IR 05000293/1978022

IE Inspec Rept 50-293/78-22 on 780905-08 During Which No Items of Noncompliance Were Noted.Major Areas Inspected Included:Plant Opers,Ie Circular 78-08,IE Bulletin 78-03 & LER Review

ML20150B932
Person / Time
Site:	Pilgrim
Issue date:	09/26/1978
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20150B924	List: IR 05000293/1978022 ML20150B921
References
50-293-78-22, NUDOCS 7811100012
Download: ML20150B932 (9)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Repot. N a_pp Docket N ,

License No. DPR-35 Priority --

Category C Licensee: Boston Edison Company M/C Nuclear 800 Boylston Street Boston, Massachusetts 02199 Facility Name: Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1

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Inspection at: Boston and Plymouth, Massachusetts Inspection conducted: September 5-8, 1978 Inspectors: [/ ,e R. Architzel, Reactor Inspector date signed 7[

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if A. Finkel, Reactor Inspector (September 6 only) j/ da,te signed date signed Approved by: d O. k b M 9 Itc hrr E. C. McCabe, Jr., Chief, Reactor date signed Projects Section No. 2, RO&NS Branch Insoection Summary:

Inspection on September 5-8,1978 (Report No. 50-293/78-22)

Areas Inspected: . Routine, announced inspection of plant operations, IE Circular 78-08 (Environmental Qualification of Electrical Equipment) IE Bulletin 78-03 (Off Gas Hydrogen Explosions), and Licensee Event Report review. A facility tour was conducted. The inspection involved 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br /> at the corporate office by two regional based inspectors and 19 hours2.199074e-4 days <br />0.00528 hours <br />3.141534e-5 weeks <br />7.2295e-6 months <br /> onsite by one regional based inspecto Results: No items of noncompliance were identifie Region I Form 12 1100Ol>

(Rev. April 77)

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' DETAILS Persons Contacted The following technical and supervisory level personnel were con-tacted:

G. C. Andognini, Manager, Nuclear Operations Department R. Bulchis, Lead Engineer Pilgrim I, Bechtel Corporation l E. Cobb, Chief Operating Engineer, PNPS  !

I W. Deccon, Senior I&C Engineer, Nuclear Engineering Department S. Little, Licensing Engineer, Plant Support Group l

• C. Mathis, Senior Plant Engineer, PNPS l P. McGuire, Station Manager, PNPS l A. Morisi, Power and Control Systems Group Leader, NED 1

• J. Nicholson, Assistant to Station Manager, PNPS P. Smith, I&C Engineer, PNPS E. Ziemianski, Licensing Engineer, Plant Support Group Other licensee employees were also interviewe *Present at the exit intervie . Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed)UnresolvedItem(293/77-25-04) Thermal Discharge Monitoring Requirements. License Amendment No. 32 deleted the operational objective of 30 F differential temperature and specified monitoring

requirement . IE Circular 78-08, " Environmental Qualification of Safety Related-Electrical Equipment" Purpose of' Inspection The purpose of this inspection was to verify that the licensee was familiar with the concerns identified in IE Circular 78-08, and that appropriate action was being taken by the licensee to review the status of environmental qualification of safety-related electrical equipment / instrumentation at his facilitie .. -,- - . _ - -. ,

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3 Assignment of Responsibility The licensee on August 17, 1978 contracted with the Bechtel Power Corporation, San Francisco, California for engineering services to retrieve and examine the qualification documentation associated with installed safety-related electrical equipment at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Unit 1. The contract package to Bechtel included IE Circular 78-08 and the fourteen items referenced therei Evaluation of the Fourteen References The inspector inquired whether the licensee had performed an evaluation of the fourteen referenced items with respect to their facility. The licensee stated that they were aware of the problems noted in the referenced material having addressed similar issues in responses to NRC Bulletins 77-05,77-05A, 77-06, 78-02 and 78-0 In reviewing each of the fourteen referenced items in IE Circular 78-08 with the licensee, the inspector noted that the licensee plans to re-review IE Bulletins 77-05,77-05A, 77-06, 78-02 and 78-04 as part of their evaluation progra Corrective Action The inspector inquired whether the licensee planned to take any action as a result of his review and evaluation of the items referenced in IE Circular 78-0 The licensee stated that problem areas identified during their evaluation of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 installed safety-related electrical equipment will be reviewed as part of this study effor The licensee plans to have the study completed by December, 1978, Assessment of Licensee's Review Program Plan The review program plan, presented by Bechtel to the inspector, was in a preliminary stage and covered a portion of the total requirements. The licensee's review in supporting the Bechtel plan should provide a complete assessment of the syste The inspector identified and discussed the following areas of special concern as related to safety-related equipment under postulated accident conditions with the license . -. . . .- .- ..- - . - - . __

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(1) Connectors: environmental qualification dat Penetrations: environmental cualification of the pene-

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tration assembl (3) Terminal Blocks: environmental qualification of terminal blocks located within terminal block enclosures c ' un-protected terminal block enclosures.-

(4) Limit Switches: environmental qualification of valve travel limit switches and stem mounted valve position limit switches on containment system isolation valves that provide valve position indication to the control room operato .

(5) Cable Splices: environmental cualification of electrical cable splices inside containment. Splices associated with electrical penetrations and splices in safety-related cable (6) Environmental Qualification: Temperature, pressure, ,

humidity, chemicals, radiation values, duration of testing i and other appropriate parameters used in the qualification progra ;

(7) Electrical Transmittersi Electrical transmitters located

within containment such as those used for pressure, flow, level, and temperature that are required to be operable during and after the postulated acciden l

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(8) Motors used on pumps, fans, valve operators and other components located within containment and required to be operable during and after the postulated acciden (9) Process Control: The methods and techniques used in preparing hardware such as potting material used in aualifying. cable connectors should be considered a part

1. the qualification of _the item if it is critical to passing ti.e environmental qualification tes (10) Certified test data correlated to DBA environmen (11) Manufacturer's specifications, Purchase Specifications, Manufacturer's certification of conformanc (12) Correlation of installation to qualified installations, including comparison of enclosure and component-sizes, materials, field work, and orientation (horizontal, vertical).

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(19 Representative inspection of "As Is" installation, documenting the quality of terminations / splices and the integrity of enclosures (ex: checks made for open boxes, missing bolts, multiple and cramped terminations on

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terminal blocks, inadequate conductor bend radii, conductor jacket / splice /ter:ninal log integrity, etc.).

The licensee acknowledged the inspectors coment IE Circular 78-08 will remain open pending completion of the licensee's actions in this area and inspection by the NR . Review of Plant Operations Facility Tour A facility tour was conducted in the company of a licensee representative. Areas inspected included the Control Room, Diesel Generator Rooms, and accessible areas in the Reactor Building. The following were among the items observed:

-- Radiation controls properly established;

-- Housekeeping, including attention to the elimination of fire hazards;

-- No fluid leaks of significance;

-- Pipe vibration, including the condition of hangers and seismic restraints;

-- Status of preselected locked valves;

-- Equipment tagging for compliance with administrative

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requirements;

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-- Control Room manning in accordance with Technical Specifi-cation requirements; and,

-- Reasons for lighted annuciators in the. Control Roo No items of noncompliance were identified, Review of Operating Records The inspector reviewed the following logs and record Jumper and Lifted Lead Log: 1978 entries 31 through 34

-- Chief Operating Engineer's Instruction Log: August 1 - September 1, 1978

-- Red Tag Log: March 1,1978 - June 13,1978

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- -- Watch Engineer's Log: August 1-20, 1978

-- Maintenance Requests - Selected 1978

-- NSSS Alarm Typer: Selected August, 1978

-- Failure and Malfunction Reports: 78-67 through 81

-- Temporary Procedures: 78-29 through 36, 40 The inspection consisted of verifying adequate management review, correct identification of problem areas, completeness and determination that conditions contrary to the Technical Specifications did not exis The inspector noted several instances documenting' difficulty in moving control rods. This problem has been analyzed by the licensee Control Rod toDrives be caused (_CRD)by w(orn see NRC internal piston Inspection seals50-293/78-Report in the 14 detail 6.c). The licensee has purchased 100 CRDs and plans <

replacement during the next scheduled refueling outage. These CRD problems will be further reviewed by the NRC together with the slow scram times identified in paragraph 6.c (293/78-22-01). IE Bulletin 78-03, Potential Explosive Gas Mixture Accumulations Associated with BWR Off Gas System Operations

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Licensee action concerning IE Bulletin 78-03 was reviewed by the inspector to verify that the Bulletin was forwarded to appropriate personnel, that a review for applicability was performed, information

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discussed in the reply was accurate, corrective action taken was as described in the reply, and that the reply was within the time period described in the Bulleti The inspector reviewed new procedure 2.4.55, " Augmented Off Gas System Explosions" Revision 0, developed to address concerns of the bulletin. The following Augmented Off Gas (A0G) System procedures were also reviewe .4.135 A0G - Loss of H2 Analyzers

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2.4.136 A0G Abnormal Carbon Vault Temperatures

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2.4.137 A0G Rupture of the Off Gas Rupture Disk

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2.4.138 A0G Loss of Coolant to Off Gas Condensor

-- 2.4.140 A0G High Charcoal Temperature

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2.4.141 Abnormal Recombiner Operation

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The inspector noted that although the recombiners cannot be bypassed within the A0G System, the entire A0G System can be bypassed. The loop seal drain for the 30 minute hold up volume drains to the Clean Radioactive Waste Syste Loss of this loop seal coupled with operation bypassing the A0G could result in release of Hydrogen gas. This item remains open (293/78-22-01) and will be re-examined during a future NRC inspectio . NRC Licensee Report Review NRC: Region I in office review of the fol. lowing licensee reports has been completed with no unacceptable conditions identifie July 1978 Monthly Report (BEco Letter 78-180)

-- 1977 Report of Changes, Tests, and Experiments Performed Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59 (BECo Letter 78-159)

, NRC: Region I in office review of the following LERs (Licensee Event Reports) has been complete LER Number Subject

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78-029/03L Salt Service Water Pump Vibration

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78-031/03L Setpoint Drift, PCIS Reactor High Pressure Switches

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78-032/03L CRD 38-47 Slow Scram Time

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78-033/03L Main Stack PRM Sample Pump Failure

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78-035/01X Reactor Scram-Loss of All Offsite Power Events surrounding LER 78-03S (Scram on Loss of Off Site Power) were reviewed onsite. Safety systems functioned as required following this event caused by a lightning strik LER 78-032 Slow. Scram Times was also reviewed onsite for determination of generic implications. Findings are discussed in paragraph 6.c below. The inspector questioned the licensee concerning the sequence of events surrounding LER 78-040, ADS Timer (Paragraph 6.d). The inspecter nad no further questions in this are _- - .- .-- - . -. . . _ - _ . -- -- . -. . - . . - - .

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8 LER 78-032. describes an event which occurred on July 10, 197 !

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While performing scram time testing.on Control Rod 38-47, the rod failed to reach 90". insertion in the required seven (7)

second The problem wcs determined to be caused by-a sticking ,

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ASCO Solenoid Valve (Catalog No. HVA 90-405-2A) and both scram  :

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- solenoid valves were replaced. The inspector contacted the l licensee and requested that the defective solenoids be examined I to determine cause of failure. After searching for the solenoids the licensee stated that they apparently had been* discarded however it was believed that the cause of failure was a fractured Buna-N disk. A similar event occurred at the Monticello reactor (Docket No. 50-263) on July 27, 1978, when a contro'

rod had a slow scram time during a reactor scram. During subsequent testing the rod would not scra The inspector reviewed General Electric SIL (Service Information  !

Letter) 128, Revision 1, Supplement 1 dated August 29, 197 '

This SIL discussed Buna-N aging problems resulting in solenoid valve failure. The SIL recomended the licensee replace all

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core assemblies, diaphragms and associated parts in all CRD

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scram pilot valves, backup scram valves, scram discharge volume vent and drain pilot valves and test valves at periodic intervals. The ORC reviewed this SIL in Meeting 78-41 (September l 5,1978) and decided to replace all the recomended part Repair kits have been ordered. This item remains open pending implementation of the preventive maintenance program and further NRC review. (293/78-22-01). LER 78-040 describes an event which occurred on August 8, 1978. The licensee stated that while performing surveillance testing on the ADS (Automatic Depressurization System) subsystem logic time delay relay setpoints were found to be out of specification -(as found 140 seconds; required 120 t 5 seconds).

! The tests were being perfonned (T.S. 4.5.C.2) because the HPCI (High Pressure Coolant Injection) System had been isolated for maintenance. The inspector contacted the licensee by telephone on September 14, 1978, and expressed concern that the ADS testing had not been completed prior to isolating the HPCI for maintenance. T.S. 4.5.C.2 requires imediate testing of the -

ADS subsystem logic, both Core Spray Systems, the Low Pressure Coolant Injection Subsystems, and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Subsystem when the HPCI is determined-to be inoperabl The licensee stated that all alternate system testing had been completed with the exception of the ADS prior to isolating the HPCI and that the licensee's policy is to ensure operability of alternate systems prior to performing scheduled maintenanc .

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.: 9 Operations personnel responsible for isolating the HPCI were  !

counseled concerning ensuring operability prior to performing '

maintenance. The inspector had no further questions in this are , Exit Interview At the conclusion of the inspection the inspector held a meeting (see paragraph 1 for attendees) to discuss the inspection scope and findings. The licensee acknowledged the inspection finding f k

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