ML20151L439

Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 147 to License NPF-1

ML20151L439
Person / Time
Site:	Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png
Issue date:	07/11/1988
From:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20151L400	List: ML20151L392 ML20151L427 ML20151L439
References
NUDOCS 8808040035
Download: ML20151L439 (3)

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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT N0.147 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE N0. NPF-1 30_RTLANDGENERALELECTRICCOMPANY THE CITY OF EUGENE, OREGON PACIFIC POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY TROJAN NUCLEAR PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-344

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated July 29, 1985, Portland General Electric Company (PGE) requested numerous changes to the Trojan Technical Specifications (TS) related to Containment Integrity, Containment Isolation Valves, and Containment Leak Testing. Among the various proposed changes, PGE reqvsted that the surveillance requirements of TS Section 3/4.6.1.1, "Containment Integrity" be revised te be consistent with the content of the Vatinghouse Standard Technical Specifications (W-STS). The staff't initial determination of the July application was noticed in the Federal Register on April 9, 1986 (51 FR 12236).

Subsequent to the publication of the Federal Register notice, various changes proposed by the July application were either revised or withdrawn.

However, none of those revisions related to TS Section 3/4.6.1.1. There-fore the staff's initial determination with respect to TS Section 3/4.6.1.1 has not been affected.

DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION TS 4.6.1.1.a.1 rurrently states that "all penetrations (except the blind flar.ge installed on the fuel transfer canal flange, which shall be verified closed after each draining of the canal) not capable of being clor,ed by 0PERABLE containment automatic isolation valves and required to be closed during accident conditions, are closed by valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their positions, except as provided in Table 3.6-1 of Specification 3.6.3.1", and that this be verified at least once per 31 days.

PGE proposes to revise this specification by excluding isolation barriers inside containment from the 31 day surveillance requirement. PGE also proposes to add TS 4.6.1.1.c which would prescribe a surveillance require-ment for isolation barriers inside containment of once per cold shutdown (but not more than once per 92 days).

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i We have reviewed the 3roposed changes and find them to be consistent with the W-STS, and that t1e changes are in the best interest of plant operational safety and personnel safety. Reduced numbers of entry into centainment reduces the likelihood of an inadvertent breach of containment, and .

reduces personnel exposure. Furthermore, certain valves may not be l easily accessible, thus requiring the erection of temporary scaffolding.

This again, would result in additional radiation exposure and increa. sed potential of personnel injury from operating components.

PGE has an administrative means of identifying those valves which are required to be held in a predetermined position by locking devices thrcugh Administrative Order A0-3-13, "Control of Locked Valves and ESF i l

Equipment." A0-3-13 lists valves, dampers, circuit breakers and switches I that are required to be in a predetermined position due to either TS l requirements or operational considerations. The locked valve list '

portion of the procedure identifies the required position for the valves and requires a double, independent verification of valve position. These valves are subdivided by systems rather than by function such as "containment isolaticn" valves (CIV), since all the valves listed in A0-3-13 are not l necessarily CIVs. However, all manually operated CIVs should be contained in this procedure.

The procedure requires that the entire listing of A0-3-13 be updated by '

physical verification performed independently by two operators prior to exiting Cold Shutdown. In addition, the procedure describes the controls, i permission, documentation and reverification that are required to ensure  !

th6t those components (valves, switches, breakers and dampers) whose  !

required positions might have changed, are recognized and approved by operations management, and are subsequently returned to their proper positions during plant operation. These provisions, as they relate to I containment isolation components located inside containment, are equivalent to the 31 day surveillance requirement.

Based on the above, we conclude that the proposed changes are acceptable.

However, for ease of identifying CIVs in A0-3-13, the licensee should consider the need for this procedure to readily and explicitly identify those components which pertain to TS Section 3/4.6, "Containment Systems."

l 3.0 CONTACT WITH STATE OFFICIAL The NRC staff has notified the Oregon Departaent of Energy of the proposed issuance of this amendment along with the proposed determination of no significant hazards consideration. No comments were received.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

This amendment involves a change in surveillance requirements. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that

may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Conmission hcs previously published a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment i on such finding. Accordingly, the amendment meets the eli for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 551.22(c)(9)gibility

. Pursuantcriteria to i

l 10 CFR 651.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the l l

amendment.

5.0 CONCLUSION

We have concluded, based or, the considerations discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and s3fety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in con liance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public. l PRINCIPAL CONTRIBUTORS:

T. Chan C. L1 l'

Dated: July 11, 1988 l

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