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Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEARML20217K3161999-10-19019 October 1999 Forwards Amend 195 to License DPR-61 & Safety Evaluation. Amend Deletes Certain TSs Either No Longer Applicable to Permanently Shutdown & Defueled State of Reactor or Duplicate Regulatory Requirements CY-99-137, Notifies NRC of Intent to Apply Haddam Neck Plant 10CFR50 App B,Qa Program to Activities Related to Development of ISFSI at Haddam1999-10-12012 October 1999 Notifies NRC of Intent to Apply Haddam Neck Plant 10CFR50 App B,Qa Program to Activities Related to Development of ISFSI at Haddam DD-99-11, Informs That Time Provided by NRC Regulation within Which Commission May Act to Review Director'S Decision (DD-99-11) Expired & That Commission Declined Any Review.Decision Became Final Action on 9910041999-10-0808 October 1999 Informs That Time Provided by NRC Regulation within Which Commission May Act to Review Director'S Decision (DD-99-11) Expired & That Commission Declined Any Review.Decision Became Final Action on 991004 ML20212L1261999-10-0404 October 1999 Forwards Viewgraphs Presented by Licensee at 990923 Meeting with Nrc,In Response to Request ML20212D0341999-09-20020 September 1999 Expresses Appreciation for Accepting NRC Request for Tour of Haddam Neck Facility During on 991014.Invites R Mellor to Participate in NRC 1999 Decommissioninng Power Reactor Work- Shop:Nrc Insp Program at Decommissioning Power Reactors CY-99-111, Submits Clarification of Changes Made to Connecticut Yankee QA Program,Per Util 990810 Submittal.Change Will Be Submitted to NRC in Dec 1999 as Part of Annual Update1999-09-0202 September 1999 Submits Clarification of Changes Made to Connecticut Yankee QA Program,Per Util 990810 Submittal.Change Will Be Submitted to NRC in Dec 1999 as Part of Annual Update ML20211E8051999-08-20020 August 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-213/99-02 on 990420-0719.No Violations Noted.Completion of Corrective Actions for Spent Fuel Bldg Ventilation Issues Adequate ML20210J6021999-08-0202 August 1999 Informs That Info Re Orise Technical Survey Assistance to NRC at CT Yankee Is to Include Copies of Listed Documents CY-99-048, Forwards Cyap Rept CY-HP-0031,Rev 0, Bounding Dose Assessment for Offsite Radioactive Matls1999-07-29029 July 1999 Forwards Cyap Rept CY-HP-0031,Rev 0, Bounding Dose Assessment for Offsite Radioactive Matls CY-99-066, Forwards Revised Plan for Recovery of Licensed Matl from Offsite Locations.Completion of Implementation of Plan During Summer of 1999 Is Planned,Contingent on Support Extended by Property Owners,Weather & Uncontrolled Factors1999-07-20020 July 1999 Forwards Revised Plan for Recovery of Licensed Matl from Offsite Locations.Completion of Implementation of Plan During Summer of 1999 Is Planned,Contingent on Support Extended by Property Owners,Weather & Uncontrolled Factors ML20210C1491999-07-0101 July 1999 Responds to ,Which Responded to NRC Ltr & NOV & Informs That Engagement in Any Similar Wrongdoing in Future May Result in More Significant Enforcement Action. No Further Action Will Be Taken at This Time ML20209C3911999-06-30030 June 1999 Forwards TS Page 6-3 for Haddam Neck Plant ML20195H1741999-06-15015 June 1999 Forwards Original & Copy of Request for Approval of Certain Indirect & Direct Transfer of License & Ownership Interests of Montaup Electric Co (Montaup) with Respect to Nuclear Facilities Described as Listed ML20195F9011999-06-0909 June 1999 Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp 50-213/98-06 on 990226. Util Did Not Agree with Disposition of Issue Cited as Severity Level IV Violation.Violation Will Be Noncited ML20195H3591999-06-0202 June 1999 Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp of License DPR-61.Corrective Actions:Disciplinary Actions Were Taken by Util Against Jm Foley & Individual & Departmental Emphasis Is Placed on New HP Stds & Expectations ML20207E9031999-06-0202 June 1999 Informs That NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Reorganized Effective 990328.As Part of Reorganization,Div of Licensing Project Mgt Created.Mt Masnik Will Be Section Chief for Haddam Neck.Organization Chart Encl ML20207B9301999-05-25025 May 1999 Responds to 990114 Correspondence Re Changes to Plant Defueled Physical Security Plan Rev 1 Submitted Under 10CFR50.54(p).Implementation of Changes Subj to Insp to Confirm Changes Have Not Decreased Security Plan ML20207G1761999-05-21021 May 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-213/99-01 on 980119-990419 & Closure of CAL 1-97-010.No Violations Noted.Conduct of Activities Associated with Control of Radiological Work at Haddam Neck Generally Characterized as Careful & Thorough ML20206R7221999-05-12012 May 1999 Refers to Investigation 1-97-031 on 970616-0718 & Forwards Nov.Investigation Found That Recipient Deliberately Did Not Follow Radiation Protection Procedures,Falsified Documents & Provided Incomplete & Inaccurate Info to NRC ML20206R7021999-05-12012 May 1999 Refers to Investigation 1-97-008 Conducted by Region I & Forwards Notice of Violation.Investigation Found That Recipient Deliberately Attempted to Conceal Release of Contaminated Video Equipment ML20206R8051999-05-12012 May 1999 Responds to 3 Investigations,Repts 1-97-031,008 & 1-98-008 Between 970314 & 980722 as Well as Insp Conducted Between 980720 & 1102.Forwards Synopsis of 3rd OI Investigation ML20206J2801999-04-30030 April 1999 Forwards 1998 Annual Financial Repts for CT Light & Power Co,Western Ma Electric Co,Public Svc Co of Nh,North Atlantic Energy Corp,Northeast Nuclear Energy Co & North Atlantic Energy Svc Corp,License Holders CY-99-057, Forwards 1998 Annual Radioactive Effluent Rept for HNP, & Rev 10 to Remodcm. with Summary of Quantities of Solid Radwaste & Liquid & Gaseous Effluents,As Well as Summary of Assessment of Max Individual Dose1999-04-30030 April 1999 Forwards 1998 Annual Radioactive Effluent Rept for HNP, & Rev 10 to Remodcm. with Summary of Quantities of Solid Radwaste & Liquid & Gaseous Effluents,As Well as Summary of Assessment of Max Individual Dose ML20206C8631999-04-28028 April 1999 Forwards Amend 194 to License DPR-61 & Safety Evaluation. Amend Authorizes Relocation of Requirements Related to Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation from TSs to Technical Requirements Manual ML20206A6871999-04-22022 April 1999 Informs of Completion of Review of Re Nepco in Capacity as Minority Shareholder in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp,Yaec,Myap & Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co ML20210V5221999-04-0808 April 1999 Discusses Continued Performance of Technical Assistance Activities for NRC & Environ Survey & Site Assessment Program (Essap) Survey Assistance at Cy IR 05000213/19960121999-04-0505 April 1999 Discusses NRC Insp Repts 50-213/96-12 & 50-213/98-04 on 961102-27 Re Airborne Radioactivity Contamination Event That Occurred in Fuel Transfer Canal & Reactor Cavity in Nov 1996.Notice of Violation Encl ML20205J7931999-04-0505 April 1999 Discusses NRC Insp Repts 50-213/96-12 & 50-213/98-04 on 961102-27 Re Airborne Radioactivity Contamination Event That Occurred in Fuel Transfer Canal & Reactor Cavity in Nov 1996.Notice of Violation Encl CY-99-042, Provides Info on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Haddam Neck Plant1999-03-31031 March 1999 Provides Info on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Haddam Neck Plant ML20206A6951999-03-29029 March 1999 Request Confirmation That No NRC Action or Approval,Required Relative to Proposed Change in Upstream Economic Ownership of New England Power Co,Minority Shareholder in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp,Yaec,Myap & Connecticut Yankee CY-99-024, Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-213/98-06. Corrective Actions:Meetings Were Held with Contractor Mgt, Disciplinary Action Against Worker Was Taken & Notices Alerting Workers to HRA Controls Were Posted1999-03-29029 March 1999 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-213/98-06. Corrective Actions:Meetings Were Held with Contractor Mgt, Disciplinary Action Against Worker Was Taken & Notices Alerting Workers to HRA Controls Were Posted B17697, Notifies NRC of Amount of Property Insurance Coverage, Effective 990401,for HNP & Mnps,Units 1,2 & 3,per Provisions of 10CFR50.54(w)1999-03-12012 March 1999 Notifies NRC of Amount of Property Insurance Coverage, Effective 990401,for HNP & Mnps,Units 1,2 & 3,per Provisions of 10CFR50.54(w) CY-99-032, Clarifies Info Re TRM Change Submitted with Re Proposed Rev to TSs on Seismic Monitoring1999-03-0909 March 1999 Clarifies Info Re TRM Change Submitted with Re Proposed Rev to TSs on Seismic Monitoring ML20207B6641999-02-26026 February 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-213/98-06 on 981103-990118 & Notice of Violation Re Locked High Radiation Area Doors That Were Found Unlocked by Staff.Security Program Was Also Inspected ML20204C6901999-02-22022 February 1999 Informs That Public Citizen Waives Copyright for 5th Edition of Nuclear Lemon So NRC May Reproduce for Purpose of Contributing to NRC Recommended Improvements to Oversight Process for Nuclear Power Reactors ML20203H9621999-02-17017 February 1999 Responds to to Dk Rathbun Which Forwarded Number of Questions from Constituent Re Spent Fuel Decommissioned Nuclear plants.NUREG-1628, Staff Responses to Frequently Asked Questions Re Decommissioning of NPPs Encl.W/O Encl CY-99-005, Responds to NRC 981221 RAI Re Amend 193 to License to Reflect Permanent Shutdown Condition of Plant.Licensee Withdrawing 981030 (CY-98-199) Request & Will Submit Corrections in Future Proposed Rev to TS1999-01-29029 January 1999 Responds to NRC 981221 RAI Re Amend 193 to License to Reflect Permanent Shutdown Condition of Plant.Licensee Withdrawing 981030 (CY-98-199) Request & Will Submit Corrections in Future Proposed Rev to TS CY-99-023, Provides Summary of Understandings Reached During 990108 Meeting Between Util & CT Dept of Environ Protection Re Dike Area Rainwater Reporting Protocol1999-01-28028 January 1999 Provides Summary of Understandings Reached During 990108 Meeting Between Util & CT Dept of Environ Protection Re Dike Area Rainwater Reporting Protocol ML20203H9711999-01-21021 January 1999 Requests Response to Concerns Raised by Constitutent M Marucci Re Spent Fuel at Decommissioned Nuclear Plants CY-99-002, Forwards Response to NRC 981203 RAI Re Proposed License Amend to Relocate Requirements for Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation from Section 3/4.3.3.3 of TS to Trm. Supporting TSs Encl1999-01-18018 January 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 981203 RAI Re Proposed License Amend to Relocate Requirements for Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation from Section 3/4.3.3.3 of TS to Trm. Supporting TSs Encl CY-99-010, Provides Special Rept Concerning Potential of Radiation Exposure Due to Hypothetical Explosive Attack to Facility. Without Encl1999-01-14014 January 1999 Provides Special Rept Concerning Potential of Radiation Exposure Due to Hypothetical Explosive Attack to Facility. Without Encl CY-99-009, Forwards Rev 1 to Haddam Neck Plant Defueled Physical Security Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p).Rev Does Not Decrease Effectiveness of Plan.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR73.21 & 2.7901999-01-14014 January 1999 Forwards Rev 1 to Haddam Neck Plant Defueled Physical Security Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p).Rev Does Not Decrease Effectiveness of Plan.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR73.21 & 2.790 ML20206R6051999-01-11011 January 1999 Ack Receipt of Submiting Sf Mgt Plan.Staff Has Reviewed Plan & Notes Plan to Store Sf in SFP Until DOE Takes Physical Possession of Fuel DD-98-12, Informs That Time Provided by NRC Regulation within Which Commission May Act to Review Director'S Decision DD-98-12 Has Expired.Decision Became Final Agency Action on 981211. with Certificate of Svc.Served on 9812221998-12-22022 December 1998 Informs That Time Provided by NRC Regulation within Which Commission May Act to Review Director'S Decision DD-98-12 Has Expired.Decision Became Final Agency Action on 981211. with Certificate of Svc.Served on 981222 CY-98-142, Forwards Proposed Rev 2 of Cyap QAP for Info & Approval of Exception Number 8 of App E of Cy Qap.Copy of Rev 2 Showing Changes from Rev 1 Also Included1998-12-22022 December 1998 Forwards Proposed Rev 2 of Cyap QAP for Info & Approval of Exception Number 8 of App E of Cy Qap.Copy of Rev 2 Showing Changes from Rev 1 Also Included ML20198R1321998-12-21021 December 1998 Forwards Insp Rept 50-213/98-05 on 980720-1102.No Violations Noted.Insp Completes Review of Licensee Actions Described in ,In Response to NOV & Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties ML20198K8651998-12-21021 December 1998 Ack Receipt of ,Requesting Corrected Pages to Be Issued for License Amend 193,issued on 980630.Informs That Inconsistencies Found When Comparing Corrected Pages Submitted on 981030 & License Amend Application CY-98-201, Provides Clarification of NRC Staff SE for Amend 193 Which Approved HNP Defueled TSs1998-12-0303 December 1998 Provides Clarification of NRC Staff SE for Amend 193 Which Approved HNP Defueled TSs IR 05000213/19980041998-11-27027 November 1998 Forwards Special Insp Rept 50-213/98-04 of Licensee Performance During Reactor Coolant Sys Chemical Decontamination ML20195J3571998-11-19019 November 1998 Forwards Exemption from Certain Requirements of 10CFR50.54(w) & 10CFR140.Exemption Submitted in Response to 971007 Application & Suppls & 1218,requesting Reduction in Amount of Insurance Required for Facility 1999-09-20
[Table view] Category:INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEARCY-99-137, Notifies NRC of Intent to Apply Haddam Neck Plant 10CFR50 App B,Qa Program to Activities Related to Development of ISFSI at Haddam1999-10-12012 October 1999 Notifies NRC of Intent to Apply Haddam Neck Plant 10CFR50 App B,Qa Program to Activities Related to Development of ISFSI at Haddam CY-99-111, Submits Clarification of Changes Made to Connecticut Yankee QA Program,Per Util 990810 Submittal.Change Will Be Submitted to NRC in Dec 1999 as Part of Annual Update1999-09-0202 September 1999 Submits Clarification of Changes Made to Connecticut Yankee QA Program,Per Util 990810 Submittal.Change Will Be Submitted to NRC in Dec 1999 as Part of Annual Update CY-99-048, Forwards Cyap Rept CY-HP-0031,Rev 0, Bounding Dose Assessment for Offsite Radioactive Matls1999-07-29029 July 1999 Forwards Cyap Rept CY-HP-0031,Rev 0, Bounding Dose Assessment for Offsite Radioactive Matls CY-99-066, Forwards Revised Plan for Recovery of Licensed Matl from Offsite Locations.Completion of Implementation of Plan During Summer of 1999 Is Planned,Contingent on Support Extended by Property Owners,Weather & Uncontrolled Factors1999-07-20020 July 1999 Forwards Revised Plan for Recovery of Licensed Matl from Offsite Locations.Completion of Implementation of Plan During Summer of 1999 Is Planned,Contingent on Support Extended by Property Owners,Weather & Uncontrolled Factors ML20209C3911999-06-30030 June 1999 Forwards TS Page 6-3 for Haddam Neck Plant ML20195H1741999-06-15015 June 1999 Forwards Original & Copy of Request for Approval of Certain Indirect & Direct Transfer of License & Ownership Interests of Montaup Electric Co (Montaup) with Respect to Nuclear Facilities Described as Listed ML20195H3591999-06-0202 June 1999 Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp of License DPR-61.Corrective Actions:Disciplinary Actions Were Taken by Util Against Jm Foley & Individual & Departmental Emphasis Is Placed on New HP Stds & Expectations CY-99-057, Forwards 1998 Annual Radioactive Effluent Rept for HNP, & Rev 10 to Remodcm. with Summary of Quantities of Solid Radwaste & Liquid & Gaseous Effluents,As Well as Summary of Assessment of Max Individual Dose1999-04-30030 April 1999 Forwards 1998 Annual Radioactive Effluent Rept for HNP, & Rev 10 to Remodcm. with Summary of Quantities of Solid Radwaste & Liquid & Gaseous Effluents,As Well as Summary of Assessment of Max Individual Dose ML20206J2801999-04-30030 April 1999 Forwards 1998 Annual Financial Repts for CT Light & Power Co,Western Ma Electric Co,Public Svc Co of Nh,North Atlantic Energy Corp,Northeast Nuclear Energy Co & North Atlantic Energy Svc Corp,License Holders ML20210V5221999-04-0808 April 1999 Discusses Continued Performance of Technical Assistance Activities for NRC & Environ Survey & Site Assessment Program (Essap) Survey Assistance at Cy CY-99-042, Provides Info on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Haddam Neck Plant1999-03-31031 March 1999 Provides Info on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Haddam Neck Plant ML20206A6951999-03-29029 March 1999 Request Confirmation That No NRC Action or Approval,Required Relative to Proposed Change in Upstream Economic Ownership of New England Power Co,Minority Shareholder in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp,Yaec,Myap & Connecticut Yankee CY-99-024, Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-213/98-06. Corrective Actions:Meetings Were Held with Contractor Mgt, Disciplinary Action Against Worker Was Taken & Notices Alerting Workers to HRA Controls Were Posted1999-03-29029 March 1999 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-213/98-06. Corrective Actions:Meetings Were Held with Contractor Mgt, Disciplinary Action Against Worker Was Taken & Notices Alerting Workers to HRA Controls Were Posted B17697, Notifies NRC of Amount of Property Insurance Coverage, Effective 990401,for HNP & Mnps,Units 1,2 & 3,per Provisions of 10CFR50.54(w)1999-03-12012 March 1999 Notifies NRC of Amount of Property Insurance Coverage, Effective 990401,for HNP & Mnps,Units 1,2 & 3,per Provisions of 10CFR50.54(w) CY-99-032, Clarifies Info Re TRM Change Submitted with Re Proposed Rev to TSs on Seismic Monitoring1999-03-0909 March 1999 Clarifies Info Re TRM Change Submitted with Re Proposed Rev to TSs on Seismic Monitoring ML20204C6901999-02-22022 February 1999 Informs That Public Citizen Waives Copyright for 5th Edition of Nuclear Lemon So NRC May Reproduce for Purpose of Contributing to NRC Recommended Improvements to Oversight Process for Nuclear Power Reactors CY-99-005, Responds to NRC 981221 RAI Re Amend 193 to License to Reflect Permanent Shutdown Condition of Plant.Licensee Withdrawing 981030 (CY-98-199) Request & Will Submit Corrections in Future Proposed Rev to TS1999-01-29029 January 1999 Responds to NRC 981221 RAI Re Amend 193 to License to Reflect Permanent Shutdown Condition of Plant.Licensee Withdrawing 981030 (CY-98-199) Request & Will Submit Corrections in Future Proposed Rev to TS ML20203H9711999-01-21021 January 1999 Requests Response to Concerns Raised by Constitutent M Marucci Re Spent Fuel at Decommissioned Nuclear Plants CY-99-002, Forwards Response to NRC 981203 RAI Re Proposed License Amend to Relocate Requirements for Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation from Section 3/4.3.3.3 of TS to Trm. Supporting TSs Encl1999-01-18018 January 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 981203 RAI Re Proposed License Amend to Relocate Requirements for Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation from Section 3/4.3.3.3 of TS to Trm. Supporting TSs Encl CY-99-009, Forwards Rev 1 to Haddam Neck Plant Defueled Physical Security Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p).Rev Does Not Decrease Effectiveness of Plan.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR73.21 & 2.7901999-01-14014 January 1999 Forwards Rev 1 to Haddam Neck Plant Defueled Physical Security Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p).Rev Does Not Decrease Effectiveness of Plan.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR73.21 & 2.790 CY-99-010, Provides Special Rept Concerning Potential of Radiation Exposure Due to Hypothetical Explosive Attack to Facility. Without Encl1999-01-14014 January 1999 Provides Special Rept Concerning Potential of Radiation Exposure Due to Hypothetical Explosive Attack to Facility. Without Encl CY-98-142, Forwards Proposed Rev 2 of Cyap QAP for Info & Approval of Exception Number 8 of App E of Cy Qap.Copy of Rev 2 Showing Changes from Rev 1 Also Included1998-12-22022 December 1998 Forwards Proposed Rev 2 of Cyap QAP for Info & Approval of Exception Number 8 of App E of Cy Qap.Copy of Rev 2 Showing Changes from Rev 1 Also Included CY-98-201, Provides Clarification of NRC Staff SE for Amend 193 Which Approved HNP Defueled TSs1998-12-0303 December 1998 Provides Clarification of NRC Staff SE for Amend 193 Which Approved HNP Defueled TSs CY-98-191, Provides Notification That Util Implemented Defueled Emergency Plan for HNP on 981001.Util Completed Annual Exercise Required by Subj Plan & 10CFR50.471998-11-0505 November 1998 Provides Notification That Util Implemented Defueled Emergency Plan for HNP on 981001.Util Completed Annual Exercise Required by Subj Plan & 10CFR50.47 CY-98-140, Provides Commitment to Maintain Water Chemistry Requirements in HNP Technical Requirements Manual1998-11-0202 November 1998 Provides Commitment to Maintain Water Chemistry Requirements in HNP Technical Requirements Manual CY-98-183, Forwards Revised License Amend 193 TS Pages to Correct Amend Number on Pages Not Changed by Amend 193.No Commitments Contained within Ltr1998-10-30030 October 1998 Forwards Revised License Amend 193 TS Pages to Correct Amend Number on Pages Not Changed by Amend 193.No Commitments Contained within Ltr CY-98-199, Forwards Listing of Corrections Made & Revised Pages for Proposed License Amend 193.Ltr Also Transmits Repaginated Pages for TS Index & Section 1,per Request of NRC Project Manager1998-10-30030 October 1998 Forwards Listing of Corrections Made & Revised Pages for Proposed License Amend 193.Ltr Also Transmits Repaginated Pages for TS Index & Section 1,per Request of NRC Project Manager CY-98-062, Updates Info of Historical Nature in Response to Both NRC Historical Review Rept & NRC Insp Rept 50-213/97-11 Open Items1998-10-28028 October 1998 Updates Info of Historical Nature in Response to Both NRC Historical Review Rept & NRC Insp Rept 50-213/97-11 Open Items CY-98-154, Forwards Sf Mgt Plan for Haddam Neck Plant.Plan Submits Info on Mgt & Funding for Program to Safely Store Sf Following Permanent Cessation of Power Operations Until Title Is Transferred to DOE1998-10-28028 October 1998 Forwards Sf Mgt Plan for Haddam Neck Plant.Plan Submits Info on Mgt & Funding for Program to Safely Store Sf Following Permanent Cessation of Power Operations Until Title Is Transferred to DOE CY-98-129, Provides Supplemental Info to 980629 Response to 2.206 Petition Questions on Spent Fuel Cooling Methods.Util Pending Commitment Made within Ltr Stated1998-10-14014 October 1998 Provides Supplemental Info to 980629 Response to 2.206 Petition Questions on Spent Fuel Cooling Methods.Util Pending Commitment Made within Ltr Stated CY-98-186, Provides Notification of Organizational Changes Which Affect Cyap.Organization Chart,Biographical Profile of K Heider & Revised Distribution List for NRC Correspondence,Encl1998-10-0202 October 1998 Provides Notification of Organizational Changes Which Affect Cyap.Organization Chart,Biographical Profile of K Heider & Revised Distribution List for NRC Correspondence,Encl CY-98-153, Forwards Final Response to NRC 961009 RAI Re Configuration Mgt Project at Plant.No New Commitments Made within Ltr or Attachment1998-09-30030 September 1998 Forwards Final Response to NRC 961009 RAI Re Configuration Mgt Project at Plant.No New Commitments Made within Ltr or Attachment CY-98-157, Responds to NRC Request That Cyap Submit Proposed License Amend to Include Fuel Storage Pool Water Chemistry Program within Haddam Neck Plant Ts.Cyap Considers That Amend Is Not Necessary for Listed Reasons.Procedure Encl1998-09-28028 September 1998 Responds to NRC Request That Cyap Submit Proposed License Amend to Include Fuel Storage Pool Water Chemistry Program within Haddam Neck Plant Ts.Cyap Considers That Amend Is Not Necessary for Listed Reasons.Procedure Encl B17440, Corrects Errors in Ltrs & 980225 Re semi-annual Fitness for Duty Performance Data for Jan-June 1998 & July-Dec 19971998-09-24024 September 1998 Corrects Errors in Ltrs & 980225 Re semi-annual Fitness for Duty Performance Data for Jan-June 1998 & July-Dec 1997 CY-98-151, Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-213/98-03.Corrective Actions:Root Cause Team Has Determined That Shift Managers Initial Reportability Decision Was Not Correct1998-09-21021 September 1998 Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-213/98-03.Corrective Actions:Root Cause Team Has Determined That Shift Managers Initial Reportability Decision Was Not Correct ML20153G3891998-09-14014 September 1998 Informs That Union of Concerned Scientists Fully Supports Citizens Awareness Network Petition Filed Pursuant to 10CFR2.206,seeking to Revoke or Suspend License for Haddam Neck Nuclear Plant ML20154J9861998-09-11011 September 1998 Forwards for Service Upon Lj Callan,Jc Hoyle & Commission, Request for NRC to Revoke Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co License to Operate Haddam Neck Reactor Pursuant to 10CFR2.206 ML20154J9991998-09-11011 September 1998 Requests NRC Take Immediate Action to Revoke Util License to Operate Haddam Neck Nuclear Power Station Pursuant to 10CFR2.206 B17420, Forwards Semiannual fitness-for-duty Performance Data for Jan-June 1998,per 10CFR26.71(d)1998-08-31031 August 1998 Forwards Semiannual fitness-for-duty Performance Data for Jan-June 1998,per 10CFR26.71(d) CY-98-107, Forwards Decommissioning Cost Study for Connecticut Yankee Nuclear Power Plant. Adjustments to Cost Estimate Will Be Made as Necessary as Detailed Work Planning Progresses & Elements of Cost Estimate Periodically Reviewed & Updated1998-08-25025 August 1998 Forwards Decommissioning Cost Study for Connecticut Yankee Nuclear Power Plant. Adjustments to Cost Estimate Will Be Made as Necessary as Detailed Work Planning Progresses & Elements of Cost Estimate Periodically Reviewed & Updated B17384, Submits fitness-for-duty Program Rept for Investigations Re Unsatisfactory Performance Test Results,Per 10CFR26,App a, Subpart B,Section 2.8(e)(4).No New Commitments Are Contained in Ltr1998-08-20020 August 1998 Submits fitness-for-duty Program Rept for Investigations Re Unsatisfactory Performance Test Results,Per 10CFR26,App a, Subpart B,Section 2.8(e)(4).No New Commitments Are Contained in Ltr CY-98-141, Requests Postponement of Defueled Emergency Plan Exercise Until 980923.Ltr Contains No New Commitments1998-08-13013 August 1998 Requests Postponement of Defueled Emergency Plan Exercise Until 980923.Ltr Contains No New Commitments CY-98-145, Provides Remediation Plans for Offsite Location 9621.Work Associated W/Location 9621 Scheduled to Begin on 9808171998-08-13013 August 1998 Provides Remediation Plans for Offsite Location 9621.Work Associated W/Location 9621 Scheduled to Begin on 980817 CY-98-132, Provides NRC W/Addl Info on Plant Defueled Emergency Plan. Util Stores Resin Liners Inside Area Protected by Vehicle Barriers1998-07-31031 July 1998 Provides NRC W/Addl Info on Plant Defueled Emergency Plan. Util Stores Resin Liners Inside Area Protected by Vehicle Barriers CY-98-127, Provides Clarifying Info Re Spent Fuel Pool make-up Capability at Hnp.Conclusions Reached by NRC Staff in SER Contained in Issuance of License Amend 193 Not Impacted & & Remain Valid1998-07-30030 July 1998 Provides Clarifying Info Re Spent Fuel Pool make-up Capability at Hnp.Conclusions Reached by NRC Staff in SER Contained in Issuance of License Amend 193 Not Impacted & & Remain Valid CY-98-118, Informs NRC Staff That Rev 38 to Plant Emergency Plan Has Been Implemented1998-07-21021 July 1998 Informs NRC Staff That Rev 38 to Plant Emergency Plan Has Been Implemented CY-98-121, Responds to NRC Request for Addl Info on Recent Operational Events at Plant.Corrective Actions That Have Been Taken, Discussed1998-07-16016 July 1998 Responds to NRC Request for Addl Info on Recent Operational Events at Plant.Corrective Actions That Have Been Taken, Discussed ML20151Z0221998-07-10010 July 1998 Informs That R Bassilakis & Gejdenson Share Same Concerns Re Recent Incidents at Connecticut Yankee Reactor in Haddam Neck,Ct & Hope That NRC Address Concerns Promptly ML20236P0971998-07-0909 July 1998 Inquires About Truth of Cyap Having No Shift Compliment of Licensed Operators at Haddam Neck Reactor ML20239A0651998-07-0707 July 1998 Discusses 980620 Inadvertent Radwaste Discharge from Plant Reactor.Team of NRC Inspectors,Completely Independent of Region I,Requested to Investigate Region I Ability to Regulate Effectively 1999-09-02
[Table view] Category:UTILITY TO NRC
MONTHYEARB13622, Forwards Crdr Human Engineering Discrepancy Info for Plant1990-08-30030 August 1990 Forwards Crdr Human Engineering Discrepancy Info for Plant B13617, Requests NRC Revise Confirmatory Order for Plant to Specify New Completion Date of Cycle 16 Refueling Outage for Item II.E.1.2.Util Intends to Implement Design Change During Next Refueling Outage to Resolve Listed Issues1990-08-22022 August 1990 Requests NRC Revise Confirmatory Order for Plant to Specify New Completion Date of Cycle 16 Refueling Outage for Item II.E.1.2.Util Intends to Implement Design Change During Next Refueling Outage to Resolve Listed Issues B13615, Requests That 900705 Request for Amend to License DPR-61 Be Approved on Emergency Basis & That Temporary Waiver of Compliance from Tech Spec 4.4.6.2.1.g Be Given Until NRC Acts on Emergency Amend1990-08-20020 August 1990 Requests That 900705 Request for Amend to License DPR-61 Be Approved on Emergency Basis & That Temporary Waiver of Compliance from Tech Spec 4.4.6.2.1.g Be Given Until NRC Acts on Emergency Amend B13611, Forwards, Semiannual Radioactive Effluents Release Rept for Jan-June 19901990-08-16016 August 1990 Forwards, Semiannual Radioactive Effluents Release Rept for Jan-June 1990 B13595, Notifies NRC That Utils Volunteer to Participate in Emergency Response Data Sys Project for All Four Nuclear Units,Per Generic Ltr 89-15 & NUREG-13941990-08-14014 August 1990 Notifies NRC That Utils Volunteer to Participate in Emergency Response Data Sys Project for All Four Nuclear Units,Per Generic Ltr 89-15 & NUREG-1394 B13602, Submits Addendum to Plant Control Room Design Review Summary Rept,Per .Lists 10CFR50 App R-related Mods Outside Control Room That Could Not Be Reviewed Until After Final Implementation of Changes1990-08-14014 August 1990 Submits Addendum to Plant Control Room Design Review Summary Rept,Per .Lists 10CFR50 App R-related Mods Outside Control Room That Could Not Be Reviewed Until After Final Implementation of Changes B13580, Discusses Revised Tech Spec Conversion Program,Reflecting Conversion of Tech Spec to Westinghouse Sts.Future Upgrade of Tech Specs Should Be Conducted on Voluntary Basis Consistent W/Nrc Policy Statement1990-08-10010 August 1990 Discusses Revised Tech Spec Conversion Program,Reflecting Conversion of Tech Spec to Westinghouse Sts.Future Upgrade of Tech Specs Should Be Conducted on Voluntary Basis Consistent W/Nrc Policy Statement B13603, Withdraws 900731 Request for Temporary Waiver of Compliance W/Tech Spec 3.7.1.2 Re Inoperability of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps1990-08-0202 August 1990 Withdraws 900731 Request for Temporary Waiver of Compliance W/Tech Spec 3.7.1.2 Re Inoperability of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps B13601, Requests Temporary Waiver of Compliance from Tech Spec 3.7.1.2,allowing Plant to Remain in Mode 3 for Addl 14 Days Beyond Current Action Statement Limits W/One or of Two Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Inoperable1990-07-31031 July 1990 Requests Temporary Waiver of Compliance from Tech Spec 3.7.1.2,allowing Plant to Remain in Mode 3 for Addl 14 Days Beyond Current Action Statement Limits W/One or of Two Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Inoperable B13585, Provides Supplemental Response to Generic Ltr 89-19 Re Request for Action Concerning Resolution of Unresolved Safety Issue A-47.Plant Procedures Modified to Provide Operability Verification of Steam Generator Protection Sys1990-07-26026 July 1990 Provides Supplemental Response to Generic Ltr 89-19 Re Request for Action Concerning Resolution of Unresolved Safety Issue A-47.Plant Procedures Modified to Provide Operability Verification of Steam Generator Protection Sys B13571, Clarifies 900625 Tech Spec Change Request Re Limit of 160 Failed Fuel Rods for Cycle 16 Operation1990-07-19019 July 1990 Clarifies 900625 Tech Spec Change Request Re Limit of 160 Failed Fuel Rods for Cycle 16 Operation B13569, Forwards, Haddam Neck Plant Decommissioning Financial Assurance Certification Rept1990-07-18018 July 1990 Forwards, Haddam Neck Plant Decommissioning Financial Assurance Certification Rept ML20055E6791990-07-0606 July 1990 Responds to NRC Bulletin 88-008, Thermal Stresses in Piping Connected to Rcs. All Socket Welded Joints from Header Isolation motor-operated Valves to RCS for All 4 Loops Examined.No Recordable Indications Found ML20055D3461990-07-0303 July 1990 Responds to NRC Bulletin 90-001 Re Loss of Fill Oil Transmitters Mfg by Rosemount.Operability Determinations Performed & Documented for All Rosemount 1153 & 1154 Transmitters at Facility B13564, Provides NRC W/Info Re Plant Pressurizer as follow-up to 900607 Meeting.Info Particularly Concerns Disposition of Three Indications on Pressurizer Inner Surface & Discussion of Resolution of Previous Indication1990-06-29029 June 1990 Provides NRC W/Info Re Plant Pressurizer as follow-up to 900607 Meeting.Info Particularly Concerns Disposition of Three Indications on Pressurizer Inner Surface & Discussion of Resolution of Previous Indication ML20055D7191990-06-29029 June 1990 Amends 900604 Rev 13 to QA Program B13550, Responds to Generic Ltr 90-04, Request for Info on Status of Generic Safety Issues Resolved W/Imposition of Requirements or Corrective Actions. Implementation & Completion Tables for staff-imposed Requirements Encl1990-06-27027 June 1990 Responds to Generic Ltr 90-04, Request for Info on Status of Generic Safety Issues Resolved W/Imposition of Requirements or Corrective Actions. Implementation & Completion Tables for staff-imposed Requirements Encl B13364, Forwards Rev 19 to Modified Amended Security Plan.Rev Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790(a))1989-10-0505 October 1989 Forwards Rev 19 to Modified Amended Security Plan.Rev Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790(a)) B13376, Forwards Util Response to Generic Ltr 89-04 Re Guidance on Developing Acceptable Inservice Test Programs1989-10-0202 October 1989 Forwards Util Response to Generic Ltr 89-04 Re Guidance on Developing Acceptable Inservice Test Programs A08598, Provides Clarification of Util Position Re Emergency Notification Sys (ENS) & Health Physics Network (Hpn).Util Intends to Provide Two Separate Qualified Individuals for ENS & HPN Communications During Exercise Drills1989-10-0202 October 1989 Provides Clarification of Util Position Re Emergency Notification Sys (ENS) & Health Physics Network (Hpn).Util Intends to Provide Two Separate Qualified Individuals for ENS & HPN Communications During Exercise Drills B13375, Responds to Request for Addl Info Re Electrical Distribution Sys Design Associated W/New Switchgear Bldg.New Switchgear Bldg Provides Opportunity to Minimize Dependence on Motor Control Ctr 5 & Further Reduce Level of Risk1989-09-29029 September 1989 Responds to Request for Addl Info Re Electrical Distribution Sys Design Associated W/New Switchgear Bldg.New Switchgear Bldg Provides Opportunity to Minimize Dependence on Motor Control Ctr 5 & Further Reduce Level of Risk ML20248E4521989-09-29029 September 1989 Forwards Proposed Tech Spec Pages Omitted from 890728 Application for Amend to License DPR-61 Re Cycle 16 Reload B13374, Forwards Bimonthly Progress Rept 18 Re New Switchgear Bldg Const1989-09-27027 September 1989 Forwards Bimonthly Progress Rept 18 Re New Switchgear Bldg Const B13352, Requests Exemption from Certain Requirements of 10CFR50,App J to Assure That Containment Leakage During Design Basis Event Will Not Exceed Applicable Leakage Limits. Justification Encl1989-09-0808 September 1989 Requests Exemption from Certain Requirements of 10CFR50,App J to Assure That Containment Leakage During Design Basis Event Will Not Exceed Applicable Leakage Limits. Justification Encl A08170, Forwards Updated Schedules for Operator Licensing & Requalification Exams for Plants,Per Generic Ltrs 89-12 & 89-031989-08-30030 August 1989 Forwards Updated Schedules for Operator Licensing & Requalification Exams for Plants,Per Generic Ltrs 89-12 & 89-03 B13346, Forwards Tornado Missile Risk Analysis of Bleed & Feed & Auxiliary Feedwater Safe Shutdown Sys at Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Station, Per SEP Topics III-2 & III-4.A1989-08-30030 August 1989 Forwards Tornado Missile Risk Analysis of Bleed & Feed & Auxiliary Feedwater Safe Shutdown Sys at Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Station, Per SEP Topics III-2 & III-4.A B13351, Provides Clarifications of Util & NRC 890525 Insp Rept 50-213/89-200.Util Proposes to Extend Schedule for Completion of Sampling and Evaluation Program to 900930 & Valves That Fail Systematic Testing Will Be Replaced1989-08-28028 August 1989 Provides Clarifications of Util & NRC 890525 Insp Rept 50-213/89-200.Util Proposes to Extend Schedule for Completion of Sampling and Evaluation Program to 900930 & Valves That Fail Systematic Testing Will Be Replaced A08237, Confirms Receipt of Listed Invoices for Costs Incurred During Routine Insps1989-08-28028 August 1989 Confirms Receipt of Listed Invoices for Costs Incurred During Routine Insps B13340, Submits Results of Svc Water & Primary Auxiliary Bldg Equipment Operability Analyses Not Provided in 890428 Submittal of Results of ECCS Single Failure Analysis1989-08-24024 August 1989 Submits Results of Svc Water & Primary Auxiliary Bldg Equipment Operability Analyses Not Provided in 890428 Submittal of Results of ECCS Single Failure Analysis A08211, Ack Receipt of Listed Invoices for Cost Incurred During Routine Insps at Plants.Payment Will Be Made on 8909061989-08-22022 August 1989 Ack Receipt of Listed Invoices for Cost Incurred During Routine Insps at Plants.Payment Will Be Made on 890906 B13341, Forwards WCAP-12196, Svc Water Sys Design Basis Temp Increase to 95 F for Connecticut Yankee & Haddam Neck Plant, Per Request in Amend 112 to License DPR-61.Northeast Utils Svc Co Suppl to Rept Also Encl1989-08-21021 August 1989 Forwards WCAP-12196, Svc Water Sys Design Basis Temp Increase to 95 F for Connecticut Yankee & Haddam Neck Plant, Per Request in Amend 112 to License DPR-61.Northeast Utils Svc Co Suppl to Rept Also Encl B13339, Forwards Addl Info Re Util 881026 & 890306 Revised Tech Specs Requests,Per NRC Request.Existing 8 H Shift Frequency Does Not Provide Enough Latitude within 8 H Shift Whereas 12 H Shift Would1989-08-21021 August 1989 Forwards Addl Info Re Util 881026 & 890306 Revised Tech Specs Requests,Per NRC Request.Existing 8 H Shift Frequency Does Not Provide Enough Latitude within 8 H Shift Whereas 12 H Shift Would B13342, Provides Util Position Re Procurement of non-code Class Fasteners in ASME Code Class Applications from Mfg or Matl Suppliers,Per Util to NRC & Insp Rept 50-423/88-18.App B Program Assures Use of Equivalent Items1989-08-15015 August 1989 Provides Util Position Re Procurement of non-code Class Fasteners in ASME Code Class Applications from Mfg or Matl Suppliers,Per Util to NRC & Insp Rept 50-423/88-18.App B Program Assures Use of Equivalent Items A08186, Ack Receipt of Listed Invoices for Cost Incurred During Insps.Funds Will Be wire-transferred on 8908241989-08-0808 August 1989 Ack Receipt of Listed Invoices for Cost Incurred During Insps.Funds Will Be wire-transferred on 890824 B13336, Forwards Annual Occupational Exposure Rept 19881989-08-0808 August 1989 Forwards Annual Occupational Exposure Rept 1988 ML20247Q7691989-08-0303 August 1989 Forwards Rev 12 to QA Program Topical Rept B13323, Comments on Draft Reg Guide, Assuring Availability of Funds for Decommissioning Nuclear Reactors. Changes to Stated Phrases Re Certification Amounts Discussed1989-08-0303 August 1989 Comments on Draft Reg Guide, Assuring Availability of Funds for Decommissioning Nuclear Reactors. Changes to Stated Phrases Re Certification Amounts Discussed A08153, Advises That Payment for Invoices H1386,H1387,H1410 & H1411 Will Be wire-transferred on 890810,per NRC Instructions1989-08-0101 August 1989 Advises That Payment for Invoices H1386,H1387,H1410 & H1411 Will Be wire-transferred on 890810,per NRC Instructions B13321, Informs of Inability to Submit plant-specific Analyses for Util as Planned,Due to Delays Encountered in Completing Sensitivity & Break Spectrum Analysis.Meeting Between NRC & Util Representatives Arranged for 8908101989-08-0101 August 1989 Informs of Inability to Submit plant-specific Analyses for Util as Planned,Due to Delays Encountered in Completing Sensitivity & Break Spectrum Analysis.Meeting Between NRC & Util Representatives Arranged for 890810 A07974, Advises That No Agreements Restricting Employees to Inform NRC of Potential Safety Issues Exist,Per V Stello1989-07-31031 July 1989 Advises That No Agreements Restricting Employees to Inform NRC of Potential Safety Issues Exist,Per V Stello ML20248B7931989-07-31031 July 1989 Forwards Response to NRC Request for Addl Info Re Util 890421 Application for Amend to License DPR-61,revising Tech Spec 3.6, Eccs. Revised Tech Spec Also Encl B13307, Responds to Generic Ltr 89-06, Task Action Plan Item I.D.2 - SPDS - 10CFR50.54(f). SPDS for Plants Meet Applicable Requirements of Suppl 1 to NUREG-0737 & Consistent W/ Majority of Positions Provided in NUREG-13421989-07-21021 July 1989 Responds to Generic Ltr 89-06, Task Action Plan Item I.D.2 - SPDS - 10CFR50.54(f). SPDS for Plants Meet Applicable Requirements of Suppl 1 to NUREG-0737 & Consistent W/ Majority of Positions Provided in NUREG-1342 A08037, Responds to Generic Ltr 89-08, Erosion/Corrosion-Induced Pipe Wall Thinning. Plants Have Programs & Procedures in Place to Monitor Erosion/Corrosion for Both single-phase & two-phase Flow Sys1989-07-13013 July 1989 Responds to Generic Ltr 89-08, Erosion/Corrosion-Induced Pipe Wall Thinning. Plants Have Programs & Procedures in Place to Monitor Erosion/Corrosion for Both single-phase & two-phase Flow Sys A08007, Requests Extension of Deadline for Response to Generic Ltr 89-06, Task Action Plan Item I.D.2-SPDS-10CFR50.54(f), to No Later than 890721.Addl Time Needed to Allow for Completion of Thorough Internal Review of Response1989-07-12012 July 1989 Requests Extension of Deadline for Response to Generic Ltr 89-06, Task Action Plan Item I.D.2-SPDS-10CFR50.54(f), to No Later than 890721.Addl Time Needed to Allow for Completion of Thorough Internal Review of Response B13282, Forwards Response to 890501 Request for Addl Info Re Util Const of New Switchgear Bldg at Plant1989-07-10010 July 1989 Forwards Response to 890501 Request for Addl Info Re Util Const of New Switchgear Bldg at Plant A08093, Advises That Fourth Quarterly Installment of 1989 Annual Fees Will Be Wire Transferred on 890731 in Payment of Invoices H1146,H1222,H1190 & H1151,per 10CFR1711989-07-0707 July 1989 Advises That Fourth Quarterly Installment of 1989 Annual Fees Will Be Wire Transferred on 890731 in Payment of Invoices H1146,H1222,H1190 & H1151,per 10CFR171 A08111, Advises That Payment for 10CFR170 Fee Sent to Jm Rodriquez Re NRC Review of Rev 11 to QA Topical Rept1989-07-0707 July 1989 Advises That Payment for 10CFR170 Fee Sent to Jm Rodriquez Re NRC Review of Rev 11 to QA Topical Rept A07951, Responds to Suppl 3 to NRC Bulletin 88-008, Thermal Stresses in Piping Connected to Rcs. Issue Represents No Problem at Any Millstone Unit.Haddam Neck Valves Will Be Inspected for Leakage During Upcoming Refueling Outage1989-06-30030 June 1989 Responds to Suppl 3 to NRC Bulletin 88-008, Thermal Stresses in Piping Connected to Rcs. Issue Represents No Problem at Any Millstone Unit.Haddam Neck Valves Will Be Inspected for Leakage During Upcoming Refueling Outage B13268, Submits Addl Info Re 890425 Proposed Rev to Tech Specs Administrative Controls Section Concerning High Radiation Areas,Per NRC 890505 Conference Call1989-06-26026 June 1989 Submits Addl Info Re 890425 Proposed Rev to Tech Specs Administrative Controls Section Concerning High Radiation Areas,Per NRC 890505 Conference Call B13215, Advises That One Technically Qualified & Trained Individual Per Site Will Man Health Physics Network & Emergency Notification Sys Telephone Lines at Plants,Per NRC Ltrs1989-06-23023 June 1989 Advises That One Technically Qualified & Trained Individual Per Site Will Man Health Physics Network & Emergency Notification Sys Telephone Lines at Plants,Per NRC Ltrs 1990-08-30
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""*'**""""C"" P.O. BOX 270 HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT 06141-0270 L L J Z Z,7% 7, (203) 665-5000 April 28, 1989 Docket No. 50-213 B13223 ISAP Topic No. 1.117 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ,
Attention: Document Control Desk '
Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:
Haddam Neck Plant Results of Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)
Sinale Failure Analysis By letters dated May 13, 1988,(I) and May 27, 1988,(2) Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company (CYAPC0) informed the NRC Staff that a single failure analysis of the ECCS electrical and air systems aoug)beCYAPC0 performed at the Haddam Neck Plant. By letter dated October 28, 1988, provided the NRC Staff with the scope of this analysis and a tentative completion date of April 1989. The purpose of this letter is to provide the results of this single failure analysis.
1
! Impell Corporation has performed the single failure analysis as described in l' the October 28, 1988 letter and has provided CYAPC0 with a report summarizing each component reviewed and how it w satisfactorily addressed. In addition, Impell Corporation provided a summary of unresolved potential single failures.
Northeast Utilities Service Company (NUSCO), on behalf of CYAPCO, has reviewed carb of these items and has addressed their single failure vulnera-bility. Each potential component failure as identified by Impell and its NUSCO evaluation is provided in Attachment 1.
Two single failure vulnerabilities were discovered and addressed as follows:
(1) E. J. Mroczka letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk, "Information Regarding ECCS Single Failure Analysis," dated May 13, 1988, stated that a single failure analysis of ECCS mechanical components would be completed prior to restart. Details of this evaluation were discussed at a meeting with the NRC Staff in our office on May 17, 1988.
(2) E. J. Mroczka letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk, " Retraction of Proposed License Amendment," dated May 27, ,
1988.
(3) E. J. Mroczka letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk, "Information Regarding ECCS Single Failure Analysis," dated October 28, 1988.
fo0{
8905080292 890428 / g PDR ADOCK 05000213 P PDC ;
L U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissior _
B13223/Page 2 !
April 28, 1989 i
- 1. Item D.1 A boundary valve between the Quality Assurance (QA) Category i and non-QA piping, CH-V-383, which was positioned open during operation could have resulted in loss of potentially contaminated sump water during the recirculation phase of a LOCA. A procedure change and valve CH-V-383 has been closed to resolve this concern.
- 2. Item E.2 A scenario was postulated where the failure of two service water pumps during a LOCA due to an electrical bus failure could result in insuffi-cient service water flow to the safety-related components. Modifications
' installed as aJanuary result of a 1989, similgr) 4 scenario reported to the g Staff by 1 letters dated 13, and February 10, 1989, resolved '!
this vulnerability.
As discussed in Attachment 1, the service water and primary auxiliary building equipment operability analyses are not yet complete. CYAPC0 will submit the results of these analyses by June 30, 1989.
If you have any questions, please contact us.
~
Very truly yours, CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY h
E. J froczka 6'
<t/
Senior Vice President cc: W. T. Russell, Region I Administrator A. B. Wang, NRC Project Manager, Haddam Neck Plant J. T. Shedlosky, Senior Resident Inspector, Haddam Neck Plant (4) D. B. Miller, Jr., letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document ,
Control Desk, transmitting Reportable Occurrence LER 50-213/88-022-00, '
" Reduced Heat Removal Rate in Containment Air Recirculation Cooling Coils," dated January 13, 1989.
(5) E. J. Mroczka letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk, " Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications, Containment Integrity During CAR Fan Heat Exchanger Cleaning Activities," dated February 10, 1989.
. l -
Docket No. 50-213 B13223 i
Attachment 1 Haddam Neck Plant Results of Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)
Single Failure Analysis i
April 1989
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B13223/ Attachment 1/Page 1 April 28, 1989 Haddam Neck Plant Results of Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)
Sinale Failure Analysis A. Hiah-Pressure Safety In.iection (HPSI)
- 1. Issue The spurious or accidental closure of either HPSI system minimum flow . isolation valves SI-M0V-903 or SI-M0V-904 during a small-break loss. of coolant accident (LOCA) of a size that would result in reactor coolant system .(RCS) pressure remaining above the shutoff head of the HPSI pumps could result in failing both HPSI pumps.
Resolution
.By letters dated September 29, 1975,(I) and November 14, 1975,(2)
CYAPC0 submitted an ECCS single. failure analysis which considered the potential for spurious motor-operated valve (MOV) movement.
This report indicated the need for some plant and procedure modifi-cations. These modifications that CYAPC0 committed to implement consisted of (1) locking open the circuit breakers supplying power to valves SI-MOV-24 and RH-MOV-22 to ensure that they remain open during operation, (2) locking open valves SI-FCV-875 and RH-FCV-796 and isolating their air supply during operation, (3) locking closed valve RH-FCV-602 and isolating its air supply during operation, and (4) installing an ' additional throttling valve parallel to FCV-J10 and agher isolation valve parallel to CH-M0V-242. On December 19, 1975, ~ CYAPC0 informed the NRC Staff that a Westinghouse (H) 1 analysis demonstrated that the probability of spurious movement of i an M0V critical to ECCS operation, in conjunction with a LOCA, was extremely low and represented negligible risk to safe plant opera-tion. As su CYAPC0 rescinded the earlier commitments. A March 18,1975g letter reaffirmed CYAPCO's position regarding the probability of spurious' movement of an MOV in the ECCS in light of (1) D. C. Switzer letter to R. A. Purple, dated September 29, 1975. i (2) D. C. Switzer letter to R. A. Purple, dated November 14, 1975.
(3) D. C. Switzer letter to R. A. Purple, dated December 19, 1975.
(4) D. C. Switzer letter to R. A. Purple, dated March 18, 1975.
i V.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B13223/ Attachment 1/Page 2 April 28, 1989 i discussions between the NRC Staff and H;(5) this position maintained that the H analysis was applicable to the Haddam Neck Plant, and that it adequately and accurately addressed the extremely low ;
probability of spurious Mg movement in conjunction with a LOCA.
However, on June 25, 1976, CYAPC0 agreed to implement the above-mentioned modifications in order to support expeditious review by j the NRC Staff of the Cycle VII operation. This letter emphasized l that CYAPC0 continued to believe that the H analytical effort remained applicable to the Haddam Neck Plant and that it adequatg addressed the issue of spurious M0V movement. The NRC Staff acknowledged the low probability of spurious valve failures and found the commitments made to be acceptable to meet the sin failure criterion for the ECCS. Finally, on July 30, 1976,g CYAPC0 submitted technical specification changes associated with the guidelines of Branch Technical Position EICSB #18.
Based on this historical review of events, CYAPC0 has concluded that spurious valve movements are not part of the Haddam Neck licensing basis.
Thus, SI-M0V-903 and SI-MOV-904 are not single failure concerns in a regulatory sense because spurious valve movements are not part of the Haddam Neck licensing basis and need not be postulated. i However, CYAPC0 is processing an amendment request that will require these valves to be verified open at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. Fur-ther, the probability is extremely low that either of the HPSI minimum flow recirculation valve; will spuriously or accidentally close during a small-break LOCA. Current plant-specific probabilis- !
tic analysis techniques were used to evalusto the frequency that one of the two minimum flow isolation valves would close due to inter- i nally initiated events and potentially result in a ccre melt. This ,
analysis showed that tho increase in core melt frequency due to ene '
of two minimum flow isolation valves spuriously closing was f ar less than 0.05 percent and therefore r.ot a signf ficant contributor to the overall core melt frequency due to internally initiated events. The evaluated frequency was small primarily because the probability of a (5) Documented by R. A. Purple letter to D. C. Switzer, dated February 23, 1976.
(6) D. C. Switzer letter to A. Schwencer, dated June 25, 1976.
(7) A. Schwencer letter to D. C. Switzer, dated June 30, 1976.
l (8) D. C. Switzer letter to A. Schwencer, dated July 30, 1976.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B13223/ Attachment 1/Page 3 April 28, 1989 spurious closure of one of two MOVs due to hot shorts is a rela- ;
tively small number and if the RCS pressure remained at a pressure above HPSI pump shutoff head, there is a reasonable probability that the charging pumps could mitigate the potential of a core melt given !
their availability.
- 2. Issue An MOV stem or other component failure on one of the four injection valves (SI-M0V-861A, B, C, or D) that is undetected could lead to a condition where no flow is delivered to the reactor during the short-term recirculation mode of operation. If one of the valves failed during its initial opening (upon a safety injection actuation signal) in such a manner that left the gate wedged into the valve's seat, the operators would be unaware of this condition since the main control board indication for this valve would show an open indication. (This condition should not pose a problem during the injection phase since we would assume that two HPSI pumps are operating and three injection lines would be available with flow being delivered to the reactor through at least two of these lines.)
The failure now presents itself as a preblem upon entering the short-term recirculation mode since the operator will be required to close two of the 861 valves. If the operator were to leave open the valve that has failed (unknown to him), and the valve to the line where a line break has been postulated, the plant could end up with a condition where no flow is delivered to the vessel.
Existing safety-related and environmentally qualified instruments- ,
tion will not provide any direct indication that the above condi- :
tions existed. However, Emergency Operating Procedures direct the operators to use a flow-to-RHR pump amperage correlation., and an analysis may also be able to determine expected flow rates for the various conditions.
Resolution l
This type of valve faige (i.e., gate-stem separation) is consid-The Haddam Neck Plant was designed to l ered a passive failure.
(9) SECY-77-439, dated August 17, 1977, discusses this type of failure and states the on the basis of the licensing review experience accumulated in I the period since 1969, it has been judged in most instances that the <
l probability of most types of passive failures in fluid systems is sufficiently small that they need not be assumed in addition to the l
(Footnote Continued) l l _ _ _ _ _ -
l i
1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B13223/ Attachment 1/Page 4 April 28, 1989 withstand an " active" failure during either the injection or recir-culation phase of a LOCA as was discussed in the original Facility Description and Safety Analysis (FgA) and the safety evaluation for the full-term operating license. In addition, a single (ipyf ilure !
and analysis was submitted to the NRC Stgff) on May 19, 1972, supplemented on September 29, 1975, which not address passive failures. By letter dated June 30,1976,g the NRC Staff approved this analysis.
Thus, SI-MOV-861A, B, C, and D are not single failure concerns in a regulatory sense because passive failures are not part of 'he Haddam Neck licensing basis and need not be postulated.
Further, CYAPC0 has concluded that although the accident scenario is possiole, the probability of this scenario is of such a low value that when compared to other accident scenarios, the event is of relatively low safety significance. Current plant-specific probabi-listic analyses have revealed that the frequency of the above-described accident scenario represents far less than 0.5 percent of the core melt frequency due to internally initiated events.
- 3. Issue Loss of valve position indication by itself could cause ECCS degra-dation in the short-term recirculation mode. If one of the injec-tion valves was closed (unknown), the operator could close valves in the two intact lines with the fourth line being the one that is I failed. The net result is no flow into the vessel. j If a valve failed open (unknown) and the operator thought it was l closed and closed any one of the other injection line valves, the j (Footnote Continued) initihting failure in application of the single failure criterion to assure safety of a nuclear power plant. In the rare instances where a passive failure is assumed to occur, it is postulated 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> into the accident.
(10) Supplement to the Safety Evaluation, Section 4, ECCS of R. A. Purple letter to D. C. Switzer, dated December 27, 1974, transmitting the "Haddam Neck Plant Full-Term Operating License."
(11) D. C. Switzer letter to D. J. Skovolt, dated May 19, 1972.
(12) D. C. Switzer letter to R. A. Purple, dated September 29, 1975.
(13) A. Schwencer letter to D. C. Switzer, dated June 30, 1976.
4 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B13223/ Attachment 1/Page 5 April 28, 1989 HPSI and/or residual heat removal (RHR) pump could run out and possibly have cavitation problems.
Resolution The limit switch is attached to the valve stem and shows the actual !
position of the valve. Thus, it would be impossible to have valve i position indication at the main control board that was exactly I opposite to the actual valve posit'on without disc / stem failure '
(di.sc/ stem failure a- discussed previously is considered a passive failure and not postulated at the Haddam Neck Plant). Feilure of position status lights at the main control board would be corrected by the operator with new bulbs. Thus, loss of position indication is not a single failure concern.
B. Low-Pressure Safety Iniection (LPSI)
- 1. Issue The spurious or accidental opening of the containment spray valves RH-MOV-23 or RH-M0V-34 during LPSI pump injection would result in a reduction in core deluge flow.
Resolution CYAPC0haspreviouslyaddressedthesgiousopeningofthesevalves prior to plant restart in May 1988 At this time CYAPC0 con-cluded that the spurious opening of these valves, RH-M0V-23 and RH-MOV-24, would not be a concern from a regulatory standpoint since spurious valve movements are not part of the Haddam Neck Plant licensing basis and need not be postulated.
C. Residual H9at Removal
- 1. Issue As was the case during LPSI pump injection, opening of the contain-ment spray valves RH-MOV-23 or RH-MOV-34 during either short- or (14) E. J. Mroczka letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk, "Information Regarding ECCS Single Failure Analysis," dated May 13, 1988, stated that a single failure analysis of ECCS mechanical components would be completed prior to restart. Details of this evaluation were discussed at a meeting with the NRC Staff in our office on May 17, 1988. l
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B13223/ Attachment 1/Page 6 April 28,1989 long-term recirculation would result in a loss or significant decrease in both flow to the vessel and net positive suction head ,
(NPSH) to the RHR, HPSI. and charging pumps during their respective l modes of operation. '
Resolution These valves are again n)t single failure concerns in the regulatory sense for the same reason es provided for Item B.1,
- 2. Issue The component cooling water (CCW) surge tank relief valve (CC-RV-777) discharges to the containment sump suction line through check valve CC-CV-802. According to the ground rules established for this review, may be assumed.(ygakage past tank The surge the check reliefvalve during valve recirculation is not safety-related, and leakage could reach the CCW system.
Resolution Although CC-RV-777 is not safety-related, leakage through the relief valve should not occur because this valve should not be opened; that is, the back-pressure resulting from leakage around the check valve will help ensure that the relief valve remains closed. A passive failure (e.g. , heat exchanger tube break) would be necessary to pressurize the CCW system to cause a challenge to the relief valve.
Thus, CC-RV-777 is not a single failure concern since this type of passivt failure need not be postulated.
- 3. Issue The reactor containment sump level transmitters (LT-1810A and B) )
which are used to signti switchover frcm the LOCA injectico to recirculation modes of operation do not appear to be safety-related; Impell Corporation considered any component not listed in the Haddam )
Neck Plant Material, Equipment, and Parts List (MEPL) to be nonsafety-related.
(15) E. J. Mroczka letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document i Control Desk, "Information Regarding ECCS Single Failure Analysis," dated j October 28, 1988. 1
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Resolution The procedure for switchover to sump recirculation postaccident has been reviewed and determined that although the operator is instructed to check sump level using these instruments, the readout is not nsed in making a decision. Instead, the primary instruments- !
tion used to perform the switchover from injection to sump recircu-lation is refueling water storage tank (RWST) level. Although the reactor containment sump level transmitters are not the primary indication used to signal switchover, CYAPC0 has reviewed the environmental electrical qualification status of this instruments-tion and has determined that it is qualified.
- 4. Issue An M0V valve failure similar to that discusscd under 'the HPSI system '
could lead to a loss of core deluge flow for the long-term recircu-lation mode of operation. The valves to be considered for this case are the core deluge valves SI-M0V-071A and B which are reclosed after the initial injection phase anc left closed for short-term recirculation. The failure occurs when the operator selects a valve and opens it from the main control board. As before, if the valve should fail in such a manner that leaves the valve's gate wedged into the seat, the operator would be unaware c' this failure since a normal open indication would show at the main control board. This condition would leave the plant in a condition where no flow is delivered to the core deluge. 1 I
Loss of position indication by itself could cause ECCS degradation as a result of a similar scenario to the one described under HPSI.
Resolution This valve stem or disc failure has been determined to be a passive f failure. Thus, SI-M0V-871A and B are not single failure concerns in j a regulatory secse because passive failures are r,ot part of the i Haddam Neck licensing basis and need not be postulated.
However, operators are instructed to verify flow using the flow-to-
" RHR pump amperage correlation as this valve is beino opened. Should i flow not increase, the operators are directed to open the other valve. Therefore, operators do not rely solely on valve indication. i Further, CYAPC0 has performed a probabilistic evaluation and deter- !
mined that the frequency of the above-described accident scenario j represents far less than 0.5 percent of the core melt frequency due !
to internally initiated events.
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B13223/ Attachment 1/Page 8 April 28, 1989 D. Charaina System
- 1. Issue Leakage of water past the charging system check valve CH-CV-382A could result in potentially contaminated water from charging minimum flow up to drain header valves DH-V-319, DH-V-407, and DH-V-408.
These valves, although normally closed, are not listed in the MEPL and therefore cannot be considered as safety-related. Consequently credit cannot be taken for them preventing leakage.
Resolution CYAPC0 has determined that the potential problem was not that CH-CV-383A may leak, but that CH-V-383 was open during operation. I In the past, valve CH-V-383 has been left in the open position so that alternate letdown to the charging pump suction could be quickly established if normal letdown were lost. However, valve CH-V-383 is the boundary between Quality Assurance (QA) Category 1 and non-QA piping and should be closed to protect the integrity of the QA boundary. Therefore, as a result of this single failure analysis, valve CH-V-383 has been closed and a path to the primary drain tank (PDT) has been established via valve DH-V-408.
Now in Modes 1, 2, and 3 if normal letdown is lost, t. loop drain valve will be open and the drain cooler outlet valve will be throt-tied to provide a path to the PDT. An operator would be dispatched to open CH-V-383 and isolate the path to the PDT, thus establishing alternate letdown to the charging pun:p suction (volune control tank). The plant is permitted to remain in this condition, by procedure, for up to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, after which a plant shetdown would be initiated. Opening of valva CH-V-383 for short periods of tke at infrequent intervals is acceptable based ,on the low probability of a LOCA concurrent with the Tailure of the non-QA piping upstream during the short time the valve is open.
Based on these actions, CH-CV-383A is no longer a single failure vulnerability because the boundary valve, CH-V-383, is now closed.
- 2. Issue The following charging system relief valves were identified to CYAPC0 for determination if their set points were still adequate for the new ECCS flow paths:
- a. BA-RV-279--Metering Pump Suction Header
- b. CH-RV-280--Metering Pump Discharge Header
- c. CH-RV-332--Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Leakoff Line
I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B13223/ Attachment 1/Page 9 April 28, 1989 l
Resolution l CYAPC0 has completed an evaluation of these three relief valves and determined that no modifications are required. The results of this evaluation are as follows:
- a. BA-RV-279--This is a small capacity relief valve that is intended to handle back-leakage through the charging metering pump. In the event it should lift, the discharge will be ,
directed to the primary drains tank.
- b. CH-RV-280--The set point of this valve is sufficient to handle the system conditions expected during the recirculation and charging modes of operation and thus should not be challenged.
- c. CH-RV-332--The set point of this valve is adequate for antici-pated pressures and thus should not be challenged.
Based on these evaluations, BA-RV-279, CH-RV-280, and CH-RV-332 are not single failure concerns.
E. ECCS Suonort System: Service Water
- 1. Issue A failure of the service water discharge header Pressure Switch Relay PS1443X could cause all four service water pumps to automati-cally start except during a loss of off-site power (LOOP), when the PS1443X automatic pump start is blocked. Such a failure of this relay is an improbable event. Failure of Pressure Switch Relay PS1443X could, however, cause all four service water pumps to automatically start and possibly overload 4160-V and 480-V station service transformers under degraded off-site power conditions.
Pesolution During normal operation the Haddam Neck Plant operates with at least two service water pumps in service; therefore, failure of PS1443X could add a maximum of two service water pumps at once. The worst-case time for this tu occur would be coincident with the start of the HPSI pumps during safety injection.
CYAPC0 has reviewed this scenario and determined that should this event occur during degraded off-site power conditions of 111-kV, then all safety injection loads, plus the additional service water pumps, will start successfully. The Connecticut Valley Electric Exchange is instructed to maintain off-site power above 112 kV and, in this scenario, would already have entered their voltage restora- I tion procedures.
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B13223/ Attachment 1/Page 10 April 28, 1989 Additionally, the probability of this pressure switch failure concurrent with the starting of tha HPSI pump is very remote. The transient will be inconsequential if the pressure switch failure were to occur either seconds before or after the HPSI motor is started, such that locked rotor currents are not taken simultane-ously.
Based on these evaluations, CYAPC0 has determined that PS1443X is not a single failure concern. l
- 2. Issue The loss of an emergency diesel generator or 4160 emergency bus with l at least one off-site power feed available could result in an unanalyzed scenario. The above scenario would result in the loss of two service water pumps without the automatic isolation of SW-MOV-1, ;
SW-MOV-2, SW-MOV-3, and SW-MOV-4 with air still available to the ;
other air-operated service water valves. SW-MOV-1, SW-MOV-2, SW-MOV-3, and SW-MOV-4 can be closed via the local control switches which are located outsido the control room. ;
Resolution .
i This scenario i i by letters dated January 13,1989,[16f milar to that10,reportgdg and February 1989, in that the major i nonessential service water loads would not be isolated. However, l these scenarios are different with respect to the number of service (
water pumps available; two pumps are available during this scenario versus three pumps during the reported scenario.
As a result of the above-reported scenario, the following modifica- l tions vera completed: l
- 1. SW-MOV-1 and SW-MOV-2 were modified to close upon receipt of a safety injection actuation signal (SIAS).
(16) D. B. Miller, Jr., letter to U.S. Nucleer Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk, transmitting Reportable Occurrence LER 50-213/88-022-00,
" Reduced Heat Removal Rate in Containment Air Recirculation Cooling Coils," dated January 13, 1989.
(17) E. J. Mroczka letter to U.S. Nuclear Regul atory Commission Document .
Control Desk, " Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications Containment l Integrity During CAR Fan Heat Exchanger Cleaning Activities," dated ;
February 10, 1989.
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V.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B13223/ Attachment 1/Page 11 April 28, 1989
- 2. SW-MOV-3 and SW-MOV-4 had a remote close push-button installed in the control room. Plant procedures were revised to instruct operators to isolate these valves prior to placing the RHR heat exchangers in service. l
- 3. SW-TV-2365A and B (steam generator blowoff tank condenser l isolation valves) were modified to close upon receipt of an l SIAS. !
Based on these modifications, the failure of two service water pumps during a LOCA due to an electrical bus failure has been evaluated, and the results show that sufficient flow is provided to safety-related components during this failure mode.
Although an electrical bus failure was credible and was a single failure vulnerability, crediting operator action and the use of nonsafety-related equipment would have allowed the third service water pump to be available in sufficient time that this scenario was enveloped by the reported scenario.
It should be noted that prior to implementing these modifications, a probabilistic analysis had determined that the frequency of this {
accident scenario represented far less than 0.05 percent of the core i melt frequency due to internally initiated events.
- 3. Issue The service water system should be analyzed to verify that it is capable of supplying adequate flow during the injection phase of a LOCA with air-operated valvet SW-A0V-9, SW-A0V-738A and B, .
SW-FCV-1421E, SW-PCV-606, SW-FCV-112, SW-A0V-8, SW-TV-781A and B, i SW-TV-2210, and SW-TV-2365A and B open.
Resolution As part of a long-term resolution described in Item E.2, CYAPC0 a s water system reanalysis. As contracted requested by}!the to NRC performStaff,gceCYAPC0 intends to submit this .
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reanalysis by June 30, 1989. The draft of this reanalysis has 4 verified that the service water system is capable of supplying ade-quate flow, assuming these valves are open, except for SW-TV-2365A and B which were modified as described above. 1 (18) A. B. Wang letter to E. J. Mroczka, " Issuance of Amendment (TAC No. 72024)," dated March 7, 1989.
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F. ECCS Support System: Heatina. Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) f
- 1. Issue Neither the primary auxiliary building (PAB) exhaust nor supply ventilation systems are single failure proof. A loss of plant air (nonsafety-related) or the the failure of numerous components could render these systems ineffective in providing PAB ventilation after a LOCA coincident with a LOOP. Operator access is required and may not be allowed if the failures occur after recirculation initiation.
Resolution i
An evaluation is currently under way to determine if HVAC is essen- ;
tial in the PAB during a LOCA coincident with a LOOP. Specifically, this analysis will determine if equipment will remain operable at the temperature expected during a LOCA without HVAC available.
Preliminary results indicate that equipment will be operable. The final results of this evaluation will be provided to the NRC Staff by June 30, 1989.
- 2. Isrue The system operating configuration and the failure modes of various components for the PAB ventilation system are not clearly docu-mented.
Resolution CVAPC0 has acknowledged that the PAB ventilation system is not single failure proof and therefore is performing the analysis dis-cussed above to ensure that equipment can operate without HVAC. l
- 3. Issue The MEPL identifies a single ventilation path for exhaust air duct at<d dampers with no backup.. The inlet to this system from the PAB is not included as safety-related. Additionally, the MEPL does not include any PA3 supply ventilation components.
Resolution ;
Same as provided for Item F.2. '
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B13223/ Attachment 1/Page 13 April 28, 1989 G. Diesel Generator Rooms "A" and "B" Ventilation
- 1. Issue The air intake damper for each diesel generator room is motor-operated and is required for diesel generator room ventilation. A review of related documents and a site walkdown did not reveal the damper's component name (identification number) so that it could be checked against the MEPL to determine if the intake dampers and associated components have the required separation.
Resolution A review of the emergency diesel generator inlet damper motors has indicated that they are independent and a single failure in the dampers cannot cause both emergency diesel generators to fail.
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