IR 05000250/2023003
ML23313A006 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Turkey Point ![]() |
Issue date: | 11/09/2023 |
From: | David Dumbacher Division Reactor Projects II |
To: | Coffey B Florida Power & Light Co |
References | |
IR 2023003 | |
Download: ML23313A006 (15) | |
Text
November 9, 2023
SUBJECT:
TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 & 4 - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000250/2023003 AND 05000251/2023003
Dear Bob Coffey:
On September 30, 2023, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Turkey Point Units 3 & 4. On October 23, 2023, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with site Vice President Michael Strope and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Turkey Point Units 3 & 4.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Turkey Point Units 3 & 4. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Signed by Dumbacher, David on 11/09/23 David E. Dumbacher, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 05000250 and 05000251 License Nos. DPR-31 and DPR-41
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers: 05000250 and 05000251 License Numbers: DPR-31 and DPR-41 Report Numbers: 05000250/2023003 and 05000251/2023003 Enterprise Identifier: I-2023-003-0029 Licensee: Florida Power & Light Company Facility: Turkey Point Units 3 & 4 Location: Homestead, FL Inspection Dates: July 01, 2023, to September 30, 2023 Inspectors: M. Bates, Senior Operations Engineer S. Egli, Sr. Construction Inspector M. Endress, Branch Chief T. Fanelli, Senior Resident Inspector V. Furr, Operations Engineer S. Lichvar, Senior Resident Inspector D. Orr, Senior Resident Inspector R. Reyes, Project Engineer Approved By: David E. Dumbacher, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Turkey Point Units 3 & 4, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Secure 4160 Vac Ground Devices Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green [H.2] - Field 71152S Systems NCV 05000250,05000251/2023003-01 Presence Open/Closed The
NRC Identified
a of a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of Title 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,
Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the licensees failure to secure ground devices in the Unit 3 and 4, A, B, and D 4160 Vac switchgear rooms in accordance with the station seismic housekeeping procedure.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
PLANT STATUS
Unit 3 started the period operating at or near rated thermal power (RTP). On August 4, 2023, Unit 3 was manually tripped due to decreasing steam generator level resulting from a failed feed water control valve. Unit 3 returned to RTP on August 6, 2023. On September 22, 2023, Unit 3 automatically tripped following a lightning strike in the switchyard. Unit 3 returned to RTP on September 24, 2023, where it remained for the rest of the inspection period.
Unit 4 started the period operating at 82 percent RTP for feed water control valve repairs. The unit was returned to RTP on July 3, 2023. On September 29, 2023, Unit 4 shutdown to 0 percent RTP and commenced a refueling outage, where it remained for the rest of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Unit 3 and Unit 4, high head safety injection (HHSI) system; 3A, 3B, 4B HHSI pumps, and the Unit 3 and Unit 4 refueling water storage tanks while the Unit 4A HHSI pump was out of service for testing, on July 21, 2023
- (2) Unit 3, safety injection flowpath verification, on September 9, 2023
- (3) Unit 3, vital DC breaker alignment verification, on September 19, 2023
- (4) Unit 4, vital DC breaker alignment verification, on September 19, 2023
- (5) Unit 3, intake cooling water and component cooling water systems while the 3A intake cooling water pump was out of service for maintenance, on September 26, 2023
Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 3, intake cooling water flowpath verification, on August 24, 2023
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (11 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Unit 3 and Unit 4, 480 volt load centers, Fire zone (FZ) 93 - 96, on July 12, 2023
- (2) Unit 3 and Unit 4, auxiliary building hallway, elevation 18', FZ 58, on July 13, 2023
- (3) Unit 3 and Unit 4, steam generator feedwater pump rooms, condensate pump pits, and main control room, FZ 66, 69, 92, 91 and 106, on July 18, 2023
- (4) Unit 3 and Unit 4, auxiliary building north-south breezeway, FZ 79A, on July 18, 2023
- (5) Unit 3 and Unit 4, 4160 Volt safety related switchgear, 480 Volt load center, and B motor control center rooms, FZ 67, 68, 70, 71, 93, 94, 95 and 96, on July 19, 2023
- (6) FLEX storage facility, FZ 150, on September 2, 2023
- (7) Unit 3 and Unit 4, cable spreading room, DC equipment room 3A and 4B, FZ 97, 98, 101,104, and 132, on September 20, 2023
- (8) Auxiliary feedwater pump area and computer room, FZ 62 and 84, on September 21, 2023
- (9) South, north, east and west electrical penetration rooms, FZ 19, 20, 26, and 27, on September 22 2023
- (10) Unit 3, EDG 3A and 3B, FZ 72 - 75, on September 22, 2023
- (11) Unit 4, EDG 4A and 4B, FZ 133 - 142, on September 22 2023
Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the onsite fire brigade training and performance during an announced fire drill on August 22, 2023
71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures
Flooding Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the Unit 3 and Unit 4 residual heat removal pump rooms on July 27, 2023
71111.07A - Heat Exchanger/Sink Performance
Annual Review (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated readiness and performance of:
- (1) 3A, 3B, and 3C component cooling water heat exchangers on July 19, 2023
71111.11B - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Requalification Program (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
An inspection was performed to assess the effectiveness of the facility licensee in implementing requalification requirements identified in 10 CFR Part 55, Operators Licenses. Each of the following inspection activities was conducted in accordance with IP
===71111.11, Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance.
- (1) Biennial Requalification Written Examinations The inspectors evaluated the quality of the licensed operator biennial requalification written examination administered on August 17, 2023.
Annual Requalification Operating Tests The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the facility licensees annual requalification operating test.
Administration of an Annual Requalification Operating Test The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the facility licensee in administering requalification operating tests required by 10 CFR 55.59(a)(2) and that the facility licensee is effectively evaluating their licensed operators for mastery of training objectives.
Requalification Examination Security The inspectors evaluated the ability of the facility licensee to safeguard examination material, such that the examination is not compromised.
Remedial Training and Re-examinations The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of remedial training conducted by the licensee, and reviewed the adequacy of re-examinations for licensed operators who did not pass a required requalification examination.
Operator License Conditions The inspectors evaluated the licensees program for ensuring that licensed operators meet the conditions of their licenses.
Control Room Simulator The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the facility licensees control room simulator in modeling the actual plant, and for meeting the requirements contained in 10 CFR 55.46.
Problem Identification and Resolution The inspectors evaluated the licensees ability to identify and resolve problems associated with licensed operator performance.
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room for the following evolutions:
1. The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the Control Room during a manual reactor trip on August 4, 2023. The operators noticed the C steam generator level decreasing. The feed water regulating valve was at 100% demand but was closed and would not re-open. As a result of the indications, the operators manually tripped the reactor and entered their Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs).
2. The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during criticality in mode 2 and power ascension activities on August, 6, 2023 Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) ===
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated a licensed operator crew assessment in the simulator on July 24, 2023
- (2) The inspectors observed and evaluated RO and SRO requalification written exams on August 31, 2023
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
- (1) AR 2460841, 4B RHR sump pump failure, review completed on July 20, 2023
- (2) AR 2460652, 4A emergency diesel generator (EDG) voltage regulator switch not responding to normal, review completed on July 25, 2023
- (3) AR 02464964, LT-4-459, Pressurizer Level Instrument failed low on August 18, 2023, replaced on August 20 WO# 40946717, review complete on August 24, 2023
- (4) AR 02457745, Incorrect Eagle21 Parameter Update Value Entered N-4-41, review completed September 12, 2023
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (1) Unit 3 online risk assessment with the following safety-related systems out of service for maintenance and/or testing: 3C ICW pump, 3B containment spray pump, and 3E241/242B, on June 26, 2023
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (7 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) AR 2461529, 4B EDG RTD #3 deviating and trending high during one-hour run, review completed on July 12, 2023
- (2) AR 2462147, diesel driven fire pump fail to auto-start on first attempt, review completed on July 12, 2023
- (3) AR 2427077, 3B intake cooling water (ICW) pump motor lower bearing high temperature, review completed on July 18, 2023
- (4) AR 2456987, received annunciator I-4/4, ICW header A/B low pressure, review completed on July 18, 2023
- (5) AR 2463160, 3C ICW pump inoperable due to foreign material in the well, review completed on July 26, 2023
- (6) AR 02464556, Check valve for water to steam generator C from Aux feedwater pump discharge (AFPD-3-014) rattling loud, review completed on August 29, 2023
- (7) AR 02462411, IST RV Failed as Found Testing After Removal, (Charging Pump 3B Discharge Relief Valve), review completed on September 3, 2023
71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk
The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system
operability and/or functionality: Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) 3-OSP-019.1, intake cooling water inservice test, WO 40862555-01 following replacement of the 3B pump and motor, review completed on August 13, 2023
===40888758, July 26, 2023, review completed on August 24, 2023
- (3) 0-PME-003.10, 4B1 battery charger troubleshoot, load test, and PMT, WO 40946521, review completed on September 8, 2023
- (4) FT-3-476 Feedwater flow transmitter sensing line repair and PMT, WO 40949004, review completed on September 5, 2023
- (5) MOV-878A SI Pump Discharge Header Unit Cross Tie Valve, Static MOV test for 10 CFR 50.55a(b)(3)(ii) Valve Program and PMT WO 40542688, review completed on September 14, 2023
- (6) 3A Intake cooling water post maintenance test per WO 40905595-11 and 3-OSP-019.1, Intake Cooling Water In-service Test, after installation of a new pump and motor, review completed on September 28, 2023 Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) ===
- (1) 3A EDG Monthly Operability Test 3-OPS-023.1 Rev 30, on August 14, 2023
- (2) Unit 3, (3A & 3C) 480 Volt load center switchgear under voltage test (WO 40862484-01 & WO 40862544-01), on August 22, 2023
- (3) 4A emergency bus load sequencer manual test (WO 40862540), on August 23, 2023
- (4) T-4-422 Tavg and Delta-T ACOT Loop B, Protection Set II (WO 40862671), on August 24, 2023
- (5) Unit 4, main steam safety valve testing per 0-OSP-072.6, main steam safety valve set point surveillance, on September 29, 2023
Inservice Testing (IST) (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) 3-OSP-019.1, 3B ICW pump inservice test (WO 40862555-01), on August 13, 2023
Containment Isolation Valve (CIV) Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
40829395-04), on September 28, 2023 Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Testing (IP Section 03.02)
===40862317), on September 2,
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS05: Safety System Functional Failures (SSFFs) Sample (IP Section 02.04) ===
- (1) Unit 3 (July 01, 2022, through June 30, 2023)
- (2) Unit 4 (July 01, 2022, through June 30, 2023)
71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issue:
The inspectors reviewed AR 02463876, 3C FRV Failed Closed Causing a Reactor Trip. The inspectors reviewed the cause and past history of the failed equipment that resulted in the manual reactor trip actuation and reviewed the corrective actions that were completed to address the cause.
71152S - Semiannual Trend Problem Identification and Resolution Semiannual Trend Review (Section 03.02) (1 Sample 1 Partial)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed the licensee corrective action program for potential adverse trends in housekeeping activities that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue or concern.
(2) (Partial)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee corrective action program for potential adverse trends in instrument air system that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue or concern.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Secure 4160 Vac Ground Devices Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green [H.2] - Field 71152S Systems NCV 05000250,05000251/2023003-01 Presence Open/Closed The NRC Identified a of a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of Title 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the licensees failure to secure ground devices in the Unit 3 and 4, A, B, and D 4160 Vac switchgear rooms in accordance with the station seismic housekeeping procedure.
Description:
The inspectors reviewed MA-AA-100-1008, "Station Housekeeping and Material Control." The inspectors noted negative housekeeping trends identified in the corrective action program. An inspection of the Class 1E 4160Vac switchgear rooms identified that large portable ground test devices were not secured against movement in four out of six switchgear rooms as required by section 4.6, Seismic Housekeeping. Item 4 in this section require, in part portable equipment shall be secured / located to preclude hazards to safety-related equipment and components. This included restraint from tipping if the minimum clear distance between the item and any safety-related equipment and components was less than the height of the temporary item plus 12 inches. Wheeled equipment shall have the wheels locked.
The identified test equipment did not have the wheels locked and several were not secured against tipping as stated above. The licensee could not provide an engineering evaluation that demonstrated that the ground test devices could not contact the Class 1E switchgear during a seismic event.
Corrective Actions: The licensee secured each ground test device as required by MA-AA-100-1008, "Station Housekeeping and Material Control."
Corrective Action References: AR 2466159
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to maintain seismic housekeeping requirements in accordance with the procedure was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to prevent adverse interactions with safety-related equipment and components during a design basis seismic event affected the cornerstone.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The finding screened to a detailed risk evaluation. A regional Senior Reactor Analyst (SRA)conducted a detailed risk evaluation of this condition in accordance with IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power. The SRA modelled the condition using SAPHIRE 8 Version 8.2.6 and the Turkey Point Units 3 & 4 SPAR Model version 8.81 dated 7/28/23. The SRA set the exposure time to 3 months (the last time the test carts were used for maintenance until discovery by the NRC inspector). The SRA modelled the condition by conservatively setting ACP-BAC-EQ1-4KV, 4 KV BUS FAULURE DUE TO SEISMIC EVENT to True for seismic bins 1-5 and solving for the seismic event sequences only. This assumes the unrestrained cart could impact the associated switchgear during a seismic event. The dominant accident sequence was a SEISMIC EVENT IN BIN 1 (Peak ground acceleration of 0.1 - 0.3g) OCCURS resulting in a loss of all offsite power and failure of all EDGs, with operators failing to enter their extended loss of all AC power procedure, failure to restore a EDG in 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and failure to restore offsite power in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Initiator. The change in core damage frequency was less than 1E-6 corresponding to a finding of very low safety significance (GREEN)
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.2 - Field Presence: Leaders are commonly seen in the work areas of the plant observing, coaching, and reinforcing standards and expectations. Deviations from standards and expectations are corrected promptly. Senior managers ensure supervisory and management oversight of work activities, including contractors and supplemental personnel.
Specifically, site leaders failed to reinforce housekeeping standards that can impact plant safety.
Enforcement:
Violation: 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, required, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be accomplished in accordance with instructions, procedures, or drawings.
Contrary to the above, since May 8, 2023, the site failed to accomplish activities affecting quality in accordance with instructions, procedures, or drawings. Specifically, the licensee failed to assure that ground test devices were stored in accordance with the seismic two over one housekeeping procedure.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On October 23, 2023, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to site vice president Mr. Michael Strope and other members of the licensee staff.
- On September 14, 2023, the inspectors presented the Biennial Requalification Inspection Exit Debrief inspection results to Michael Strope, Site Vice President and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
71111.04 Drawings 5613-M-3019 Sh Intake Cooling Water System Rev 44
5613-M-3019 Sh Intake Cooling Water System Rev 35
Procedures 3-OSP-019.2 Intake Cooling Water Flowpath Verification Rev 5
3-OSP-202.1 Safety Injection/Residual Heat Removal/Accumulators 13
Flowpath Verification
71111.05 Procedures 0-ADM-016.2 Fire Brigade Program Rev 15
71111.11Q Procedures 3-EOP-ES-0.1 Reactor Trip Response Rev 19
3-GOP-301 Hot Standby to Power Operation Rev 73
71111.24 Procedures 0-CMI-102.54 Rosemount 3154 Bench Calibration and Installation Rev 5
0-CMl-102.04 Rosemount 3150 Series Pressure Transmitter Repair and Rev 4
Calibration Including 3152, 3153, & 3154
3-OSP-019.1 Intake Cooling Water Inservice Test 58
3-OSP-023.1 Diesel Generator Operability Tests Rev 30
3-OSP-068.5A 3A CS Pump INSERVICE TEST Rev 18
4-SMI-041.16B T-4-422 Tavg and Delta-T ACOT Loop A, Protection Set 2 Rev 16
4OSP-024.2 Emergency Bus Load Sequencer Manual Test Rev 11
Work Orders 40862555-01
40862671-01
71151 Procedures 0-ADM-032 NRC Performance Indicators Turkey Point Rev 12, 13,
and 14
71152A Corrective Action AR 02455754 MA-AA-100-1013 - Air Operated Valve Diagnostic Testing 04/26/2023
Documents AR 02455757 3-PMI-074.18C - Main FW Flow Control Valve FCV-3-498 04/26/2023
Actuator
AR 02455760 FCV-3-498 - S/G "C" Main Feedwater Control Valve 04/26/2023
AR 02456107 FCV-3-498 3C Feed Reg. Valve Failed to Open 04/29/2023
AR 02456111 U3 FRV Valvelink Data Review 04/29/2023
AR 02457008 3C FRV Not Controlling in Automatic 05/07/2023
AR 02463876 3C FRV Failed Closed Causing Reactor Trip 08/04/2023
AR 02463901 Unable to Replace #1 PSNR Due to No New Positioner 08/04/2023
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
AR 02463971 Initial 3C FRV Stroke Time Was at 3.4 Sec 08/06/2023
AR 02464085 FCV-3-498 - S/G "C" Main Feedwater Control Valve 08/08/2023
AR 02464161 Laptop Connected to FCV-3-498 Greater 24 Hours 08/09/2023
CR 2463876 Turkey Point Root Cause Evaluation Manual Reactor Trip 08/04/2023
due to 3C FRV Failure
Work Orders 40878858 FCV-3-498 3C Feed Reg Valve Failed to Open 04/29/2023
40880326 3C FRV Not Controlling in Automatic 05/07/2023
40907532 FCV-3-498 Calibrate Positioners/Accessories 08/04/2023
40907986 FCV-3-498 3C FRV Failed Closed Causing Reactor Trip 08/04/2023
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