IR 05000373/1993037
| ML20058H189 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 12/02/1993 |
| From: | Belanger J, Creed J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20058H167 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-373-93-37-EC, 50-374-93-37, NUDOCS 9312130008 | |
| Download: ML20058H189 (15) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION III
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Report Nos. 50-373/93037(DRSS); 50-374/93037(DRSS)
.j Docket Nos. 50-373; 50-374 License Nos. NPF-ll; NPF-18
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Licensee:
LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2
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Meeting Conducted: November 30, 1993 Meeting At:
NRC Region III Office, Glen Ellyn, Illinois
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Type of Meeting: Enforcement Conference
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Inspector:
Q 1 (bdoWV1
/1/2-/73 J. t. Belanger Date v
Senior Physical Security Inspector
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Approved By:
e Tafeguards and Incident Response Section j
James R. Creed, Chief Date r
Meetino Summary
Enforcement Conference on November 30. 1993 (Report Nos. 50-373/93037(DRSS):
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50-374/93037(DRSS))
Areas Discussed:
Review of an apparent Fitness for Duty violation identified during a reactive Fitness for Duty and Physical Protection Inspection (Inspection Report Nos. 50-373/93033(DRSS); 50-374/93033(DRSS), potential safety significance of the event and. corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee.
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Results: The licensee agreed with the apparent violation. They believed this
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event to be an isolated failure of the FFD program with minimal safety l
significance but treated it as a serious issue.
Licensee's corrective
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actions were comprehensive and should prevent recurrence. The licensee maintained that the event should be properly categorized as a Fitness-for-Duty issue.
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QDR ADOCK 05000373
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DETAILS
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Persons Present at the Conference Commonwealth Edison Company W. Murphy, Site Vice President LaSalle C. Sargent, Services Director G. Tnleski, FFD Program Administrator E. McVey, NRC Coordinator, Lasalle G. Benes, Licensing Administrator S. Reece-Koenig, Regulatory Performance P. Laird, Director, Corporate Security R. Dillon, Station Security Administrator, LaSalle S. Trubatch, Counselor, Winston and Strong U.S. Nuclear Reaulatory Commission W. L. Axelson, Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards C. Pederson, Chief, Reactor Support Programs Branch J. Creed, Chief, Safeguards and Incident Response Section J. Belanger, Senior Physical Security Inspector A. McMurtray, Reactor Engineer D. Hills, Senior Resident Inspector, LaSalle C. Weil, Enforcement Specialist T. Gody, Project Manager, NRR (Via Telecon)
R. Hague, Section Chief, Division of Reactor Projects Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety J. Roman, Resident Engineer 2.
Enforcement Conference An Enforcement Conference was held in the Region III office on November 30, 1993. This conference was conducted as a result of an finding in a reactive fitness for duty and physical protection inspection conducted on November 4, 1993, in which an apparent violation of the fitness for duty program was identified.
Inspection findings were documented in Inspection Report Nos. 50-373/93033(DRSS) and 50-374/93033(DRSS) and transmitted to the licensee by letter dated November 22, 1993.
The purpose of the conference was to:
(1) discuss the apparent violation, causes, and the licensee's corrective actions;.(2) determine if there were any escalating or mitigating circumstances; and (3)'obtain any information which would help determine the appropriate enforcement action.
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Regional representatives presented a brief description of the, pertinent.
l facts that led to thel apparent violation; regulatory requirements;
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i apparent violation; and the potential safety significance of the event.
The licensee's representatives described the events which led to the.
violation, including root cause and short and long term corrective
actions.
In summary, the corrective actions were:
prohibiting the in-
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processing clerk from entering any data in'the security badge
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authorization section of the security check-in form'and _ requiring an
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independent-verification by the security force supervisor of the t
information in the security section of the badging form entered by the j
licensee's security staff. The licensee also discussed enhancements to-
the LaSalle FFD Program, the safety significance of the event, and how l
they believed the event should be categorized under NRC'S enforcement
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policy.
In summary, licensee stated that the safety significance of-this event was minimal, the incident was an isolated event, and that the
event should be categorized as a Fitness for Duty issue under NRC's
The licensee representatives did not contest the apparent violation. A
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f copy of the licensee's presentation material is enclosed.
At the conclusion of the conference, the licensee representatives were informed that NRC would evaluate the information provided by the
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licensee during their presentation and that they would be notified in a
the near future of the final enforcement action.
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Appendix A-i
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COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY LASALLE STATION
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PRESENTATION TO i
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THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
REGARDING i
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ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE NOVEMBER 30,1993
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INTRODUCTION OUR PURPOSE TODAY IS TO DISCUSS THE FITNESS FOR DUTY EVENT THAT OCCURRED AT LASALLE STATION ON OCTOBER 21, 1993.
THE EVENT INVOLVED THE ISSUANCE OF A SECURITY BADGE TO A CONTRACTOR WITHOUT VERIFICATION OF A NEGATIVE DRUG TEST.
POSITIVE DRUG TEST RESULTS WERE LATER CONFIRMED AND THE INDIVIDUAL WAS PROMPTLY REMOVED FROM THE PROTECTED AREA.
ALTHOUGH WE BELIEVE THIS EVENT TO BE AN ISOLATED FAILURE OF THE FFD PROGRAM WITH MINIMAL SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE, WE ARE TREATING IT AS A SERIOUS ISSUE.
EVEN BEFORE THIS EVENT, THE STATION HAD INITIATED A REVIEW OF THE FFD PROGRAM IN RESPONSE TO OTHER INDICATORS OF WEAKNESSES.
THEREFORE, WE VIEW THIS EVENT AS CONFIRMING THE NEED FOR THE ONGOING EFFORTS TO REVIEW AND ENHANCE THE FFD PROGRAM.
AT THIS TIME, I WOULD LIKE TO INTRODUCE CHARLES SARGENT, SERVICES DIRECTOR AT LASALLE STATION.
HE WILL DISCUSS THE j
EVENT AND JOINT ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE STATION AND CORPORATE OFFICE TO ENHANCE THE FFD PROGRAM.
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PROPOSED VIOLATION
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ONE APPARENT VIOLATION REGARDING A FAILURE l
TO ADEQUATELY VERIFY NEGATIVE DRUG TEST j
RESULTS FOR PREACCESS TESTING PRIOR TO GRANTING UNESCORTED ACCESS.
THIS FAILURE RESULTED IN THE ISSUANCE OF A SECURITY'
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BADGE TO AN INDIVIDUAL WHO HAD TESTED POSITIVE DURING PREACCESS TESTING.
THIS-INDIVIDUAL ACCESSED THE PLANTS PROTECTED i,.
AND VITAL AREAS.
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i BADGING OVERVIEW j
TO UNDERSTAND HOW THE EVENT OCCURRED
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AND ITS RELATION TO THE FFD PROGRAM, j
THE FFD PORTION OF.THE BADGING PROCESS IS SUMMARIZED BELOW:
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i PREACCESS TESTING CONDUCTED ON-SITE.
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ON-SITE TEST RESULTS ARE FORWARDED TO
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CORPORATE FFD.
THE-DATE OF THE' NEGATIVE TEST RESULT IS ENTERED BY FFD INTO THE INFORMATION-MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (IMS) COMPUTER.
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IF A PRESUMPTIVE POSITIVE TEST RESULT IS
OBTAINED ON-SITE, THE SPECIMEN IS FORWARDED TO l
A LABORATORY FOR FURTHER ANALYSIS.
l THE SITE CHECKS IMS FOR THE DATE OF THE
NEGATIVE TEST.
THIS DATE IS ENTERED ON A
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BADGING FORM ALONG WITH OTHER CRITICAL BADGING
INFORMATION SUCH AS FINGERPRINTING AND l
BACKGROUND SCREENING.
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E WHEN THE REQUIRED INFORMATION IS VERIFIED THE
SECURITY ADMINISTRATOR OR DESIGNEE AUTHORIZES l
THE' SECURITY BADGE TO BE ISSUED.
THIS IS THE FIRST OCCURRENCE OF ITS KIND IN
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OVER 5600 PREACCESS TESTS.
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CHRONOLOGY ON OCTOBER 15, 1993 A CONTRACTOR PROVIDED
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A PRESUMPTIVE POSITIVE PREACCESS TEST.
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PER PROCEDURE, THE SPECIMEN WAS SENT TO A
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LABORATORY FOR CONFIRMATORY TESTING.
THE IN-PROCESSING CLERK NEW TO THE JOB AND
INADEQUATELY TRAINED, DOCUMENTED "FFD
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TESTING" DATE OF 10-15-93.
THIS DATE WAS
BASED ON PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF WHEN THE TEST WAS PERFORMED, INSTEAD OF THE DATE OF
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NEGATIVE TEST RESULTS.
ON OCTOBER 18, 1993, THE ASSISTANT STATION
SECURITY ADMINISTRATOR DID NOT PROPERLY VERIFY THE DATE OF THE NEGATIVE TEST RESULT.
HE AUTHORIZED UNESCORTED ACCESS
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FOR THE CONTRACTOR.
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ON OCTOBER 19, 20 AND 21, 1993, THE
CONTRACTOR ACCESSED THE SITE PROTECTED AREAS.
HE ALSO ACCESSED A VITAL AREA FOR 52 MINUTES ON THE 19th.
ON OCTOBER 21, 1993, CORPORATE FFD
NOTIFIED THE ASSISTANT STATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATOR OF THE CONTRACTOR'S POSITIVE
TEST RESULTS.
THE CONTRACTOR WAS PROMPTLY LOCATED AND
ESCORTED OFF-SITE AND DENIED ACCESS.
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ON OCTOBER 22, 1993, LASALLE NOTIFIED i
REGION III AND NRR OF THE EVENT.
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INITIAL RESPONSE t
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WHEREABOUTS DURING THE TIME HE HAD l
UNESCORTED ACCESS TO THE PLANT WAS l
PERFORMED.
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O DURING THE PERIOD FROM OCTOBER 19 To 21, 1993, THE CONTRACTOR SPENT THE
MAJORITY OF HIS TIME IN
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ADMINISTRATIVE TYPE MEETINGS OR IN
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f THE UNIT 2 HEATER BAY AREA OF THE PLANT, ALL.NON-VITAL AREAS.
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o ON OCTOBER 19, 1993, THE CONTRACTOR SPENT 52 MINUTES IN THE UNIT 1 REACTOR BUILDING (PASSING THROUGH),
THE UNIT 2 REACTOR BUILDING AND THE OFF GAS BUILDING, ALL VITAL AREAS.
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CO-WORKER AT ALL TIMES WHILE IN THE I
VITAL AREA.
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INTERVIEWS WERE CONDUCTED WITH THE
CONTRACTOR'S FOREMAN AND A CO-WORKER.
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THESE INDIVIDUALS DID NOT OBSERVE ANY
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ABERRANT BEHAVIOR.
A REVIEW OF THE CONTRACTOR'S WORK
HISTORY FROM OCTOBER 19 TO 21, 1993,
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SHOWED THAT HE DID NO SAFETY-RELATED
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WORK.
THE JOB DUTIES INVOLVED INSULATING SUPPORT ACTIVITIES WHICH l
INCLUDED MATERIAL STAGING AND CLEANUP.
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ROOT CAUSES
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ROOT CAUSE OF THE EVENT WAS PERSONNEL
ERROR.
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CONTRIBUTING CAUSE TO THE FAILURE WAS
INADEQUATE TRAINING OF THE INPROCESSING
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CLERK.
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j CORRECTIVE ACTIONS i
APPROPRIATE DISCIPLINARY ACTION WAS TAKEN.
- AN INDIVI. DUAL WITH PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE IN
THE FFD AREA HAS BEEN ASSIGNED i
RESPONSIBILITY FOR ADMINISTERING THE FFD l
PROGRAM AND TRAINING THE NEW ASSISTANT f
STATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATOR.
THE IN-PROCESSING CLERK WILL NO LONGER
ENTER ANY DATA IN THE SECURITY BADGE i
U AUTHORIZATION SECTION OF THE SECURITY CHECK-IN FORM.
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THE SECURITY SECTION OF THE BADGING FORM
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WILL BE ENTERED BY THE CECO SECURITY' STAFF AND INDEPENDENTLY VERIFIED BY THE SECURITY l
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FORCE SUPERVISOR PRIOR TO FABRICATION OF THE BADGE.
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ON OCTOBER 28, ALL OTHER CECO STATION
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SECURITY ADMINISTRATORS WERE PROVIDED A i
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT
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INCLUDING THE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS.
A LESSONS LEARNED NOTIFICATION WAS SENT TO
THE OTHER FIVE STATION SUPPORT SERVICES DIRECTORS AND SECURITY ADMINISTRATORS.
CORPORATE SECURITY HAS REQUESTED EACH OF
i THE OTHER FL:VE NUCLEAR STATION SUPPORT SERVICES DIRECTORS TO CONDUCT AN
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ASSESSMENT OF THE STATION'S BADGING PROCESS RELATIVE TO CAUSAL FACTORS IDENTIFIED IN THE LASALLE EVENT.
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i LASALLE FFD PROGRAM ENHANCEMENTS i
PRIOR TO THIS EVENT, THE STATION
IDENTIFIED WEAKNESSES IN THE FFD PROGRAM AND WAS IMPLEMENTING REVISIONS TO THE PROGRAM TO ELIMINATE THESE WEAKNESSES.
THE SERVICES DIRECTOR REQUESTED
CORPORATE FFD PERFORM AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF LASALLE'S FFD PROGRAM.
THE ASSESSMENT BEGAN APPROXIMATELY OCTOBER 11, 1993.
O SERVICES DIRECTOR INFORIED RESIDENT INSPECTOR OF FFD PROGRAM WEAKNESSES AND THE INTENT TO REQUEST A CORPORATE
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ASSESSMENT OF THE PROGRAM.
O CORPORATE FFD IDENTIFIED STATION WEAKNESSES AND ISSUED A REPORT OF THEIR
FINDINGS ON NOVEMBER 1, 1993.
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O THE REPORT WAS SHARED WITH THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR AND REGION III.
O ALL RECOMIENDATIONS OF THE FFD ASSESSIENT HAVE BEEN IMPLEMENTED.
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i LASALLE FFD PROGRAM t
INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT
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OFF-SITE QUALITY VERIFICATION IS NOW
'f PERFORMING AN ANNUAL COMPARATIVE AUDIT
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OF THE FFD PROGRAM AT LASALLE AND WILL'
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ASSESS'THE STATION IMPLEMENTATION OF THE i
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l EVENT SIGNIFICANCE THE SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS
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EVENT WAS MINIMAL:
THE CONTRACTOR PERFORIED NO SAFETY-
RELATED WORK.
HE WAS ACCOMPANIED AT ALL TIIES WHILE
IN THE VITAL AREA.
HE WAS ACCOMPANIED MOST OF THE TIME
WHILE IN THE PROTECTED AREA.
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NO PRIOR POSITIVE DRUG TESTS OR l
DEROGATORY INFORMATION WERE IDENTIFIED IN THE SUITABLE INQU'IRIES.
THIS WAS AN ISOLATED EVENT.
IT IS THE FIRST OCCURRENCE OF ITS KIND IN OVER 5600 PREACCESS TESTS.
THE EVENT IS IMPORTANT TO THE STATION FFD PROGRAM BECAUSE IT:
REINFORCED THE STATIONS DETERMINATION
THAT THE FFD PROGRAM HAD WEAKNESSES WHICH NEEDED TO BE ADDRESSED.
-t REINFORCED THE NEED TO CONTINUALLY
SCRUTINIZE THE FFD PROGRAM TO MAINTAIN A HIGH LEVEL OF EFFECTIVENESS (SALP 1).
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CATEGORY OF VIOLATION CECO RECOGNIZES THE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ACCESS AUTHORIZATION AND FITNESS FOR DUTY RULES.
HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THE LASALLE EVENT, WHICH RESULTED IN BADGING A CONTRACTOR WITHOUT A NEGATIVE TEST, IS CLEARLY A FITNESS FOR DUTY ISSUE FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:
10 CFR 26 FITNESS FOR DUTY PROGRAMS IS A
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SEPARATE REGULATION WITH THE FOLLOWING GENERAL PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES:
PROVIDE REASONABLE ASSURANCE PERSONNEL
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ARE NOT UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ANY
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SUBSTANCE WHICH AFFECTS THEIR ABILITY
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TO SAFELY AND COMPETENTLY PERFORM DUTIES.
PROVIDE FOR THE EARLY DETECTION OF
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PERSONS WHO ARE NOT FIT TO PERFORM ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE SCOPE OF 10CFR 26.
ACHIEVING A DRUG FREE WORKPLACE
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UNDER 10CFR 73.56, ACCESS DETERMINATION CONCERNS ARE:
BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT
BEHAVIORAL OBSERVATION
ACCESS AUTHORIZATION DECISIONS ARE BASED UPON EVALUATION OF INFORMATION IN THESE AREAS.
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CATEGORY OF VIOLATION (cont)
"AIOR TO THE ACCESS AUTHORIZATION RULE, THIS EVENT WOULD HAVE BEEN A VIOLATION UNDER 10CFR
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PART 2, SUPPLEMENT VII.
AFTER THE NRC ADOPTED THE ACCESS AUTHORIZATION RULE, THE FITNESS FOR DUTY VIOLATIONS REMAINED UNCHANGED WHILE ACCESS AUTHORIZATION VIOLATIONS WERE ADDED SEPARATELY UNDER SUPPLEMENT III
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SAFEGUARDS.
ACCESS AUTHORIZATION AS CONTAINED IN 10CFR 73 IS PART OF THE REGULATION FOR THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS.
FITNESS FOR DUTY, UNDER 10CFR 26, IS NOT.
THERE WAS NO INDICATION OF INTENT TO KEPLACE FFD VIOLATIONS WITH ACCESS AUTHORIZATION VIOLATIONS.
IN FACT, IN ITS STATEMENT OF CONSIDERATIONS TO i
73.56, THE COMMISSION RECOGNIZED THE TEST FOR II LEGAL DRUG USE AS AN ELEMENT OF FITNESS FOR DUTY RULEMAKING, NOT THE ACCESS AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM.
SUPPLEMENT III C.7 VIOLATION IS FOR FAILURE TO PERFORM AN EVALUATION OF INFORMATION RELEVANT TO ACCESS DETERMINATION AS USED IN 10CFR 73.56.
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THE LASALLE EVENT IS A FAILURE TO CONDUCT A PRE-ACCESS DRUG AND ALCOHOL TEST WITHIN 60 DAYS PRIOR TO THE INITIAL GRANTING OF UNESCORTED ACCESS TO THE PROTECTED AREA OF THE STATION.
THIS IS A FITNESS FOR DUTY VIOLATION UNDER 10CFR 26.24(1).
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