ML20203M765

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Supplemental Safety Evaluation Re Amend 2 to Dcrdr Summary Rept.Rept Did Not Discuss Participation of Human Factors Consultant in Activities Required to Complete Dcrdr
ML20203M765
Person / Time
Site: Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png
Issue date: 04/17/1986
From:
NRC
To:
Shared Package
ML20199F591 List:
References
TAC-56176, NUDOCS 8605010682
Download: ML20203M765 (4)


Text

e e SUPPLEMENTAL SAFETY EVALUATION TROJAN NUCLEAR PLANT DETAILED CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW BACKGROUND By letter dated July 28, 1983, Portland General Electric Company (PGE) sub-mitted its Program Plan for a Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR) of the Trojan Nuclear Plant. NRC staff comments on that plan were forwarded to PGE on November 17, 1983. Results of the Program Plan review indicated the need for an in-progress audit. The staff conducted that audit on ,

December 12-16, 1983, and the audit report was forwarded to PGE on February 29, 1984.

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PGE submitted a Summary Report for the Trojan DCRDR on December 31, 1984.

Review of the Summary Report indicated the need for a pre-implementation audit which was conducted on February 25-March 1, 1985. The NRC concluded from the pre-implementation audit that only one element (verification) of the DCRDR was complete and recommended that PGE submit a supplement to the Summary Report and to address the results of activities rea'uired to complete the remaining eight l l

elements of the DCRDR.

A revision to the Summary Report was submitted by PGE on April 17,1985, and Amendment 2 to the Summary Report was submitted on December 31, 1985 in l

l response to the NRC's request. l 1

8605010682 PDR 860417 ADOCK 05000344 PDR ,

EVALUATION The current staff evaluation of the Trojan DCRDR is provided below. This

- evaluation is based on information available to date and is arranged in order of the DCRDR elements identified in Supplement I to NUREG-0737. The staff was assisted in its evaluation by Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC). Acopy.oftheSAICSupplemen(it6theTechn'icalEvaluationReport t (STER) is attached. The staff concurs with the evaluations and conclusions in the STER.

Establishment of a qualified multidisciplinary review team.

Amendment 2 of the Summary Report did not discuss the participation of a Human Factors consultant in the activities required to complete the DCRDR and that PGE would maintain multidisciplinary participatioh'throughout the remainder of the DCRDR. In order to satisfy this requirement, PGE should provide a description of the participation of the human factors specialist in the activities outlined in the attached STER (Pages 4-5).  !

Function and task analyses to identify control room tasks and information and control reouirements 4

The function and task analyses as described in Amendment 2 of the Summary l

Report is acceptable and meets the requirements of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737. l l

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Comparison of display and control requirements with a control room inventory Informationprovided1nAmendment2oftheSummaryReportindicatek_thatPGE met the requirement of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737.

A control room survey to identify deviations from accepted human factors principles PGE's centrol room survey is incomplete as PGE did not describe the participa-tion of the human factors, specialist in the annunciator study. In addition PGE should provide the resolution of the annunciator study. The annunciator study will complete the control room survey if annunciator conventions based on accepted human factors principles are developed and consistently applied.

Assessment of human engineering discrepancies N

PGE indicated during the pre-implementation audit that all HEDs (including those identified during Phase 1) were assessed. Assessment was en the basis of:

1) Potential for operator error, and
2) Plant safety impact.

The assessment process used by PGE is acceptable and meets the requirement of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737.

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Selection of design improvements ,

The organization and process for selecting design improvements satisfies the  !

l requirement. However PGE should provide responses to the comments and concerns 1

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discussed for the HEDs in Appendices A, B, C and D of the STER.

Verification that selected improvements will provide the necessary correction and verification that improvements will not introduce new HEDs The NRC's concerns as stated in the SER for verifying HED correction still exist. PGE's description of the verification process in Amendment 2 does not contain an explicit response to the concerns of the NRC. This is still an open item.

's Coordination of control room imorovements with changes from other programs I such as the safety parameter display system (SPDS), operator training, Reg.

Guide 1.97 instrumentation, and upgraded emergency operatino procedures PGE has only resolved the concern regarding the SPDS operator interface, therefore, the requirement is unsatisfied and PGE should provide more informa-tion on operator training for changes in the control room.

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