ML20151E455
| ML20151E455 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
| Issue date: | 07/11/1988 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151E447 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8807260072 | |
| Download: ML20151E455 (3) | |
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT N0.147 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE N0. NPF-1 PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY THE CITY OF EUGENE, OREGON PACIFIC POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY TROJAN NUCLEAR PLANT 00CXET N0. 50-344
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letter dated July 29, 1985, Portland General Electric Company (PGE) requested numerous changes to the Trojan Technical Specifications (TS) related to Containment Integrity, Containment Isolation Valves, and Containment Leak Testing. Among the various proposed changes, PGE requested that the surveillance requirements of TS Section 3/4.6.1.1, "Containment Integrity" be revised to be consistent with the content of the Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications (W-STS). The staff's initial determination of the July application was noticed in the Federal Register on April 9,1986(51FR12236).
Subsequent to the publication of the Federal Register notice, various changes proposed by the July application were either revised or withdrawn.
However, none of those revisions related to TS Section 3/4.6.1.1.
There-fore the staff's initial determination with respect to TS Section 3/4.6.1.1 has not been affected.
DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION TS 4.6.1.1.a.1 currently states that "all penetrations (except the blind flange installed on the fuel transfer canal flange, which shall be verified closed after each draining of the canal) not capable of being closed by OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valves and required to be closed during accident conditions, are closed by valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their positions, except as provided in Table 3.6-1 of Specification 3.6.3.1", and that this be verified at least once per 31 days.
PGE proposes to revise this specification by excluding isolation barriers l
inside containment from the 31 day surveillance requirement.
PGE also proposes to add TS 4.6.1.1.c which would prescribe a surveillance require-ment for isolation barriers inside containment of once per cold shutdown (butnotmorethanonceper92 days).
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We have reviewed the proposed changes and find the, to be consistent with the W-STS, and that t1e changes are in the best interest of plant operational safety and personnel safety.
Reduced numbers of entry into containment reduces the likelihood of an inadvertent breach of containment, and reduces personnel exsosure. Furthermore, certain valves may not be easily accessible, t1us requiring the erection of temporary scaffolding.
This again, would result in additional radiation exposure and increased potential of personnel injury from operating components.
PGE has an administrative means of identifying those valves which are required to be held in a predetermined position by locking devices through Administrative Order A0-3-13, "Control of Locked Valves and ESF Equipment." A0-3-13 lists valves, dampers, circuit breakers and switches that are required to be in a predetermined position due to either TS requirements or operational considerations. The locked valve list portion of the procedure identifies the required position for the valves and requires a double, independent verification of valve position. These valves are subdivided by systems rather than by function such as "containment isolation" valves (CIV), since all the valves listed in A0-3-13 are not necessarily CIVs.
However, all manually operated CIVs should be contained in this procedure.
The procedure requires that the entire listing of A0-3-13 be updated by physical verification performed independently by two operators prior to exiting Cold Shutdown.
In addition, the procedure describes the controls, permission, documentation and reverification that are required to ensure that those components (valves, switches, breakers and dampers) whose required positions might have changed, are recognized and approved by operations management, and are subsequently returned to their proper positions during plant operation. These provisions, as they relate to containment isolation components located inside containment, are equivalent to the 31 day surveillance requiren,ent.
Basedon'heabove,weconcludethattheproposedchangesareacceptable.
However, for ease of identifying CIVs in A0-3-13, the icensee should consider the need for this procedure to readily and explicitly identify those components which pertain to TS Section 3/4.6, "fontainment Systems."
3.0 CONTACT WITH STATE OFFICIAL The NRC staff has notified the Oregon Departnent of Energy of the proposed issuance of this amendment along with the proposed determination of no significant hazards consideration.
No comments were received.
4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
This amendment involves a c'ange in surveillance requirements. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that
', 1 may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Comission has previously published a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, the amendment meets the eli for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 651.22(c)(9)gibility criteria
. Pursuant to 10 CFR 551.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.
5.0 CONCLUSION
We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above. that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
PRINCIPAL CONTRIBUTORS:
T. Chan C. Li Dated: July 11, 1988
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