ML20216E599
ML20216E599 | |
Person / Time | |
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Site: | Waterford |
Issue date: | 03/12/1998 |
From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
To: | |
Shared Package | |
ML20216E562 | List: |
References | |
50-382-98-05, 50-382-98-5, NUDOCS 9803180096 | |
Download: ML20216E599 (19) | |
See also: IR 05000382/1998005
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ENCLOSURE 2
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket No.: -50-382
License No.: NPF-38
Report No.: 50-382/98-05
Licensee: Entergy Operations, Inc.
Facility: Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3
Location: Hwy.18
Killona, Louisiana
Dates: February 2-6 and February 10-12,1998
Inspector: Thomas W. Dexter, Senior Physical Security Specialist
Plant Support Branch
Approved By: Blaine Murray, Chief, Plant Support Branch
Division Reactor Safety
Attachment: Supplemental Information
9903100096 980312
PDR ADOCK 05000382
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3
NRC Inspection Report 50-382/98-05
This was an announced inspection of the licensee's physical security program. The areas
inspected included access authorization, alarm stations, communications, protected area access
control of personnel, packages and vehicles, testing and maintenance, detection aids,
assessment aids, protected area physical barriers, security program plans and procedures,
security event logs, security training and qualification, management support, management
effectiveness, audits, onsite review of event reports, and followup of open items. Overall
performance in the security area was adequate with no improvement trend.
Plant Sucoort
Performance in the physical security area continued to be adequate with no improvement
trend. Several positive attributes were noted. Alarm stations were redundant and well
protected. Good radio and telephone communication systems were maintained. An
adequate number of radios were available for security force members. Assessment aids
provided effective assessment of the perimeter detection zones. Changes to the
security program and plans were reported within the required time frame. A good
security event reporting program was in place. A good training program for security
contingency drills had been implemented. Changes to the security program and plans
were reported within the required time frame A good security event reporting program
was in place. A good training program for security contingency drills had been ,
implemented. Senior management support for the security organization was good. The
security program was adequately managed. Due to a shortage of security officers and -
equipment problems overtime hours worked by security officers averaged over 20
percent per month fer the past seven months (Sections S1.1,1.2,1.3,2.3,3.1,3.2,5.1,
6.1, and 6.2)
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The individual conducting equipment testing had an excellent knowledge of testing
procedures. All access control equipment functioned as required. Testing and l
maintenance r./f the security equipment was a program strength. The audit of the j
security program was thorough and of very good quality (Sections 2.1 and 7.1). l
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A noncited violation involving the failure to effectively control unescorted access into a
vital area was identified. A noncited violation involving the failure to search emergency
vehicles and personnel responding to a drill was identified. A marginally adequate
program for searching personnel packages and vehicles was maintained (Section S1.4).
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A violation involving the failure to have a railroad derailer in place in accordance with the
security plan was identified by the inspector. Good protected area barriers and detection
systems were generally maintained. During performance testing of the detection system,
all attempts to intrude into the protected area were detected (Section S2.2).
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Report Details
IV. Plant Sucoort
S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities
SI.I Access Authorization-
a. Insoection Scoce (81700-02.01)
The Access Authorization Program was inspected to determine compliance with the
requirements of the security plan. The areas inspected included the review of
background investigation files for individuals presently granted unescorted acce% and
for individuals that have been denied unescorted access.
b. Observations and Findinas
The inspector reviewed records and conducted interviews to determine the adequacy of l
the program. The inspector also reviewed information concerning the licensee's
verification of identity, employment history, educational history, credit history, criminal
history, military service, and the character and reputation of the applicants before
granting individuals unescorted access to protected and vital areas.
The inspector reviewed six background investigation files. The files were coinplete and
thorough. The iicensee's program for denying or revoking unescorted access
authorization was good. The inspector reviewed the rationale used by the licensee in its
decision making for denial of unescorted access. The persons denied access were
notified of the denial of access and of their right to review and reply to anything in the
records used as a reason for the access denial. These persons were also provided with
information on the appeal process that was available to them.
The licensee had recently hired a new manager for the access authorization program.
The new manager was in the process of reviewing and revising procedures during this
inspection.
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c. C_onclusions
Background investigation screening files were complete and thorough. A good program i
hed been established for denying, revoking, and appealing unescorted access
authorization.
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S1.2 Alarm stations
a. Insoection Scooe (81700-02.01)
The alarm stations were inspected to determine compliance with the requirements of the
security plan. The areas inspected included the requirements and capabilities of the
alarm stations, redundancy and diversity of stations, protection of the alarm stations, and
systems security,
b. Observations and Findinas
The inspector verified the redundancy and diversity of the alarm ciations. Action by one
alarm station opeiator could not reduce the effectiveness of the security systems without
the knowledge of the other alarm station operators. The central alarm station and
secondary alarm station were bullet resistant. The inspector questioned the station
operators and determined that they were properly trained and knowledgeable of their
duties.
The licensee had app.oved the installation of a new security computer system. This new
system to be installed in early 1998 should improve the overall security program.
c. Conclusions ]
The alarm stations were redundant and well protected. Alarm station operators were
alert and effectively trained. A new security computer system scheduled to be installed l
in 1998 should improve the security program.
S1.3 Communications
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a. Inspftetion Scoce (81700-02.01)
The communication capabilities were inspected to determine compliance with the
requirements of the security plan. The areas inspected included the operability of radio
and telephone systems and the capability to effectively communicate with the local law
enforcement agencies through both of the systems.
b. Qhigrvations and Findinas
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The inspector verified that the licensee had good radio and telephone systems capable
of meeting all communication requirements of the security organization. The licensee
had 40 portable radios with two batteries each assigned. The licensee maintained an
adequate number of portable radios for use by members of the security organization. A i
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review of records determined 16 radios were in maintenance. However, eight radios in
maintenance for repairs could not be located. Adequate control of portable radios was a
concern.
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The licensee had a maintenance program to insure that the batteries for the portable
radios remained at maximum operating power.
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c. Conclusions d
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Good radio and telephone communication systems were maintained. An adequate !
number of portable radios with batteries were available for members of the security
organization. i
S1.4 Protected Area Access Control of Personnel. Packages. and Vehicles
a. Insoection Scooe (81700-02.01)
The access control program for personnel packages and vehicles was inspected to
determine compliance with the requirements of the security plan. ]
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b. Observations and Findinas l
During the inspection Licensee Event Report 97-S03, " Potential for Undetected Entry
into a Vital Area,"was reviewed.
On July 4,1997, security personnel discovered scaffolding had been erected by
outage contractors that permitted undetected access to the reactor auxiliary
building roof, a vital area. The contractor contacted by security did have
unescorted to the vital area. Once the vulnerability was discovered, security
personnel immediately implemented compensatory measures and searched the
area for unauthorized personnel and evidence of tampering or possible sabotage.
No problems were identified. The door to the vital area was not accessible to
personnel unless scaffolding was in place.
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Paragraph 5.2.1 of the licensee's physical secuiity plan states, in part, " Personnel
access to designated vital areas is controlled by the use of a key card system
and/or mechanical key and lock.
+ Licensee Security Procedure PS-011-102," Personnel Access and Exit,"
Revision 14, Change 1, paragraph 5.2.4 states, in part, " Access control to a vital
area is accomplished by use of card readers, keys, or security personnel."
The licensee's corrective actions were:
- The licensee posted the door providing access with a notice that security must be
contacted to open the door.
= A security directive was de'. eloped providing specific instructions for personnel to
follow during outages for access requirements.
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Individuals involved in the event were briefed by security management on the ;
correct access requirements for the area. i
The failure of the licensee to effectively control uneccerted access into a vital area is l
considered a violation of Section 5 of the licensee's physical security plan. The violation j
was licensee identified, nonrepetitive, and corrected within a reasonable period of time. l
Accordingly, the violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with
Section Vil.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (382/98-05-01)
Licensee Event Report 97-S05," Emergency Vehicles Entry into the Protected Area l
Without a Proper Security Search," was reviewed.
On December 10,1997, personnel and vehicles from two local fire departments were
allowed access to the plant protected area during an emergercy drill without being
searched as required by the security plan.
Paragraph 5.7.1 of the licensee's physical security plan states, in part, "Except under
emergency conditions and special situations requiring delivery by rail or that oreclude l
processing at the Access Control Facility, vehicles that enter the protected ama are !
processed at the vehicular gate adjacent to the Access Control Facility. . " l
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Security Procedure PS-011-012, " Personnel Access and Exit," Revision 14,
paragraph 5.3.10, Note 2, states, in part, that fire and medical personnel (th& equipment i
and vehicles) summoned to the plant site by the emergency coordinator or the shift l
supervisor are exempt from entry searches.
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The licensee's investigation determined that the cause of this event was a 1
misinterpretation of a plant security procedure by the security shift supervisor. The I
licensee also determined that although the fire department's vehicles and personnel !
entered the protected area unsearched, they were escorted at all times by armed
security personnel.
The licensee implemented the following corrective actions: !
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= Security Procedure PS-011-102. Revision 15, " Personnel Access Control and
Exit," was revised to state that search requirements of responding personnel and
vehicles during drills can only be waived with varification of prior NRC notification. ;
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Procedure NTP-202, Revision 7, " Fire Protection Training," was revised to require I
that security management receive prior notification of scheduled drills. ;
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- Procedure EP-003-020, " Emergency Preparedness Drills and Exercises, I
Revision 9, was revised to add responsibilities and requirements for prior security
notification when drills / exercise involve response of offsite emergency vehicles or ;
personnel. i
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The failure of the licensee to search fire department personnel and vehicles responding
to a drillis considered a violation of Section 5 of the licensee's physical security plan. i
The vioiation was licensee identified, nonrepetitive, and corrected within a reasonable !
period of time. Accordingly, the violation is being treated as a noncited violation,
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consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (382/9805-02)
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The inspector determined through observations at the primary access facility and at the
vehicle sallyport that the licensee generally properly controlled personnel, package, and
vehicle access to the protected area. The protected area access control equipment was
inspected and found to be functional and effectively maintained. The inspector alto 1
observed use of the X-ray machine and search of packages and material at the primary 1
access facility. The operators demonstrated good knowledge of their duties,
c. Conclusioria
A noncited violation for failure to effectively control unescorted access into a vital area
was identified. A noncited violation for failure to search emergency vehic! and
personnel responding to a drill was also identified. A marginally adequate program for
searching personnel packages and vehicles was maintained.
'S2 Status of Security Facilities and Equipment I
S2.1 Testino and Maintenance (81700-02.07)
a. ID.SPElion Scoce
The inspector requested testing of access control equipment to determine compliance
with the requirements of the security plan.
b. Observations and Findinos
't he inspector requested and observed the licensee conducted testing of the explosive
and metal detectors at the protected area primary access facility. The individual
conducting the tesb was knowledgeable of the testing procedures and conducted the
tests in a manner that challenged the equipment. All equipment tested satisfactorily.
Testing and maintenance of the access control equipment was a program strength.
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c. Cpnclusions
The individual conducting equipment testing had an excellent knowledge of testing ;
procedures. All access control equipment functioned es required. Testing and ;
maintenance of the security equipment was a prcgram strength.
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S2.2 Protected Area Barrier and Detection Aids
a. Insoection Scoce (7175( 2d 81Z00)
The inspector reviewed the protected area barrier and detection aids to determine
compliance with the requirements of the physical security plan. The areas inspected
included the protected area barrie~and the design and capabilities of the detection aids j
system. ,
b. Observations and Findinas
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The inspector conducted a walkdown inspection of the protected area barrier and l
dete, ~nined that the protected area barrier was installed and maintained as described in j
the ,aysical secunty plan. Additionally, the inspector determined that the protected area 'l
barrier provided penetration resistance to both forced and surreptitious entry and was I
adequate to ansure delay of a potential adversary with the following exception:
During a review of condition identification records, the inspector discovered that on 1
November 11,1997. the licensee identified in a conditian identification report that the {
derailer inside the service yard had become unutached from the track, and no j
compensatory measures were implemented. This degraded condition existed until '
February 11,1998, when it was identified by the MRC security inspector. Security
procedures did not provide adequate guidance for security officers if they found the
derailer degraded. Once it was reported in the condition identification report security
officers waited for maintenance to repair it.
Waterford 3 Physical Security Plan, Revision 17, dated March 1996, Chapter 3,
paragrapn 3.2.6, ' Vehicle Denial," states, in part, " Railroad derailers are installed inside ;
the protected area on the railroad spurs that enter the site."
Plant Security Procedure PS-011-103," Vehicle Access Control," Revision 8, Section 5,
paragraph 5.1.3.2.C, states, in part, " Railroad derailers are installed inside the protected
area on rail spurs that allow entry into the protected area."
Plant Security Procedure PS-012-101, "Parimeter Barriers," Revision 9, Section 5.6,
paragraph 5.6.1, states, " Security Officers will inspect the derailers to ensure that they
are locked in the derail configuration. This check will be made twice each shift."
The failure to ensure that the derailer was locked in the derail configuration from
November 11,1997, to February 11,1998, is a violation of the security plan
(382/9805-03).
The inspector observed the licensee test the perimeter microwave system at several
locations around the protected area. The detection system was well designed and
maintained. All attempts to intrude into the protected area were detected. The licensee's
tests of the system were performance based to ensure that system failures were
discovered and corrected.
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Additionally, the inspector verified that an alarm annunciated in the ccntinuously manned
security alarm stations.
c. Conclusions
The licensee's failure to maintain a derailer inside the protected area is a violation of
paragraph 3.2.6 of the security plan. Good protected area barriers and detection
systems were maintained. During performance testing of the detection system, all
attempts to intrude into the protected area were detected.
S2.3 Assessment Aids
a. Insoection Scone (81700-02.02)
The inspector reviewed the assessment aids to determine compliance with the physical
security plan. The areas inspected included the closed-circuit television monitors located
in the alarm stations.
b. Obseryations and Findinas
The inspector observed the assessment aids during the hours of daylight and inclement
weather on February 11,1998, and determined that the licensee's overall assessment
aids system was adequate. The inspector verified through observation that the fixed
closed-circuit television cameras were positioned to ensure proper coverage of the
perimeter security alarm zones. The camera resolution was generally acceptable. The
inspector questioned the picture resolution on one camera, and the licensee immediately
implemented compensatory measures. Instrumentation and Controls technicians later
replaced the camera. The inspector determined through interviews that licensee
instrumentation and controls technicians provided excellent service support.
c. Conclusions
Assessment aids provided effective assessment of the perimeter detection zones.
S3 Security and Safeguards Procedures and Documentation
S3.1 Security Proaram Plans and Procedures
a. Insoection Scoce (81700-02.03)
The physical security plan and the implementing procedures were inspected to
determine compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(p) and the physical
security plan.
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b. Observations and Findinos
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The inspector determined that previous plan changes were subn.itted within the required
time frame and changes submitted did not reduce the effectiveness of the plan. The
inspector reviewed implementing procedures for adequacy, ensured that the licensee
maintained an effective management system for the development and administration of
procedures, and that changes to the procedures did not reduce the effectiveness of the !
licensee's security program. I
c. Conclusions
Changes to security programs and plans were reported within the required time frame.
Overali, implementing procedures met the performance requirements in the physical
security plan.
S3.2 Security Event Loas
a. Insoection Scone (81700-02.03)
The inspector reviewed safeguards event logs and security incident reports to determine
compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.21(b) and (c),10 CFR 26.73, and the
physical security plan.
b. Observatioris and Findinas
The inspector reviewed the security event logs from July 1 through December 31,1997.
The records were available for review and maintained for the time required by
regulations. The inspector determined that the licensee conformed to the regulatory
requirements regarding the rer orting of security events. The inspector also reviewed
security incident reports and licensee security condition reports. The logs and supporting
reports were neat and contained sufficient detail for the reviewer to determine root cause,
reportability, and corrective action taken.
c. Conclusions
A good security event reporting program was in place. The security staff was correctly
reporting security events.
SS Security and Safeguards Staff Training and Qualification
S5.1 Security Trainina and Qualification
a. Insoection Scooe (81700-02.05)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's security training and qualification program to
determine adequacy and compliance with the requirements of the security, training, and
qualification plan and the contingency plan.
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b. Observations and Findings
The inspector verified that the security organization conducted security training in
accordance with its approved security, training, and contingency plans. The inspector
confirmed by a review of the security training records that contingency drills were
conducted on shift. Documentation of the shift drills was maintained on file.
The inspector interviewed the security training instructor and determined that the
licensee's initial training had been very thorough and met all requirements of the
approved security plans. Additionally, the inspector observed security officers during the
performance of their duties. All security officers displayed good conduct and knowledge
of the procedural requirements,
c. Conclusions
A good training program for security officers had been implemented. Documentation by
the security shifts and training section was good.
SS Security Organization and Administration
S6.1 Management Sucoort
a. Inspection Scoce (81700-02.06)
The affectiveness and adequacy of management support were inspected to determine
the degree of management support for the physical security program.
b. Observations and Findings
The inspector determined by discussions with security force personnel that the security
program received very good support from senior management. The inspector
determined that the security program was implemented by a trained and qualified
security staff.
c. C_Qnclusions
Senior management support for the security organization was good. The security
program was implerr ented by a trained and qualified staff. ,
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S6.2 Manaoement Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scoce (81700-02.06 j
The e'fectiveness and adequacy of the security management staffs administration of the
security program were evaluated.
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b. Discussion
The security program was managed by a trained and qualified security staff.
Management effectiveness of the security crganization was adequate. The inspector ;
determined that overtime hours worked by security officers averaged over 2u percent a l
month for the past 7 months. The overtime was caused by a shortage of security l
officers and compensatory posting for equipment repairs. Tne security contractor had {
seven new security officers preparing to be assigned to shifts during this inspection. j
c. Conclusion
The security program was adequately managed. Due to a shortage of security cfficers
and equipment problems, overtime hours worked by security officers averaged over
20 percent a month for the past 7 months.
S7 Quality Assurance in Security and Safeauards Activities
S7.1 Security Proaram Audits
a. Insoection Scoce (81700-02.QZ)
The audits of the security program were inspected to determine compliance with the
requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(p) and the physical security plan.
b. Observations and Findinas
The inspector verified that security program audits had been conducted at least every
12 months as required. The inspector reviewed Quality Assurance Audit SA-97-030.1.
The inspecto confirmed that audit personnel was independent of plant security j
management and plant security management supervision. The inspector determined ]
tl'at the audit was thorough and very good quality. i
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c. Conclusions
The audit of the security program was thorough and very good quality.
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S8 Followup - Plant Support (92904) !
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S8.1 (Closed) Insoection Followun item 382/9719-02: Openino Vehicle Gates in Emeraency
During a previous security inspectico, it was noted that the licensee did not have a
procedure for the operation of the vehicle barrier gates in the event of a loss of power to
them. l
During this inspection, the inspector reviewed Licensee Procedure 11-103A, * Manual
> Operation of VBS Gates 1 and 2," Revision O February 12,1998, that included j
step-by step directions on how to operate gaiu No.1 and 2 manually.
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S8.2 (Closed) Violation 382/9709-01: Failure to Terminate Active Kev Cards for Terminated !
Empj91 :
On April 18,1997, the licensee determined that its Waterford 3 security superintendent
had not been notified prior to or concurrently with the termination of approximately
10 contract employees. Active badge / key cards were available to those employees who
no longer had a need for unescorted access into the protected area. In scme cases,
those active badges / key cards were on file at the badge issue station 30 days or more
after the contract employee's termination.
During this inspection, the inspector reviewed the licensee's procedure chaLge and
interviewed access authorization personnel on the procedure changes. The licensee's
corrective actions vere considered effective.
S8.3 (Closed) Violation 382/9709-02: Inadeauate 31-Day Access Review
On April 23,1997, the NRC inspector identified that on April 1,1997, a contractor !
supervisor signed a 31-day access review record indicating he had reviewed the record
and signed a memorandum stating that no updates were required. However, that record
had approximately four individuals listed who had not used their unescorted access in
excess of 30 days, and two individuals who had been terminated several days prior to
the required review. None of these individuals continued to require unescorted access
into the protected area.
During this inspection, the inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective actions to ensure i
supervisors complied with the reverification process for continued unescorted access.
The licensee's corrective actions appeared to be effective.
S8.4 (Closed) Violation 382/9709-03: Temocrary Jnescorted Access Granted Without i
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Backaround investiaation Screenina Comoleted
On April 23,1997, the NRC inspector identified that on March 25,1997, a photo
badge / key card had been assigned to a cortactor employee who had been terminated
4 days earlier, March 21,1997, by the ccntrutor. The licensee had deleted the badge
from the computer system en April 21,1997.
During this inspection, the inspector determined the licensee's corrective actions
included revision of the access authorization request form, counseling of the supervisor,
and ensuring all supervisors have a copy of the site processing procedure.
S8.5 (Closed) Violation 382/9709-04: Inattentive Security Officer at Vital Area Door
On April 23,1997, an NRC inspector, accompanied by a licensee employee, found a
security officer posted as a compensatory measure at the open vital area doors
inattentive to his duties such that he could not provide positive access control of a vital
area used to support the refueling outage. The licensee replaced the officer on the post
and began investigative actions.
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During this inspection, the inspector determined that the licensee disciplined the officer
and revised the " Handbook for Security Officers" on actions to take when feeling tired or
ill, directed supervisors to conduct more frequent checks of posted officers, and directed
the alarm stations to conduct more frequent radio checks. ,
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S8.6 (Closed) Licensee Event Reoort 382/95-S02: Derogatorv Informa"..'on on Badaed
Emolovee
On October 10,1995, a contract employee's fingerprint record was received from the
FBI. The record indicated a pending felony charge against the individual. The contract .
employee admitted that the charge was currently pending against him. The licensee
revoked his temporary unescorted access and the information entered into the Integrated
Nuclear Data Exchange (INDEX) System. All of the licensee's actions were correct.
S8.7 (Closed) Licensee Event Reoort 382/95-S03 Deroaatorv information on Badaed
Emotoveg
On October 7,1995, a contract employee's fingerprint record was received from the FBI.
The record indicated a pending felony charge and other arrest to include convictions for
alcohol related offenses. The licensee revoked his temporary unescorted access and
the information was entered into the INDEX System. All of the licensee's actions were
correct.
S8.8 (Closed) Licensee Event Reoort 382/97-S03: Potential for Undetected Entrv Into a Vital
LT9B
On July 4,1997, security personnel discovered scaffolding had been erected by outage
contractors that permitted undetected access to the reactor auxiliary building roof, a vital
area. The contractor contacted by security did have unescorted to the vital area. Once
the vulnerability was discovered, security personnel immediately implemented
compensatory measures and searched the area for unauthorized personnel and
evidence of tampering or possible sabotage. No problems were identified. The door to
the vital area was not accessible to personnel unless scaffolding was in place. This
Licensee Event Report was dispositioned as a noncited violation (382/9805-01). (See
Section S1.4.)
S8.9 (Closed) Licensee Event Reoort 382/97-S05: Emeraency Vehicle: Entrv Into Protected
Area Without Being Searched
On December 10,1997, personnel and vehicles from two local fire departments were
allowed access to the plant protected area during an emergency drill without being
searched as required by the security plan. This Licensee 5 Event Report was
dispositioned as a noncited violation (382/9805-02). (See Section S1.4.)
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V. Manaaement Meetinas
XI Exit Meeting Summary
The inspector presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the
conclusion of the inspection on February 12,1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings
presented.
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ATTACHMENT
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee
R. Allen, Manager, Operational Experience Engineering
E. Aviles, Coordinator, Nuclear Security
E. Beckendorf, Superintendent, Plant Security
R. Burski, Director, Plant Modifications and Construction
D. Childress, Supervisor, Security Access Authorization and Fitness-for-Duty
H. Cooper, Manager, Corporate Security
F. Drummond, Director, Site Support
C_. Dugger, Vice President, Operations
E. Ewing, Director, Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Affairs
C. Hayes, Technical Coordinator, Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Affairs
T. Leonard, General Manager, Plant Operations
J. O'Hern, Director, Training
G. Pierce, Director, Quality
D. Pintado, Coordinator, Nuclear Security
O. Pipkins, Licensing Engineer
G. Scott, Licensing Engineer
C. Thomas, Licensing Supervisor
G. Zetsch, Supervisor, Security Operations
Contractor
R. Bitner, Project Manager, The Wackenhut Corporation
T Duet, Security Training Coordinator, The Wackenhut Corporation
R Rodriquez, Security Equipment Testing Specialist, The Wackenhut Corporation
T. Shannon, Director, The Wackenhut Corporation
NBG
J. Keaton, Resident inspector
(NSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
IP 81700 Physical Security Program for Power Reactors
IP 92700 Onsite Review of Licensee Event Reports
IP 92904 Foliowup
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ITEMS OPENED. CLOSED. AND DISCUSSED ,
Ooened
50-382/9805-01 NCV Failure to Control Access into a Vital Area
50-382/9805-02 NCV Failure to Search Emergency Personnel and Vehicles
Entering the Protected Area During a Drill
50-382/9805-03 VIO Railroad Derailer removed.
Closed
50-382/9719-02 IFl Opening Vehicle Gate in Emergency
50-382/9805-02 NCV Failure to Control Access into a Vital Area
50-382/9805-03 NCV Failure to Search Emergency Personnel and Vehicles
Entering the Protected Area During a Drill
50-382/9709-01 VIO Failure to Terminate Active Key Cards for Terminated
Employees
50-382/9709-02 VIO Inadequate 31~ Day Access List Review
50-382/9709-03 VIO Temporary Unescorted Access Granted without
Background Investigation Screening Completed
50-382/9709-04 VIO Inattentive Security Officer at Vital Area Door
50-382/95-S O2 LER Derogatory Information on Badged Contract Employee
50-382/95-S O3 LER Derogatory Information on Badged Contract Employee
50-382/97-S O3 LER Potential for Undetected Entry ir.to Plant Vital Area
50-382/97-S O5 LER Emergency Vehicles Entry lato Protected Area Without
Being Searched
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PARTIAL LIST OF LICENSEE DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Waterford 3 Physical Security Plan, Revision 17, dated August 1996
Selected Condition Reports for 1997
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Security Equipment Testing and Maintenance Records from July through December 1997 on
perimeter intrusion detection aids, cameras, vital area doors, access control equipment, radios, !
and vehicle barriers.
Trending records on equipment problems.
Training Records on seven security officers.
Response for drills conducted by security shift personnel.
Alarms Station Communication Records. i
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Licensee Procedures
Waterford 3 Procedure OM-110. " Continual Behavioral Observation Program," Revision 0, l
March 31,1995 1
Security Procedure PS-016-101, " Security Procedure During Refueling and Major Maintenance l
Operations," Revision 8 June 19,1996 '
Licensee Administrative Procedure UNT-004-036," Security Requirements for Penetrating PA &
VA Barriers," Revision 3, January 7,1997
Waterford 3 Procedure OM-106, " Unescorted Access Authorization
Program," Revision 2, April 28,1996
Waterford 3 SES Security Directive, D-036, " Department Self Assessment," July 7,1997
Waterford 3, SES Security Guideline Number ADM-032, " Degrading Trending Program,"
Revision 0, January 1,1998
Waterford 3 Quality Assurance Audit SA-97-030.1," Security Program, November 14,1007
Entergy Corporate Security Site Procedure CS-WP-AA-101, " Security Inprocessing and
Outprocessing," Revision 0, October 31,1997
Waterford 3 Procodure PS-011-103, " Vehicle Access Control," Revision 8, February 12,1998
Waterford 3 SES Security Guideline 11-103A," Operation of Vehicle Barrier System Gates 1
and 2,' Revision 0, February 12,1998
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Waterford 3 Security Procedure PS-015-101, " Security Patr.ols," Revision 10, September 23,
1997
Emergency Plan Procedure EP-003-020, " Emergency Preparedness Drills and Exercises,"
Revision 9, Change 2, February 10,1998
Waterford 3, SES Security Department Directive D-036, " Security Officer Attentiveness,"
May 29,1997 !
Waterford 3 Procedure PS-011-102, " Personnel Access and Exit," Revision 14, October 31,
1997, and Revision 15, February 12,1998
Waterford 3 Procedure PS-016-102, " Security Response to Plant Emergency Conditions," l
Revision 7, February 12,1998
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