IR 05000373/1993030

Insp Repts 50-373/93-30 & 50-374/93-30.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Followup on Previously Identified Items & LER & Review of Operational Safety & Monthly Maintenance & Surveillance Activities

ML20058H516
Person / Time
Site:	LaSalle
Issue date:	12/02/1993
From:	Hague R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20058H458	List: IR 05000373/1993030 ML20058H454
References
50-373-93-30, 50-374-93-30, NUDOCS 9312130100
Download: ML20058H516 (11)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION-

REGION III

Report N /93030(DRP); 50-374/93030(DRP)

Docket No ; 50-374 License Nos. NPF-ll; NPF-18'

Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Executive Towers West III 1400 Opus Place Suite 300 Downers Grove, IL 605I5 Facility Name: LaSalle County Station, Units I and 2'

Inspection At: LaSalle Site, Marseilles, Illinois Inspection Conducted: October 16 through November 24, 1993

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Inspectors: D. Hills C. Phillips  ;

J. Roman, Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety - t

't Approved By:

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'gue, Chief Bd/93

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Rea t Projects Section IC

Inspection Summary -

Inspection from October 16 throuah November 24. 1993 (Reports No. 50-373/93030 'i (DRP): 50-374/93030(DRP)).  !

l Areas Inspected: A routine, unannounced safety inspection was conducted by'  ;

the resident inspectors and an Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety '

inspector. The inspection included followup on previously' identified items .j and licensee event reports and review of operational safety, monthly J maintenance and surveillance activities, and engineering activitie .'

Result s: No violations were identified. Three open items were identifie These involved an expanded review of dirty contact failures, failures of the licensee's vibration analysis program to identify degraded pumps, and completion of the licensee's root cause analysis of safety relief valve actuator air leak Plant Operations Inspectors noted early signs of degraded licensed operator turnover. A licensee business development team ascertained plant and personnel performance problems. The licensee is currently evaluating corrective action No personnel performance problems were noted during fuel loadin Continued inconsistent plant labeling was note PDR ADDCK 05000373 G PDR

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Maintenance f A modification to split neutron monitoring instrumentation doors was regarded l as a good effort to preclude possible personnel errors. A reactor core !

isolation cooling system failure was attributed to dirty contacts caused by lack of preventive maintenance. The inspectors planned a broader evaluation to ascertain whether this represented a more generic proble !

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Engineerina l The inspectors noted the licensee's vibration analysis program failed to :

identify several degraded pumps. The inspectors planned to evaluate the i licensee's assessment of this are j

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Plant Support  !

The appointment of a corrective actions manager resulted in some immediate !

improvement in radiological housekeeping. A licensee assessment of radworker [

practices resulted in numerous recommendations with assigned responsibilities -

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and due dates. The inspectors will continue to evaluate long term effectiveness of these action ,

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DETAILS i i Persons Contacted  ;

W. Murphy, Site Vice President ,

J. Schmeltz, Station Manager ,

J. Gieseker, Site Engineering and Construction Manager i C. Sargent, Support Services Director M. Reed, Technical Services Superintendent  ;

J. Lockwood, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor

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• M. Santic, Maintenance Superintendent

• R. Crawford, Work Planning Assistant Superintendent

• G. Benes, Nuclear Licensing Administrator ,

• R. Vincer, Training Department  !

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• C. Silich, Quality Control Supervisor

• S. Henrikson, Maintenance Staff <

• R. Ragan, System Engineering Supervisor l

• R. Williams, Regulatory Assurance Staff  !

• T. Nauman, Master Mechanic

• J. Arnould, Regulatory Assurance  !

• Heyner, Station Quality Verification i

• Cray, Master Instrument Mechanic  !

• Denotes those attending the exit interview conducted on November 24, ,

j 199 The inspectors also talked with and interviewed several other licensee ;

employees during the course of the inspectio ,

i Licensee Action on Previous 1v Identified Items (92701 and 92702) i

(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-373/92013-02(DRP)): Resolve discrepancies !

identified in non-licensed operator rounds packages. A notice of  ;

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violation (NOV) was issued .to the licensee on October 15, 1993 to 1 address falsification of plant records. The licensee took actions i following initial identification of the discrepancies to upgrade J procedural guidance on operator rounds packages andito provide-increased !

oversight to preclude repetition. This item is considered closed. The- -J

, NRC was particularly concerned that licensee management actions in'

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response to Information Notice 92-30, dealing with this type issue, were ineffective. The NRC also recently identified inadequate licensee j actions pertaining to Information Notice 87-10 dealing with the j potential for water hammer in the residual heat removal system (Inspection Rcport 50-373/93019; 50-374/93019(DRP)). Further inspection

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to evaluate licensee actions pertaining to NRC information notices is planne (0 pen) Unresolved Item (373/93019-04(DRP)): Review station actions regarding the applicability of Information Notice 87-10, " Potential For Water Hammer During Restart of Residual Heat Removal Pumps." The licensee took several actions following NRC concerns that this ,

information notice had not been adequately addressed. The licensee '

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performed testing and proved that the potential for a severe water hammer was possible during a simultaneous loss of offsite power and loss of coolant accident with either the residual heat removal system or- the low pressure core spray in the suppression pool cooling mode of operation. The licensee took administrative _ action, through procedural changes. This item remains open pending inspector review of the adequacy of the administrative actio (Closed) Unresolved Item (373/88027-01(DRS); 374/88026-01(DRS)):

Neutron flux monitoring instrumentation did not meet regulatory guide (RG) 1.97 Category I requirements. The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) completed an evaluation of the boiling water reactor (BWR) owners group report, NE00-31558, " Position on NRC Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 3, Requirements for Post-Accident Neutron Monitoring-System," and concluded that for current BWR license holders, the NEDO-31558 criteria was an acceptable alternative to the recommendations of RG 1.97. NRR requested the licensee to review their neutron flux monitoring instrumentation against the NEDO criteria and submit the results of that review to NRR. On August 17, 1993, the licensee provided some of the requested information; however, the licensee stated that further review would be required to assess the actions necessary to comply with those NEDO recommendations not currently addressed by system design. The licensee stated that this information would be submitted to NRR in 90 days. No further NRC Region III action is require Therefore, this item is close No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Licensee Event Reports Followup (92700)

The following licensee event reports were reviewed to ensure that _

reportability requirements were met, and that corrective actions, both immediate and to prevent recurrence, were accomplished or planned in accordance with the technical specifications:

(Closed) LER 374/93007 Failure of Shutdown Volume Level Transmitters to Meet Technical Specification LCO (Closed) LER 373/93013-01 1A Diesel Generator Automatic Start Due to a Vessel level Transient During Valving of Instruments In addition, recent problem identification forms (PIFs) were reviewed in order to monitor conditions related to plant or personnel performance and to detect potential development of trends. Appropriate generatio and disposition of deviation reports (DVRs), in accordance with the Quality Assurance Manual, were also reviewe No violations or deviations were identified in this are s

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4. Plant Operations (40500. 60710. 71707 and 71710)

f The inspectors reviewed the facility for conformance with the license 1 and regulatory requirement !

, On a sampling basis the inspectors observed control room i activities for proper control room staffing; coordination of plant l activities; adherence to procedures or technical specifications;  !

operator cognizance of plant parameters and alarms; electrical  !

power configuration; and the frequency of plant and control room i visits by station managers. Various logs and surveillance records l were reviewed for accuracy and completenes i Significant observations were:

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The inspectors reviewed a failure of operators to turn on i additional main transformer cooling fan banks during the Unit 1 l startup on October 8, 1993. A previous failure to perform this j action during a Unit 2 startup on June 8, 1993 was due to a  !

miscommunication between operators. This second event however, I was due to operator inattention to detail. The licensee planned to address this second event with additional logging requirements- i during startup ,

The inspectors noted on two separate occasions the unit nuclear -

station operator (NS0) control room turnover took less than 90 1 seconds. The inspectors informed licensee management that this j was not considered an adequate amount of time for NSO shift  !

turnover. On another occasion, the inspectors noted a pen on a i

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backpanel chart recorder stuck in the downscale position. This had not been identified by the licensee through several shift As a result of the NRC concerns, the licensee issued a letter to ';

the NS0's to clarify shift turnover expectations. The inspectors  :

will continue to monitor control room turnover practice ;

The licensee instituted a business development team to ascertain  :

plant and personnel performance. A-team exit meeting was  ;

conducted on November 15, 199 Results were similar to items of  ;

concern expressed in the most recent NRC SALP report of July 21, l 1993. However, more specifics were included which should provide  ;

added insight for determination of corrective actions. The j

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inspectors will follow this process including the implementation phase and evaluation of effectivenes ;

i On a routine basis the inspectors toured accessible areas of the -!

facility to assess worker adherence to radiation controls and the  ;

site security plan, housekeeping or cleanliness, and control of i field activities in progres j

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Significant observations were: .;

In order to provide immediate improvement to address radiological j housekeeping concerns, the licensee assigned a corrective actions t manager (CAM). The CAM arranged plant tours to identify problems . .

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and was given a dedicated work crew to address the deficiencie l This action resulted in some improvement but by itself did not .

ensure lasting effectiveness. (Plant housekeeping at LaSalle has i been referred to as cyclical for some tima.) Setting a particular_

standard for management to uphold in regards to radiological i housekeeping and recent' efforts to ensure more management presence- i in the field could be beneficial. Although the inspectors noted more of an increased management presence in the plant, this tias inconsistent depending on the individual. The-inspectors will

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continue to observe this area for long term improvement !

i The licensee completed an assessment of radworker practices to address NRC concerns in this area. This resulted in approximately l 60 recommendations that were assigned responsible parties and due o dates. The inspectors will continue to track progress and i effectiveness of these actions as t%y are implemente [ Walkdowns of select engineered safety features (ESF) were i performed. The ESFs were reviewed for proper valve and. electrical alignments. Components were inspected for leakage, lubrication, abnormal corrosion, ventilation and cooling water supply .  !

availabilit Tagouts and jumper records were reviewed fo i accuracy where appropriate. The inspectors noted inconsistent i plant labeling. This has been identified in previous report ! Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Systems i

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- During the inspection,_ the inspectors selected accessible portions 1 of an ESF system to verify its status. Consideration was given to 1

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the plant mode, applicable technical specifications, limiting _  !

conditions for operation action requirements (LCOARs), and other applicable requirements.

Various observations, where applicable, were made of hangers and l supports; housekeeping; breaker positions and conditions;.  !

. potential ignition sources; major component labeling, lubrication, i cooling, etc.; interior conditions of electrical breakers and ,

control panels; whether instrumentation was properly installed and !

functioning and whether significant process parameter' values were !

consistent with expected values; whether instrumentation' was calibrated; whether necessary support systems were operational;  ;

whether vendor manuals were controlled and implemented;. and  ;

whether local and remote indicated breaker positions agree !

During the inspection, the following ESF components ~ were walked :.

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Electrical Distribution I No concerns were-identifie , Refuelina Activities .!

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The inspector verified that refueling activities were being j conducted and controlled as required by approved procedures. This was done on a sampling basis through direct observations, j discussions with licensee personnel, and review of' work request *

The inspector observed portions of the core load. The core loa i was progressing in a controlled and orderly fashion while the inspector was presen l i

No violations or deviations were identified in this are '

5. Maintenance (40500. 61726. and 62703) l

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Station maintenance activities affecting the safety-related and l important to safety systems and components listed below were observed or  ;

reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with l

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approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards, l and did not conflict with technical specification l I

The following maintenance activities were observed and reviewed: l WR L21226 Repair the Unit 2 Rod Position Indication System For l Malfunctioning Control Rods 'j WR L21420 Repair the 2B RHR Service Water Strainer a

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WR L24033 Replace the 2A Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump Outboard j Oiler and Inboard and Outboard Bearings l

WR L19451 Modify the Unit 2 Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) Doors [

WR L25382 Repair the 2B Source Range Monitor i i

WR L19965 Inspect the 2A Reactor Recirculation Low Frequency Motor Generator Set ,

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WR L85415 Repair Valve 2G33F033 1 a

WR L20453 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) 250V DC Bus Inspection j

Significant observations included: [

l The modification on the APRM doors was initiated by the licensee '

due to concerns raised in a past scram reduction committee meeting I of the potential for workers to perform activities on the -

incorrect instrumentation channels within the cabinets. The doors  ;

provided access to APRM, local power range monitor group, and rod

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block monitor channel instrumentation. The modification split each door such that only one group of instrumentation was exposed; .

with a door cpen. This was viewed as a positive licensee ,

initiative to prevent personnel error j l The inspectors observed the installation of 250V DC. breakers in l the Unit 2 RCIC bus. Tags attached to these breakers indicated i the breakers had failed testing. The licensee indicated that during testing they incorrectly assumed the breakers had a thermal

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i trip function in addition to an instantaneous trip function. This resulted in the apparent failures. The licensee planned to again *

test the breakers prior to completion of the refuel outag Results of that testing will be described in a subsequent (

inspection repor '

Surveillance testing required by technical specifications, the safety analysis report, maintenance activities, or modification activities were j observed or reviewed. Areas of consideration while performing observations were procedure adherence, calibration of test equipment, ,

identification of test deficiencies, and personnel qualification. Areas !

of consideration while reviewing surveillance records were completeness, !

proper authorization and review signatures, test results properly )

- dispositioned, and independent verification documented. The following i activities were observe 6 or reviewed:  ;

LaSalle Instrument Surveillance (LIS)-PC-107, " Unit 1 Post Accident  ;

Containment Oxygen and Hydrogen Monitoring System Quarterly Calibration

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and Reagent Gas Bottle Replacement" j

LaSalle Electrical Surveillance (LES)-DC-103D, "250 Volt DC Battery 1 Charger Capacity Test" l LaSalle Operating Surveillance (LOS)-RH-Ql, "RHR (LPCI) and RHR Service Water Pump and Valve Inservice Test for Operating Conditions 1,.2, 3, 4, ,

and 5"  !

LES-RR-03, " Reactor Recirculation Low Frequency Motor Generator Set Preventative Maintenance Inspection"

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LOS-RD-SRI, " Control Rod Mechanical Coupling Check" l; I

LOS-RI-Q5, " Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Pump Operability, Valve Inservice Tests in Conditions 1, 2, and 3, and Cold Quick Start"  ;

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During the performance of LOS-RI-Q5, the turbine W and the pump discharge pressure.were observed to drop momentarily, then return to normal. The licensee declared the system inoperable-and began to ,

investigate the problem. The problem was believed to be caused by dirty -

contacts on relay lE51K49 in the control circuitry. The licensee had 8 ]

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not performed preventative maintenance (PM) on the relay to assure the contacts were clean. The licensee indicated the relay in question would be included in the preventative meintenance program and would review other low current relays for inclusion in the preventative maintenance program. Results of the licensee review and completion of an NRC review of other dirty contact failures to ascertain whether similar generic PM concerns exist is an open item (50-373/93030-01(DRP)).

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No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Engineerina (37828, 62703, and 71707) The inspector reviewed modifications in progress to ascertain that related modification activities were being conducted in a proper manner. The inspector selected a sample of modifications in progress during the current Unit 2 refueling outage; reviewed the packages in the field to assure they contained approved procedures and drawings; verified the system licensing design criteria approved by the NRC remained valid following the modification; and verified acceptable testing of the modification had been carried out by approved procedures and was adequate to test the scope o'

the modification. Modification selected to be reviewed wer M01-2-93-022 Reactor fuel Zone Level Reference Leg Division I Continuous Backfill M01-2-93-023 Reactor fuel Zone Level reference Leg Division 11 Continuous Backfill M01-2-93-024 Reactor Level Reference Leg Continuous Backfill Division 1 M01-2-93-025 Reactor Level Reference Leg Continuous Backfill Division 2 M01-2-93-026 Reactor Level Reference Leg Continuous Backfill Division 3 The licensee determined the modifications constituted an unreviewed safety question and required relief from Regulatory Guide commitments. The appropriate requests were submitted to the NRC to deal with the issues. At the end of the inspection period, testing of the modifications continued and will be reviewed in future inspection report While repairing a seal leak on the Unit 2 reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) pump, the licensee noted two of four cap screws on the throttle bushing lock ring had broken of The licensee formed a damage analysis team, consisting of system and design engineers, maintenance, equipment vendor, General Electric, and failure analysis consultant representatives to evaluate the caus Considerable additional damage to various components was

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discovered as the pump was systematically disassembled. The ,

inspectors considered the team an excellent coordinated root cause  ;

analysis approach which performed a comprehensive review of

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pertinent equipment condition data and history. The cause was i attrib ted to post modification testing performed in April 199 l This modification provided a RCIC test return line to the i suppression pool by tying into the low pressure core spray (LPCS)

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test return line. The post modification testing attempted to i evaluate whether RCIC and LPCS could be operated simultaneously i j

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the test return mod During testing, indications of the RCIC -

pump running dry were noted and the licensee ensured the system i was never subsequently operated in a similar manner on either '!

unit. The licensee considered the Unit 2 RCIC pump operable _ as  !

measured pump differential pressure at the specified pump speed- 1 and flow remained within normal limits, however it was lower than-

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before. In addition, although pump vibrations were initially j higher than before, the licensee considered them acceptable and j they later returned to normal. No problems were noted during the  !

intervening surveillance tests. Noting that vibration analysis  !

had not identified RCIC pump damage or diesel generator cooling j water pump bearing damage (discussed in inspection report 50- l 373/93022(DRP); 50-374/93022(DRP)), the licensee documented the- >

need for further review of the vibration analysis program in a ';

e problem identification form (PIF). NRC review of the licensee's "

conclusions with regard to the PIF is an open item (50-374/93030-02(DRP)). l t

' Due to safety relief valve (SRV) complicatiors in conjunction with l the Unit 1 September 14, 1993 scram, the licensee tested Unit I  ;

SRV components for air leaks. Only a few minor leaks were foun j However, similar testing on Unit 2 during the current refuel .;

outage identified numerous actuator air leaks. The licensee was  !

overhauling these leaking actuators. This is considered an open -l item (50-373/93030-03(DRP)) pending completion and review of the  :

E licensee's root cause analysis- .

l No violations or' deviations were identified in this are l

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7. Report Review (90713) l, During the inspection, the inspector reviewed selected licensee reports

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and determined that the information was technically adequate, and that

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it satisfied the reporting requirements of the license, technical  ;

specifications, and 10 CFR as appropriat I No violations or deviations were ider.tified in this are {

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Open items are matters which have been discussed with the-licensee, ,

which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some  !

action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. Open items j disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Paragraphs 5 and l

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f Exit Interview l The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragrap l 1) during the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection  !

period on November 24, 1993. The inspectors summarized the scope and i results of the inspection and discussed the likely content of this  !

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inspection repor The licensee acknowledged the information and did not indicate that any of the information disclosed during the inspection ,

could be considered proprietary in natur .!

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