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Category:NRC TECHNICAL REPORT
MONTHYEARML20245F9401989-04-26026 April 1989
AEOD/T907 Component Degradation Due to Indiscriminate Painting, Technical Review Rept
ML20148B3291988-03-14014 March 1988
Headquarters Daily Rept for 880314
ML20237F6221987-08-27027 August 1987
LER Quality Evaluation for Catawba Units 1 & 2 During Period from Oct 1986 - Jul 1987
ML20137N9071985-11-22022 November 1985
Significant Change Analysis
ML20209G4011985-09-0404 September 1985
AEOD/T510, Xenon-Induced Power Oscillations at Catawba, Technical Review Rept.No Further Action by AEOD or Other NRC Ofcs Necessary
1989-04-26
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Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217H0201999-09-30030 September 1999
Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2
ML20216E5401999-09-0707 September 1999
Special Rept:On 990826,discovered That Meteorological Sys Upper Wind Speed Cup Set Broken,Causing Upper Wind Channel to Be Inoperable.Cup Set Replaced & Channel Restored to Operable Status on 990826
ML20212B4711999-08-31031 August 1999
Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2
ML20217H0321999-08-31031 August 1999
Revised Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2
ML20211B1281999-08-31031 August 1999
Dynamic Rod Worth Measurement Using Casmo/Simulate
ML20211A9791999-08-20020 August 1999
Safety Evaluation Granting Licensee Request for Approval of Proposed Relief from Volumetric Exam Requirements of ASME B&PV Code,Section Xi,For Plant,Unit 2
ML20211F3441999-08-17017 August 1999
Updated non-proprietary Page 2-4 of TR DPC-NE-2009
ML20211C1291999-08-17017 August 1999
ISI Rept Unit 1 Catawba 1999 RFO 11
ML20210R1051999-08-0606 August 1999
Special Rept:On 990628,cathodic Protection Sys Was Declared Inoperable After Sys Did Not Pass Acceptance Criteria of Bimonthly Surveillance.Work Request 98085802 Was Initiated & Connections on Well Anode Were Cleaned or Replaced
ML20210S2891999-07-31031 July 1999
Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2
ML20212B4871999-07-31031 July 1999
Revised Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2
ML20209E4361999-07-0909 July 1999
SER Agreeing with Licensee General Interpretation of TS LCO 3.0.6,but Finds No Technical Basis or Guidance That Snubbers Could Be Treated as Exception to General Interpretation
ML20196K6631999-07-0707 July 1999
Safety Evaluation Supporting Licensee 990520 Position Re Inoperable Snubbers
ML20210S2951999-06-30030 June 1999
Revised Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2
ML20209H4501999-06-30030 June 1999
Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2
ML20209H4561999-05-31031 May 1999
Revised Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2
ML20206T4771999-05-31031 May 1999
Rev 3 to UFSAR Chapter 15 Sys Transient Analysis Methodology
ML20196L1881999-05-31031 May 1999
Non-proprietary Rev 1 to DPC-NE-3004, Mass & Energy Release & Containment Response Methodology
ML20196A0001999-05-31031 May 1999
Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2
ML20206P5201999-05-14014 May 1999
Safety Evaluation Accepting GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valves
ML20206N8391999-05-0404 May 1999
Rev 16 to CNEI-0400-24, Catawba Unit 1 Cycle 12 Colr
ML20206R1811999-04-30030 April 1999
Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2
ML20196A0041999-04-30030 April 1999
Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2
ML20206N8261999-04-22022 April 1999
Rev 15 to CNEI-0400-24, Catawba Unit 1 Cycle 12 Colr. Page 145 of 270 of Incoming Submittal Not Included
ML20205S5551999-04-21021 April 1999
Safety Evaluation Accepting Response to GL 96-06, Assurance of Equipment Operability & Containment Integrity During Design Basis Accident Conditions
ML20205N3651999-04-12012 April 1999
Safety Evaluation Accepting IPE of External Events Submittal
ML18016A9011999-04-12012 April 1999
Part 21 Rept Re Defect in Component of DSRV-16-4,Enterprise DG Sys.Caused by Potential Problem with Connecting Rod Assemblies Built Since 1986,that Have Been Converted to Use Prestressed Fasteners.Affected Rods Should Be Inspected
ML20206R1931999-03-31031 March 1999
Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2
ML20205P9521999-03-31031 March 1999
Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2
ML20205P9561999-02-28028 February 1999
Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2
ML20204C9111999-02-28028 February 1999
Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2
ML20203A2581999-02-0505 February 1999
Safety Evaluation of TR DPC-NE-3002-A,Rev 2, UFSAR Chapter 15 Sys Transient Analysis Methodology. Rept Acceptable. Staff Requests Duke Energy Corp to Publish Accepted Version of TR within 3 Months of Receipt of SE
ML20204C9161999-01-31031 January 1999
Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2
ML20199K8711999-01-13013 January 1999
Inservice Insp Rept for Unit 2 Catawba 1998 Refueling Outage 9
ML20199E3071998-12-31031 December 1998
Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2
ML20216F9931998-12-31031 December 1998
Piedmont Municipal Power Agency 1998 Annual Rept
ML20205E9441998-12-31031 December 1998
1998 10CFR50.59 Rept for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2, Containing Brief Description of Changes,Tests & Experiments,Including Summary of Ses.With
ML20206P2081998-12-31031 December 1998
Special Rept:On 981218,inoperability of Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation Channels,Was Observed.Caused by Data Logger Overloading Circuit.Replaced & Repaired Temp Signal Processor
ML20203A4101998-12-22022 December 1998
Rev 16 to CNEI-0400-25, Catawba Unit 2 Cycle 10 Colr
ML20203A4041998-12-22022 December 1998
Rev 14 to CNEI-0400-24, Catawba Unit 1 Cycle 11 Colr
ML20198B1341998-12-14014 December 1998
Revised Special Rept:On 980505,discovered That Certain Fire Barriers Appeared to Be Degraded.Caused by Removal of Firestop Damming Boards.Hourly Fire Watches Established in Affected Areas
ML20196J8351998-12-0808 December 1998
Safety Evaluation Granting Relief Request Re Relief Valves in Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Sys
ML20199E3221998-11-30030 November 1998
Revised MOR for Nov 1998 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 Re Personnel Exposure
ML20198E3151998-11-30030 November 1998
Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2
ML20196C0251998-11-27027 November 1998
SER Accepting Clarification on Calibration Tolerances on Trip Setpoints for Catawba Nuclear Station
ML20196A6881998-11-25025 November 1998
Safety Evaluation Granting Relief Request 98-02 Re Limited Exam for Three Welds
ML20196D4041998-11-19019 November 1998
Rev 1 to Special Rept:On 980618,determined That Method Used to Calibrate Wind Speed Instrumentation Loops of Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation Sys Does Not Meet TS Definition for Channel Calibration.Procedure Revised
ML20195E5521998-10-31031 October 1998
Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2
ML20198E3261998-10-31031 October 1998
Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2
ML20154M7661998-10-12012 October 1998
LER 98-S01-00:on 980913,terminated Vendor Employee Entered Protected Area.Caused by Computer Interface Malfunction. Security Retained Vendor Employee Badge to Prevent Further Access & Computer Malfunction Was Repaired.With
1999-09-07
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.t AE0D TECHNICAL' REVIEW REPORT UNIT: Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 TR REPORT NO.: AEOD/T907 50-413, 50-414 April 26, 1989 DOCKET NOS.: DATE:
LICENSEE: Duke Power Company EVALUATOR / CONTACT: L. Padovan NSSS/AE: Westinghouse / Utility
SUBJECT:
COMPONENT DEGRADATION DUE TO INDISCRIMINATE PAINTING
SUMMARY
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E On February 5,1988, Duke Pcwer Company determined that T-drains on 22 Unit 2
/ Limitorque valve actuators at Catawba had been painted over, or were missing.
A similar inspection of Unit 1 Limitorque valve actuators also revealed that 20 actuators had missing or paint clogged T-drains.
The identified actuators were environmentally qualified for service in harsh environments which can exist following a loss of coolant accident, a main steam line break, or other high energy line breaks. Functioning T-drains were required to maintain these actuator environmental qualifications. Some of the affected actuators were located on valves which function to mitigate the effects of postulated accidents. These valves included containment isolation valves, reactor head vent valves, inlet valves for the Unit I hydrogen "skirrrner fan", and other valves located in the auxiliary buildings.
As a result of-the identified concerns, AEOD initiated this study to investi-
. gate the generic applicability of component degradation due to indiscriminate painting. The study evaluated 65 Licensee Event Reports (LERs) which were identified.through a LER text search on the word " paint",. utilizing the NRC's NUDOCS system. None of the 65 LERs evaluated were found to involve component degradation from indiscriminate painting. Accordingly, no generic safety significance was cetermined to be associated with this issue, and no further AE0D actior; in this regard is warranted.
DISCUSSION Description of Catawba Occurrences
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- 1. l On February 5,1988, in response to concerns identified by an NRC environ-mental qualification (EQ) team inspection, a review of Unit 2 Limitorque I valve actuator T-drains was performed by the utility. The review revealed that T-drains had been painted over, or were missing, on 22 Unit 2 Limitorque valve actuators. An inspection of Limitorque actuators on Unit I valves also revealed that 20 actuators had missing or paint clogged T-drains. The affected actuators were Limitorque Models SB, SMB, and SBD, which were utilized in the containment buildings and steam doghouses.
Some of the affected actuators were located on valves which function to mitigate the effects of postulated accidents. These valves included containment isolation valves, reactor head vent valves, inlet valves for the Unit I hydrogen "skimirer fan," and other valves located in the auxi-liary buildings.
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. ks the Limitorque actuator motors were not completely sealed from the environment, T-drains were installed in the motor compartments to drain condensate which would be formed from trapped steam under accident conditions. Undesired accumulation of condensate could saturate the motor insulation and short circuit the motor. T-drains also provided actuator internal to external pressure equalization. Hence, T-drains were required-to maintain actuator environmental qualifications.
As corrective action, all missing and paint clogged T-drains were repaired or replaced. Applicable painting and maintenance procedures were revised, and a program for periodic training of painters was established.
- 2. Operational Data This study was performed utilizing a LER text search on the word " paint".
65 LERs were identified which contained the word'" paint", but none in-volved degradation of critical components from indiscriminate painting.
Typical subjects of the identified LERs were as follows:
- Automatic initiation of emergency air filtration systems.
- Painting of components,
- Burned, discolored, or blistered paint due to excessive temperatures,
- Inadvertent actuation or damage to equipment from painting activities in the same area,
- Torque paint on bolts, 6 Hissed surveillance due to wet paint,
- Scraping of paint due to movement, and
- Paint chips in undesired locations.
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS None of the.65 LERs, which were identified from a text search on the word
" paint" utilizing the NUDOCS system, were fcund to involve component degrada-tion from indiscriminate painting. Accordingly, no generic safety significance was determined to be associated with this issue, and no further AE0D action in this regard is warranted at this time. :
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