ML20238C367
| ML20238C367 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Haddam Neck, 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 12/31/1983 |
| From: | Dionne B, Guzallis E, Powell J CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20238C358 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8712300230 | |
| Download: ML20238C367 (67) | |
Text
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s CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY HADDAM NECK, CONNECTICUT qa!k '
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h 1983 REFUELING OUTAGE ALARA REPORT '
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1983 CORE XI - XII REFUELING OUTAGE AT. ARA REPORT Prepared by:
1 B. J. Dionne.
ALARA Coordinator of CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY HEALTH PHYSICS DEPARTMENT Assisted By:
J. Powell E. Guzallis Reviewed and Approved By:
H. E. CLOW, HEALTH PHYSICS SUPERVISOR I
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TABLE OF CONTENTS Page
- 1. INTRODUCTION 1 II. RADIATION EXPOSURE CONTROL A. MANREM Totals Summary 2 B. Major Job ALARA Review Summary 10 C. Shielding.. Flushing, Source Removal and Timesaving Techniques 42 D. HELPORE II 46 III. RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION CONTROL A. Personnel External Contamination 49 B. Personnel Internal Contamination 51 C. Airborne Contamination 52 D. Tool, Equipment and Area Surface Contamination 54 IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 59
I LIST OF TABLES TABLE TITLE PACE I MANREM Expenditures by Selected Work Groupo 6 2 CY 1983 Refueling Outage Major Job Man-hour 7 and MANREM Summary 3 Connecticut Yankee's Repetitive Job Exposure Comparison 9 4 Nur.ber of Personnel Externally Contaminated by Work Group 50 5 Percentage of Personnel External Radioactive 50 Contaminations by Body Locations l
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LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS FIGURE TITLE PAGE 1 Daily Cumulative MANREM and MANHOUR Totals 4 for the CY 1983 Refueling Outage
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2 Daily MANREF and MANHOUR Expenditures 5 3 Steam Generator #1 & #2 Skirt Area 13 4 Steam' Generator #3 & #4 Skirt Area 14 5 Core Exit Thermocouple Shielding 18 6 Reactor Head on Laydown Pad with HACSS Shielding 19 7 CRD Repair Shielding 22 8 Reactor Cavity - No Shiciding 26 9 Reactor Cavity - Cavity Seal Ring Shielded 27 10 Reactor Cavity - Cavity Seal Ring and RV Head Shielded 28 11 Pre and Post Maslin Decon Survey 29 12 Pre and Post ALARA 1146 Decon Paint Survey 30 13 Steam Generator #1 - 4 Handhole Shield Survey 35 l
l 14 Old Cavity Pool Seal Pre and Post Radiacwash l Decon Survey 38 15 #4 T St P Valve 40 h
16 #2 Tc St P Valve 41 l
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- 1. INTRODUCTION The subject of this report is the Eleventh Connecticut Yankee Refueling ;
and Maintenance Outage. The Connecticut Yankee plant is located in the town of Haddam, on the cast bank of the Connecticut River, fifteen miles ,
south, southeast of Hartford. The reactor is a Westinghouse design, i pressurized light water system presently rated at 1825 MW thermal and 600 !
MW electric. Since achieving initial criticality on July 24, 1967, the plant has generated over 62.4 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity at an average yearly capacity of 82.7 percent (MDC net). The purpose of this report is to document the major radiological precautions and the ALARA techniques which were utilized during the outage, evaluate their effectiveness and recommend improvements for future use.
This summary of data adds to the previous Connecticut Yankee (CY) ALARA Outage Reports data base from 1979, 1980 and 1981. The benefit of this date base is that it will aid in MANREM estimated, document the application of ALARA techniques, provide a MANREM reference to quantify the effectiveness of ALARA techniques and assist job / task leaders in job planning.
This report is generated in accordance with the Northeast Utilities' (NU)
Corporate Management Program for Maintaining Occupational Exposure As Low As Reasonably Achievable manual, l The report covers the period from January 22, 1983 to April 15, 1983.
Topics to be discussed include:
- 1. Radiation Exposure Control--MANREM Totals Summary; Major Job ALARA Review Summary; Shielding, Flushing, Source Removal and Timesaving Techniques; and HELPORE II.
- 2. Radioactive Contamination Control--Personnel External Contamination; Personnel Internal Contamination; Airborne Contamination; and Tool, Equipment and Area Surface Contamination.
The Health Physics staff handled all major radiological events without any major problems and without violating any federal radiation protection regulations. The 1983 Outage Health Physics manpower was reduced significantly from previous outages. This necessitated more efficient manpower utilizztien snd ::nagement. In addition, all managerial positions in the 1983 Health Physics Outage organization were staffed with permanent CY HP personnel.
The major radiological jobs performed during the 1983 refueling outage were: Primary Steam Generator Inspection and Maintenance; Seismic 1 Support Malfunction (SEP); Head Area Cable Support Structures (HACSS);
Refueling yI to XII; Inservice Inspection (ISI) and CRD Repair.
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The ALARA data, ALARA Achievements, and new suggested future improvements are detailed in the following pages. j Page 1 of 62
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- 17. RADIATION EXPOSURE CONTROL-s p . IIA..MANREM Totals Summary A total pinnt dose equivalent of 1260 MANREM was expended during the-period January 22, 1983 to' April'15, 1983. .This total is based on Radiation Work Permits (RWP)--Pocket-Ion Chamber:(PIC) readings.which were-entered into the HELPORE II' program.
The 198.3 outage MANREM total, (1260 MANREM) overran our 1983 outage.
MANREM goal of 800 MANREM. The~ overrun was. caused in part by exceeding the estimates' for the SEP and HACSS projects (120 MANREM and 100 MANREM estimated versus 167 MANREM and'128 MANREM actual), the unanticipated ' steam generator (S/G) tube plugging effort (176 MANREM .j actual) and the unexpected CRD repair, RCP #2 Vibration repair, Pressurizer Relief Valve repair and other miscellaneous post-refueling work-(127 MANREM, total).
Figure 1 depicts.the " Daily Cumulative MANREM and MANNOUR totals for the 1983 Refueling Outage". The graph indicates that over the twelve week 1983 outage we expended approximately 1260 MANREM. By comparison, the twelve week 1980 outage total was 1000 MANREM. The following tabulation compares the MANREM and MANHOURS from the .
previous outages. '
Refueling Man Man Outage Dates Weeks REM Hours 1979 1/26/79 to 3/12/79 6 528 35,700-1980 5/3/80 to 8/8/80 12 1005 141,304 1981 9/26/81 to 11/16/81 7 878 73,383 1983 1/22/83 to 4/15/83 12 1260 72,665 Figure 2, the " Daily MANREM and MANHOUR Expenditures for.the 1983.' '!
Refueling Outage", shows that during the peak period, the MANREM i ranged fron 14 to 64 MANREM per day with an average daily MANREM of.
approximately 20 MANREM. By comparison, the 1980 values for the peak period MANREM ranged from 12 to 16 MANREM per day, with an average daily MANREM of approximately 14 MANREM.
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. The-breakdown of the station MANREMLexpenditures by work groups'is shown'in Table 1. In general, 175 MANREM'or 16~ percent of the: total station dose equivalent was. received by permanent CY employees 835 MANREM 'or 77 percent ;
~ by contractors-and 71 MANREM'or 7 percent by offsite utility. personnel. ..l 1
- No individual exceeded the federal quarterly or annual occupational . (
. externa 1' exposure Ifmits. In addition, no. individual exceeded.the 5. "
REM per year Administrative External. Exposure Limit.. A listing of~the CY 1983 Refueling' Outage Major: Job.MANREM and MANHOUR Sumnary is in Table.
- 2. This listing accounts for approximately 75 percent (90 percent is accounted; for using the grand totals listed ~ for the asterisked jobs in Table 2.I. - see respective ALARA Review Job. Summary.in section. IIB.) of the plants outage MANREM.- The top ten jobs for MANREM expenditures, are as.
follows:
JOB MANREM'
- l. Primary Steam Generator' Inspection and Maintenance 293.6
- 2. Seismic Support Modification (SEP) '
-167.6
- 3. -Head Area Cable Support Structures (HACSS) 128.8
- 4. CRD Repair 79.1
- 5. Refueling Cycle XI - XII 77.4
- 6. Inservice Inspection (ISI) '
76.9
- 7. Valve Repair / Maintenance 39.4-
- 8. Secondary Steam Generator Inspection and Maintenance. 40.8
- 9. Reactor Cavity Pool Seal Replacement 25.1
- 10. Loop Stop Valve #4 hT and #2 Tc Repair 13.6' i
A compilation of the personnel radiation exposure trends for repetitive jobs conducted during CY's 1979, 1980, 1981 and 1983, .l are shown in Table 3. For those repetitive jobs that have similar work. scope from outage to outage, the MANREM in general ,
is trending downwards. J I
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l TABLE 1 MANRFM EXPENDITURES BY SELECTED WORK GROUPS January 22, 1983 to April 15, 1983
- 1. ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF 5. OPERATIONS DEPARTME.N_T Total MANREM - 6.874 Total MANREM - 40.223 '
Plant Personnel - 2.398 Plant Personnel - 40.223 Contract Personnel - 4.316 Utility Personnel - 0.160
- 2. ENGINEERING DEPARIMENT 6. MAINTENANCE DEPARTMENT j Total MANREM - 32.957 Total MANREM - 769.77 Plant Personnel - 9.982 Plant Personnel - 95.212 Utility Personnel - 22.975 Contract Personnel - 628.966 Utility Personnel - 45.542
- 3. CHFMISTRY DEPARTMENT 7. QC/QA DEPARTMENT Total MANREM - 1.591 Total MANREM - 15.062 Plant Personnel - 1.586 Plant Personnel - 1.960 Utility Personnel - 0.005 Contract Personnel - 12.672 i Utility Personnel - 0.430
- 4. HEALTH PHYSICS DEPARTMENT Total fiANREM - 216.580 Plant Personnel - 24.360 !
Contract Personnel - 189.855 {
i Utilfry Personnel - 2.365 I The MANREM values are based on RWPs--PIC readings which were entered into the HELPORE nrogram.
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TABLE 2 CY 1983 REFUELING OUTAGE MAJOR JOB
SUMMARY
January 22, 1983 - April 15, 1983 I. Greater Than 10 MANREM Jobs Estimated Actual Estimated actual Job Title Manhour Manhour Manrem Manrem
- 1. Primary Steam Generator 2350 1984,79 123.472 117.03 Inspection & Maintenance
- 2. Seismic Support Modification SEP 10119.93 167.62
- 3. Head Area Cable Support Structure (HACSS) --
8985.08 -- 128,849
- 4. Refueling Cycle XI to XII 3207 3409.64 90.032 61.956
- 5. Inservice Inspection (ISI) 2622 2699.08 93.245 76.903
- 6. CRD Repair 2247 2542.00 65.299 71.862
- 7. Valve Repair / Maintenance --
2159.96 --
39.409
- 8. Secondary Steam Generator Inspection & Maintenance 886 2256.9 17.912 40.809
- 9. Reactor Cavity Pool Seal Replacement 2408 3463.39 24.104 25.108
- 10. Loop Stop Valve Repair
- 4 Th and #2 Tc 128 317.40 32.260 13.589
- Subtotals of actual manrem and manhours. Only include actuals for tasks which had estimated manhours and manrem. See section IIB for grand totals. )
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TABLE 2 (cont'd)
CY 1983 REFUELING OUTACE MAJOR JOB SITMMARY (Cont'd)
II. I to 10 MANREM Jobs Estimated Actual Estimated Actual Job Title Manhour Manhour Manrem Manrem
- 1. Reactor Coolant Pump #1 Inspection & Seal Replacement 515 488.82 10.609 8.897 i
- 2. Reactor Coolant Pump 72 Vibration Repair 310 393.04 8.295 8.815
- 3. Neutron Shield Replacement 310 333.58 2.720 2.965
- 4. 1A & IB Charging Pump Repair 556 587.71 8.000 2.596
- 5. Boric Acid Piping Heat Trace 820 726.62 2.717 3.000
- 6. Reactor Coolant Pump Inspection Calibration 80 61.66 1.600 1.721
- 7. Containment Penetration P-20 and P-71 Modification 660 428.37 10.050 2.245 1
l 8. Loop RTO Junction Box Installation 149 87.14 1.640 1.505
- 9. Primary Vent Header i Modification 95 51.67 2.350 l
1.015 III. Miscellaneous Jobs Actual Job Title MANREM
- 1. Radwaste Processing 47.005 l
- 2. Venting and Valving 34.197 I
- 3. Decon containment 29.960
- 4. Decen RCA 27.046
- 5. Operations Blanket 6.906
- 6. IIP Job Coverage and Surveys 4.384
- 7. Security Blanket 3.191
- 8. Administrative Blanker 2.476
- 9. Cavity Piltration 1.435 l
- 10. Chemistry Blanket 0.866
- 11. Maintenance Blanket 0.338
- 12. Building Service Blanket 0.053 1
Page 8 of 62
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TABLE 3 Connecticut Yankee's Repetitive Job Exposure Comparison 1979 - 1983 I l
JOB DESCRIPTION MANREM 1979 1980 1981 1983
- 1. Refueling (Disassembly / Fuel Shuffle l Reassembly) 117 124 132 62
- 2. S/G Primary Side Inspection ECT/ Prof. REM Tube 0.058 0.011 0.012 0.015 !
- 3. S/G Primary Side Repair Plugging Rem Tube 5.200 4.087 1.539 .0.803
- 4. S/G Primary Manway Removal / Replacement REM S/G 11.755 9.060 5.865 4.699
- 5. S/G Secondary Sludge Lance (4 S/G Total excluding equipment setup) 14.700 10.192 12.571 8.253
- 6. Reactor Coolant Pump Repair REM RCP 10.830 10.609 9.536 8.855
- 7. Inservice Inspection 12.681 22.869- 41.582 76.903
- 8. Valve Repair 25.706 8.132 16.438 41.379- Y
- 9. Cavity Filter Replacement 9.703 5.797 5.322 1.435
- 10. Cavity Decon ---
6.880 16.460 7.217
- 11. Radiation Control Area Decon & Trash 48.952 52.589 38.870 57.006
- 12. IIcalth Physics 42.083 189.377 222.395 216.580
- 13. Operations 11.212 31.296 37.656 40.223 Page 9 of 62
IIB. Major Job ALARA Review Summary Attached are the major ALARA review summaries. These summaries identify the job, list the tasks and their respective estimated / actual MANHOURS and MANREM list the ALARA controls 3
utilized, describe the effectiveness of the controls, shows survey data and enumerate suggested improvements. It is anticipated that these summaries will be of great aid in future job planning. fit is recommended that efforts begin immediately to evaluate and implement, where feasible, the suggested improvements so that they can be utilized during future outages.
I I. Primary Steam Generator Inspection and Maintenance II. Seismic Support Repair / Modification i
III. Head Area Cable Support Structure (HACSS)
IV. CRD Repair V. Refueling Cycle XI - XII VI. Inservice Inspection (ISI)
VII. Valve Repair / Maintenance 1
VIII. Secondary Steam Generator Inspection and Maintenance IX. Reactor Cavity Pool Seal Replacement l
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X. Loop Stop Valve #4 hT and #2 T Repair
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ALARA REVIEW JOB
SUMMARY
I. Job
Title:
Primary Steam Generator Inspection and Maintenance #1-4 Task Estimated Actual Estimated Actual Manrem No. Task Title Manhour Manhour Manrem Manrem Diff.
l 1. General HP Preparation 250 222.83 7.700 4.108 47%
- 2. Remove / Replace i
Manways (4 S/G) 390 303.76 27.395 18.795 31%
- 3. Set-up/ Remove ECT Equip. 407 479.74 26.260 26.000 1%
- 4. ECT/ Profilometry (ECT 3148 tubes / Prof. 1446) 1303 978.46 62.117 68.130 10%
- 5. Mech. Tube Plugging (220 tubes) ---
1625.16 ---
176.pj5 --
Sub-Total
- 2350 1984.79 123.472 117.G33 --
Grand Total ---
3609.95 ---
293.618 --
Subtotal excludes manhours and manrem from task f5 Tube Plugging.
Ap RA CONTROLS UTILIZED Fhielded drum for diaphragm storage; shicided loop Jrain lines and skirt work platform grating; hydrogen peroxide flush of primary piping with ion exchange cleanup; decon skirt surfaces and sludge on the floor below the grating; S/G ventilation systen.s (2,425 CFM/SG); ukirt herculite shroud; welding curtain on skirt entrance; S/G jumper pens; use of catch pan during diaphragm removal; jumpers to have mock-up training; tied off and inventoried equipment going in and cut; located eddy current readout in a low dose rate area; used automated ECT and Profilometry equipment; utilized mechanical tube plugging and audio and visual communication on jumpers and attendants.
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EFFECT?.VENESS OF ALARA CONTROLS The ALARA controls were adequate. The welding curtains with magnetic bases worked well. The pre-made jumper pens with scaled seams were casier to install and were not easily knocked down. The use of a dedicated HP coordinator proved to be of great use. The noise attenuators on the S/G ventilation system reduced the noise in the loops significantly. The routing of the steam generator l
ventilation exhaust duct to a common header worked well. The new S/G mockup I proved to be extremely useful. The S/G manway diaphragm 1/4 turn f asteners were not installed due to parts being received too late. Increased exposure resulted from: plugging row I tubes in S/G #1 & 2, nozzle and skirt cover retrieval, frequent failure of communications and TV monitors for plug removal, removal of l a hanging plug in #2 S/G and frequent ECT/ profilometry equipment malfunctions.
Page 11 of 62
j SURVEY DATA 1
l See Figure 3 & 4 Suggested Improvements Utilize telemetric dosimetry; improve audio visual communications between Health Physics and the worker; improve the power distribution to the skirts; formalize the mock-up training; purchase improved S/G ventilation duct inter-connector sleeves; improve housekeeping in the S/G jumper pens and skirt areas; investi gate the use of a skirt camera; install manway diaphragm 1/4 turn fasteners; modify nozzle cover design to prevent their loss in loop piping, and add per-manent shielding to S/G skirt work platform.
l Page 12 of 62
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- 1-29-83
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sm. Tri rTerTnq sm.
CAL. CA L.
[ moutnef so.v.as @ Pet Joe [ Post.jos COMPOSITE SPtCIAL (evPM 0TWte
]a es
"#* "#* 0064 RATR 4tADem08 att led h#taVWW Af ea'57 LtvtL UMLfl1 OfMtew 14iPECPe t D.
cierteD wusstes @ ino CATE wtan L oms.
CAk _ C'b' CitCLtc testat LOCATIONS AND WVetta W0tCAYe CouT&asemAflona LtvtL5 8N DresMie Cm3 s
Figure 4 HR
, (***%, 25R/HR 20R/HR ,e " ,i ,-
' \ -
. 18" 18"i8I ,'. " , [ 2,:,0.600R/HR
'.{ -
'..1
,/
e l
10R/HR g g,,
/
0.5-0.7R/HR i80 v
^" *
- r3R /h,< 2R/HR "D.o(u /HR ;
m-1 m f PLATFORM SHIELDED
,, ._m. l " " , 1l - W/ h" 0F LEAD
., n -
7 ..m
.,"' l l R"!m" mn
,.* ] ,
3 Q
' /
0.150 - 0.300R/HR c -
\
i I :*,'0. 400R /HR [
's. .-
o' (
wne .
t;.,
eman- - ,,-
l &!:
e
. l$
a s, \
1- )
_. . . .=
%:w M
- 1 l
" INDICATFS CONTACT READING 4
, O
- u ..<Aa.'ai r Aa' a t=>< O ALL i SA s t T=A i ..e.o c=> -
atALfw Pwf.eca rootenAn CD##tCT8tf ACTiest TAR.se es Cese Parc 14 of 62 t _ . .
~
ALARA REVIEW JOB
SUMMARY
II. Job
Title:
Seismic Support Repair / Modification Task Estimated
- Actual Estimated
- Actual Manrem No. Task Title Manhour Manhour Manrem Manrem Diff.
- 1. Repair / Modify /
Install Supports ---
4672.28 ---
102.099 ---
- 2. Move tools and material in and out of containment. ---
2018.36 ---
8.188 ---
- 3. Staging / Shielding ---
1389.70 ---
23.383 ---
4 Inspection 1205.51 23.220 ---
- 5. Hanger inspection by l Stone & Webster ---
110.96 ---
3.540 ---
l 6. RWST Supports ---
346.54 ---
4.610 - , _
- 7. Miscellaneous ---
376.58 ---
2.580 ---
Total ---
10119.93 ---
167.62 ---
- Because of numerous uncertainties in the SSR/M design and the complexity of work scope and work logistics, the Manrem/Manhour estimates could not be determined.
ALARA CONTROLS UTILIZED l Drawings were forwarded to ALARA to allow for adequate pre-job planning. Surveys for each job were taken after the work site had been identified. Because of the large scope of this job and the short time allowed for pre-planning it was necessary to set ALARA controls for shielding and contamination control on a case by case basis.
Delayed the hanger modifications in the middle level loops until the secondary steam generators were flooded. Shielding was installed on the majority of primary and safety related piping supports requiring modifications.
EFFECTIVENESS OF ALARA CONTROLS Exter.sive shielding was required which cost approximately 10 MANREM to install and remove, but yielded a net savings of ~55 MANREM. Due to a newly instituted shielding procedure there were delays in shielding many arean initially. Pre-job briefings of the work crews by the job leader were inadequate. Many times, locations were not identified to HP properly or in a timely manner. Work began before the full scope of the job was known.
FUTURE IMPROVEMENTS Ensure that the scope of the project be known before work begins and organize work logistics accordingly; ensure strict compliance with the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> RWP submittal requirement to allow for proper surveys and shielding installation; ensure job leaders brief work crews adequately; consider labor requirements for shielding installation / removal as a part of contractor manpower allocations and improve coordination between HP, Ops, ALARA, NUSCO B & B and the contractor supervision.
Page 15 of 62
i 1
ALARA REVIEW JOB
SUMMARY
III. Job
Title:
Head Area Cable Support Structure (HACSS)
Task Estimated
- Actual Estimated
- Actual Manrem No. Task Title Manhour' Manhour Manrem Manrem Diff.
- 1. Install cable trays from cable vault penetr.
l to charging floor ---
1223.99 ---
10.058 ---
- 2. Install and remove scaffolding ---
1328.41 ---
19.791 ---
- 3. Install CET connectors on head when in cavity ---
141.77 ---
8.895 ---
- 4. Install cables and Uni-strut for CET/HJTC in loops--- 562.81 ---
7.168 ---
- 5. Install cables / trays on missile shield on laydown ---
106.14 ---
0.330 ---
919.79 ---
47.460 ---
- 7. Install (4) panels /
connectors on charging floor ---
428.98 ---
2.007 ---
- 8. Seismically support missile shield ---
2554.52 ---
8.561 ---
- 9. Electrical test / check inspection 301.11 0.930 ---
- 10. Shield CETs connector area ---
215.33 ---
5.630 ---
- 11. Move tools / equipment ---
434.33 ---
2.311 ---_
- 12. Supervisory inspection ---
594.98 ---
6.148 ---
- 13. Disconnect / connect head cables ---
76.41 - - -
5.435 ---
14 Install CRDM protective aluminum covers ---
96.51 ---
4.125 ---
I Total 8985.08 128.849
- Because of numerous uncertainties in the HACSS design and the complexity of work scope and work logistics, the MANREM/MANHOUR estimates could not be determined.
i i
i i
l Page 16 of 62
a i
ALARA REVIEW JOB
SUMMARY
{
III. (Cont.) i ALARA CONTROLS UTILIZED I Shielded CET tube bundle area; personnel shields in cavity; shielded observation j booth in Rx head laydown, shielded core deluge pipe on R.V. Head; shicided CRD :
hydraulics around head lift rods; shicided deck of RV head catwalk; flushed core ;
deluge pipes, required mockup training or past experience for CET work; deconned '
CET tubes; herculited the scaffold and the area around the CETs; decenned and hercu11ted missile shield structure; cables installed in low dose areas whenever possible; prefabricated conduit, cables, connectors, trays and supports whenever possible; vacuumed or mas 11ned surfaces to be drilled, cut or grinded; used Z strip or needle gun to remove paint; vacuummed filings after drilling or cutting; and used high speed extension drill with sharp bits.
EFFECTIVENESS OF ALARA CONTROLS CET Shield installation and removal cost 5.6 MANREM; the HACSS Shielding on the R.V. Head in laydown cost 3.3 MANREM to install and remove and saved an esti-mated 2.5 MANREM; the CET mineral cable run in loops could not be scheduled when the S/G secondaries were flooded; cable raceways under R.V. Head catwalk were not located in low dose rate area; several field changes of cable runs !
around the RV Head Catwalk and near the drain cooler in the lower level outer annulus resulted in increased exposure; dose balancing amongst contractors was good; missile shield work went well with the exception of HACSS work area contamination caused by setting of the contaminated tensioner hoist monorail and contaminated I-beam on the top of the missile shield; and early acceptance of a Nelson studs gun to attach head catwalk cable raceways could have saved manrem.
SURVEY DATA See Figures 5 & 6 SUGGESTED IMPROVEMENTS Installation or modification of equipment in high radiation areas should require physical or photographic examination in an attempt to minimize interference problems; the station ALARA Coordinator should be consulted during the. design of all radiation shields; obtain as built drawings of the reactor head; during MOV replacement of Core Deluge valves consider replacing core deluge piping under catwalk and have prewired MOV connectors; reduce future drilling on RV head 1 as it is extremely hardened steel; and locate future cable runs in low dose areas; and modify CET tube bundle sleeves to reduce interference problems associated with conoseal disassembly / reassembly.
Page 17 of 62 i
q,I OfS229 FEV. T* 82 lATl!N CC%T A hKd A f t!N
}M
[gy Ogy CORE EX1T THEPJ40 COUPLE SHIFLDitr' 1/29/83-1/31/83 "E*5 N "5* Y' TIM E 4.TELETECTOR_ s.N. COMPOSITE
]nour:NEio.w.mi]PnEJoe OrosT.Jos
C" O s,ECiA L <=.,,, oT8Ea E7 5HIELD NG Da ~
' I O' N. 5.N.
" L- C^ '- CincLEo NuusERS @ INDICATE SMEAR LoCATloNS.
CinCLEp smEAa LoCATroNs AND NUmsER h 500)0 lNDICATE CoNTAMINATloM LEVELS IN DPMM00 CM2 Figure 5 m
=====r
.J "# s g ,
s r %.l
\ 8H g 5 '
~
3
' ,\ k f '
)
1 NORTH, SOUTH, EAST, AND WEST y CET PORTS GENERAL AREA ly 7 DOSE RATES (MR'/HR)
N f 3 I PRESHIELD POSTSHIELD
/ j d's 700-800 250-400 Q) Y; . !
y \
CET SHIELDItr> - '
j 3/4 LEAD PLATES HUNG ALONG ,
l I- /,,,s VERTICAL CRDM COOLING BAFFLES j LEAD WOOL BLANKETS (6-8) r STACKED AROUND.CET BULLET }l L NOSE b REACTOR VESSEL WATER LEVEL FQ ,4, AT THE TOP OF THE HEAD y ,
w%
x ~. w
_e ..e...' v. '
~
\
] 'J ALL $mEAR$ LEls TNAN 1000 DPM/100 Cm2/ ALL SMEARS LE1$ TK AN 100 DPM/100 CMId HEALTH PHY11F$ FOREMAN .
CO RECTivE ACTION TAKEN YES No l
Page 18 of 62 l
l
- PS221 9 EV. T 82 CY HEALTH PHYSIC $ $URVEY R&26 Aft!N CCNT AClil A TIC $$
( @gr O gy ON lAYDOWN PAD WITH HACSS SHIFLDING ^^**Q{T b bh3
" " ' "IU"YET' TIM E PR
- m. X-1000 s.N.
C^
] ROUTIN E !D.W.M)
PRE -JOB ]P$ . JO B TECH PO A '- 1 SHIELI ,
'-- '"'"OST
- C'"*"' rX' O7 O-
.N . -
$.N.
2 '- C " '-
CIRCLED NUMBER! h INDICATE SMEAR LOCATIONS.
CIRCLEo SMEAR locations AND NUMBER h 500)0 lNDICATE CONTAMINATION LEVEL Figure 6 N,ERAL AREA DOSERATES g . .- - .%
CATWALK:
I '
s IST 100-200 100-125
[-N- -
l ih d 1 c
"T 25_0-350 ,
"" [ #
150-200
~
/ ,Ci_ " .
GENERAL AREA DOSERATES ARDUND CORE DELUGE VALVE CONTACT ON CORE DELUGE PIPES:
I 00-2200 Nl
~
CONNECTORS' I {
125-250 -
f 250-700
\
GENERAL AREA DOSERATE ALONG R.V. HEAD LIFT RODS: ,
q gel j
$W
$$,N.
GENERAL AREA DOSERATES UNDER CATWALK:
l 400-600 I l. l 500-700 300-500 ,
1 300-450
, GENERAL AREA DOSERATES
!\ - /1 N AROUND HEAD VENT CONNECTOP,S:
A 400-600
> 300-350
~lr N
1, -
I: g 7 -
( }
PRESHIELD DOSERATE f Nf E ~Vl" POSTSHIELD DOSERATE e 6' ,
Oau $Ne>R$ 'ess Taia iooo oa oao C 'r aa $ae>Ri 'i$s T *~ iao or nao C 2 -
HEALTH PHYSIC 5 POREMAN C02:ECTivE ACTION TAKEN YE5 h MD Page 19 of 62
_________-___-_____--___A
ALARA REVIEW JOB
SUMMARY
IV. Job
Title:
CRD Repair Task Estimated Actual Estimated Actual Manrem No. Task Title Manhour Manhour Manrem Manrem Diff.
- 1. RX Vessel Head Disassem. 166 114.58 3.870 4.378 13%
- 2. Remove and store transfer tube flange 46 7.50 0.535 1.365 155%
- 3. R.V. Stud Detensioning 295 213.58 9.850 7.120 28%
- 4. Cavity Preparations 130 124.77 4.828 3.480 28'l~~
- 5. Internals removal and replacement 289 365.61 1.520 2.188 44%
- 7. RX vessel head preparation 29 26.66 1.175 1.640 40%
- 8. Fuel equipment inspection containment fuel moves 125 152.90 0.375 0.730 95%
- 9. RX vessel head replacement 38 86.33 3.188 5.815 83%
- 10. Cavity Decon 100 48.08 3.600 1.375 62%
- 11. RV stud tensioning 233 491.05 8.840 10.780 22%
- 12. Remove new seal ring 44 26.75 1.635 0.320 80%
- 13. Install transfer tube 21 16.99 1.235 1.615 31%
- 14. Reassemble RV head 181 286.41 11.648 17.091 47%
- 15. Disconnect / connect RV head electrical ---
32.00 ---
1.280 ---
- 16. Install / remove radiological equipment ---
56.56 - - -
2.800 ---
- 17. RX head vent solenoid valve ---
49.33 ---
3.129 ---
Subtotal
- 2.247 2,542.79 65.299 71.862 10%
Grand Total --- 2,680.63 ---
79.071 ---
Subtotal excludes manhours and MANREM from task //15,16 and 17 as no estimates {
were made for these tasks.
l 1
Page 20 of 62
. o IV. ALARA REVIEW JOB
SUMMARY
(Cont'd)
ALARA CONTROLS UTILIZED Same as ALARA controls used during Refueling XI - XII.
EFFECTIVENESS OF ALARA CONTROLS Effectiveness of controls were similar to Refueling XI - XII with the following exceptions. The following resulted in increased exposure: Poor briefings and improper tools for removal and replacement of the transfer tube flange (0.830 MANREM); operational problem with head vent solenoid valve required its removal, replacement, removal and replacement (3.1 MANREM); mechanical problem with loose air connector on stud detensioner delayed men in cavity; paper' wrapper was left on R.V. Head 0 Ring which required wrapper removal in a high dose area; because of time constraints unexperienced laborer briefings were minimal, therefore, worker efficiency was reduced. The following resulted in the spread of radioactive contamination; cavity seal plate lead blankets were not drummed in cavity, they were drummed on charging floor; a worker was sent into transfer canal to retrieve a piece of herculite without adequate protective clothing; removal of herculite from cavity seal plate resulted in airborne contamination.
In addition, the temporary RV Head shield and shield on the vessel flange and seal ring cost 2.7 MANREM to install and remove but the shield resulted in a net savings of approximately 40 MANREM. The water in the transfer. canal saved approximately 3 MANREM.
SURVEY DATA See Figure 7 SUGGESTED IMPROVEMENTS Suggested improvements for CRD repair are included in the suggested improve-ments Section for V. Refueling XI - XII.
(
)
)
i i
Page 21 of 62
]
- drsani e-so gnAoiArioN pourAourrio s CY HEALTH PHYSICS SURVEY CRD SHAFT REPAIR SHIELDING DAY / 0 41 DATE REASON FOR $URVEY:
TIME CAL. CAL. O aou"Nc'a > O 'ar Jo8 OPOST-JOB COMPOSITE PRE . TECH 0 5eeC AL <R.P.,
n O- OOTHERoos7 SHietoino 1 g
3 DOSE RATE READINGS ARE IN MREMAiR AT WAIST LEVEL UNLE55 01NERwtSE %PECIFIED, CIRCL E O NUMBE RS j C# INDICATE SMEAR LOC IONS.
C# I CIRCLED $MEAR LOCATIONS AND NUMBER INDICATE CONTAMINATION LEVELS IN DPMMOo CM2' Figure 7 8R/HRY S 33 gg h 2R/HR[&8 g (3 100 g y & 0(3 @ 18" 100-300 g y& 0(3 HR HR CRD DRIVE ASSEMBLY COUPLItG 1-2R/HR[
100-800HR$ { @ 18,,100-200 g y
- 1. WORKED ON IN A VENTILATED TENT HR
- 2. 4-5 LAYERS OF HERCULITE OVER t LENGTH OF SHAFT. .)
- 3. 5-6 LAYERS OF LEAD WOOL BLAtKETS PRESHIELD DOSERATE POSTSHIELD DOSERATE INDICATES CONTACT READIt4 i
O*u$as^a5'essTHANiooooeMoooCMr 2 OALLsaEARs'EssTHANiocao.oC2-NEALTN PHY$lC5 FOREMAN CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN YES ONo Page 22 of 62
ALARA REVIEW JOB
SUMMARY
V. Job
Title:
Refueling Cycle XI - XII Task Estimated
- Actual Estimated Actual
- Manrem No. Task Title Manhour Manhour Manrem Manrem. Diff.
- 1. RV head disassembly 175 166.18 3.820 3.870 1%
- 2. Remove / store transfer tube flange 18 45.75 0.167 0.535 220%
- 3. RV Stud Detension 336 295.34 11.567 9.850 15%
- 4. Cavity preparation 130 198.87 4.828 5.093 5%
- 5. Internals removal 130 77.17 0.790 0.415 47%
- 6. Fuel shuffle 1200 1271.81 5.200 4.130 20%
- 7. RV head preparation 70 28.92 2.973 1.175 60%
- 8. Internals installation 140 221.52 2.619 1.105 59%
- 9. Replace RV head 28 37.50 0.658 3.188 385%
- 10. Cavity decon 224 202.83 8.000 7.217 10%
- 11. RV stud tensioning 420 617.00 27.170 10.860 60%
- 12. Remove new seal ring 70 44.00 6.090 1.635 73%
- 13. Install / transfer tube flange 21 21.67 1.535 1.235 20%
- 14. Reassemble RV head 245 181.08 14.615 11.648 20%
- 15. Miscellaneous --
362.57 ---
15.450 --
Subtotal
- 3207 3409.64 90.032 61.956* 31%
l Grand Total --
3772.21 ---
77.406 --
i Subtotal excludes manhours and MANREM from task #15 Miscellaneous Page 23 of 62
l ALARA REVIEW JOB
SUMMARY
j V. (Cont'd) j ALARA CONTROLS UTILIZED Temporary reactor vessel head shield; shielded cavity seni plate and vessel flange drip tray; personnel shields; water to railing in transfer cana];
shielded deck and rails of manipulator crane bridge; permanent plexiglass shield on manipulator mast; flushed core deluge piping; flushed crud in seal plate crevices; ALARA 1146 decon paint on cavity; deconned head flange and cavity seal plate; portable ventilation in cavity (4,000 CFM); charging floor modular enclosure; stud cleaning machines and associated ventilation; herculited around stud racks; herculited over the top and side of the transfer canal; CRD shaft repair tent with ventilation; shielded the CRD shaft for repair; underwater cavity filtration / vacuum system; core exit thermocouple area shields; processed water in the RWST; operated cavity and spent fuel pool cleanup; hydrolase of transfer canal; and A URA 1146 decon paint on old cavity seal plate.
EFFECTIVENESS OF ALARA CONTROLS The temporary RV Head Shield and shielding on cavity seal plate and vessel flange drip tray cost ~ 4.8 MANREM to install and remove and gave a net dose savings of 3.5 MANREM. Adding 2 feet of water to the transfer canal saved ~2 MANREM during fuel transfer tube blind flange work; hydrolysing of transfer canal not ef fective due to inadequate canal drainage; herculite over the transfer canal was not adequate to prevent airborne contamination during canal hydrolase; cavity portable ventilation was disconnected during the missile shield ficup, it was not reconnected, this resulted in airborne contaminat. ion during stud hole wire brushing; conoseal reassembly had increased exposure from CET/HACSS modification interferences; RV head lifting rig alignment problems cost 4.7 MANREM; underwater cavity filters were not changed out as designed (3.4 MANREM), cavity purification was not run at full capacity; 2 R/hr and 20 R/hr vacuum cleaners were left in the cavity for several days; increased exposure due to problem in heating up RV head studs; initial painting of cavity floor with ALARA 1146 substituted with mas]in mopdown due to low initial contamination; increased exposure resulted in reassembly of RV flange mirror insulation due to interference with new cavity seal plate air fittings and diamond plate gap covers, and missing angle iron; increased exposure resulted dce to the repair of two CRD shaft couplings (6.5 MANREM).
SURVEY DATA See Figures 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 Page 24 of 62 a
l l
l l
I SUGGESTFD IMPROVEMENTS Evaluate, design and obtain quick acting fuel transfer tube hatch; evaluate, i design and obtain new reactor vessel head flange mirror insulation; obtain l improved stud cleaning machines; investigate electrical and operational problems associated with the pressurizer to head vent solenoid valves; if numerous CRD's are to be rebuilt, design a shielded CRD rebuild box with magnifying glass viewing window; obtain a small conoscal ramhead; install suitcase clamps on CRD vent shrouds around conoseal ports in lieu of bolts; investigate improved technique-(e.g., steam cleaning) for deconning and removing new highly contaminated seal plate; replace cavity personnel shields with ALARA 1146 coated shielded booth with seats; install permanent beta shield on spent fuel pool fuel mast; increase briefings of inexperienced refueling laborers; obtain streamlined Biach stud detensioners; increase the number of primary water outlets around the cavity.
l Page 25 of 62
e O P3221 R E V. 7- Q3
~U RO DQ TION CON TA MIN A TION LZJ '
REACTOR CAYlTY
@4Y O gy NO SHIELDING con R@M REASON FOR $URVEY yjgf , jgpgy m TIM E ROUTlN E (D,w,M) PRE. JOB POS T . JO B CAL. _.
s A L. COMPOSITE TECH g u $PECIAL (RwPs) OTHER PRE SHIELD DOSE RATE READING 5 ARE IN MREM /HR AI WAIST LEVEL UNLESS OTHERwl5E SPECIF C A L. C A L. CIRCLE O NUMBERS h JNOICA TE SME AR LOCA TiONS.
CIRCLED SMEAR LOCA flONS AND NUMBER INOlCATE CONTAM'N ATION LEVELS IN OPM/ loo CM2 m
60 Figure 8 50 HEAD LEVEL
_ w A IST g g LevcL-80 E 80 I
2.0,,,
E
- { CONT.
_ oeCx M
25g 110 6[10 110 e E .
18 0-e h
1_40 80 E0 F
__ U _
3% g 180 f W WO Q
M 14 0
_15 0 E0 150 100 1%
10 0 8 ~
O A t t s E A as L Ess T"A~ iooo Oa 'ioo CM2rDALLsEARsLCssTNANioo0,M,ioCM 2-HEALTH PHYSIC 5 FOREMAN CORRE CTivE ACTION TAKEN YES h NO Page 26.of 62
o ps::: nev. 7- as CY HEALTH PHYSICS SURVEY RADIATION CON T A MIN A TION w REACTOR CAVITY ^
gjy jy CAVITY SEAL RING SHIELDED 3-19-83 RO-2A RE ASON FOR $URVEY' TIM E 3,y , 3,y,
] ROUTINE (D,w,M) PRE JOB POST . JOB
-CAL _ ,
CAL, 7ggg n M SPECI A L (RWP#) X OTHER POST SHIf1D 3,y, 3,y, DOSE RATE READINGS ARE IN MREMA1R AT WAIST LEV' EL UNLESS OTHERWl$E SPECirtED.
' CAL, CAL, CIRCLE D NUMBE RS h INDICATE $ME AR LOC ATIONS.
2 i CIRCLED $MEAR LOCATIONS AND NUMBER h 500hlNDICATE CONTAM' NATION LE 2_5 PRE l POST SHIELD LOC. SHIELD Figure 9 25 '
i 30 200- NEAo 250- t
' EVE' l PERSONNEL SHIELD
~
400 420 80- waist 100-i~d _ E 180 LEVEL 200 5 E I25 80-g IOC g 200
' con T.
Deck 25-75 -
_ m.
25 0 B0 10 0 L10 \
25 f a 3 f g T l
l t
h h g- .
g 50 40
_ U _
]
35 0 .
10
$ 'o l '
2-3 LAYERS OF LEAD WOOL 100 30
~~~ ~~~~
BLANKETS ON THE RX VESSEL __
l FLANGE DRIP TRAY AND CAVITY 300 l
SEAL PLATE AS INDICATED
]
45 r
__ 10 0
~~~
180 ISO E
LOO 120 -
1 ALL SME ARS L E55 THAN 1000 DPM/100 CM2r O ALL SMEAas LEss THAN i00 orMeiOO 2- CM .
HE ALTH PHY$lCS FOREMAN CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN YE1 NO Page 27 of 62 ;
3 opsist nEv. 7-02
{
cou v A min A viou " """ N N M
- i OX anotarios REACTOR CAVITY ^
BJer D jy CAVITY SEAL RING AND R.V. HEAD SHLELDED 3-20-83 pgg REASON FOR SURVEY: TIME PRE -JOB POST JOB
] ROUTIN E ID.W.M)
C a t. __ _. CAL. TECH
$PECIAL (RWP#) OTHER_ POST SHIELD
]n c l
DOSE RATE READINGS ARE IN MREMAtR AT WAl5T LEVEL UNLESS OTHERWISE SPECIFIED. j N. 5A CIWCLE D NUMBE RS INDICA T E SME AR L OCA TtONS. i!
CAL. CAL. 2 CIRCLED SMEAR LOCATIONS AND NUMBER h 500)0 lNDICATE CONTAM' NATION LE 1
E PRE g* POST Figure 10 18 SHIELD SHIELD j 2
200- HEAD 140- I i
l PEnsowwEL$ WIELD V_0 400 LEVEL 200 l
R0- . Aist 80-180 LEVEL 120 80 12 3 c NT 25-80-
] -4 80 r
40 --;
200 g
90 15 0 14 C D >
n 0 -y
/
1
^ -
o l 19 0 T p : L90 p
g- -LOO b, 55 W f -
200 W 50' L20 , , 10
\
2-3 LAYERS OF LEAD WOOL E 1 TEMPORARY REACTOR VESSEL
~~
BLANKETS ON THE RX VESSEL HEAD SHIELD l FLANGE DRIP TRAY AND CAVITY W SEAL PLATE AS INDICATED lQL 25 i
80 )
L50 s
1 A LL SME A RS L ESS THAN 1000 DPM/100 CM2/ h ALL SME ARS LESS THAN 100 DPb/100 2* CM .
HE ALTH PHY$lCS FOREMAN CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN YES NO Page 28 of 62 j
}
' C* stas 9.e0 0;;AotAttow X Cf,ETAM4NA f TON CAYlTY WALLS o,re jy jy PRE AND POST MASLIN DECON SURVEY N
1-24-83 R
5.N . k39 .N 1h 1 TIM E PRE DECON 1845
] routine co.w.M{ PRE-JOS Post.JOS POST DECON 1945 CAL. CAL. PRE TECN n X m SP ECIAL (RwPs) X OTHER POST DECOb L 177 5.N. 5.N. 14127 DO5E RATE READING 5 ARE IN MREMAR AT WAIST LEVEL UNLESS OTHERwt%F $PECIFIED.
CIRCLE D NUMBE RS INDICATE WE AR LOCA flONS.
CAL. CA L.
CIRCLED 5MEAR LOCAT 0N5 AND NUMBER INDICATE CONTAMINATION LEVELS IN DPM/100 CM2 PRIOR TO REACTOR HEAD DISASSEMBLY Figure 11 1
50U1H WALL 5' FROM CAv. FLOOR 15* FROM CA V. FLOOR 10' FRou CA V. FLOOR 5' FROM CAv. FLOOR b '
)
17*
19W j j 23' I3 r G 42' b 0 0 + o n-Q WEST WALL
'I kb h n.
15' v
NORTN
@) h @ (5) NOTES:
1 SMEARS 1-10 TAKEN ON CAVITY WALLS
- 2. SMEARS 11-20 TAKEN ON CAVITY FLOORS
- 3. ALL SMEARS INDICATE CON TAMINATIO eo rm ou , DPM 100CMy UNLESS LEVELSOTHER IN DECON SURVEY RESULTS 4 24K 3K 13 23.1 MRAD /HR 480K S INDICATED E PRE-DECON POST-DECON 5 12K 4K 14 340K 50K 1 21K 2K 2 30K 2K 7 80K 4K 16 340K 48K 3 18K 4K 8 30K 2K 17 340K 47K 9 30K SK 18 26.WRAD/HR 90K 10 18K SK 19 280K 44K 11 180K 70K 20 340K 150K 12 600K 360K 2
[ ALL SMEAR $ LESS THAN 1000 DPM/100 CM / ALL SMEAR $ LESS THAN 100 DPM/100 CM2d N EALTN PHYSICS POREMAN CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN YES ONo Page 29 of 62
l CY WEALTH PHYSICS SU3VEY.
OnAsis.ma . @C3NTAMIN A f t@N jy g PRE & POST AL ff4 ON PAGNT SURVEY. ' PRE 2/26/83
/HP210 " * ' ' ' "
RO-2A 720s,N. 75 REAsow roR suRvEv - TIME s.N. PRE 1120 CAL. CAL.
RoufiNe to.w.M> O 'R=>o' - o' ansT nas -
- m->DECON TECH X OTHER POST
]n L
==a (fi 17 P SP E CIA L (RwPs) s.N. s.N. 14127 DOSE RATE READING 5 ARE IN MREMAR AT wAl5T LEVEL UNLESS OTHERwl%F SPECf FIED.
Tf 0N5,
. CAL. CAL. CIRCLED NUMBER $ h INDICATE SMEAR LO CIRCLED SMEAR LOCATIONS AND NUM8ER 4 INDICATE CONTAMINATION LEVELS IN DPMM CM7 FOLLOWING REACTOR CAVITY DRAINDOWN SOUTH WALL i
)
5' F ROM CA V. F LOO R 15' FROM CAY. FLOOR -
10' FROM CAV. FLOOR 5' FROM CAY. FLOOR
)
17' 18*
19h* l l 22' _
() .@
u.9 g
+ it-S@ @ WEST WALL 12' A l z2-
,3 NORTH NOTES:
- 1. SMEARS 1-12 TAKEN ON g g CAVITY FLOOR.
2.-SMEARS 13,14,15 & 16 TAKEN ON CAVITY WALLS.
- 3. ALL SMEAR INDICATE CONTAMINATION LEVELS 2
IN DPM/100CM UNLESS.
OTHERWISE INDICATED.'
NORTHWALL DECON SURVEY RESULTS NO. PRE DECON POST DECON 1 16 MRAD /FR 50K 5 435 MRAD /HR 400K 9 890 MRAD /HR 120k 13 400K 40K 2 13 " 60K " "
6 330 120K 10 1120 250k 14 100K 80K 3 3 150K 7 1360 150K 11 100 250k 15 50K .40K 4 710 " 120K 8 1250 "
180K 12 "
13 200K 16 80K 60K O A u 5MeAR5'e55taANi oPMei CM>r O ALL MEARs LEsi vaA i .PMo CM 2-.
NEALTH PHY8tC3 FOREMAN
' CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN YES Ono -
Page 30 of 62
ALARA REVIEW JOB
SUMMARY
VI. Job
Title:
Inservice Inspection Task Estimated Actual Estimated Actual Manrem I No. Task Title Manhour Manhour Manrem Manrem Diff.
- 1. NDE Class I & II piping /supp/inspec. ---
1585.14 ---
60.036 ---
- 2. Snubber inspec. ---
152.85 ---
5.120 --- 1
- 3. Carbon Steel bolt inspec. ---
54.50 ---
2.740 ---
- 4. Vibration measurements ---
40.58 ---
0.875 ---
- 5. Insp. Reactor /
Vessel internals ---
203.44 ---
0.767 ---
- 6. Vent /insp.
secondary side S/G ---
13.10 ---
0.710 - - -
- 7. Repairs dictated by ISI ---
9.67 ---
0.220 -- ~
- 8. Ventilation train IST ---
52.41 ---
0.210 --- l
- 9. Reactor Stud inspection ---
70.06 ---
0.200 ---
55.50 ---
0.130 ---
- 11. Reinsulate #4 S/G ---
261.67 ---
5.100 ---
- 12. Instrument repair calibration ---
129.60 ---
0.075 ---
- 13. RCP Flywheel inspection ---
30.25 ---
0.075 --- i
- 14. Miscellaneous ---
40.31 ---
0.645 ---
Grand Total 2622 2699.08 93.245 76.903 18%
ALARA CONTROLS UTILIZED The use of a dedicated ISI HP technician; the areas were to be identified by a person knowledgeable so that surveys, shielding, and contamination control requirements could be determined in advance; digital electronic dosimeters were to be utilized. Test equipment should be set up in a low dose rate area j whenever possible; used piping drawings whenever possible for insulation i fabrication; prefabricate staging and insulation whenever possible; and use !
extension mirrors and electronic equipment to perform remote inspections whenever possible.
I Page 31 of 62
EFFECTIVENESS OF ALARA CONTROLS Because the inspection plan was not known to ALARA until the outage was only a few days away, the AI. ARA controls are of n very general nature. Approximately y 3 MANREM was wasted removing and replacing regenerative heat exchanger insula-tion because no inspection was performed due to exposure limitations on inspec-tion personnel.
FUTURE IMPROVEMENTS l
Pre-planning of this job must start months ahead of time to allow for proper '
ALARA planning. The personnel involved with performing the inspections must be included in the pre-planning, only they know the idiosyncrasies of each particular job. Dositecs and other remote reading dosimetry need to be fully utilized. Use of photographs, videotapes or scale models to show ISI Techs weld locations; use of ISI tags hung by CY or NUSCO personnel to facilitate identification of welds to be inspected. Temporary water' shield booths inould be located at strategic locations in the loops to await dye penetrant develop-ment.
-l I
I l
I i
Page 32 of 62 l
L
ALARA REVIEW JOB SUHMARY VII. Job
Title:
Valve Repair / Maintenance Task Estimated
- Actual Estimated
- Actual Mamrem No. Task Title Manhour Manhour Manrem Manrem Diff.
- 1. Inspect and/or repair ---
1441.92 ---
25.527 ---
- 2. PM valve operations --- 165.01 ---
5.370 ---
- 3. Recove/ test reinstall ---
235.06 ---
1.528 ---
4 Repack / adjust ---
125.47 ---
3.950 ---
- 5. Replace gasket /
leak repair ---
130.33 ---
2.639 ---
- 6. Install a new valve ---
62.17 ---
0.395 ---
Total ---
2159.96 ---
39.409 ---
Pressurizer relief valve work from 3-21-83 to 4-7-83 expended 3.335 manrem and 360.42 manhours.
Because of uncertainties in the number and scope of valves to be worked on, an accurate estimate cf manhours and manrem could not be determined.
ALARA CONTROLS UTILIZED Surveyed each valve before work began and notified HP at least 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> in advance to allow time for ALARA planning; maximized the use of containment devices; used power toolo whenever possible; removed the valve to a low dose rate area when practical; flushed lines when possible; ensured workers are familiar with the valve to be worked before entering the area; and installed shielding on numerous valves and pipes.
EFFECTIVENESS OF ALARA CONTROLS ALARA controls were adequate. Having one maintenance person coordinate the work preved to be of value. More coordination between Maintenance, Operations i and Health Physics on the upcoming daily work scope was needed. Stop work {
authority was exercised on several occasions due to lack of required shielding. I I
FUTURE IMPROVEMENTS Mockup training for mechanics in the use of containment devices and the installation'of shielding; improve coordination between the Maintenance and Operations Departments with respect to flushing, draining, and identifying valves and liner; improve coordination between Maintenance and Health Physics Departments with respect to upcoming valves to be worked; and increase reliance on job supervisors for prescribing shielding and containments for valve repair work.
Page 33 of 62 L_ J
I l
1 ALARA REVIEW JOB
SUMMARY
VIII. Job
Title:
Secondary Steam Generator Inspection / Maintenance #1-4 Task Estimated Actual Estimated Actual Manrem No. Task Title Manhour Manhour Manrem Maurem Diff.
- 1. Remove / replace handhole covers /manw. 92 88.07 2.792 6.555 135% l
- 2. Sludge lancing 80 1080.25 6.284 8.253 31%
- 3. Setup / breakdown equip. each gen. 368 414.08 5.576 9.062 63%
4 Movement equip. in and out of containment 300 423.99 0.200 0.397 99%
- 5. Removal of foreign object --
47.09 --
3.712 *
- 6. Remove / replace railing --
11.50 --
0.435 *
- 7. Photo flowslot of fiber optic inspect. 42 108.25 2.860 7.935 177%
- 8. Handhole repairs --
81.59 --
4.445 *
- 9. Maintenance inspect. 4 2.17 0.200 0.015 93%
Total 886 2256.99 17.912 40.809 56%
- New additions to the work scope. The estimate for the job was low by 21%
excluding the asterisked tasks.
ALARA CONTROLS UTILIZED Shielded local hot spots; used steam generator handhole shields; assured leak tight sludge lance hosing; avoided handhole beam; obtained a positive seal on lance fixture; expedited filling of the secondary steam generators following handhole replacement; sleeved hoses entering the loops; placed herculite under the filter trailer and set-up a laydown for the sludge filter drums; a computerized wand was used; and repaired handhole covers in a low dose rate area.
EFFECTIVENESS OF AT. ARA CONTROLS The ALARA controls vere adequate. The computerized wand did not cave as much exposure as predicted due to increased exposure involved with equipment setup and breakdown. Sludge lance eculpment fitup to handhole required additional exposure. Fiber optic inspection exposure was greater than expected due to the discovery of forei Fn objects. Secondary S/G exposure total higher than j previous years due to foreign object retrieval and handhole repair.
SURVEY DATA See Figure 13 FUTURE IMPROVEMENTS Mechanize the fiber optic inspection to avoid extremity exposures. Continue to use computerized sludge lancing if economical. Fabricate improved S/G handhole j shields which can be chained to the handhole flange to prevent loss.
Page 34 of 62 4
e OPS 12, to.40 x acoicTion goNrausuario. STEAM GENERATOR #1-4 CY HEALVH PHYSICS SURtf EY HANDHOLE SHIELD SURVEY DATE DAY Der 1-25-83 REASCL. FOR SURVEY:
5.N . TFl CTFETOR5.N. TIM E
% 004 ROUTINElo.w.ut { PRE. Joe P E PO5T->Os COMPOSITE CAL. CAL.
TECH n M SPECIAL (RwPs) O ERSTSHIELD 3 DOSE RATE READINGS ARE IN MREMAIR AT WAIST LEVEL UNLESS OTHERwl%E $PECIFIED.
J CAL. CAL. CIRCLED NUM8 ER5 h INDICA TE SMEAR LOCA TIONS.
CIRCLED 5MEAR LOCAflONS AND NUMRER( INDICATE CONTAMINATION LEVELS IN DPMM00 CM2 FIGURE 13 MAMWAY C I" TOWARDS R CRANEWALL BACKSIDti FEED FEED INLET INLE1 l
LUMEN OLUMEN 2-3 R/HR 2-3 R/HR R 400-600 35,ogog, W-M 40Rl41259'HR 23g} 250-350 350-400 25R/HR35R/HR 40R/H 1 3FT 2FT IFT miotgygg IFT 2FT 3FT PRESHIELD DOSERATE {
POSTSHIELD DOSERATE INLET OUTLET ALL SMEAR 5 LESS TNAN 1000 DPMM00 CM2/ ALL SMEARS LESS THAN 100 DPMM00 CM2x
, H EALTH PNY58C5 FOREMAN CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN Y ES NO Page 35 of 62
A1 ARA REVIEW JOB
SUMMARY
IX. Job
Title:
Reactor Cavity Pool Seal Replacement Task Estimated Actual Estimated Actual Manrem No. Task Title Manbour Manhour Manrem Manrem Diff.
- 1. Instal]/ remove scaffolding --
16.50 --
0.060 --
- 2. Assemble, pool seal arsembly charging floor 1440 2297.18 11.520 9.577 17%
- 3. Prepare cavity flanges mating surfaces 100 187.50 2.500 4.
4.320 73%
Install ring controls test and repair 100 114.48 2.500 2.525 1%
- 5. Remove, cut and transfer old seal ring 720 305.33 7.200 6.
5.279 27%
Erect new seal ring stand 48 140.58 0.384 1.130 194%
- 7. Transfer tool and equipment --
354.99 --
0.767 --
S. Install diamond plate seal ring gap --
46.83 --
1.450 --
Total 2408 3463.39 24.104 25.108 4%
ALARA CONTROLS UTILIZED Deconned ledge of cavity and RX vessel flange prior, during and af ter grinding; ventilated tent during grinding and velding af mating surfaces; RX vessel head shield; cavity personnel shields; decontaminated and fixed contamination on old cavity seal ring with A1 ARA 1146; herculited floor during plasma cutting of old cavity seal ring; disposal of ring segments immediately after cutting; shielding on old seal ring during its prolonged storage on the charging floor; and use of a ventilated doghouse during grinding of the old ring into two sections.
Page 36 of 62
l EFFECTIVENESS OF ALARA CONTROLS Portable ventilated containment prevented airborne during cutting of old ring; and strippable coating (ALARA 1146) of the old seal ring prevented airborne and surface contamination during removal from cavity, grinding and torching; high beta field from Ex Vessel flange was not shielded; shielding hung from cavity rail which reduced exposure during ring assembly was removed the next shift for no reason; airborne contamination occurred: during initial grinding on Rx Vessel flange without ventilated containment and decon; and during stud tensioner monorail and contaminated I beam lift onto the top of the missile shield without decon or herculite covering; increased exposure occurred; due to polar crane unavailability; power pack setup delays; old ring storage on charging floor for 32 days; cutting ring with grinder instead of plasma torch (2 REM); missing shackle on cavity seal plate lift rig; scaffold erected for stand installation was not being used; stand for storing ring was not designed j properly and required several field modifications and; moved air control station from ladder to center of west wall of the cavity.
SURVEY DATA See Figure 14 SUCCESTEP IMPROVEMENTS Future modifications involving the transfer and disposal of highly contaminated equipment must be more carefully planned and coordinated by both station management and Betterment Construction. Installation or modification of equipment in radiation areas should require a physical or photographic evaluation in an attempt to minimize interference problems and fitup problems.
Evaluate steam cleaning of the new cavity seal ring following draindown with rubber rings inflated. Also, paint ring with ALARA 1146 along with cavity floor prior to ring transfer onto charging floor.
Page 37 of 62
l .
~
oesm o.co O a^o'ao" ECON T*"'"^ r'0" OLD CAVITY POOL SEAL CY HEALTH PHYSICS SURVEY PRE /WD POST RADIACWASH DECON SURVEY DA U R EBERL1 R -It 1 2-2~83 RE ASON FOR SURVEY:
5.N . 1467 5.N. $22.1d.131( ygg CAL, ROMlWM PRE-JOB POST JOB hhhT D g g 1h0 CAL. PRE TECH n M iPE CIA L (RWPs) OTHER PORT @ 3,,, g,,, coSE RATE kEADINGS ARE IN MREMMR AT WAl5T LEVEL UNLES$ 01HE Rw15E $Pf CIFIED. CIRCLE D NUMBE RS INDICATE SME AR LOC A TIONS. C^ '- C^'* CIRCLED $ME AR LOCATIONS AND NUMBER INDICATE CONTAMINA TION LE V EL5 tN DPMM00 CM2 Figure 14 PRIOR TO ALARA 1146 DECON PAINT APPLICATION PRE DECON SURVEY - POST DECON SURVEY SMEAR RESULTS g SMEAR RESULTS NO MRAD /HR/100 CM' 2 NO DPM/100 CM ~ 2 1 14 2 77 O 3 1 2 40K 450K 3 11.5 3 120K 4 14 5 30 g 4 5 120K 6 21 - - 35 MRAD /HR/100CM2 6 275K 7 101.5 7 425K 8 31.5 @ s 8 150K 9 40.4 ' 9 500K 10 30.5 10 80K 11 12 17.5 66.5 g 11 12 90K 160K 2 ALL SME ARS LESS THAN 1000 DPMM00 CM / ALL SME ARS LESS THAN 100 DPMA00 Cg 2 g HEALTH PHYSICS FOREMAN CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN YE5 hMO Page 38 of 62
ALARA REVIEW JOB
SUMMARY
l X. Job
Title:
Loop Stop Valve #4 Th and #2 Tc Repair Task Estimated Actual Estimated Actual Manrem No. Task Titic Manhour Manhour Manrem Manrem Diff.
- 1. Install / remove shielding and inspec. --
30.67 -- 1.295 --
- 2. Disconnect electrical leads 10 6.08 2.500 .255 91%
- 3. Remove / replace valve bonnet 62 137 15.400 6.699 73%
- 4. Replace the gasket 16 77.74 2.360 2.490 10%
- 5. Remove / replace studs 40 53.84 12.000 2.595 78%
- b. Remove interference --
12.08 -- 0.285 -- Total 128 317.41 32.260 13.589 57% ALARA CONTROLS UTILIZED Shielded the grating around the valves; shielded the hot valves and lines in the area (MOV 861D - DRF ~3.75, MOV 861E - DRF ~6 and MOV 861B elbow to cold leg - DRF ~4); herculited the work area; draped the rails with herculite to form a bullpen; placed blotter paper over the herculite on the deck; utilize a catch pan with a drain beneath the valve; used a doghouse to clean the studs with HEPA filtered vacuum attached; used multiple stud heaters; used charging floor modular enclosure to clean parts; and used automatic torque wrench; maintenance coordinator on charging floor to expedite the delivery of equipment and relay information. EFFECTIVENESS OF ALARA CONTROLS The ALARA controls were adequate, however, shielding the grating did not reduce general area dose rates. The infrared heat sensor did not arrive on site in time to be used. The removal of the valve internals was not anticipated. Stop work authority was exercised due to high radiation and contamination levels upon opening the valve bonnet. The spread of radiation contamination, job disruption and additional exposure to maintenance and radwaste personnel resulted from loop water level not being drained properly. This radioactivity spill occurred twice on the same day. SURVEY DATA See Figure 15 and 16. FUTURE IMPROVEMENTS Ensure the valve is properly drained; modify the stud removal procedure to better reflect actual repair procedure; utilize the infrared heat sensor gun to determine stud temperature instead of heat pencils; and research a better method to remove boric acid crystals from valve internals; minimize the number l of men around the valve; and valve operations which have the potential to cause an uncontrolled release of radioactivity should have independent verification of valve lineup by experienced operations personnel. Page 39 of 62
4 oesm ,.oo
@nAoiatlou QowTAmmaTion CY HEALTH PHYSICS SURVEY
#4TH STOP VALVE 0 ATE U 3-2-83 2
REASON FOR $URVEvi g, SE
] ROUTIN E ID.W,M1 PRE. JOB 1000 CAL. CAL. ]Po$T.Jos n
]m SPECIA L (RWPs) OTHER SK SK 00$E RATE READINGS ARE IN MREM /HR AT WAl5T LEVEL UNLEss OTHERwl1E SPECIFIED.
CIRCLED NUMBE R$ INDICATE $MEAR 5 CA L*
- j CIRCLED SMEAR LOCAT10NS AND NUMSER lNDICATE CONTAMINATION LEVELS IN DPM/100 CMI Figure 15
- " INDICATES CONTACT READItK,5 PRESHIELD DOSERATE POSTSHIELD DOSERATE 3000
'800 SI HOV 861D
)
300 10 0 . ' 3,0 On
~
8 '
#4Td g GENERAL AREA . STOP . 200~ GENERAL WEA 75 - 150 $ VALVE $ "300 150 - 2 50_
80
~~~110"< $ h RC-MOV-501 g
e "200 NOTE: PRIOR TO BONNET REMOVAL
#4 S/G Page 40 of 62 2
] ALL $MEAR$ LE13 THAN 1000 DPM400 CM /h ALL SMEARS LESS THAN 100 DPMM00 2 et CM HEALTH PHy$tCS POREMAN CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN YES Dao
f
@aAoiAvion pouvaammarlos CY HEALTH PHY$lC8 SURyty p er Der #2TC STOP VALVE oatt --
3-2-83 s n, 7. ,,,, Reason PoRsuRvEva Tm E CAL.- CAL. Routswtlo.w. wig PRE ios geosT.Jos 1500 I TECM
]n e.g SPECIA L (RR Ps) OTHER SR. SR. ----
DOSE NATE READtwCS ARE IN taRF4AAtt AT WAIST LEriEL UMLESS OTHE#wtSE $PECIPIED. CAL CAL CIRCLED Num8ER1 h INDtCA ft SMEAR1. CIRCLED WEAR LoCAfl0NS AND MUmsER MDtCATE CONTAMINATION LEVEL 5 IN DPMM00 Cu2 t BIOLOGICAL SHIELD s- j l X INDICATES CONTACT READif65 GEtERAL AREA Mgue 16
,200 - 250 S 1' PRESHIELD DOSERATE j y
NSTSHIELD DOSERATE ' 8618 3009 "1000 -
. W -
W i 250 200
#2 TC GElERAL AREA _300 , f 150 GENERAL AREA S
200 - 250 500x y $ ' ::.2_0__0_ 100 - 150. RC--MOV-537 i 450 200 4 NOTE: PRIOR TO BONNET REh0 VAL e i
#2 RCP Page 41 of 62 04uaRAki'esitaA=iateoa=o.C=>r att i EARS tEsi rai i= on o. C.:-
MEALTH PMysics FOREmAM CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN YES h Mo
/
IIC. Shielding, Flushing, Source Removal and Timesaving Techniques Work areas with "het" pipes and equipment were identified during the initial containment rndiation surveys. The following locations were initially shielded and the associated dose reduction factors (DRF) were achieved. o Shielded PRV 573 and 574 pressurizer spray valves and piping in the middle level outer annulus using concrete blocks. (DRF -9.7). o Shielded cavity fill line near loop #3 spiral staircase (DRF ~7.1) and loop bypass lines on the middle level loops (DRF ~3.7) with lead blankets, o Shielded RHR and core deluge piping in lower level outer annulus near #1 S/G loop entrance using two mobile shield racks and lead blankets. (DRF ~7 to 10.) During the course of the outage, over a thousand 1/4" thick lend blankets were utilized. A total of approximately 33 tons of lead were utilized for shielding purposes. The following locations were shielded and the associated dose reduction factors were achieved, o Placed a permanent plexiglass beta shield on upender cable reel stand and on the refueling bridge fuel mast frame and hung lead blankets on the bridge floor and rails during fuel shuffle and CRD repair work. o Draped several layers of herculite over the CRD shaft and covered it with lead blankets (DRF beta ~100 and gamma ~72) during CRD shaft repair. o Installed temporary reactor vessel head shield and placed lead blarlets around the base of the reactor vessel flange (DRF head
~1.9 waist ~1.5 and feet ~3.4, utf11 red the two 1/2" steel personnel shields (DRF ~2), and maintained water IcVel in reactor vessel as high as possible during refueling operations and rRD repair (estimated savings 75 MANREM).
o Added about 24" of water in the transfer canal during blind flange removal and replacement (estimated savings 5 MANREM). o Shielded loop bypass lines in the middle 1cvel loop area during RCP real work and secondary steam generator work. (DRF ~7.0) . o Shielded numerous " hot lines" in the loop area and lover level outer annulus during the sicsmic support modification work. (Estimated savings 55 MANPEM). Page 42 of 62
~
l o Shic]ded the old cavity seal plate with ALARA 1146 strippable coating, 15 layers of herculite, 2" wood planks and lead blankets during its prolonged storage on the charging floor. j o Shielded the secondary steam generator handholes during secondary steam generator inspection and repair. o Shielded the penetration for the incore flux thimbles during its I preventive maintenance and calibrations, o Shielded the steam generator skirt platforms with lead plates (DRF under platform ~2) and shielded skirt loop drain lines (DRF 10) during primary eteam generator work. , o Shielded #1-4 cold legs in the vicinity loop drain and loop fill valves during their repair. (DRF ~2) o Shielded lines in metaring pump cubicle du?ing T&C instrument calibrations. o Shielded " hot pipes" in the vicinity of valves during valve repair work, o Shielded the 1A and IB charging pump discharge'line and " hot valves" on the north wall during charging pump rebuild work. o Shielded grating, RHR line and loop bypass lines in the vicinity of the loop stop valves #4 Th and #2 Tc during their repair. o Shielded grating above hot pipes on the #1 and #2 RCP decks during RCP seal and vibration maintenance, o Temporary reactor vessel head shield, shielded catwalk on the reactor head (DRF ~1.2), wrapped lead blankets around the core deluge piping under the catwalk (DRF ~1.6) and hung lead blankets from the catwalks inner kickplate in the vicinity of the 1:!t rods (DRF ~1.5) during HACSS cable and connector work on the RV head when in laydown (estimated savings 25 MANREM). Also constructed a shielded observation booth in the vicinity of the head laydown in #2 loop entrance. J ( y %j y \% (' ;
,j Page 43 of 62 N '
. , I < ,
s h, h' 4*i , 17 y ('
.t S
_lrj w Lu . _~ L 'wh *O
~
o Installed core exit thermocouple ~ shields during CET connector replacement--(HACSS)'with the' head in the cavity. The four ports were shielded with two sets ofithree.1/4" lead sheets which were hung against the CRDM cooling shrouds vertical baffles. Lead blankets were stacked on the horizontal ledge of the CRDM cooling shrouds around the conoseal ports. The reactor vessel water level was raised to the top of the head (DRF.~2.4 estimated savings 7 MANREM). o Expedited the flooding of the-secondary side of the-steam generators. Other MANREM reduction techniques utilized during this. outage were flushing and decontamination,' timesaving' techniques and restricting access. The major examples of these are: o RCP seal water return line flushed for RCPf seal inspection and repair work, o Core deluge piping flu'hed s for refueling =and HACSS work on head, o Restricted access to the RCA yard during high level' drum and-liner movements. o Flushed and deconned the crud inside the drip tray around the reactor vessel flange during' reactor headLreassembly. o Desludged floor under the grating:inside the steam generator skirts during primary steam generator work and in preparation. for the S/G manway tensioner/detensioner modification. o Desludged the 49 R/hr aerated drains tank down to 2 R/hr. o Evacuated affected loop areas during retraction of the flux thimbles. o Restricted access to the area around the steam generator skirt entrance with the S/C jumper pens. o Restricted access to the area around.the reactor head laydown area with a herculite fence. o Restricted access to the #1 and #2 RCP sen] platform with q herculite bullpens. ' o Flushed the crud and . removed debris from the -lower level outer annulus floor drain trench and the containment sump during floor drafn screen installation and containment sump pump repair. l 1 f% gj ' ' Page.44 of 62 _._a
. i o Performed a hydrogen peroxide primary system flush and purged primary system gases following shutdown. o Processed water in the refueling water storage tank (RWST) prior to flooding the cavity and ran both the cavity filtration and spent fuel cooling and clean-up systems during refueling. e Hydrolased and flushed the crud from the cavity transfer canal prior to transfer tube blind flange removal and replacement. The aforementioned exposure reduction techniques and the ALARA attitudes which prevailed, definitely led to a large reduction in the total dose equivalent this outage. I o I l l I
\
l l Page 45 of 62 j
.i l
IID. HELPORE II al 1 HELPORE (HEattn Physics Occupational Radiation Exposure System) is a computer based tracking system which was developed by Northeast Utilities Service Company, in conjunction with Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company and Northeast Nuclear Energy Company. The system is designed to maintain current occupational exposure data for individuals and to track radiation exposures by system and component worked. HELPORE I was developed in 1978 and first instituted at CY' in January 1979. HELPORE II was developed during 1980 to late 1982 and was first instituted just before the 1983. Refuel Outage in January 1983. The major advantages of HELPORE II over HELPORE I are:
- 1. Improvements were made to correct problems and drawbacks encountered in HELPORE I;
- 2. The use of CIC service in lieu of TSO service resulted in increased computer speed;
- 3. The use of dosimetry form imaging 11n conjunction with automatic cursor advance and block data entry resulted in rapid data processing;
- 4. Allowance for multiple CICS users in the same HELPORE subsystem; and,
- 5. Color formatting on terminal screens with incorrect input identification.
In general HELPORE II improvement greatly enhanced RWP data processing time.
\
The recording accuracy of plant systems, components, job description. I { ALARA number and plant area codes was again improved. The { improvements which were instrumental in upgrading the efficiency of the system were:
- 1. Instituted revised consolidated system, component and job description codes. Also added a new type of code to provide sort capabf11 ties by plant area.
1
- 2. A temporary full tiac ALARA clerk provided consistency in.ALARA ;
code computer entry and in the generation of ALARA computer ' printouts.
- 3. The use of HP coordinators by the various trade crafts for submitting RWPs and entering the appropriate ALARA codes lead to improved coding consistency.
)
l Page 46 of 62 _-_---_-____D
I The new HELPORE II program was instrumental in fast and accurate processing of the large amount of personnel dosimetry information (6062 dosimetry packets processed) and RWP data (7100 RWPs entered into HELPORE). However, the institution of the HELPORE II program at the beginning of the outage caused problems in the debugging of the program and decreased worker credibility in dosimetry data due to inaccurate exposure summaries. The two major accuracy problems encountered with HELPORE II during the outage were:
- 1. the program's inability to correctly update an individual's exposure record for those individuals issued two or more whole body TLDs for the same day; and
- 2. the program's inability to correctly total individuals exposure results and provide an accurate printout of individuals' accumulated exposure.
Problem 1. (multiple TLDs) resulted in additional administrative control of multiple TIDs and a regression to manual tracking of exposures for the affected personnel. If the multiple TLD totaling problem went undetected, personnel overexposure could have occurred. Problem 2. (totaling inaccuracies) resulted in the development of a separate totaling subroutine which had to be run each shift. The inaccurate exposure totals on the daily printouts resulted in numerous workers questioning their (high readings) exposure results and some loss of confidence in the system. RWP data retrieval was facilitated by HELPORE IIs form imaging, block data entry and batch sort capability. However, several previously ' suggested improvements (see 1980 and 1981 ALARA Outage Reports , page 56 and 42 and 43, respectively) that will produce needed ALARA data summaries in a timely fashion are: l
- 1. develop a subroutine which would yield a report by personnel code of the number of individuals, the annual man-hours, the annual MANREM, and each quarter's average individual and maximum individual quarterly dose equivalent;
- 2. develop a subroutine which would yield a report by personnel code of the number of individuals, the annual average individual and maximum individual whole body count resulfs, the annual average individual and maximum individual urinalysis results and each quarters average individual and maximum individual I l
quarterly maximum permissible concentration (MPC) hours; ' l Page 47 of 62 A
- 3. develop a subroutine which would yield a monthly report by personnel code of the number of individuals, the monthly thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD) MANREM, annual TLD MANREM and the average individual and maximum individuals monthly dose equivalent; and,
- 4. develop a subroutine to produce automated man-hour and MANREM reports by preselected ALARA number, system, component, job description and dates. This summary report should be capable of being changed by preselecting any combination of the-aforementioned sort parameters.
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1 l 1 1 III. RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION CONTROL f IIIA. Personnel External Contamination i A total of 163 Personnel Contamination Forms were completed on j individuals having external radioactive surface contamination in excess of 1000 dpm Sy. Considering the total number of man-hours ! spent in the Radiation Control Area this outage (72,665 man-hours), 160 contamination occurrences represent a small incidence rate, f.e., one personnel external contamination in 454 man-hours. The personnel external contamination incidence for the 1980, 1981 and 1983 outages are: Man-hours / Year Versonnel Man-hours Personnel 1980 400 141,304 353 1981 137 73,383 535 1983 160 72,665 -454 The personnel external contamination incidence per man-hour was 22 percent greater this outage than the 1981 outage but it was 21 percent less than the 1980 outage. A review of the personnel contamination was performed to identify recurring problems and methods to reduce future external contamination. Table 4 shows the number of personnel receiving external radioactive contamination for the various work groups. i As expected, the work groups having the largest number of workers contaminated were those performing the high risk radiological operations i.e., maintenance laborers, decon and radwaste technicians, steam generator jumpers, .and refueling crew. Table 5 shows the regions of the body which received the largest percentage of external contamination. This sort is indicative of weakness in the way protective clothing was being donned and removed. Again, the head, neck, face and hair were the regions having the highest contamination incidence. The major causes being improper respirator and hood removal and rubbing or touching the face with contaminated gloves. Therefore, to reduce facial contamination it is recommended that:
- 1. More emphasis be placed on hood and respirator removal by training personnel during hands-on training and by the HP Technicians on the job. l l
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TABLE 4 NUMBFR OF PERSONNEL EXTERNALLY CONTAMINATED BY WORK GROUP-1983 WORK GROUP NUMBER WORK CROUP NUMBER
- 1. Maintenance Laborers 36 8. Operations 5
- 2. Decon and Radwaste 32 9. Health Physics 4 Technicians Technicians
- 3. S/G Crew 23 10. Service Company 8
- 4. Mechanics 15 11. Instrumentation 1
- 5. Refuel Crew 13 12. Electricians 1
- 6. Construction Laborers 13 13. QA Contractors 1
- 7. Insulators 8 14. ISI Contractors 2
- 15. Engineers 1 TABLE 5 PERCENTAGE OF PERSONNEL EXTERNAL RADI0 ACTIVE CONTAMINATIONS BY BODY LOCATIONS-1983 BODY LOCATION PERCENTAGE
- 1. Head, Neck, Face and Hair 59%
- 2. Hands and Arms 18%
- 3. Body or Trunk 9%
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- 4. Feet and Legs 7%
- 5. Nasal )
7%
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I 1 l The second highest region of the body receiving external contamination was the hands. This is to be expected since the gloved hand comes in contact with highly contaminated equipment more than any other part of the body. The use of several glove sizes did reduce the incidence of hand external contamination. The major cause being handling of contaminated protective clothing or contaminated equipment with just cotton glove liners , on their hands. Therefore, to reduce hand contamination it is recommended that:
- 1. Emphasis be placed on the inef festiveness of glove If ners with regard to preventing contamination spread by the training personnel during hands-on training.
- 2. Increased vigilance by supervision in preventing individuals from handling contaminated material with just cotton glove liners.
The jobs which had the highest incidence of personnel external contamination are: Refueling (cavity and transfer canal decon, studhole cleaning and CRD repair); primary steam generator work (manway removal / replacement and ECT/ profilometry platform work and equipment renoval); RCP #1 & 2 seal inspection and repair (seal and ring cleaning); seismic piping hanger modification; HACSS work on the RV head; cavity seal plate grinding and welding of mating surfaces; valve repair and maintenance (105 valves worked in the RCA); ISI (insulation removal and replacement); and decontamination work. This listing of jobs indicates that extensive work was done in high risk radiological areas (e.g., RV head, cavity seal ring annulus, steam generator channelheads) this outage. This increase in high risk radiologicci work is believed to be the main reason for increased personnel external contamination over the 1981 outage. The increase in high risk radiological work over the 1981 outage is supported by the fact that the daily manrem during the 1983 outage was between 14 to 64 REM and only 12 to 36 REM during the 1981 outage. IIIB. Personnel Internal Contamination ! Approximately 2,350 Whole Body Counts (WBC) were performed during the period or January 22, 1983 to April 15, 1983. Out of these 2,350 counts, no individuals had a bonaffde internal radioactive body burden which exceeded the action points requiring internal dose calculations and, no individual exceeded the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) internal exposure limits. This is based on the amount of personnel internal contamination determined by measurement of radioactive concentrations in air { together with the individual's stay time. Subsequent assessment " by WBC verified that no individual exceeded any NRC internal exposure limits. Page 51 of 62 ! J
L . I I i l IIIC, Airborne Contamination _ i { l In general, the number of airborne contamination occurrences was shout the same this outage an.in the 1981 outage. This is I believed to be due to the increase in the amount of high contamination work (e.g., cavity pool seal replacement, transfer canal hydrolysing). However, the severity and consequences of the airborne occurrences were reduced in comparison to previous i outages. None of the airborne occurrences resulted in personnel l internal exposures above the NRC Jimits. The three major airborne contamination occurrences and their associated radiological consequences are listed below:
- 1. On February 3,1983 at 0130 the charging floor had slightly z l
elevated airborne concentrations. The probable causes were due to both radwaste cicanup under the seal ring and grinding on the reactor vessel flenge in preparation for the new cavity seal ring. The grinding was stopped for 2 hours until a tent was built and the 1,000 CFM blower which was providing local ventilation cleanup, was attached to the tent. No respirators were required on the charging floor. At about 0230 the RV head lift rig's detensioner monorail, which was highly contaminated, was removed from the head and set atop of the missile shield's HACSS scaffold. At about 0300 a highly contaminated I beam was removed from the cavity and set atop of the missile shield'HACSS scaffold. Respirators were required on the charging floor from 0300 to 0345. The I beam and monorail ring were wrapped-with herculite. The missile shield HACSS scaffold work platform and the floor around the missile shield were decontaminated.
- 2. On February 26, 1983 after cavity decontamination, from 1015 to 1230, the charging floor exhibited elevated airborne concentrations. From 1030 to 1130 the charging floor was evacuated due to high dose rate equipment and airborne concentrations. The probable causes were due to the simultaneous removal from the cavity and placement on tre charging floor of 1) the grossly contaminated new cavity {
{ seal ring (2-50 R/hr), 2) the new cavity filtration systems l, filter storage rack, which contained a damaged spent filter (25 P/hr), 3) the new cavity filtration systems hoses 4) a {' bagged wet vacuuu (2 R/hr), 5) a dozen bagged spaghetti mops i l (10 P/hr), 6) highly contaminated bagged wet vacuum hoses (5 R/hr), and 7) bngged wet vac nozzles (? R/hr). The high s level equipment was contained and moved out of containment. j The new cavity seal ring was covered with herculite and hot j l spots shielded with lead blankets. The charging floor was then decontaminated and access was reestablished at 1300.
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Page 52 of 62
.3. On Marcifl, 1983 during.the hydrolysing of the transterscanal the charging floor exhibited elevated airborne concentrations.
Respirators were required on the charging floor from 1700 to. 1900. The probable cause was that although the canal was-enclosed with herculite, the increased pressure added by the hydrolaser forced radioactive air out through penetrations in the herculite. Hydrolysing was stopped'and the charging floor was decontaminated. Some of the other noteworthy airborne contamination occurrences which were documented are listed below: 1. On January 22, 1983 at 0430 respirators were required throughout the Vaste Gas building. Operations conducted tests and inspections to determine the source of the leak. .On January 25, 1983 at about 0100 the airborne ~ concentrations returned'to normal. The source of the gas leakage remains. unknown. 2. On February 28, 1983 respirators were required on the. charging floor from 1400 to 1530. The probable cause was reactor stud tensioning without ventilation. The cavity ventilation cleanup was disconnected the day before in order to replace the missile shield. It was being reestablished at the time.that the airborne concentrations started to rise. 3. On March 2,1983- the charging floor's. airborne concentrations; became slightly elevated.from 1150 to 1256 .No' respirators were required. The probable causes were R.V. stud tensioning and high ~ volume flushing of the transfer canal walls'and floor.
- 4. On March 31, 1983 the charging floor airborne concentrations were slightly elevated. This required respirators on the charging floor from 1600 to 1830. The probable cause was the aggressive removal of herculite from the grossly contaminated new cavity i seal ring.
Portable ventilation equipment which was on hand and operational during the outage were: I (3) - 1500 CFM Blowers (2) - 2000 CFM Blowers, (one with charcoal bed) (3) - 2425 CFM Blowers I 1 l l
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These blowers or portable vacuums were used to provide local airborne contamination reduction for the following: o Stud cleaning machine exhaust o Cleanup of air inside the charging floor modular decontamination enclosure o Tent used for repair of the CRD shafts o Reactor coolant pump seal decon work inside the portable F love boxes o S/G primary side inspection and repair o Tent used for grinding and welding on cavity and reactor vessel ledges during cavity pool seal replacement o Aluminum and PVC fume hoods used for the plasma torching and grinding of the old cavity seal plate o Grinding and drilling on the RV head during HACSS cable runs. The use of portable ventilation blowers and portable vacuum cleaners definitely reduced the spread of airborne contamination. it is recommended that any equipment which is suspected of being highly contaminated, be evaluated for the feasibility of covering or bagging prior to removal from the reactor cavity. In addition, a procedure should be developed which will address decontamination and containment or fixing of contamination during removal of the new cavity seal ring from the cavity. IIID. Tool, Equipment and Arca Surface Contamination In general, the levels and degree of radioactive surface contamination experienced this outage were higher than what was experienced in the last few outages. This is attributed to the large amount of high contamination work. The major contamination control techniques utilized this outage j were ventilation, decontamination, containment and spray systems. { The use of ventilation systems was addressed in the previous Section 111C. The major examples of decontamination used during the outage are: i l Page 54 of 62 ' I J
o Initial and periodic containment decon and housekeeping (6,107 man-hours). o . Periodic RCA (excluding containment) decon 183 man-hours. o Periodic spent fuel building decon. o Refueling bridges and manipulator mast were deconned, o Ultrasonic, freon spray and grit blast decon of tools and equipment which included: Contractors Mobile Decontamination Trailers Valve Disc. Bonnet Assenbly Ib Charging Pump Seal Reactor Head Lift Rig FDT Strainer Valves S/C Nozzle Cover 18 Stud Bolts Disengage plate underwater light 2 Scrubbers Chain Falls Scaffold Tools Cauges Maintenance Decon Room Charging Pump Shaft and parts HPSI Pump parts Relief Valve parts Tools I J 1 l l l i l l Page 55 of 62 ________-__-_______O
1 o i
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t i o Decon of reactor vessel studs in stud cleaning machine. '] o Wipe 3vun and vacuum missile shield structure and cable { trays Lov HACSS. l I o Decom.ca the contaminated lead blankets. i o Deconned and fixed contamination using ALARA 1146 paint on the old cavity seal plate prior to its removal. Deconned cavity ledges, RV flange and vessel drip trays durinF cavity seal ring replacement, o Deconned the upper internal lifting rig and the cavity seal ring lift rig, o Deconned the vessel stud detensioner devices. o Deconned the refueling equipment and tools in the charging floor-modular enclosure, o Deconned the scaffolding and tools in the new containment equipment building. o Deconned the containment lower Icvel outer annulus floor drain trench, o Deconned the pressurizer relief valves MOV 584. 585 and 586) and the pressurizer spray valves (A0V 563 & 574) during their repair). o Deconned the area around the RCPs during seal and vibration , repair work. 1 o Deconned the' area around 4Tc and 2Th loop isolation valves (RC-MOV-501 & 537) during their repair. o Deconned the area around the RV head laydown pad following HACSS work on head.
~l o Deconned the steam generator skirt walls and floor below the 1 grating.
o Deconned the A & B charging pumps and cubicles during their repair. o Desludged the aerated drains holdup tank following the resin spf]1s in the recin pit. I o Deconned the top of the CAR fans in support of HACSS cable I run and SEP hanger modifications. I i I Page 56 of 62 i _J
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o Desludged and deconned the containment sump during sump pump repair, o Deconned CRD shafts prior to their repair. o Deconned the top of the ion. exchanger cubfcles following the letdown prefilter changeout. o Deconned the resin pit and backyard in the vicinity of the pit following several resin spills. o Deconned the sludge lance hoses following steam generator sludge lancing. o Deconned pipe racks and scaffolding during the seismic modification of pipe supports. o Deconned the RHR pit during RHR valve and pump repair. The major examples of containment systems used during the outage are: o Charging floor modular enclosure for deconning reactor coolant pump, stop valve parts and refueling tools and equipment. o Tent used for grinding and welding on cavity seal ring. o Tents used for repair of CRD shaft, o Aluminum and PVC fume hoods, which were used for plasma torching and grinding of the old cavity seal ring, o Herculite bullpen around stud cleaning machines.. o Ventilated doghouse type glove box, herculited floors and railings for reactor coolant pump seal replacement and
- vibration repair work.
l l o S/G jumper pens, skirt shrouds and skirt entrance herculite flaps. o Herculited the reactor head laydown pad and installed herculite fence around the head. ! o Hercu11ted the top and side of fuel transfer canal during l blind flange removal and replacement and transfer canal decontamination. ' o Containment drums used to transport the pressurizer safety relief valves and the containment sump pump to the decon for testing and repair. 3 i i
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Page 57 of 62 a
A o Herculite bullpen around #4 Tc and #2 Th loop isolation valves, o Sleeved reactor head guide pina, and covered reactor ' equipment with herculite upon its removal from the cavity. o Stored and transferred contaminated lead blankets in 55 gallon drums. o Contained the syphon heater tube bundle in herculite prior to its transfer to the spent fuel building for leak repair, o Contained the B charging pump shaft in herculite prior to its transfer to the decon shop to be rebuilt. o Contained the new cavity filtration system during its transfer to the spent fuel building. The major examples of spray systems used during the outage are: o Cavity wall spray system. o Hosed down CRD shaf ts during their removal. o Hosed down transfer tube blind flange during its removal and replacement. Improvements which would enhance tool, equipment and area surface contamination control capabilities are as follows:
- 1. Develop in-house strippable decon paint capabilities by procuring a compressor, paint guns and strippable decon paint.
- 2. Increase the number of primary water hose outlets around the cavity and install a semi-permanent spray system along the cavity walls.
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- 3. Evaluate and implement an improved method for removing the crud from the refueling cavity floor and new cavity seal ring following draindown.
- 4. Valve operations which have the potential to cause uncontrolled releases of radioactivity should have a physical independent verification of valve lineup.
- 5. Investigate the causes of the past resin and filter changeout spills and take actions to prevent recurrence.
Page 58 of 62 l a
.I IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS IVA. Recommendations
' Based on. the ALARA group's observations and the job / task leaders post job
~
reviews of the work performed during the 1983' Refueling Outage, the following recommendations are made. -These, suggested-improvements should be evaluated with respect to their feasibility and implemented, if determined to be reasonably achievable. It should be noted that'the recommendations. i represent the author's opinion of the most beneficial-recommendations'to be I evaluated for implementation during future Refueling Outage.-
- 1. Evaluate the Westinghouse or equivalent " quick opening fuel transfer tube closure" hatch. The removal and replacement of the existing flange is labor intensive,'is-.in a dark, wet and. cramped space; has high. radiation and contamination levels and has repeatedly.resulted in high personnel exposures and personnel contamination..
- 2. Evaluate an' improved method for, removing the radioactive debris from the refueling cavity floor and new cavity seal ring following draindown. The existing method is costly, labor intensive and-has a high radiological risk.
- 3. Evaluate the need'for improving the method ofiinstallation of the mirror insulation for the reactor head. The existing' insulation is in poor physical condition, has-high surface contamination and is not firm enough to install switches. This-has resulted in increased' exposure, personnel contamination and crit 1 cal path delays.
- 4. Develop the following HELPORE II ALARA data summary subroutines.- This is needed due to the lack of consolidated exposure data outputs in the new HELPORE Il program,
- a. Workgroup external exposure summary f
- b. Workgroup internal exposure summary !
a
- c. Monthly workgroup TLD exposure summary l
- d. Automated job HANREM and MANHOUR summary
- e. Daily MANREM histogram l
)
I
- f. Daily cumulative MANREM histogram
- g. Workgroup quarterly exposure histogram
- h. Workgroup internal exposure histogram )
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- 1. Personnel quarterly external exposure vs administrative limit histogram 1 Pege 59 of 62 a
'5. Evaluate the following'RCP work platform structured modifications'to
~
determine 1f the increase' in ' worker productivity would justify . the. cost of these modifications.
- a. Temporary 3 foot wide catwalkLto cover the gap between the RCP' pump bowl and.gtating.
- b. Extend out gratings to crane walls and biological shield wherever
.possible,
- c. Modify the' temporary RCP parts cleaning' table which-if. knuckled to the deck railing would provide'a custom tabic for each RCP.
- 6. Increase the amount of 440V power outlets in containment to avoid the L exposure incurred in installing and removing of portable power packs each outage.
- 7. If numerous CRD shafts.are to be repaired next outage design end-fabricate a CRD repair box. Radiological features such as shaft-beta / gamma shiciding, magnifying glass viewing window (beta shield),
ventilated containment, specialy modified power tools and large-lighted tent should be incorporated.
- 8. Modify the 2" lead steam generator handhole shield plugs to facilitate installation and prevent their loss. Attach.the shield plug to the steam generator handhole flange using a chain. 'Obtain key handled q short bolts and attach them to the chain. When the shield is.not in use the shield and bolts would hang'from the flange.
- 9. As shown in Table 3-(Page 9), CY Inservice Inspection exposure.has about doubled each outage. This is mainly due to the increase in support activities i.e., insulation and scaffolding and the increase.
in the scope of the inspection program. During the last four outages S l- approximately 150 MANREM has been expended on ISI. An investigation- ) I should be conducted'to quantify the costs and benefits of the ISI program. Then, dependent upon the studies' findings, the NRC and ASME should be petitioned to streamline ISI requirements.
- 10. Construct a permanent Radwaste Segregation Packaging and Storage 3 Facility. During this outage due to lack of a permanent storage j faciJity, radwaste overflowed from the temporary radwaste storage area- {
behind the S.F. Bldg. Anto the S.F. Bldg. lower level and onto the RCA l backyard (south gate driveway). This resulted in utilization of-valuable space, increased exposure to Radwaste Techs., elevated dose ; rates in these areas and increased difficulties in processing and ' shipping'of radwaste. l
- 11. Installation or modification of equipment in high radiation areas
(>100 mR/hr) should require physical or photographic evaluation in an attempt to minimize. interference problems. There were several fle]d changes made in the HACSS cable runs and SEP supports due to .; interference problems. This resulted in increased exposure and ' manhours as well as disruption of work activities. j Page 60 of 62 _)
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- 12. Request Operations Department personnel that when valve operatiors have a potential to cause uncontrolled release of radioactivity they' should have an independent. verification of valve lineup by operations
. supervision. During the isolation of equipment, the breaching of primary system boundaries and other valving operations, several q uncontrolled radioactive releases' occurred. This resulted in. J
' increased exposure and manhours for operations, maintenance and ;
radwaste personnel, disruption of work activities and the spread of ' contamination. There exists several moderate to high personnel traffic areas in.the containment in which radioactive pipes and components are causing ~ j clevated dose rates. These areas require shielding to be installed- ' and removed each. outage. In addition, during'the weekly containment inspection,' Operators and. Health Physics technicians receive cdditional exposure. This occurs during. walk-throughs in the vicinity = of these unshielded radioactive pipes and components. The' pipes, components and the affected areas are:
- a. The pressurizer spray valves and associated piping located in'the:
middle level outer annulus corridor.
.b. The RHR and Core Deluge piping and valves located'near the S/G #1 loop entrance in the lower level outer annulus corridor.
It is requested that Engineering procure acceptable shields'for these pipes and components. Finally, several engineering projects are underway which are improvements that will significantly reduce personnel exposures and/or reduce the spread of radioactive contamination. It is expected.that. , engineering efforts proceed for insta11ation'of the following j plant /ALARA improvements such that installation can-be completed in ~i the 1984 outage.
- a. Increase the number of primary water outlets around the cavity,
- b. Installation of Icad plates on the S/G skirt work platform deck,
- c. Installation of the quarter turn fasteners on the primary S/G.
manway diaphragm. J
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l i l IVB. Conclusions In conclusion the 1983 Refueling Outage, from a radiological perspective, was a success. The Henith Physics Department handled all major I radiological events without any major problems and without violating any i Federal Radiation Protection Regulations. Key factors contributing to this success were the use of permanent CY Health Physics Department personnel in the managerial positions of the Health Physics Outage organization, state , of the art Health Physics equipment and programs, and strong management i support. A total plant dose equivalent of 1260 MANREM was expended during the twelve week outage. Nineteen projects received pre-job planning by the ALARA group and their respective job / task icaders. This report documents the radiological improvements that were implemented, describes their effectiveness and details the lessons learned. It is intended that this report will be of great aid in planning and implementing of ALARA techniques for the 1984 Core XII-XIII Refueling Outage. ~ i l l l l i i l l i, { l Page 62 of 62 d}}