceptance criteria.
to provide protection. Displays of the These blocks are open/closed status of identified in Table the reactor trip 2.5.2-6. 9.b) The breakers can be PMS two-out-of-four retrieved in the MCR.
initiation logic reverts The PMS blocks are to a two-out-of-three automatically coincidence logic if removed when the one of the four test signal reaches channels is the specified limit.
bypassed. All The PMS two-out-of-bypassed channels four initiation logic are alarmed in the reverts to a two-out-MCR. 9.c) The of-three coincidence PMS does not allow logic if one of the four simultaneous bypass channels is of two redundant bypassed. All channels. bypassed channels are alarmed in the MCR. The redundant channel cannot be placed in bypass.
51 No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Acceptance Criteria Analysis 603 2.6.03.04c 4.c) Each IDS 24-Testing of each 24-The battery terminal hour battery bank hour asbuilt battery voltage is greater supplies a dc bank will be performed than or equal to 210 switchboard bus load by applying a V after a period of no for a period of 24 simulated or real load, less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> hours without or a combination of with an equivalent recharging. 4.d) simulated or real loads load that equals or Each IDS 72-hour which envelope the exceeds the battery battery bank supplies battery bank design bank design duty a dc switchboard bus duty cycle. The test cycle capacity. The load for a period of will be conducted on a battery terminal 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> without battery bank that has voltage is greater recharging. 4.e) The been fully charged than or equal to 210 IDS spare battery and has been V after a period of no bank supplies a dc connected to a battery less than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> load equal to or charger maintained at with an equivalent greater than the most 270+/-2 V for a period load that equals or severe switchboard of no less than 24 exceeds the battery bus load for the hours prior to the test. bank design duty required period Testing of each 72-cycle capacity. The without recharging. hour as-built battery battery terminal 4.f) Each IDS 24-bank will be performed voltage is greater hour inverter supplies by applying a than or equal to 210 its ac load. 4.g) Each simulated or real load, V after a period with IDS 72-hour inverter or a combination of a load and duration supplies its ac load. simulated or real loads that equals or 4.h) Each IDS 24-which envelope the exceeds the most hour battery charger battery bank design severe battery bank provides the PMS duty cycle. The test design duty cycle with two loss-of-ac will be conducted on a capacity. Each 24-input voltage signals. battery bank that has hour inverter supplies 5.a) Each IDS 24-been fully charged a line-to-line output hour battery charger and has been voltage of 208 +/- 2%
supplies a dc connected to a battery V at a frequency of switchboard bus load charger maintained at 60 +/- 0.5% Hz. Each while maintaining the 270+/-2 V for a period 72-hour inverter corresponding of no less than 24 supplies a line-to-line battery charged. 5.b) hours prior to the test. output voltage of 208 Each IDS 72-hour Testing of the as-built +/- 2% V at a battery charger spare battery bank will frequency of 60 +/-
supplies a dc be performed by 0.5% Hz. Two PMS switchboard bus load applying a simulated input signals exist while maintaining the or real load, or a from each 24-hour corresponding combination of battery charger battery charged. 5.c) simulated or real loads indicating loss of ac Each IDS regulating which envelope the input voltage when transformer supplies most severe of the the loss-of-input an ac load when division batteries voltage condition is powered from the design duty cycle. The simulated. Each 24-
52 No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Acceptance Criteria Analysis 480 V MCC. 6. test will be conducted hour battery charger Safety-related on a battery bank that provides an output displays identified in has been fully charged current of at least Table 2.6.3-1 can be and has been 150 A with an output retrieved in the MCR. connected to a battery voltage in the range
- 11. Displays of the charger maintained at 210 to 280 V. Each parameters identified 270+/-2 V for a period 72-hour battery in Table 2.6.3-2 can of no less than 24 charger provides an be retrieved in the hours prior to the test. output current of at MCR. Testing of each 24-least 125 A with an hour as-built inverter output voltage in the will be performed by range 210 to 280 V.
applying a simulated Each regulating or real load, or a transformer supplies combination of a line-to-line output simulated or real voltage of 208 +/- 2%
loads, equivalent to a V. Safety-related resistive load greater displays identified in than 12 kW. The Table 2.6.3-1 can be inverter input voltage retrieved in the MCR.
will be no more than Displays identified in 210 Vdc during the Table 2.6.3-2 can be test. Testing of each retrieved in the MCR.
72-hour as-built inverter will be performed by applying a simulated or real load, or a combination of simulated or real loads, equivalent to a resistive load greater than 7 kW. The inverter input voltage will be no more than 210 Vdc during the test. Testing will be performed by simulating a loss of input voltage to each 24-hour battery charger. Testing of each as-built 24-hour battery charger will be performed by applying a simulated or real load, or a combination of simulated or real loads. Testing of each 72-hour as-built
53 No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Acceptance Criteria Analysis battery charger will be performed by applying a simulated or real load, or a combination of simulated or real loads. Testing of each as-built regulating transformer will be performed by applying a simulated or real load, or a combination of simulated or real loads, equivalent to a resistive load greater than 30 kW when powered from the 480 V MCC. Inspection will be performed for retrievability of the safety-related displays in the MCR.
Inspection will be performed for retrievability of the displays identified in Table 2.6.3-2 in the MCR.
646 2.6.09.05c 5.c) The central and Inspections and/or The central and secondary alarm analysis of the central secondary alarm stations are designed and secondary alarm stations are designed and equipped such station will be and equipped such that, in the event of a performed. that, in the event of a single act, in single act, in accordance with the accordance with the design basis threat of design basis threat of radiological radiological sabotage, the design sabotage, equipment enables the needed to maintain survivability of the functional equipment needed to capability of either maintain the alarm station to functional capability detect and assess of either alarm station alarms and to detect and assess communicate with alarms and onsite and offsite communicate with response personnel onsite and offsite exists.
response personnel.
54 No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Acceptance Criteria Analysis 647 2.6.09.06 6. The vehicle barrier Inspections and The vehicle barrier system is installed analysis will be system will protect and located at the performed for the against the DBT necessary stand-off vehicle barrier system. vehicle bombs based distance to protect upon the stand-off against the DBT distance of the vehicle bombs. system.
650 2.6.09.08 8. Isolation zones Inspection of the The illumination in and exterior areas illumination in the isolation zones and within the protected isolation zones and exterior areas within area are provided external areas of the the protected area is with illumination to protected area will be 0.2 foot candles permit observation of performed. measured abnormal presence horizontally at ground or activity of persons level or, alternatively, or vehicles. sufficient to permit observation.
652 2.6.09.13a 13.a) The central and Tests, inspections, or The central and secondary alarm a combination of tests secondary alarm stations have and inspections of the stations are equipped conventional central and secondary with conventional (landline) telephone alarm stations (landline) telephone service with the main conventional service with the main control room and telephone services will control room and local law be performed. Tests, local law enforcement inspections, or a enforcement authorities. 13.b) combination of tests authorities. The The central and and inspections of the central and secondary alarm central and secondary secondary alarm stations are capable alarm stations stations are equipped of continuous continuous with the capability to communication with communication continuously security personnel. capabilities will be communicate with performed. security officers, watchmen, armed response individuals, or any security personnel that have responsibilities during a contingency event.
55 No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Acceptance Criteria Analysis 654 2.6.09.13c 13.c) Non-portable Tests, inspections, or Non-portable communication a combination of tests communication equipment in the and inspections of the devices (including central and non-portable conventional secondary alarm communications telephone systems) stations remains equipment will be in the central and operable from an performed. secondary alarm independent power stations are wired to source in the event of an independent loss of normal power. power supply that
- 14. Not used. enables the system to remain operable in the event of loss of normal power.
56 No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Acceptance Criteria Analysis 655 2.6.09.15a 15.a) Security alarm A test will be A report exists and devices, including performed to verify concludes that transmission lines to that security alarms, security alarm annunciators, are including transmission devices, including tamper indicating and lines to annunciators, transmission lines to self-checking (e.g., are tamper indicating annunciators, are an automatic and selfchecking tamper indicating and indication is provided (e.g., an automatic selfchecking (e.g.,
when failure of the indication is provided an automatic alarm system or a when failure of the indication is provided component occurs, or alarm system or a when failure of the when on standby component occurs, or alarm system or a power). Alarm when on standby component occurs, annunciation shall power) and that alarm or when the system indicate the type of annunciation indicates is on standby power) alarm (e.g., intrusion the type of alarm (e.g., and that alarm alarms and intrusion alarms and annunciation emergency exit emergency exit indicates the type of alarm) and location. alarms) and location. alarm (e.g., intrusion
- 16. Equipment exists Test, analysis, or a alarms and to record onsite combination of test emergency exit security alarm and analysis will be alarms) and location.
annunciation, performed to ensure A report exists and including the location that equipment is concludes that of the alarm, false capable of recording equipment is capable alarm, alarm check, each onsite security of recording each and tamper alarm annunciation, onsite security alarm indication; and the including the location annunciation, type of alarm, of the alarm, false including the location location, alarm alarm, alarm check, of the alarm, false circuit, date, and and tamper indication; alarm, alarm check, time. and the type of alarm, and tamper location, alarm circuit, indication; and the date, and time. type of alarm, location, alarm circuit, date, and time.
57 No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Acceptance Criteria Analysis 667 C.2.6.09.07 7. Access to vital Inspection will be Vital equipment is equipment physical performed to confirm located within a barriers requires that access to vital protected area such passage through the equipment physical that access to vital protected area barriers requires equipment physical perimeter barrier. passage through the barriers requires 7.a) Vital equipment protected area passage through the is located only within perimeter barrier. protected area a vital area. 7.b) Inspection will be perimeter barrier. All Access to vital performed to confirm vital equipment is equipment requires that vital equipment is located only within a passage through the located within a vital vital area. Vital vital area barrier. area Inspection will equipment is located be performed to within a protected confirm that access to area such that vital equipment access to vital requires passage equipment requires through the vital area passage through the barrier. vital area barrier.
668 C.2.6.09.08a 8.a) Penetrations Inspections will be Penetrations and through the protected performed of openings through the area barrier are penetrations through protected area secured and the protected area barrier are secured monitored. 8.b) barrier. Inspections and monitored.
Unattended openings will be performed of Unattended openings (such as unattended openings (such as underground that intersect the underground pathways) that protected area pathways) that intersect the boundary or vital area intersect the protected area boundary. protected area boundary or vital boundary or vital area boundary will be area boundary are protected by a protected by a physical barrier and physical barrier and monitored by monitored by intrusion detection intrusion detection equipment or equipment or provided surveillance provided surveillance at a frequency at a frequency sufficient to detect sufficient to detect exploitation. exploitation.
58 No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Acceptance Criteria Analysis 744 3.2.00.01e 1. The HFE e) An evaluation of e) A report exists verification and the implementation of and concludes that:
validation program is the plant HFE/HSI (as The plant HFE/HSI, performed in designed at the time as designed at the accordance with the of plant startup) time of plant startup, HFE verification and verification will be is consistent with the validation performed. HFE/HSI verified in implementation plan 1.a) through 1.d).
and includes the following activities:
e) Plant HFE/HSI (as designed at the time of plant startup) verification 877 2.2.05.09c 9.c) The MCR Load Testing will be The MCR Load Shed Shed Panels performed on the Panels identified in identified in Table MCR Load Shed Table 2.2.5-1 2.2.5-1 perform their Panels listed in Table perform their active active safety function 2.2.5-1 using real or safety function after receiving a simulated signals into identified in the table signal from the PMS. the PMS. after receiving a signal from the PMS.
59