IR 05000456/1999011

Insp Repts 50-456/99-11 & 50-457/99-11 on 990525-0706.Two Violations Occurred & Being Treated as Ncvs.Major Areas Inspected:Aspects of Licensee Operations,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support

ML20210G647
Person / Time
Site:	Braidwood
Issue date:	07/29/1999
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20210G634	List: IR 05000456/1999011 ML20210G629
References
50-456-99-11, 50-457-99-11, NUDOCS 9908030168
Download: ML20210G647 (17)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 111 Docket Nos: 50-456,50-457 License Nos: NPF-72, NPF-77 Report No: 50-456/99011(DRP); 50-457/99011(DRP)

Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Facility: Braidwood Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Location: RR #1, Box 64 l

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Braceville,IL 60407 Dates: May 25 through July 6,1999 Inspectors: _ C. Phillips, Senior Resident inspector J. Adams, Resident inspector Approved by: Michael J. Jordan, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects l

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Braidwood Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 NRC Inspection Report 50-456/99011(DRP); 50-457/99011(DRP)

This inspection included aspects of licensee operations, maintenance, engineering, and plant support. The report covers a 6-week period of resident inspection from May 25 through July 6 199 Ooerations

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There were three examples of licensed operators exceeding the licensee's administrative procedural limits of overtime worked without prior station manager approval during the last Unit 2 refueling outage in April and May 1999. This was a non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.2.2.d as implemented by the station's administrative overtime procedures. (Section O6.1)

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The inspectors concluded that the simulator instructors possessed a heightened level of awareness to the deficiencies previously identified during a nuclear oversight assessment of operations simulator training. Corrective actions addressing several of the deficiencies were evident in the training observed by the inspectors. The inspectors concluded that control room expectation and standards were consistently applied at the simulator during the observed training. (Section O7.1)

- The licensee's conclusions in the operations quarterly self-assessment report were self-critical, clearly stated, and supported by multiple examples and documentatio Improvement initiatives were implemented and had the support of management personnel. (Section 07.2)

Maintenance

- The inspectors observed the performance of three surveillance tests associated with 18 auxiliary feed pump and 2A emergency diesel generator, both risk sensitive system The inspectors concluded that the surveillance tests adequately tested the system, the operators followed the procedures, and that the procedures included the required testing discussed in the Technical Specifications. (Section M1.1)

- The inspectors observed the installation and calibration of the main generator voltage regulator minimum excitation limit circuit card and concluded that the heightened level of awareness briefing met procedural requirements, the work instructions contained a level of detail sufficient to perform the required work, and the work was performed in

- accordance with the work package instructions. The inspectors concluded that operators and operational analysis department personnel used proper three-way communication techniques, that operators correctly performed peer and self-checks, and that operators appropriately stopped the activity when unexpected indications were ;

observed. The inspectors conc'uded that the connection of test equipment by l operational analysis department personnel while operators were adjusting the automatic l voltage regulator without prior notification was a poor practice. (Section M1.2)

- The licensee made the Unit 2 "A" train of emergency core cooling system inoperable for about 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. The licensee had to isolato the essential service water to the Unit 2 "A" i

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train to perform a Generic Letter 89-13 inspection of the 2A safety injection pump lube oil cooler. The poor material condition of the 2A safety injection pump oil cooler maintenance ball valves prevented proper isolation at the cooler. The licensee properly classified the on-line risk status and took adequate compensatory actions to minimize the time necessary to restore essential service water if necessary. (Section M2.1)

' Enaineerina a The licensee's engineering evaluations of problems identified with reactor pressure control at low power levels and an auxiliary feedwater testing anomaly demonstrated adequate root cause assessment. The associated corrective actions were thorough and timely. (Section E7.1)

= The licensee identified that the high voltage setting to the Unit 2 source range nuclear I

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instrument N31 was set to the wrong voltage. The licensee's apparent cause evaluation was weak in that it did not identify that the surveillance used to determine the high voltage set point did not have adequate acceptance criteria. A non-cited violation was issued. (Section E7.1)

Plant Support

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= During inspection observations station access control equipment was well maintained and station employees were adequately searched. Security guards were attentive to their duties and received frequent supervision. (Section S1.1)

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Report Details Summary of Plant Status Unit 1 and Unit 2 entered the period at or near 100 percent power and remained there for the entire inspection perio . Operations

' 06 Operations Organization and Administration O6.1 Review of Ooerations Overtime . Inspection Scooe (71707)

The inspectors reviewed overtime records for operations department personnel for 1999, Braidwood Administrative Procedure (BwAP) 100-7, " Overtime Guidelines For Station Personnel," Revision 8, Technical Specifbation 5.2.2.d, and NRC Generic Letter 82-12 " Nuclear Power Plant Staff Working Hours." Observations and Findinas Technical Specification 5.2.2.d, stated, "The amount of overtime worked by unit staff members performing safety-related functions shall be limited and controlled in accordance with the NRC Policy Statement on working hours (Generic Letter 82-12)."

Generic Letter 82-12 requested that the licensee prepare administrative procedures to implement the overtime guidelines and provide for a method of review of overtime by the NR The Generic Letter 82-12 guidelines and Technical Specification 5.2.2.d were implemented by Procedure BwAP 100-7. Procedure BwAP 100-7, Step C.3.b, stated,

"An employee will be permitted to exceed the limit of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> in a 7-day period if no other qualified and available employee voluntarily accepts the assignment provided that no employee shall be permitted in this circumstance to work more than 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> in a 7-day period." Step C.4.b, stated, "All deviations of the 72-hour rule shall be approved by the station manager before the fact. Only in emergency situations will deviations from the 72-hour rule be permitted with after the fact approval."

Between April 27 and May 23,1999, there were three examples of licensed operator exceeding 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> that were approved after the fact. All of the above examples in the justification portion of the approval form stated that the employee's were aware of the overtime in advance, were perform!ng routine shift work, or were performing previously

- scheduled activities. All of these instances involved the same employee exceeding the requirements of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> la a 7-day period for several 7-day periods in a row. One licensed supervisor exceeded 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> in a 7-day period twic Contrary to the above, between April 27 and May 23,1999, there were three examples, of licensed operators, that exceeded the requirements of BwAP 100-7, " Overtime Guidelines For Station Personnel," Revision 8, Steps C.3.b and C.4.b without prior approval of the station manager. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a

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non-cited violation (50-456/457/99011-01(DRP)), consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Problem Identification Form (PlF) A1999-0196 . Conclusions There were three examples of licensed operators exceeding the licensee's administrative procedural limits of overtime worked without prior station manager approval.during the last Unit 2 refueling outage in April and May 1999. This was a non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.2.2.d as implemented by the station's administrative overtime procedure Quality Assurance in Operations 07.1 Observation of Licensed Operator Reaualification ' Simulator Trainina Inspection Scope (71707)

The inspectors observed one simulator scenario during cycle three of operator requalification training. The inspectors also reviewed the following documents:

• Nuclear Oversight Assessment 20-99-010, " Operations - Simulator Training,"

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• PIF A1999-01004, " Nuclear Oversight identified that Operations Department

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• PlF A1999-01003, " Nuclear Oversight identified Simulator instructors Miss Opportunities to improve Crew Performance";

• PIF A1999-01006, " Nuclear Oversight identified Expectations are Not Clearly Communicated by Instructors and Shift Manager"; and

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• PlF A1999-01007, " Nuclear Oversight identified that BwOP [Braidwood Operating Procedure] Usage While in BwEPs [Braidwood Emergency Procedures) and BwOAs [Braidwood Abnorma! Operating Procedures] Varies Between Crews." Observations and Findings The inspectors reviewed Nuclear Oversight Assessment 20-99-010 and noted that the licensee had entered identified deficiencies contained in the assessment report into their corrective action program with PlFs A1999-01003, A1999-01004, A1999-01006, and A1999-01007. The inepectors noted that nuclear oversight identified issues with missed opportunities to improve crew performance, enforcement of department standards, communication of expectations, and variation in procedure use between crews. On June 22, the inspectors observed simulator training. The inspectors noted a heightened level of awareness by the simulator instructors to the problems identified by nuclear oversight. For example, the simulator scenario was halted and a discussion held to reinforce expectations concerning operator response to annunciator alarms. The inspectors also noted instructor comments during the post scenario critique highlighting I

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failures of crew members in meeting operations standards, identifying communication weaknesses such as the use of slang, and providing examples where teamwork could have improved crew performance. The inspectors determined that control room expectation and standards were consistently applied at the simulato Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the simulator instructors possessed a heightened level of awareness to the deficiencies previously identified during a nuclear oversight assessment of operations simulator training. Corrective actions addressing several of the deficiencies were evident in the training observed by the inspectors. The inspectors concluded that control room expectation and standards were consistently applied at the simulator during the observed trainin .2 Review of First Quarter 1999 Ooerations Self-Assessment ' Inspection Scope (71707)

The inspectors reviewed the operations quarterly self-assessment report, "Braidwood Station Operations Area 1" Quarter 1999.*

• Observations and Findinas The operations quarterly .self-assessment repost included six assessment areas, a performance rating of that area, a performance trend, bases for conclusions, focus areas, and identified improvement initiatives. The inspectors noted that the bases supporting their conclusions were clearly stated, included multiple examples, and usually referenced additional supporting documentation. The licensee self-assessment report included improvement initiatives to address deficiencies that appeared in the bases for the conclusions. The inspectors observed the implementation of some of the improvement initiatives. For example, inspectors observed the routine use of post-shift briefings by operations personnel, an increased use of the weekly schedule to assign operations resources, an increased focus on providing clear expectations conceming operations standards, an increased emphasis on the elimination of control room distractions, and improved consistency in the performance of interim crew briefings during simulator exercise Conclusions The licensee's conclusions in the operations quarterly self-assessment report were self-critical, clearly stated, and supported by multiple examples and documentatio Improvement initiatives were implemented and had the support of management personne .

08- Miscellaneous Operations issues (92901)

08.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Reoort (LER) 50-457/98002-00: " Boron Dilution Prevention System (BDPS) Bypassed for an Extended Period of Time." On February 3,1998, a reactor startup was terminated due to problems with the estimated critical condition calculation. During the inseition of the control bank control rods, an unrelated problem was identified with the bank overlap unit that required the entry into mode three (hot

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standby). Mode three was entered at 12:00 p.m., but BDPS was not reset and remained inoperable. At 2:29 p.m., operators made both trains of BDPS operabl Technical Specification 3.1.2.7 required BDPS to be operable in modes three, four, and five, or, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, verify chemical and volume contrul (CV) system valves CV-1118, CV-8428, CV-8439, CV-8441, and CV-8435 are closed and secured in position, and that the shut down margin requirements of Technical Specification 3.1.1.1 or 3.1.1.2 are ,

met. Contrary to the above, operators failed to implement the required actions of the '

limiting condition for operation of Technical Specification 3.1.2.7 within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of entry into mode three. A Non-Cited Violation was issued in Inspection Report 50-456/457/98002(DRP). The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective actions for this event and found them to be acceptable. This LER is close . Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 Observation of Surveillance Activities Inspection Scooe (61726)

The inspectors observed an or portions of the following surveillance activities:

- Unit 2 Braidwood Operating Surveillance Procedure (2BwOSR) 3.8.1.2-1,

" Unit Two 2A Diesel Gene stor Operability Monthly and Semi-Annual Surveillance," Revision 1E1; a Unit 1 Braidwood Engineering Surveillance Procedure (18wVSR) 5.5.8.AF.2,

" Unit One Diesel Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (AF) Pump American Society of Mechanical Engineering Quarterly Surveillance," Revision 3; and

. .1BwOSR 3.7.5.3-2,." Unit One Diesel Driven AF Pump Monthly Surveillance "

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Revision OE Observations and Findinos During the inspection period, the inspectors observed the performance of the above listed surveillance tests. For each surveillance test, the inspectors observed the establishment of initial conditions required for the surveillance test, the operation of equipment, and the communications between the licensed operators in the control room and non-licensed operators in the auxiliary building. The inspectors determined that each of these activities were performed in accordance with the applicable procedur l The inspectors reviewed the data obtained during the sunreillance tests and noted that it )

met the required acceptance criteria specified in the surveillance test procedures. The !

~ inspectors also reviewed the associated portions of the Updated Final Safety Analysis i Report (UFSAR) and the Technical Specifications and determined that the surveillance test procedures demonstrated the systems performed as designe I

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. Conclusions

. The inspectors observed the performanc3 of three surveillance tests associated with 18 AF pump and 2A emergency diesel generator, both risk sensitive systems. The inspectors concluded that the surveillance tests adequately tested the system, the operators followed the procedures, and that the procedures included the required testing discussed in the Technical Specification M1.2 Replacement of the Main Generator Voltaae Reaulator Minimum Excitation Limit Circuit Card (CARD) Inspection Scoos (62707)

The inspectors attended the heightened-level-of-awareness (HLA) briefing for the replacement and calibration of the CARD and reviewed:

.- BwAP 100-12, " Human Performance and Awareness Pre-Job Briefings / Meetings and Self-Checking," Revision 5;

BwAP 100-12T1, "P! ant Activities Meeting Form," Revision 3; and

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Work package for work request (WR) # 990058833-01, " Verify Proper Operation of Auto Voltage Regulator."'

The inspectors observed the installation and the calibration of the Unit 2 CAR Observations and Findinas The inspectors attended the HLA briefing conducted by an operation analysis department (OAD) supervisor. The inspectors noted that the appropriate operations and OAD personnel were in attendance. The HLA covered all the areas specified in BwAP 100-12 and the check list, BwAP.100-12T1, was used. The inspectors noted that the unit supervit or summarized the briefing and solicited questions from those in attendance following completion of the OAD supervisor's briefing. Although the briefing by the OAD supervisor was adequate, the summarization by the unit supervisor ensured the work expectations were clear to everyone presen The inspectors performed a review of work package WR # 990058833-01 and i

determined that it contained the necessary level of detail for the CARD replacement and referred personnel to the appropriate procedure for the CARD's calibration. The inspectors noted that the execution of the maintenance activity was performed in accordance with the work package. However, during the performance of steps to null the voltage regulator output, operators observed fluctuations in the voltage regulator j output The operators stopped the activity, investigated the cause, and determined that 4 OAD personnel caused the voltage regulator fluctuations while connecting test equipment. As discussed in the pre-job briefing, the operators thought that the connection of the test equipment had been completed prior to proceeding with the nulling of the voltage regulator. The inspectors determined that the connection of test equipment to the automatic voltage regulator circuit had no consequences to plant performance since the manual voltage regulator circuit was providing voltage contro . - - .

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The inspectors noted that three-way communications were used by both operators and OAD personnel. The unit supervisor directly supervised the evolution and operators pmformed peer and self-checks. The operators paused and discussed the expected indications and contingency actions prior to retuming the voltage regulator back to automatic, .Q.g_riciusions

, , The inspectors observed the installation and calibration of the CARD and concluded that

~ the heightened level of awareness briefing met procedural requirements, the work instructions contained a level of detail sufficient to perform the required work, and was performed in accordance with the work package instructions. The inspectors concluded that operators and operational. analysis department personnel used proper three-way communication techniques, that operators correctly performed peer and self-checks, and that operators appropriately stopped the activi+/ when unexpected indications were observed. The inspectors concluded that the cc~ ction of test equipment by

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operational analysis department personnel whik srators were adjusting the automatic voltage regulator without prior notification was ; work practic M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facues and Equipment

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M2.1 Material Condition of Essential Service Water' Maintenance Valves sDection Scope (62707)

The inspectors reviewed:

WR 97008376-01, "2A SI (safety injection) pump bearing oil cooler outlet value repalf;

• BwAP S 0-10. " Conducting Risk Assessments of Planned On-Line Maintenance Activities," Revision 2; and

• Nuclear Station Procedure - Work Control (NSP-WC)-3006, "On-Line Maintenance," Revision . The inspectors also observed portions of the maintenance performed and interviewed licensee personnel responsible for calculating on-line maintenance ris Observations and Findinos in order to perform a visualinspection of the 2A Si pump oil cooler to meet Generic Letter 89-13 commitments the oil cooler needed to be isolated from the essential service

' water supply. Normally, the maintenance ball valves would isolate the cooler. However, the maintenance ball valves for the cooler leaked so badly that essential service water needed to be isolated to the entire "A" train of tht, emergency core cooling water system (ECCS) in order to establish a freeze seal to repair the maintenance ball valves and inspect the cooler. This made the Unit 2 "A" ECCS train, which consisted of the charging, SI, residual heat removal, and the containment spray pumps, inoperable for 9  !

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about 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. The maintenance ball valves are seldom cycled. This results in silt and impurities getting stuck between the ball and the seat making it difficult to close the valve The inspectors verified that this condition was allowable in accordance with Technical Specification 3.5.2 and that the *B" train of ECCS was operable. The inspectors also verified that the licensee had assigned the proper on-line risk status. Core damage

- frequency increased by a factor of 3.3 which in accordance with NSP-WC-3006

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f corresponded to an on-line risk status of yellow. The licensee's contingency actions 6 included a designated non-licensed operator to re-establish essential service water to the "A" ECCS train if necessary. This action was adequate for the circumstance Conclusions The licensee made the Unit 2 "A" train of emergency core cooling system inoperable for about 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. The licensee had to isolate the essential service water to the Unit 2 "A" train to perform a Generic Letter 89-3 inspection of the 2A Si pump lube oil cooler. The poor material condition of the 2A SI pump oil cooler maintenance ball valves prevented proper isolation at the cooler. The licensee properly classified the on-line risk status and took adequate compensatory actions to minimize the time necessary to restore essential service water if necessar id8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92902)

M8.1 (Closed) LER 60-457/9800M0. Unit 2 Trip Following Digital Electro-Hydraulic Control Card Repair. On January 26,1998, the Unit 2 reactor tripped on low steam generator level in the 2A steam generator. The operators stabilized the unit and initiated a plant cooldown. All emergency safety features functioned properly and there were no safety e consequences as a result of the event. The cause of the trip was identified as a misconfigured circuit card installed in the Unit 2 turbine digital electro-hydraulic control system. The licensee reported the event as required by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv) as an event or condition that resulted in a manual or automatic actuation of any engineered safety feature. Inspectors performed an inspection of the event and documented the results of the inspection in Inspection Report 50-456/457/98003(DRS). No violations of NRC requirements were identified during the inspection. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective actions for this event and found them to be acceptable. This LER is close HLEngineeririg E7 Quality Assurance in Engineering Activities E Effectiveness of Licensee Controls for Corrective Antigns Inspection Scope (37551)

The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective actions for completeness and timeliness for three items:

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PIF A1999-04319," Unplanned LCOAR [ limiting condition for operation action ,

I requirements) entries for DNB [ departure from nucleate boiling] since steam generator replacement";

PlF A1999-01684, "2B AF Pump Response Time and Data Anomaly"; and

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PlF A1999-01027,"2NR8031 High Voltage Power Supply Appendix Value." Observations and Findinas Unolanned LCOAR Entries for DNB Since Steam Generator Reolacement Licensee personnel identified that during a secondary plant transient, at low reactor power, pressurizer pressure could drop below the 2219 psig Technical Specification limit for DNB for 1 to 2 minutes. This was first identified after the Unit 1 steam generator replacement outage at the end of 1998. Although the licensee has yet to determine a root cause or the pressure control problems, the ir.spectors reviewed completed and planned actions to correct the observed problems and found them to be thorough and timely commensurate with the potential safety consequence of the issu B AF Pumo Response Time and Data Anomalv Licensee personnel identified that while performing a post-modification gerability test for a valve trim change to the "B" train AF throttle valve to the "C" steam generator, 2AF005G, that flow through the valve did not reach expected value's. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's evaluation and corrective actions for the problem and found

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them to be thorough and timely commensurate with the potential safety consequence of the issu NR8031 Hiah Voltaae Power Supolv Accendix Value After the Unit 2 reactor trip on April 14,1999, licensee personnel identified that source range nuclear instrument N31 was reading low and declared it inoperable. System engineering personnel performed an apparent causo evaluation and identified that the detector high vol+ age had been set low. The licensee's proposed corrective action was to put the source range high voltage set point into the set point control program. This would require a review of any future change to source range high voltage. The inspectors agreed that this action would probably prevent a similar occurrence because source range high voltage was not expected to change. However, the inspectors identified that the licensee's apparent cause evaluation lacked rigor and failed to identify that the surveillance test procedure did not include appropriate acceptance criteria for the determination of the high voltage set poin CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, states, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, and drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings. Instructions, procedures, or drawings shall include appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accumplished.

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The source range nuclear instrument has an associated high flux reactor trip input. The source range nuclear instrument accuracy is depender,t on the high voltage setpoin Therefore, adjusting the source range nuclear instrument high voltage setpoint was an activity affecting quality. Source Range Nuclear Instrument N31 was calibrated using BwlSR 3.3.1.11-201, " Channel Verification / Calibration of Nuclear Instrumentation System Source Range N31, Audio Count Rate N34, and Scaler Timer N34A,"

i Revision 3, on March 4,1999. The high voltage setpoint used to calibrate N31 was i

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. provided to instrument maintenance personnel from nuclear engineering personne The setpoint came from the results of BwVS 3.1.1-3.1,' Source Range Discriminator Plateau Determination and Calibration For N31," Revision 3, Step 1.26, which measured

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source range high voltage directly at the high voltage power supply, on September 28, 1997. Licensee personnel stated that the high voltage was measured at the power supply in Step 1.26 to verify the meter readings recorded in Steps 1.10 and/or 1.16.

f Contrary to the above, on September 28,1997, there were no quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for either Steps 1.10,1.16, or 1.26 of Procedure BwVS 3.1.1-3.1,

" Source Range Discriminator Plateau Determination and Calibration For N31,"

Revision 3. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a non-cited violatios (50-456/457/9901142(DRP)), consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement l Policy. This. violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as PlF A1999-01027.

l The high voltage measured and recorded in BwVS 3.1.1-3.1, Step 1.26, on September 28,1997, was about 100 volts lower than the associated meter reading recorded in Steps 1.10 and 1.16. Because there was no acceptance criteria this went unnoticed. The lower high voltage reading was then transferred to BwlSR 3.3.1.11-201 and N31 was set low. The licensee did not determine why the voltage reading was read and recorded low. The as-found voltage when BwlSR 3.3.1.11-201 was performed on March 4,1999, was about 1373 volts. This was a correct voltage setting. The incorrect

. voltage was not actually set until March 4,1999, which meant there was no time at which N31 was required to be operable, prior to April 14,1999, (when the condition was identified following the Unit 2 trip) that it had an incorrectly set high voltag Conclusions i The licensee's engineering evaluations of problems identifed with reactor pressure control at low power levels and an AF testing anomaly demonstrated adequate root cause assessment. The associated corrective actions were thorough and timely. The licensee identified that the high voltage setting to the Unit 2 source range nuclear instrument N31 was set to the wrong voltage. The licensee's apparent cause evaluation was weak in that it did not identify that the surveillance used to determine the high voltage set point did not have adequate acceptance criteria. A non-cited violation was issue E8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues (92903)

E Review of Braidwood Year 2000 (Y2K) Proaram The staff conducted an abbreviated review of Y2K activities and documentation using Temporary Instruction 2515/141, " Review of Y2K Readiness of Computer Systems at l- Nuclear Power Plants." The review addressed aspects of Y2K management planning,

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documentation, implementation planning, initial assessment, detailed assessment, remediation activities, Y2K testing and validation, notification activities, and contingency planning. The reviewers used NEl/NUSMG 97-07, " Nuclear Utility Year

' 2000 Readiness," and NEl/NUSMG 98-07, " Nuclear Utility Year 2000 Readiness Contingency Planning," as the basis for this review. The results of this review will be combined with the results of reviews from other stations in a summary report to be issued by July 31,199 E8.2 - (Closed) LER 50-457/99001-00: " Unit 2 Generator and Subsequent Reactor Trip Due To a Spurious Generator Stator Ground Relay (GlX-104) Actuation and Subsequent Rod Control Problems." On April 14,1999, the Unit 2 reactor tripped due to a turbine trip caused by a spurious generator stator ground relay actuation. The operators quickly stabilized the unit. All emergency safety features functioned properly and there were no safety consequences as a result of the event. The licensee reported the event as required by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv) as an event or condition that resulted in a manual or automatic actuation of any engineered safety feature, in addition, the licensee attempted to re-start the unit, but encountered numerous rod control system material condition problems including some control rods becoming misaligned. This eventually resulted in a manual reactor trip to shutdown the reactor because the problem could not be repaired prior to the expiration of a Technical Specification LCOAR statement. The licensee reported this event as required by 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i) as the completion of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications. The Inspectors performed a follow-up inspection of these events and documented the results in inspection Report 50-456/457/99007(DRP). The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective actions for these events and found them to be acceptable. No violations of NRC requirements were identified during the inspection of the event. This LER is close IV. Plant Support S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities S1.1 Access Control Observations Insoection Scooe (71750)

The inspectors observed access controls to the plant on several occasions for varying periods of tim Observations and Findinos

~ The inspectors observed that access control equipment functioned properly, security guard were attentive to the performance of their duties, employees that caused equipment alarms were properly detained and researched, and that security supervision was frequently presen '13 i

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During inspection observations station access control equipment was well maintained and station employees were adequately searched. Security guards were attentive to their duties and received frequent supervisio V. Manaaement Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Summary

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The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on July 6,1999. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identifie ;

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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee

• M. Cassidy, Regulatory Assurance - NRC Coordinator R r .iham, Work Control Manager

• L :thrie, Maintenance Manager

• A. Haeger, Radiation Protection Manager T. Luke, Engineering Manager K. Schwartz, Station Manager

- T. Simpkin, Regulatory Assurance Manager

• T. Tulon, Site Vice President '

• R. Wegner, Operations Manager N_B_G

• J. Adams, Resident inspector

• M. Jordan, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 3 D. Pelton, Resident inspector

• C. Phillips, Sanior Resident inspector T. Tongue, Project Engineer IDRS J. Roman

• Denotes those who attended the exit interview conducted on July 6,199 .

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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED lP 37551: Onsite Engineering IP 61726: . Surveillance Observations IP 62707: Maintenance Observation IP 71707: Plant Operations IP 71750: Plant Support Activities IP 92901: Followup - Plant Operations IP 92902: Followup - Plant Maintenance

. IP 92903: Followup - Engineering

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ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened

- 50-456/457/99011-01 NCV failure to follow overtime procedures 50-456/457/99011-02 NCV failure to establish acceptance criteria Closed 50-456/457/99011-01 NCV failure to follow overtime procedures 50-456/457/99011-02 NCV failure to establish acceptance criteria 50-457/98001-00 LER Digital Electro-Hydraulic Control Card Repair 50-457/98002-00 LER BDPS bypassed for extended period of time

- 50-457/99001-00 LER Spurious Generator Stator Ground Relay Discussed None l

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l LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

.AF Auxiliary Feedwater

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BDPS Boron Dilution Prevention System BwAP Braidwood Administrative Procedure BwEP. Braidwood Emergency Procedure BwOA Braidwood Abnormal Operating Procedure

BwOP Braidwood Operating Procedure BwOSR Braidwood Operating Surveillance Procedure i BwVSR Braidwood Engineering Sunreillance Procedure I CARD Main Generator Voltage Regulator Minimum Excitation Limit Circuit Card CFR Code of Federal Regulations CV Chemical and Volume Control DNB Departure from Nucleate Boiling

< ECCS Emergency Core Cooling Water System HLA Heightened-Level-of-Awareness LCOAR Limiting Condition for Operation Action Requirement LER Licensee Event Report NCV Non-Cited Violation NR Nuclear Regulatory Commission NSP Nuclear Station Procedure OAD Operations Analysis Department PIF Problem Identification Form SI Safety injection UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report WC Work Control WR Work Request Y2K Year 2000

17

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