ML20238C382
| ML20238C382 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Haddam Neck, 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 12/31/1986 |
| From: | Guzallis E, Powell J CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20238C358 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8712300242 | |
| Download: ML20238C382 (65) | |
Text
CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY HADDAM NECK, CONNECTICUT t
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1986 STEAM GENERATOR REPAIR DUTAGE ALARA REPORT 8712300242 B71223 PDR ADOCK 05000213 P
PDR e
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l CONNECTICUT YANKEE s
1986.
STEAM-GENERATOR REPAIR OUTAGE ALARA REPORT PREPARED BY:
J.
O.
POWELL ALARA COORDINATOR AND E.
C.
GUZALLIS ALARA TECHNICIAN 1
REVIEWED BY:
W.
F.
NEVELOS RADIATION PROTECTION SUPERVISOR-APPROVED BY:
H.
E.
CLOW HEALTH PHYSICS SUPERVISOR l
l, a
I.
INTRODUCTION ON-JULY 11.
1986 CONNECTICUT YANKEE COMMENCED COOLDOWN IN ORDER TO PERFORM REPAIRS ON B CHARGING PUMP.
STEAM GENERATORS NUMBERS 2 3.
AND 4 WERE ALSO SCHEDULED FOR REPAIR DUE TO A PRIMARY TO SECONDARY LEAK ON SG 2 AND EVALUATION OF UNDEFINED ECT SIGNALS IN THE TLHE ROLL RE'GIONS ON SG 2.
3.
AND 4 THESE SIGNALS HAD BEEN IDENT IFIED AF T ER CUMPLEl lON JF I
SG MAINTENANCE DURING THE 1986 REFUELING OUTAGE.
FURTHER ElsG I NE ER I N6 EVALUATIONS DETERMINED 1 HAT 124 TUBES WOULD REQUIRE MECHANICAL IUBE PLUGGING.
(SG2 - 29 TUBES. SG3 - 38 TUBES. SG4 - 57 1UBES)
EDDV CURRENT TES11NG WAS ALSO PERFORMED IN STEAM GENERATOR NUMBER 2 DN THREE TUBES.
THIS TESTING REVEALED THAT THE CRACKED TUBE COULD BE PLUGGED USING MECHANICAL TUBE PLUGS INSTEAD OF WELDED PLUGS.
THE UNIT WAS RETURNED TO SERVICE ON AUGUST 1.
1986.
ON JULY 23. 1986 AN OVEREXPOSURE INCIDENT OCCURRED.
DNE INDIVIDUAL
]'
PERFORMING WORK ON STEAM GENERATOR NUMBER 4 RECEIVED 3.292 REM TOTAL DUARTERLY EXPOSURE.
WORK WAS HALTED ON JULY 23, 1986 AT 1000 HRS. UN;1L A ROOT C AUSE. EVALUAT I ON COULD BE COMPLETED.
ADDITIONAL RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS WERE SPECIF15D AND WORK WAS RESUMED ON JULY 23. 1986 41 2130 HRS.
THE ADDITIONAL CONTROLS SPECIFIED ARE LISTED IN THC ALAPA REVIEW JOB
SUMMARY
- 11. EXPOSURE
SUMMARY
DURING THE PERIOD OF JULY 11 - AUGUST 1.
1986 THE UNIT EXPENDED A TurAL OF' 128.889 MANREM.
THE FOLLOWING IS A LISTING OF JOBS PERFORMED DURING THE PERIOD AND ACCOUNTS FOR 96 % OF THE TOTAL DU1 AGE EXPOSURE.
ALL 1OT ALS ORE BASED ENTIREL V ON POCKET IONIZAT1ON CHAMBER (PIC) E Xi'OSURii READINGS FROM RADIATION WORK PERMllS (RWP'S).
ESTIMATED ACTUAL ESTIMATED ALTUAL JOB MANHOURS MANHOURS MANREM M4NR E.M STEAM GENERATOR REPAIR 2548 1486.93 135 loe.425 CHARGING PUMP REPAIR 349.65 1.354 VALVE REPA1RS 64.51 1.085 VENTING & VALVING 245.78 5.485 BLANKET RWPS 42.25
(.'40 s
HEALTH PHYSICS BLANKET 504.44 6.310 NIS CABLE INSI ALL 4i 1ONi 78.67 1.965 ILC INSTRU. CAL /PMS 57.99 0.b60 SEE ALARA REVIEW JOB
SUMMARY
FOR TASK BREAKDOWNS.
i 1
f 4
TWO REPETITIVE TASKS WHERE PERFORMED DURING THIS PERIOD.
COMPARISONS TO PREVIOUS PERFORMANCE ARE AS FOLLOWS I
i JOB DESCRIPTION MANREM l
1983 1984 1986 7/86 SG PRIMARY SIDE REPAIR
)
PLUGGING REM / PLUG-O.402 0.645 0.587 0.355 l
I t
SG PRIMARY MANWAY REMOVAL /
REPLACEMENT REM /SG 4.699 5.977 5.039 4.633 ATTACHED IS THE MAJOR ALARA JOB REVIEW
SUMMARY
THIS
SUMMARY
IDENTIFIES THE TASKS AND THEIR RESPECTIVE ESTIMATED / ACTUAL MANHOURS AND MANREM.
LISTS THE ALARA CONTROLS UTILIZED, DESCRIBES THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CONTROLS. AND ENUMERATES SUGGESTED IMPROVEMENTS.
IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT EFFlRTS'BEGIN IMMEDIATELY TO EVALUATE AND' IMPLEMENT. WHERE FEASIBLE. THE SUGGESTED IMPROVEMENTS 50 THAT THEY CAN BE UTIL17ED DURING FUTURE O JT AGES.
PLEASE N3T THAT THE MANREM DIFFERENCE LISTED FOR THE 1 ASKS IS BASED ON
.l MANREM VALUES (ACT. - EST. / EST.) (IOO). A NEGATIVE VALUE INDICATES THAT ACTUAL MANREM WAS LESS THAN ESTIMATED.
III.
ALARA REVIEW JOB
SUMMARY
JOB TITLE:
PRIMARY STEAM GENERATOR REPAIR (SG 2, 3.
AND 4)
TASK TITLE ESTIMATED ACTUAL ESTIMATED ACTUAL DIFF.
MANHOUR MANHOUR MANREM MANREM
- /.
GENERAL PREPARATIONS 140 162.59 3.000 1.940
-35 d
REMOVE / REPLACE MANWAYS 275 246.25 15.000 13.900
-7 TUBE PLUGGING (124) 2127 948.17 112.000 87.970
-21 EDDY CURRENT TESTING 6
129.92 5.000 2.615
-48 TOTALS 2548 1486.93 135.000 106.425
-21 TUBE PLUGGING - ADDITIONAL DETAIL TOTAL MANREM MANREM STEAM GENERATOR NO. TUBES MANREM
/ TUBE
/ PLUG NUMBER TWO 29 28.168 O.971 0.486 NUMBER THREL 38 16.768 0.441 0.220 NUMBER FOUR 57 43.033 0.755 0.377 ALARA CONTROLS UTILIZED (HEALTH PHYSICS CONTROLS) l AREA ACCESS AND UNDRESSING EVOLUTION WILL BE PERFORMED AT THE HEAD l
LAYDOWN AREA.
DRESSING EVOLUTIONS WILL BE PERFORMED IN THE OU1ER I
ANNULUS. DIL CANVAS TO BE INSTALLED IN THE SKIRT AREA AND BULLPEN FOR CONTAMINATION CONTROL.' VENTILATORS WILL BE PROVIDED WITH IODINE REMOVAL CAPABILITIES.
VENTILATORS WILL BE CHECKED OPERATIONAL PRIOR TO MANWAY REMOVAL AND ANY CHANNEL HEAD ENTRIES.
SG VENTILATORS TO BE AIR SAMPLED AT THE EXHAUST DISCHARGE AFTFR ATTACHMENT TO MANWAYS TO VERIFY THAT NO IODINE BREAKTHROUGH HAS OCCURRED.
SG VENTILATORS WILL BE SURVEYED DAILY. ALARA WILL BE NOTIFIED WHEN PREFILTER READS 300 MR/HR.
CHANNEL HEAD STAYTIMES,WILL BE ESTABLISHED BY HP SUPERVISION.
STAYTIMES WILL BE STRICTLY ADHERED TO.
ANY LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS WILL IMMEDIATELY REQUIRE TERMINATION OF THE ENTRY.
HP SURVEILLANCE MONITORS WILL BE LOCATED IN THE LLOA. PRT AREA.
t i
(MAINTENANCE CONTROLS) e MANWAYS AND DIAPHRAGMS FARTHEST FORM THE UPPER PLATFORM ACCESS LADDER TO BE REMOVED FIRST SO AS TO MINIMIZE TIME SPENT IN FRONT OF AN UNSHIELDED MANWAY.
DURING MANWAY AND DIAPHRAGM REPLACEMEN1 THE MANWAY CLOSEST TO THE ACCESS LADDER SHOULD BE REPLACED FIRST.
DIAPHRAGMS WILL STORED IN THE LOWER SKIRT AREA IN DRUM CONTAINER.
THE CONTAINER WILL BE LOCATED AS FAR AS POSSIBLE FROM THE UPPER PLATFORM ACCESS LADDER.
1 l
l
(CONTRACTOR CONTROLS)
HP WILL ESTABLISH STAYTIMES IN THE CHANNEL HEAD.
ALL STAY 11MLS WILL HE STRICTLY ADHERED TO.
ALL WORKERS ENTERING THE CHANNEL HEAD WILL HAVE DOCUMENTED MOCKUP TRAINING.
CONTINUOUS COMMUNICATIONS WILL BE ESTABLISHED WITH WORKER PRIOR TO ENTRY.
HP WILL SHARE A COMMUNICATIONS o
LINE.
ALL HOSES, CORDS AND VENTILATOR DUCTING SHOULD BE RUN THROUGH THE COLD LEG SKIRT OPENING SO AS NOT TO RESTRICT ACCESS THROUGH THE SKIRT DOOR.
EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL WILL NOT BE STORED IN THE IMMEDIATE BULLPEN AREA.
TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT USED IN THE CHANNEL HEAD WILL BE BAGGED PRIOR TO REMOVAL FROM THE SKIRT AREA.
PERSONNEL PERFORMING WORK WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR TRANSFER OF MANWAY ADAPTER TO OPPOSITE MANWAY.
CONTROL STATION FOR TUBE PLUGGING TO BE LOCATED IN THE LLOA.
ADDITIONAL ALARA CONTROLS (AS OF 7/23/86)
PRIOR 10 ENTERING CONTAINMENT. JOB SUPERVISION AND THE HP TECHNICIANS ASSIGNED SG RESPONSIBILITIES WILL HAVE A PRCJOB DISCUSSION INCLUDING l
UPCOMING JOB SCOPE AND GOALS TO BE ACHIEVED.
PLAIFORM WORKERS WILL BE ISSUED A DOSITEC WITH AN ALAhM SETPOINT 200 l
MR BELOW THEIR AVAILABLE QUAR 1ERLY LIMIT.
THESE WORKERS WILL BE I
INSTRUCTED 10 EX IT THE LOOPS IF THE ALARM SETPOINT IS REACHED AND REFOHi TO THE SG CONTROL POINT.
IF THE WORKER LEAVES THE SKIRT PRIOR T O THL ALARM AN HP TECHNICIAN WILL MONITOR THE PIC READING PRIOR TO ALLOWING THE WORKER BACK ONTO THE PLATFORM.
WHILE IN THE SG SKIRT, WORKERS WILL BE INSTRUCTED TO MINIMIZE TIME SPENi ON THE UPPER PLATFORM IN THE AREA OF THE MANWAYS.
WHEN MULTIPLE ENTRIES ARE REQUIRED TO THE UPPER PLATFORM OR CHANNEL HEAD. THE WAITING WILL BE DONE OUTSIDE THE SKIRT. BACK-UP JUMPERS WILL WAIT IN THE BULLPEN. NOT IN THE SKIRT.
l ANY QUESTIONABLE PIC READING WILL TERMINATE ALL ACTIVITIES ASSUCIATED j
WITH THE AFFECTED SG UN11L HP SUPERVISION HAS REVIEWED IHE SITUA'llON.
i A DEDICATED HP WORK GROUP WILL BE SUPPLIED FOR EACH SG BEING WORKED.
l l
HIGH RADIATION AUTHORIZATION CARDS WILL BE ISSUED FOR ONE RWP.
ENTRY l
ON SUBSEQUENT RWPS WILL REQUIRE ADD 1110NAL HIGH RADI ATION AUTHORI Z ATION -
- CARDS, s
EFFECTIVENESS OF ALARA CONTROLS THE ALARA CONTROLS UTILIZED WERE EFFECTIVE IN REDUCING EXPOSURE.
COMPARISON TO PAST PERFORMANCE SHOWS THAT EXPOSURE PER PLUG IS ONE OF THE LOWEST IN THE UNITS HISTORY, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF 1983. (NOIE: 1983 DATA INCLUDES THE PLUGGING OF SG 1 FIRST ROW TUBES)
THIS EXPOSURE REDUCTION CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE FOLLOWING:
1 1.
LOCATING THE TUBE PLUG CONTROL STATION IN THE LLOA>
2.
PERFORMING DRESSING / UNDRESSING EVOLUTIONS IN A LOW DOSE AREA.
3.
HEALTH PHYSICS SURVEILLANCE BY REMOTE CCTV MONITORING.
l 11 SHOULD ALSO BE NOTED THAT CONTAMINATION CONTROL BARRIERS AND j
DECONTAMINATION ACTIVITIES WHERE KEPT TO A MINIMUM DURING THIS PERIOD.
l 1HESE METHODS COULD ONLY BE USED DUE TO RESTRICTED ACCESS TO THE LOOP AREAS.
NORMAL OUTAGE ACTIVITIES WHICH RUN CONCURRENT Wi1H SG WURK INCREASE INTERFERENCE AND REQUIRE STRICTER CONTAMINATION CONTROL METHODS.
THE COMBINATION OF THESE METHODS SAVED AN ESTIMATED 24 MANREM.
THE EXPOSURE FOR MANWAY REMOVAL AND INSTALLATION WAS ALSO HEDUCED BY O.406 MANREM/SG FOR A TOTAL SAVINGS OF 1.21B MANREM.
THIS SAVINGS 15 DUE TO SEQUENTIAL REMOVAL AND REPLACEMENT OF THE MANWAYS AND WORKER FAMILIARITY WITH THE EQUIPMENT SINCE THIS TASK HAD BEEN RECENTLY PERFORMED.
PROBLEMS WERE NOTED WITH THE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM SUPPLIED BY THE CONTRACTOR.
DUE TO SHORT CABLE LENGTHS THE WORKER COULD NOI ESTABLISH COMMUNICATIONS OUTSIDE OF THE SG SKIRT AREA.
THIS LED TO WORKERS WAITING IN THE SKIRT AREA INSTEAD OF THE LOWER DOSERATE AREA OUTSIDE FOR MULTIPLE TASK ENTRIES.
RECOMMENDATIONS EVALUATE THE PURCHASE AN ADDITIONAL MANWAY HANDLING DEVICE FUR MOCKUF TRAINING.
INVESTIGATE THE USE OF ROBOTICS FOR TUBE PLUGGING ACTIVITIES.
MOCKUP TRAINING FOR PERSONNEL ENTERING lHE CHANNEL HEAD SHOULD BE T AE'K SPECIFIL AND A MINIMUM CRITERIA ESTABLISHED FOR EACH IASK, WORKERS lHAT CAN NOT MEEl THE MOCKUP CRITERIA SHOULD BE TRAINED FOR SUPPOR1 FUNCTIONS.
EVALUATE THE PURCHASE OF A CY COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM FOR CG WORK.
ATTEMPT, WITHIN THE LIM 115 OF THE OUTAGE SCHEDULE. TO RESlRICl ACCESS TO THE LOOPS IN ORDER TO LIMIT
- INTERFERENCE WITH SG ACTIVITIES.
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STE411 GENERATOR NUMBER 3 k
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POWER RUN BF. TWEEN 5/10/86 - 7/11/86' s.
ALL READINGS IN R/HR r
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LOCATION POST DECON POST PWR OPS 7
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TOP (NEAR TUBESHEET) 9.O 7.O
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H. '.t.'. S. lWyi December 18, 1986 R. C. Q._l '
NE-86-RA-1229 g,7, n l -
C. T. bl -
T0:
S. E. Scace - Millstone Station Superintendent R. H. Graves - CY Station Superintendent
(/
FROM:
M. R.
man
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ud Cd.
e* W{
%.L.R.C.Roders-ManagerRbadh i logical Assessment h
W. G. Collins C. A. F ory y +c3, (Ext. 5279)
(Ext. 5472)
(Ext. 3597) j p
SUBJECT:
ALARA PROGRAM APPRAISAL
.Y Tf h@ '
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
A special ALARA Program Appraisal was conducted at Millstone, Connecticut Yankee, and the NUSCO corporate office during the month of November,1986.
Seventy-four man-hours were expended on-site during the performance of this audit (62 at Millstone,12 at CY).
Additional hours were expended at the corporate office.
We would like to thank all the personnel contacted during the course _ of this appraisal.
Many interviews were scheduled with short notice; yet everyone was willing to provide their time, cooperation-and candid opinions.
Personnel contacted included:
C. Bacon - MP2 Health Physics T. Blanchard - MP2 Engineering G. Bouchard - CY Station Services Superintendent M. Brennan - MPI Radiation Protection Supervisor D. Chick - NUSCO Construction Representative H. Clow - CY Health Physics Supervisor R. Crandall - NUSCO RAB Radiological Engineering Supervisor J. Crockett - MP3 Unit Superintendent F. Dacimo - MP2 Maintenance Supervisor R. Doherty - MP1 ALARA Coordinator B. Duffy - MP2 Assistant Engineering Supervisor D. Fitts - MP2 ALARA Coordinator E. Foster - MP2 Engineering B. Granados - MP Health Physics Supervisor E. Guzallis - CY ALARA Technician M. Heinonen - MP2 Assistant Maintenance Supervisor M. Joyce - MP2 Health Physics G. Komosky - MP2 Engineering H. Labiniack - C.E. ECT Supervisor E. Laine - MP2 Radiation Protection Supervisor OS70 REV 3-83
3, Personnel. Contacted'(Contd.)
J. McHughi-NUSCO RAB
'J. ' Powell - CY ALARA Coordinator W. Rambow - NUSCO Gen.. Construction ALARA Coordinator R. Sachatello-MP3 Radiation. Protection Supervisor S. Scace - MP2 Unit Superintendent P. Simmons - MP Radiation Protection Suppo:-t Supervisor.
J. Stetz.- MP1 Unit Superintendent
- S. Turowski'- MP2 ALARA Coordinator' W. Varney - MP1 Maintenance-Supervisor R. Veilleux - CNF HP' Coordinator Various-exit interviews were conducted between December 4 and December.16,.-1986.
Attending.these interviews were:
R. A. Crandall-l, J. G. McHugh R. N. McGrath R. C. Rodgers H. E. Clow J. O. Powell E. C. Guzallis E. A. DeBarba G. H. Bouchard l'
B. L. Granados J. P. Kangley J. J. Kelley R. A. Grebasch
'W.
Rambow I
i 2.0 MANAGEMENT
SUMMARY
This ALARA Appraisal was conducted primarily through interviews of l.
personnel at all level s of the organization.
Topics of. discussion l
included:
the responsibility. for and the effectiveness of ALARA controls; l
.the communication of program goals to various levels of management and the-rad-worker; upper management support; site Land corporate' communications; goals and estimates; training; 'and perceptions of roles,
- goals, and.
. attitudes.
Much of' this appraisal focused. on the_. on-going Millstone 2 outage since-most of the plant's exposure and ALARA activities occur'during an outage.
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i 2.0 MANAGEMENT
SUMMARY
(Contd.)
Some recent changes and improvements in the ALARA program were noted:
o The establishment of the Exposure Reduction-Initiatives (in 'the v
areas of Radiation Field Control, Work Scope Reduction, and Worker Ef.ficiency. Improvement) gives: significant. direction to the task of reducing exposures.
A recent ' meeting concerning ALARA revi.ew of 1987 CY ' Outage Projects o
included representatives of RAB, CY, Generation Engineering and Generation Construction.
The five upcoming outage projects with the highest estimated exposure were. discussed.
Exposure reduction and work scope reduction alternatives were reviewed.
The' results of the appraisal fall into two major areas of Communications and Responsibilities.
In the area of Communications there were some instances in which the root causes of problems could be traced to either 1) a breakdown in the communications. flow or 2) communications barriers created by the established work methods.
Section 3.1 identifies 5 such problem areas... These are listed below along with the associated finding or recommendation numbers.
3.1.1 ALARA Goals (11-26-86-1).
3.1.2 Radiological Assessment Branch Functions- (11-26.-86-2) 3.1.3 ALARA Design and Engineering (11-26-85-3 and 11-26-86-4) 3.1.4 Unit ALARA Coordinator Functions (11-26-86-5 and 11-26-86-6) 3.1.6 Training (11-26-85-7)
The second major area is that of Responsibilities.
Section 3.2 identifies seven areas in which the root causes of some problems can be traced to a failure to assign responsibility, provide the requisite authority, or provide the resources needed to meet a responsibility. The seven areas are:
l 3.2.1 Job Procedure Reviews (11-26-86-8) 3.2.2 ALARA Exposure Control (11-26-86-9) l 3.2.3 Pre-Job Briefings (11-26-86-10) l-3.2.4 Audits and Inspections of ALARA Controls (11-26-86-11) 3.2.5 Enforcement Authority (11-26-86-12) 3.2.6 Control of the number of workers on a job (11-26-86-13).
3.2.7 Exposure Equalization (11-26-86-14)
Section 3.3, Dose Accounting, identifies a concern brought to our attention on the. anomalies of using Pocket Ion Chamber (PIC) results for exposure tracking versus the use of TLD results.
(11-26-86-15)
The 15 separate findings.or recommendations have been detailed in this Appraisal Report.
Summaries of each item have also been entered on our standard finding forms and are attached for tracking purposes.
m
. To ease the logistics.of responding to this apprasal, we are soliciting specific responses from the organizations listed below for.each item:
11-26-86-1. :
RAB, Millstone, and CY 11-26-86-7' :
RAB, Millstone, and CY 11-26-86-8 :
RAB, Millstone, and-CY 11-26-86-9 : Millstone 11-26-86-10 : Millstone, and CY 11-26-86-11 :
Millstone, and CY 11-26-86-12 :
RAB, Millstone,.and CY 11-26-86-13 :
RAB, Millstone, and CY 11-26-86-14 :
RAB, Millstone, and CY 11-26-86-15 :
RAB, Millstone,'and.CY As discussed and accepted at the exit in'terviews, responses will be submitted to each of the Station Services Superintendents and the Manager, RAB.
The station and corporate responses should then be coordinated so that-a combined response can be issued by April 15, 1987.
3.1 BREAK-DOWN IN OR BARRIERS TO COMMUNICATIONS 3.1.1 ALARA Goals In the last few years goals have been established for total person-rem exposure by unit.
These goals were developed by RAB and were based upon meeting INPO-Guidelines for person-rem dxposure at a future date.
Often these goals did not reflect the actual planned work.and estimated 1 exposures for the unit.
Subsequently a large amount of time was expended in justifying and explaining why the goals.were not met.
Since the goals were perceived as being unrealistic, they were. often not communicated to the workers.
This situation ' created a serious barrie'r to communications between the station and'RAB.
For 1987, goals are being developed based upon job estimates and past exposure histories alone.
The goals will not be tied-to the INPO Guidelines.
The establisher,t of goals baso4 on exposure histories and job estimates requires close coope ation. between RAB and each unit. This cooperation was evident it Connecticut Yankee.
At CY all levels of management were.awar e of :the. new goals process and were satisfied.with the attempts. o correct the past problems.
At Millstone,
- however, most interviewees continued to discuss the goals as' though the past expf-iences l
were to be repeated.
All levels of' management attacked the 9 ? s process as not being based upon ' actual work or-realistic dose rates.
They insisted that their input for goals development was not sought.
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.5L-3.1 BREAK-DOWN IN OR BARRIERS TO COMMUNICATIONS (Contd.).
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3.1.1 ALARA Goals'(Contd.).
A review of RAB's-work in development of new goals was conducted.
Memos. to Millstone asking' for exposure.; estimates 'and input were l 1
evident'.
However, when responses to c these J requests were not.-
received, there was no evidence of' follow-up requests.
A' breakdown in communications ' between Millstone and RAB seems 'to
~
exist.
Part. of. this problem is due. to there being' no.fo.rmally accepted ' process for goal development.
Exposure goals l are: not.
mentioned in the ALARA Frogram Manual.. Establishment of goals. is-n mentioned only briefly in NE0'2.05.
As a recommendation. (11-26-86-1)', - the description-- of. the goals process should. be expanded' in ' the -NE0 : procedure. or-the ALARA Program Manual.
.Once.' established,.this process-should.-be communicated to all management levels' down to ;ine supervisors.
Support from all levels of management is ~ needed to implement: an -
effective goals program.
3.1.2 RADIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT ' BRANCH FUNCTIONS l
During the appraisal interviews. it was apparent that there is-l-
much confusion concerning. the functions of RAB. in the ALARA program.
Perceptions have been formed at the station which often do not match. RAB's perception of their function.
This. has created another barrier to effective communications.
For example:
RAB's ALARA. involvement with-.the project ends upon completion of the ' Design Review..
.However,.some. station personnel expressed the sentiment that RAB's ~ involvement in the project should continue at the station by verifying' the.
I implementation of the Design criteria.
. Questions included:
Why aren't they'down at the site more. often? ' How can they do an ALARA Design Review at the corporate 'of fice?'
- 2) ALARA Procedure (15 entitled "ALARA Job Reviews"', paragraph 8.1.3, states: 'For job (s) estimated to exceed '30 person-rem, NUSCO RAB personnel should be contacted to provide assistanceL in the performance of. the-job review'.. This requirement / has not ;been implemented.
The ALARA ' coordinators consider; RAB~
personnel too removed from :the job site to be of assistance during the job reviews.
Priorities for RAB ALARA personnel' do -
not include being involved in the job reviews. This procedure l
requirement should be implemented, deleted, or revised to.
clarify RAB's function.
]
- 3) RAB has spent a ' considerable amount of time 1 developing and'
'l refining the Exposure Reduction Initiatives (ERI's).. At this point, however, it's not clear who takes'the next step.
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3.1 BREAK-DOWN IN OR BARRIERS TO COMMUNICATIONS (Contd.)
3.1.2 RADIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT BRANCH FUNCTIONS (Contd.)
Is RAB's function simply to suggest ERI's; or does RAB obtain the upper management comitment of resources to complete the initiatives; or even
- further, does RAB develop the specifications and instructions necessary to implement the initiatives?
All of these options were mentioned during the interviews.
The confusion over RAB's function in the ALARA program has been compounded by the ambiguity of the ALARA Program Procedurcs themselves.
The Responsibilities Section of ALARA Procedure #2, concerning Cost Bene fit Evaluations; Procedure
- 4, concerning ALARA Design Reviews; Procedure #5 concerning ALARA Job Reviews; and others only state that RAB 'provides radiological assistance...'.
There are no ALARA program procedures detailing Exposure Goals or Exposure Reduction Initiatives.
As a recommendation (11-26-86-2), the communication of RAB's function should be improved by 1) revising the present ALARA program procedures, 2) developing other procedures as necessary to detail all of RAB's functions, and 3) l establishing open communications with the stations to clarify RAB's functions.
3.1.3 ALARA DESIGN AND ENGINEERING The ALARA involvement in the plant design change process suffers from a lack of communications and a lack of feedback of information.
Several ongoing projects for the Millstone Unit 2 outage were reviewed during this appraisal.
Concerns with two of those projects are described below:
PDCR 2-64-86 Millstone 2 Steam Generator Channel Head Decon The ALARA design review for this project was completed in August, 1986 and was reviewed by the RAB ALARA group 8/13/86.
One design review checklist item, (Section 1, item 5) asked:
'Do design features prevent personnel from inadvertently entering areas where a significant dose could be received in a short period of time?'.
The answer to this question in August
- was,
' Shield wall will prevent personnel access to ion I
exchange columns'.
As this project progressed, the shield wall design was changed; first to allow personnel access and finally to remove the wall altogether.
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- 3.1 BREAK-DOWN IN OR BARRIERS TO COMMUNICATIONS (Contd.)
3.1.3 ALARA DESIGN AND ENGINEERING (Contd.)
There was no evidence that the ALARA Design Review Checklist was revised or that there was any feedback of information to the RAB ALARA reviewer.
Additionally, on the PDCR, there was. no sign off for the ALARA installation review by the unit ALARA coordinator.
The unit ALARA Coordinator had not yet seen the ALARA Design Review Checklist for the project although the Steam Generator decon was in process.
PDCR 2-85-86 Neutron Shield Tank The ALARA Design Review Checklist for this project was also reviewed by RAB and included the following statement on the Checklist cover page:
' Construction activities will be evaluated under (the) installation review'.
This project was in progress at the time of the appraisal yet the installation review had not been conducted.
However, this PDCR had received "early approval for construction", a process that allows construction prior to completion of all design reviews.
By this interpretation, the PDCR procedure allows work to start on a project before any ALARA review.
The change in design without a change in the ALARA Design Checklist, the failure to complete the installation review, and the possible performance of work without an ALARA review are presented as Finding 11-26-86-3.
These are just examples (symptoms) of the lack of communications and feedback in the ALARA Design and Engineering process.
As a recommendation (11-26-86-4), the following issues should be evaluated:
If so, how do they communicate the results of their review to the Unit ALARA Coordinator?
- 2) Is an overview or monitoring of a project necessary to l
ensure that ALARA design criteria are in fact implemented?
l If so, who should have responsibility for this task?
- 3) What is the extent of the ALARA Installation Review?
The l
PDCR procedure only includes a
definition.
Further i
guidance for the ALARA Coordinators should be provided.
j 3.1.4 UNIT ALARA COORDINATOR FUNCTIONS j
Each unit has an ALARA Coordinator who reports to the unit's Radiation Protection Supervisor.
Connecticut Yankee provides an additional permanent ALARA Technician to work with the 4
ALARA Coordinator.
Millstone provides contractor technician i
assistance during outages.
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.. 3.1 BREAK-DOWN IN OR BARRIERS TO COMMUNICATIONS (Contd.)
3.1.4 UWIT ALARA COORDINATOR FUNCTIONS (Contd.)
During the Appraisol, it was noted that each of the ALARA Coordinators approach their job ~ differently although each is implementing the same ALARA Program.
The differences in approach consist mainly of the division of time among their I
various duties.
The reason for the differences can be traced to:
- 1) location: Physical proximity of the ALARA Coordinator to the Health Physics office (at MP3 and CY) seems to involve the ALARA Coordinator in more day-to-day activities.
- 2) Variations in supervision:
Each ALARA Coordinator reports to a dif ferent supervisor with. differing priorities.
- 3) Variations in Unit Management expectations:
There is varying emphasis on exposure tracking duties versus ALARA control implementation duties at each of the units.
The different approaches to the ALARA Coordinator's job has created communication problems with those who must deal with all four units.
For example:
The lack of standardized coding makes it nearly impossible for anyone else to extract past exposure histories for similar types of jobs.
It also necessitates using a large amount of the ALARA Coordinator's time during an outage to properly code the RWP's.
- 2) There are widely differing opinions of what an ALARA Coordinator should be doing.
Interviewees have stated that the ALARA Coordinator's primary function should be:
exposure tracking ALARA Control development and verification planning for future outages reviewing modification and maintenance techniques for exposure reduction.
While each coordinator performs these functions, even the coordinators do not agree on their primary function.
This results in different emphasis on different aspects of the job.
- 3) The differing locations of the ALARA Coordinators in relation to their HP o f fices has resulted in different levels of involvement in pre-job activities.
This adds a level of confusion for job supervisors who must deal with all the coordinators.
As a recommendation (11-26-86-5), consideration should be given to standardization of the ALARA Coordinator's function.
This should include an agreement, through all levels of Station Management, on the expected functions of the ALARA Coordinator.
u.
3.1 BREAK-DOWN IN OR BARRIERS TO COMMUNICATIONS (Contd.)
3.1.4 UNIT ALARA COORDINATOR FUNCTIONS (Contd.)
One other communications difficulty arises because the ALARA Coordinators must deal with a large number of job supervisors.
Each of these job supervisors has different levels of experience with-the ALARA program.
The Generation Construction Department has taken a -stepL toward relieving this problem by ' establishing their own department's ALARA Coordinator to act as liason between Construction representatives and the -ALARA Coordinators and the' other-Health Physics personnel.
. Establishing department level ALARA Coordinators-has -been.
recommended by an ' INP0 Good Practice.
This has also - been formally recommended by the Connecticut Yankee ALARA Coordinator.
At CY, unofficial department liasons between HP/ALARA and each department have been effective.
As a.
recommendation ~(11-26-86-6),
the establishment. of departmental ALARA - Coordinators on a formal E basis should be considered. This is. not necessarily another full time position but could be an individual' in ~each department to act as 'a liaison.- This should include Unit departments,
.NUSCO departments, and even contractor / vendor representatives.
This would reduce the number of contacts for each ALARA Coordinator.
This would allow extensive - ALARA and exposure-reduction indoctrination to a relatively small number of people across a wide span of organizations. Finally, this would also provide a direct ALARA contact for the workers to encourage 2-way communications.
3.1.5 TRAINING 1
There are presently two requirements for ALARA training:
ALARA Procedure #5 entitled " ALARA Job Reviews", section 5.2 states:
' Unit Superintendents, Station Services Superintendents, and the Betterment Construction System Superintendent shall ensure their personnel are trained in and adhere to this procedure and are aware of and understand the requirements for ALARA'.
NE0 Procedure 2.05 entitled
' Radiation Protection and Maintaining Occupational Radiation Exposures. as low-as-Reasonably Achievable ( ALARA)', paragraph. 6.4.7, states:
'The
- Manager, NUSCO RAB, will, jointly-with Nuclear Training Depa rtment,
coordinate and conduct-discipline speci fic training in ALARA for all NE0 departments.
Neither of these training requirements has b'een met. (Finding l
11-26-86-7).
I i
.., DREAK-DOWN IN OR BARRIERS TO COMMUNICATIONS (Contd.)
3.1
_3.1.5 TRAINING (contd.)
Most
. interviewees
. indicated
,that
- their, only ALARA-indoctrination. has.been through. General Employee.' Training (GET).
An' ALARA training course' for : Engineers. was held a.
couple ' of-years ago but this ~ focused only on performance of ALARA Design Reviews and Cost Benefit evaluations... Nea rly -
everyone interviewed recognized the need' for 1 some specific
- ALARA training for' the.: first line job. supervisors. and foti L
l'eaders. _
They' have the' majority of responsibility 'for implementing ALARA requirements. and. yet they ' have had. ' no.
training in 1) the ALARA. Program, 2) ALARA goals, 3)'conductng ALARA required. pre-job briefings, or 4) different. techniques for high versus low exposure jobs.
This. type of training should also be available to the. various contractor- 'jo b1 supervisors.
. Increased training for job. supervisors is included in the Exposure Reduction Initiatives..
l Additionally, some interviewees ' questioned why' ALARA training j
in GET is the same for all employees.
Why does a Steam Generator worker have the same ALARA indoctrination as ' people who may never enter a high radiation area?
3.2 FAILURE TO ASSIGN RESPONSIBILITY, PROVIDE THE REQUISITE AUTHORITY, OR PROVIDE THE RESOURCES NEEDED TO MEET THE RESPONSIBILITY 3.2.1 Job Procedure Reviews The ALARA job checklist used at Millstone (Station'~ Form 848),
includes item #8
' Job procedures have been-prepared or modi fied to minimize exposures. Explain.' For jobs. reviewed during this appraisal,. the answer to this item was "yes".
There were no details of which procedures were_ reviewed and or revised.
Mi11 stone's procedure-ACP 6.02-states that' controlled copies of any special procedures should be-forwarded to the unit ALARA Coordinator. This is not done.
The Job Leader has responsibility to complete the ALARA Job Checklist and presumably the responsibility. to review the procedures.
However, this was not clear. to the Job Leaders interviewed.
The Job Leaders also expressed some doubt as _ to how to review the procedures for exposure reduction.
It seems-that the ALARA Coordinators are the ones with _the expertise. to.
l perform this
- function, but that responsibility is not.
l assigned.
As a
recommendation.
(11-26-86-8) the function and responsibilities' for job procedure reviews should be reassessed and revised to clearly. assign responsibilities.
The previously recommended department level ALARA Coordinators could assume some of the respon'sibilities in this area.
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3.2 FAILURE TO ASSIGN RESPONSIBILITY, PROVIDE THE REQUISITE' AUTHORITY, OR
[
PROVIDE THE RESOURCES NEEDED TO MEET THE RESPONSIBILITY (Contd.)
3.2.2
-ALARA' Exposure Controls ALARA Procedure. #5 entitled ' ALARA Job Reviews', states in section 5.7 that 'Radworkers shall be responsible for:
5.7.1 Keeping their exposures
'ALARA-by' -remaining ~
knowledgeable in. and strictly adhering _ to the.. ALARA exposure controls'.
In practice,.there is confusion in. responsibilities for being cognizant of the ALARA : Exposure Controls.
For. repetitive-jobs, the'. ALARA controls tend to be repetitiv'e so a sense lof apathy was noted.
The' controls are met because. "that's the way the -job has _ always been.done".
Workers' expressed the feeling that the ALARA_ Exposure Control Sheets used at Millstone are only. reminders 'for the Job Supervisors...The lack of importance of.the 'ALARA controls is due to: a-combination of weakly worded ALARA Controls -(using.words like "should", "as a ppro pri a te",
"when necessary"). weak pre-job briefings and little or no enforcement of the ALARA Controls.
The pre-job briefings and enforcement issues are covered in subsequent sections of this. report.
Connecticut Yankee has successfully implemented the use of ALARA Control Area -postings to draw attention to the ALARA -
Controls, and ensure that they are,not overlooked.
As a recommendation (11-26-86-9), Millstone should consider revising the method in which ALARA Controls are communicated.
The ALARA Controls should be written. as controls, i.e., with strong words of requirements (shall, will, etc).
These requirements should be communicated during '. the pre-job briefing and should be posted at the; job site.
The Job Supervisor should have the' ability to revise the controls with the ALARA Coordinator's approval.
This would eliminate the need to write controls with provisional.words such as : when needed and as appropriate.
3.2.3 Pre-Job Briefings ALARA Procedure #5, paragraph 8.2.5 ' states that 'The. Job / Task Leader shall ensure that all job / task workers are... briefed on the work to be performed'.
Most interviewees admitted that the pre-job briefings in ALARA Controls for the job, are weak or non-existent.
- This - is partly due to the indifference resulting:from: repetitive jobs.
Al so, for any particular job there are a large number of
~
people who could be considered as the. job or task leader.
.It~
is not clear who has the final responsibility for the -pre-job' briefings.
~H e ' 3.2-FAILURE TO ASSIGN RESPONSIBILITY, PROVIDE THE REQUISITE AUTHORITY, OR PROVIDE THE RESOURCES NEEDED TO MEET THE RESPONSIBILITY (Contd.)
3.2.3 Pre-Job Briefings (Contd.)
As a recommendation -(11-26-86-10), - the - responsibility for, the ALARA portion of pre ~ job briefing should be re-assigned to:'
. the ALARA Coordinator the' Health Physics staff, o_r_
- a departmental ALARA Coordinator.
(previous recommendation'11-26-86-6),
3.2.4 Audits and Inspections of' ALARA Controls ALARA Procedure #5, paragraph. 5.3.4 ' states that the ' Health Physics Supervisor or. the ALARA. Coo rdina tor. shall.
be
' responsible for auditing' RWP and. ALARA' Control. commitments' to-
~
ensure they are being adhered to 'by - Job / Task ' Leaders and workers'. '
Paragraph 8.1.6.2.b expands on. this and states:
' A copy. of (the ALARA Controls, are) sent~ to HP to permit l the HP technician assigned to the job or work -area zone 'to check the job for compliance with ' the specified ALARA ' exposure controls'.
Through discussions with both the Millstone and CY. Health Physics staff, we found that HP personnel do not audit the ALARA controls unless the controls happen to coincide with the.
RWP requirements..
Th'e - audits conducted by. the ALARA Coordinators are generally not documented'(with the' exception
~
of Connecticut Yankee where an informal log is maintained).
As recommendation (11-26-86-11),
the responsibilities for conducting the audits. of ALARA Controls should be reemphasized with the HP Staff and ALARA Coordinators.
The performance of audits may not need to be formally documented; however, 'some form of feedback should be established.
This ' feedback should include 1) notification from HP to the ALARA Coordinator 'of ALARA Controls which were checked and the subsequent results; j
and 2) notification from the ALARA Coordinator.to.the Job / Task q
Leaders of the results of ALARA Control Audits..
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1 3.2 FAILURE TO ASSIGN. RESPONSIBILITY, PROVIDE THE REQUISITE AUTHORITY, OR PROVIDE THE RESOURCES NEEDED TO MEET THE RESPONSIBILITY (Contd.)
'3.2.5 Enforcement Authority ALARA procedure #5 specifies' only one enforcement recourse for the violation of. ALARA'. Controls: ~ The Stop ' Work Order.
The responsibility for' exercising the Stop Work' Order
.is ambiguous.. Paragraphs. 4.4 and 5.3.7 discuss the' Stop Work Authority and responsibilities but-'do not mention the - ALARA Coordinator.
However, paragraph 8.2.7 states that the ALARA Coordinator can exercise the Stop Work Order.
Discussions.with ALARA' Coordinators and HP Staf.f indicate that Stop Work Orders are seldom exercised.
All agreed _ that a violation of one ALARA Control would probably.:not result in 'a l
Stop Work Order. ' This enforcement tool is usually only' used for violations of Federal Regulations or to prevent over exposures.
There is an impression. that there would ' be little upper management support for stopping a, critical path job' because of failure' to implement. an - ALARA Control'.
Procedure
- 5 enforces this impression by noting in. paragraph 8.2.7 that senior station management-is notified. only if there is 'no resolution of the Stop Work Order.
As a recommendation (11-26-86-12), the responsibilities for and the use of 'Stop Work' Authority for violations of ALARA Controls should be reassessed.
Perha ps some lower level enforcement tool could be developed.
This could take the form of a formal violation notification to the' job leader with copies to upper management followed.by some logical escalation to the Stop Work Order.
It was noted that CY has established a Radiological Deficiency Report which could be used for.'a minor violation of an ALARA control.
3.2.6 Control Of The Number Of Workers On A Jeb Control of the number of workers assigned to a job was one of the problems voiced by all interviewees'.
A revision to ALARA Procedure #5 in August of 1985 added a' responsibility for the Job / Task Leader to ensure 'that the minimum number-of workers needed to do the job has-been determined and that no more than' that number has-been assigned to it'.
.The ALARA Job Estimate form in Procedure #5 - added a requirement : to- ' list the number.
of each of the various type worker needed to do the job.
Include analysis that this. is the ' minimum number.'of workers required for efficient performance'.
w 3.2 FAILURE TO ASSIGN RESPONSIBILITY, PROVIDE THE REQUISITE AUTHORITY, OR I
PROVIDE THE RESOURCES NEEDED TO MEET THE RESPONSIBILITY (Contd.)
f 3.2.6 Control Of The Number Of Workers On-A Job (Contd.)
These requirements for. estimating-and listing the ' minimum number and types. of workers have not-been - implemented at either station.. At ' Millstone', the Job Estimate form (SF 847) has not been revised to include the requirement.
Based on discussions during: this appraisal, the delay in.. implementation seems to stem from several concerns.
- 1) The responsibility assigned to. a : Job /Tas.k Leader is.too broad based.
Who. actually should be doing this-for a major ~
Betterment project?. The construction ' representative?
The' various contract supervisors? A job foreman?
- 2) The logistics of making the determination of the minimum number of workers seems overwhelming considering the number of contractors on-site and the many last minute changes.- to a project or job.
- 3) There are no requirements for follow-'up. or monitoring of the workers.
Who checks that the specified number L of workers is appropriate and not exceeded?
As a
recommendation (11-26-86-13),
the entire issue of determining the number of workers on a
job should be reassessed.
Further detailed guidance should be provided specifying responsibilities and specific methods for performing and following up the worker estimates.
Note that this may be another area in which a
Department ALARA Coordinator may provide assistance-and-consistency (recommendation 11-26-86-6).
Another approach may be to tighten Radiological Control' Area (RCA) access control.
This has a disadvantage of putting-the enforcement. responsibility on the HP Technicians - and. Control Point Monitors.
It was noted that stricter access control is included in the Exposure Reduction Initiatives.
3.2.7 Exposure Equalization One of the stated objectives of the ALARA program (Part A, Objective 3.A.4) is 'to balance individuals exposure within the various work groups ' consistent with experience, manpower, and union agreement. limitations'.
1 A'. ARA Procedure
- 5, paragraph. 5.4 states that
' Job / Task Lesders and/or Department Heads shall-be responsible for:
5.4.4
' ensuring that exposures incurred. by. department i
~!
personnel are as evenly distributed as possible within the different skills'..
i
.15 -
C 3.2 FAILURE TO ASSIGN RESPONSIBILITY, PROVIDE THE REQUISITE AUTHORITY, OR PROVIDE THE RESOURCES NEEDED TO MEET.THE RESPONSIBILITY (Contd.).
3.2.7 Exposure Equilzation (Contd.)
Although this requirement is recognized and ' included on - the
.t ALARA dob Checklist, most interviewees have 'the impression that this requirement is not' implemented.
For. example:
One Millstone Unit. 2 ALARA ~ Job Checklist stated:
'Yes, Wexsum (the weekly. exposure. summary) will be made available for review.
Left unanswered are the. questions: by whom? How often? and what actions. can or' will be taken?-
~
I As a recommendation (11-26-86-14),. more detailed guidance should be provided indicating responsibility for., tracking the exposures and taking action, responsibility for monitoring the.
performance of the' task, and methods of enforcement, One interviewee noted that union overtime hours are' easily monitored and equalized. Why can't we do this for exposures?-
3.3 DOSE ACCOUNTING One concern within the ALARA program has been the comparison of our relatively higher exposure histories versus other nuclear plants.
.Much of our time is spent justifying the person-rem. expended over any one year period.
One point brought out during the appraisal is that our total person-rem may be inflated because it is based on Pocket Ion Chamber (PIC) results instead of the permanent Thermoluminescent Dosimeter (TLD) results...The use of multiple dosimetry introduces an even larger disparity.
With multiple dosimetry, the hichest PIC reading is entered in the exposure l.
1 record and used for A'LARA reports.
This can result in ' readings significantly. higher than the-individuals permanent exposure results.
As an illustration, one Steam Generator worker's' October exposure is detailed on the next page.
Note that five separate packs of dosimetry-are used for Steam Generator work: one each on-the. head,. chest, back, left knee and right knee.
i l
4 i
j J
3 I
i i 1
3.3 OOSE ACCOUNTING (Contd.)
PIC Results:
Highest PIC Reading Entered Left Right On The Date Head Chest Eack Knee Knee RWP 10/14 80 20 80 80 100 100 10/15 25 0
25 100 50 100 10/26 25 50 25 0
25 50 l
10/27 75 150 100 125 200 200 10/28 50 50 0
50 50 50 10/30 100 75 50 50 50 100 l
l Total by RWP =
600 TLD results for the same Steam Generator entries:
Highest Used for l
Left Right Whcle Body Head Chest Back Knee Knee Exposure l
427 409 286 402 332 427 The legally reported total for this individual is 427 millirem.
However, the figure used for the job exposure totals is 600 millirem.
We recognize that a shift to the use of TLD data for ALARA exposure tracking may be logistically difficult because of the time needed for processing.
As a recommendation (11-26-86-15), the use of permanent TLD results should be investigated for the person-rem comparisons of NU's plants to other pl a nts.
This may improve our appearance to outside agencies.
l l
1 l
1
. 4.0 STATUS OF PREVIOUS FINDINGS Not applicable to this Appraisal 5.0 ATTACHMENTS Findings and recommendations:
11-26-86-1 through 11-26-86-15 MRB/pb Attachment c:
E. J. Mroczka W. F. Nevelos W. D. Romberg F. C. Rothen C. F. Sears W. Rambow R. P. Werner R.'K. Doherty R. T. Harris D. W. Fitts G. L. Johns n S. M. Turowski E. R. Foster J. O. Powell J. J. Kelley R. A. Crandall G, H. Bouchard H. W. Siegrist H. E. Clow I. L. Haas J. P. Kangley B. L. Granados Audit File E. J. Laine M. J. Brennan R. J. Sachatello
Eev. 6
)
Date 1/86.
Pare I/5-15 Health Physics-Audit Tinding Term
- Pa rt 1:
Documentation and Identification of Responsible Supervisor A.
Tinding
Description:
Tinding Number:
ll-N - 8(o - l
.Tmp4 eve comMc Arioo or we ALARA 6M u4t Auditee:
CY, MPI, MP2, MP3,.
Goaus paoesss 7D Act uvets or MAvaSescur.
m 7,7,3, pg31,, gtDI, Ce'oen wrCq nt pacesss,o ao Mco o< AWA Peonooet.
(RAGD B.
Classification:
C Noncompliance I - Violation of D Noncompliance II - Violation cf m,,e rete bar Niu, lsee AL^ed Aqwaisa' D Deficienev y
h Recocatedation]'
i OAT 54ctSC
- 3. l
- J C.
Ir=nediate /etions 7aken (if reouired) and Priorite of Corrective Actions:
1.
Ic=ediate Actions Taken D.
Y If yes, detail actions below:
(NOTE: A Nonce:pliance I Y
X recuires a Yes) 2.
Cor:ective A:: ions ?:Lo ity:
l C W:.hi: 2 verting day
- Sher:-ter=
days r 1.o:g-ter=
n:::.hs Response..
RST II
..c n m !.nire: Due by: Aera 8r.g M ( hiv_
ich [em C.eetc.4 e. fcnLa w pec Lzte A hte:
D1 e To M Mtif.4*v1W4 D 3.
Findirr Trne and F.eseensibilier:
- E.P.
2 Fe:-E.P.
Responsible supr.:
- /A f'on. wis Andsac.
I.
A:h=ovieer-2e:::
Ftc 4%r teruJ.Lws E A.OJMobett 5 P.d.Geeke/4
/td,[#s C u ;_ _ 2.ep:ese:_
- .v'e Lt e R68 l
?z-2:
C:::er ive A::ie:s Lo:.=e:.2 ie: z:2 Ertzge=er Eerier A.
Ce r e:-ive A:-3--- "mie::
3.
Szte cf Cere:-dre A -ders:
Ee_gensible Supe: v:.s::
.,z A
C f.r ten: ::
I:. ::. : Ser. 5:p..
Ot e 5.2 ic: 5:p -.eader:
Lzte D.
Arii e: :2ese::::
is=t ::
Late
?t-: 3:
Et:ar-me:- Cne:riev Sup. Ezd. ?::.. Se:::c:/tz:2 r e r. 3. l
- F.IFIF.r:CI:
Cc:perate A*AF.A } h eti, Pt-: 3, ? oceiure 63
ww:^ms d-Date 1/86 P..Fe B/3-15 Hea]th Physics Audit T2ndiDF Torm
- Part 1:
Documentation and Identification of Responsible Supervisor A.
Tindine
Description:
Tinding Number:
11 - U,- 8(o - f.
~
~
Im n,c c$mmuv6'ao or RAWS A AU Auditee:
CY, tipi,tiP2, tiP3, rvachneve.bsraAsqa Peceov d N AS/am on w J
- ' &3, POSI., h'.:D P4ct owtc teve gmwr.
(RAS B.
Classification:
C Nonce pliance I - Violatien of D Noncompliance II - Violation of D D'fiCi'D
i y rmea Ocru;ss, ste Al ARA &nnha 3 f
p Eeconsendationl gepoer Szerdo 3.1. E C.
Ic::nediate Actions Taken (if reouired) and Priority of Corrective Actions:
1.
Ic=ediate Actions Taken D
Sr If yes, detail actions below:
(NOTE: A Nonce:pliance I l'
N re:;uires a Yes) 2.
Cer:ective Artie:s ? derity:
20 ths 2 E thin 3 verhirg day
- Shen-ter:
_ days F Io:g-te:=
R4scome Mn I kr : e n:-4 e:d:2+ Due by:
N # B7
.K, i k(
' * 'dt d,u e d,e L % w w rc
-;z.e A :: c:
0zie
_ b F./. btTd <2,dentb 2.
Findirr Tree a:d F.espeeribil::r:
- I.?.
2 Nc:-I.P.
I.esre:sible sup:.:
(A ron. Ms Am:4w 66 I.
A:h=oviedrere:::
Ttr_ Enir instavh n R. A.CnAea 4 R O. /2 Eus 12fshea 0
. h Eer:esehrz:.ve Ltte R46
?z - 2:
C: re: ive A;;ie:S Doct -:.2 den 2:d --> ge=er ? eTiew A.
Cerendre A::ie:S Tzher:
3.
3zte cf C:=ertive Ar-iens:
E e:p :s i Y.u 5=pe:- 5::
~.t:1 C.
- 7. - i eu-d ':- :
5:.z
- 5er. 5:p:..
Oz. e 5 2.c 5:p
---:.e
- ies:
Lzte 2).
Ariite C2escent:
Azi- :.:-
Date
?t - 3:
6:rge=e : Crve r-d ev 5:y:..r.nc. :::t. re: ic:!D:ltt:. :;
t 7 :
T '; "E :
Cc perr.:e A* A2A PL uti, ? t-: 3, Precedure f3 j
cev y
.a.
Date 1/86'
'Page E/3-15.
Health Physics Audit Tindint Torm *-
-Part 1:
Documentation and Identification of Responsible Supervisor A.
Tinding
Description:
Tinding Nurr.ber:
l[- N 8 [a - 3 Auditee:
CY, MP1, @ MP3,
- 1. Au io.paoce:s u4mc ro a basisio luv40 bartb 6.J ALAfLA D asisio n t e t e.
f? 2 ' '"' S&3* POSL h"*~J~
i
- 2. Au ALA#A Pbett restauan ac hdC wAs.uar Swesedb -
REE8'O a. rNE P oc.2. fkoetts Au=ws 'co=*: rn Edi'u Buc40 M ALdd E.
Classification:
C Noncompliance I - Violation of Cr Nonecepliance 24-Violation of NCO 3.CA ALARP_nocedurez '4 D Recomme.ndation grpoar MerioO.btrAb,3 Set ALA2/1 A(PRA'ia e
D Lef2ciency c
- p., 9.
,tr,,, tL o
u
. '3. t.
C.
Immediate Actions Taken (if reouired) and Priority of Corrective Actions:
2.
2c=ediate Actions Taken D
E If yes, detail actions below:
(NOTE: A Noncorp11ance I Y
'N recuires a Yes) 2.
Cc::ective Actions ?:ic:L:7:
' =c :hs O Vif-n 1 verhi=g day
- Shert-ter=
days Y~,ong-te =
s.,xJ"?-L rue 37:
y,dB
,#f/h6
<e/m /sc corn.sedut Aenso w w La.e in :. c Late' ro Ba e m a.Muao O.
Tirdi r Tv:>e and 7.espensi:ilt v:
E.?.
E'Fcc-E.?.
F.espensible Sup:.:
IJM foe 'N s AW$isAt
'l I.
A:h=ouledrere:::
" fee Knir iurtavN.w J.1. Kru.zy itlitl st.
Sunc: I.ep.45 c anve One
?z-: 2:
Cere::ive A::ie:.s 3c::=e: z. den z:d E--> reme:: Keview A.
Cerenive A::iers Men:
3.
Orte cf ::=e nive A:-ic._s:
?.ery : si_-im 5:pe.: _.se:
ze C.
?.-iee i b :
5_zne: -er. I:p:..
One iu_ic: 5:pe _:ter.ce:.
Late
'3.
A diter Clesee ::
Ani ::
32.e
?t 2:
%t:s tere:: Cnerview Supr. 7.zi. ?:ct. le::ie:/tru re:. I.!.I J.ITI?.C C:. :
Cc:pera:e f A?.A 11.;ti, ?tn 3, ?:ocedure f3
r.:
~
~
~
~ ~ - - ~
MCY Date 1/86.
Fare I/3-15.
Health Physses Audit Tindint Term
- Part 1:
Documentation and Identification of Responsible Supervisor A.
Tinding
Description:
Tindint Number:
ll-De-8(p - N
- s. Ga6 ante RA% coubworn eusows**svr s's ALW Auditee:
CY, 1 MP2,fiP3, uve.a n.zatws.
- 2. t.. wars r 4 utso to me~/rea impsemestarn'.o or AAstA usic.o carrei A MP3,2,&,
POSI., hiD*
S. Pw;os raar> se q v;sswe w M flanamet or'~t Poetnaa'*n"a'*.m.a tav.co. 8%
A r
3.
Classification:
D Nontoepliance I - Violation of D Noncompliance II - Violation of D Deficiency I_ Foa. ForTwta. 'DtTwit,s A /2Ariac '
sir AcA4A T
[ir Recommendation]
Cfont* Mcrn.oa 5. l.3 C.
Iceediate Actions Taken (if reouired) and Priority of Corrective Actions:
I Iceediate Actions Taken D
D' If yes, detail actions below:
(NOTE: A Noncompliance I l'
N requires a Yes) 2.
Cc::ective A: icts ?:icri:y:
O U---
2 verhirg day D Shert-ter=
days ur leng-ter=
ne::ths T2.esfewd J
C..z..i=: :.=i Due by:
Ll,ICf8)
Yh l'Lln), pg, fo 4rt. deriv ( Se n'o c % g b ec Lz:e Ann.te:
Late To ^66 Dstew.~e 6 3.
Tirdirr "ivre and 7estensibiliev:
Y I.P.
O Fe:-E.P.
Responsible Sq:.:
d/A I.
A:h=ov2edr-2ert:
F e. s u r u ree vit a G A fo*artt, M @ cut T2c. Mees it lu,,( st, S z::.:: = - -c*-.1:dve Lt e f*m Rh6 *
?a-t 2:
C ::e::ive A::iens Do:. e: z: den z.nf a mgement Review A.
'C:- e: ive A::i:~s :zh.::
~
3.
3 rte :f C re:_dve A nders:
Fasp::sf.Ea 5:pe_- ::.s::
Lzte C.
_en: : c:
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La,.e 5:z: c: 5:p - temder:
Lite
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Anditer C2eseer::
And.::::
La e
?A : 3:
6 :agement Cne.M ev Sup. 7.2d. ? ::. 5e::te:/."atzger J.E.3
- ?.I?I?.C CI:
C:. pert e A* A?J. Laut.1, Pt-: 5, ?:oted::e (3
hev. 6 Date 1/86 Pate L/3-15 Nealth Physics Audit Tinding Term
- Part 1:
Documentation and Identification of Responsible Supervisor A.
Tintint
Description:
Tinding Number:
- ll-2(o -EVa-6~
Couss*Dt/L stwwbAv.c.*canoo oF Ovie ALAttA Auditee:
C1, MP3, tiP2, MP3, Coont mvens' rwae.%s MP3,2,&3 POSL, }?UDL i RAB J
B.
C2 ossification:
D Noncompliance I - Violation of D Noncor:pliance II - Violation of D DeH eiency ALMA ApWuO FoA roaracA. DcTAks S(4 C8**C m'end*t2 n3 9 ar - s eevio o a.l.4 a
C.
Ic::nediate Aetiens Taken (if reeuired) and Priority of Corrective Actdens:
2.
Irmediate Actions Taken D
r If yes, detail actions below:
(NOTE: A Nonce:pliance I Y
N requires a Tes) 2.
Cerrective Actions 7:dcrity:
O *n+' a 1 verhing day D Short-ter:
days F Lent-te- -
~-"s
- -c: c n
. Gas Due by:
4 lnifp7*
%2 r~t lu h'-
%*.fcr% Acrioa tuos %rc DL*e h;;L* C:
DE~e
'Tb %f bggmjagy 3.
Ti:fier Tree zud 7,eseersibildtv:
- I.P.
O Nc:-I.P.
Respensidle supr.:
N/A z.
u =culeer-=e:::
Pct Gir wreavicas Itfb fl G" bests,.U k%s.1, ECAccInts 5.1 :.c: 1.e::ese: Li:.se Dne
~
% kMB
?z-: 2:
Oc::enive Anic:s Do:.:e. zide: zzt Et zge=en: 1eries A.
Ce-e ti--
a--'--c zhe::
1
~
3.
Late cf Ce-- e::ive A:-iens:
j
]
?. esp:=sible 5:7 --::.s::
Ot e.
C
? :ewef b :
5 2:::: Ser. 5:p:..
Lue 5:2 :. c 5:p - -ter ier :
Late 1
3.
Andite: 01esee---
1 Ani: ::
Dz e 1
j
?t-: 3:
ht:a gement Cree.--der j
Sup:. 7.mi. ?::1. Senic:! z:.zier. ?.L1
- TITI?DCI:
Cc p::s.:e A* O.A 12.nur.1, ?t:1 3, ?:ocedure f3 i
I
Eev. 6 Date 1/66 Page B/3-15 Health Physics A_u_dit Tandant Torm
- Part 1:
Docu:nentation and Identification of Responsible Supervisor A.
Tinding
Description:
Tindint Number:
JI-2(* - 8(*
- l's Coas.sg.t estarkiiwi,)
t, e mcurau /.LAIEA Auditee:
" CY MP2,."iPJ,
~
de.ts;oatoes ett ste use ta wo To rer at cas B 2r' Lzaa
'er u w o: m oz2 a.,o ru t **."=d e$
' 'P 2 ' ' '" 3 POSI. ' r""*~
or encn u anrme ar-RAS i
3.
Classification:
0 Noncompliance I - Violation of D Noncompliance II - Violation of D Defitiency Foe f. int dre, b e m u Su W
,24,'54 CSRecomme.ndata.ct)
%f Sten.oas 3 l.4 i
C.
Ic=iediate Actions Taken (if reoudred) and Priority of Corrective Actions.:
I, d
4 i
i N
y l
2.
It::ediate Actions Take:
D V
2f yes, detail actions below: Ys f
(NOTE: A Noncompliance 1 Y
N requires a Yes) 2.
Cc::e::ive Attic s Tricri:y:
C Vi9
- 2 verhing cay D Smert-term days F Long-ter:
- :::*h5 T2esee~se Nj$ Y I*tlnl*p Ee eeet1ve'A-:i m Due b :
3 %' M 7
dewenW Ac.Wou.he bre
- ene Aut::.c One t To "bc 'bs rtn m.:.>e s D.
Tirdirr Tvre and F.ereensibili:v:
LP, z Nen-E.P.
3-spe:sible sup.:
e/g fo/t. n.%
(4 cts,sm, H
I.
A:hrevled r _re:::
f g 4. nwa r harta M vs
'v G.*l. h n 44tx N lot.((v. R 0.8o /Ers
'1)'l fEl-Su :.c: ; - -<
u nse 7;i e Aun MS -
?a-- 2 :
Ce re::ive A: tiers I>e:.=e
- . tie:
-! 2'r a gem e : Eerier I
es, 1
A.
C:=er ive A::d e:s Tzher:
"(s
,1 3.
Orte cf Cere: dve A:-ic:s:
b i.erp = 1 C:le E rg +nzs::
L
- .L:1 ( }f r
,s C
F._--! ee f 1- :
Suur: Ser. 5 p:..
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Lzte I
/
"D.
Anfite: Cieseert:
i, A - _::
.>n e t 'j c
s
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't, 5:::. 7.zi. ? ::. See i: /.te:2 r e r. ?.!.i 1
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tl, Par: 5, ?:ocedure f3 t
I N
4.
t b
Eev iq S N/l
- y Datel1/86
- u. 4 PaFe L/3-15 Health Physics Audit Tinding Torrn.*
i
.j Part 1:
Docurnentation and Identification of Responsible Supervisor.
s j
A.
Tinding
Description:
Tinding Nurnber:
//- fle-86 *L7 j
NED 2.05, pM.A &.4 7 mm Al.M4 knoc, *$~
Auditce:
"C1, dip 1, tiP!:,tMP3, T*t%Ia) Rgev;rtnturs Hkd Ab7 Sddd FMry H?},2,L3
?QS2,, NyD*,
RAB 1
B.
Classification:
D Noncompliance 1 - M.'olation of-(B Noncompliance 13]~ Vib1stion of QCO 2.0$ eas Al.A7f Przoc,*$
D Deficiency y,g, 3gg yg g D Recoceendation jgg3o,g,7 gg e n o,3 1,t, g
,I t
a F-C.
Ic::nediate Actions Taken' (if reouired) and Priority of Corrective Actieds :
.1" f
2.
Ic=ediate Actions Taken D
B If yes, detail actions below:
(NOTE:
A Noncompliance I Y
N rec.uires a Yes) 9
'l' 2.
Corr'e :.ive A tiens 7:1erity:
I O WiC-" 3 verhing day
- Shcrt-ter=-
days ErI,dt 2::::115 N4 /L(f_ / g er= --
,e/u./z c.
y cm :t M # % puedy:
9 f.s le>
d Chuc AcT4,3 %g %g Late A ::.:c.
zte j ;>
T* ~dt 'bcvcos. e d g,
u 3.
Id:dirr Tree and 7.eseensibili:v.:
% - t u
\\
C E.P.
Y Ec -E.P.
Eespensible Sup:.:
A/M Fan TM AMA.Ailat -
n I.
A:h=ov2 e d r are:::
'e Tu. uir a. reta.us.
h 6 " be Att>,.i.5 <tas y _ rz.c, E.: fos s /E/g 5 z- ~ -- ; :e s e:11..be Dz. e Rub RAS
- s
?z-: 2:
00::ertive A:tiens Do:.=e::ztic: z d W-* Fe22:0 EevicW i
J..
Cr-e- ive A::de r Tzher:
3.
Szte c#
- e::dve A:-ie s:
. :1
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1 C.,
7._- deef b- :
I 2::.c Sec. 5:;:.
Oz e 5:ztic: 5:p - terce c Ir Late "D.
- 8. iite-C2eseert:
?
A=itz::
Date i
s t
l
~
h-3:
Ezratere : Cme:--d ev I
Supr. 7.zd. ?::.. Se:'.ic:/ta 2 r e r. F.!.5 f
- 7.IFI?3 'I:
Ccrperzt e /* A.7.4 Et ::ti, ?t t 3, ?:oced :e f3
.-_'r..-
lev.
6-_ _ _ _ _ - _. -_
J
-4 1
Date 1/86 l
Pere 5/3-15 Health Physics Audit Tinding Torm
- Part 1:
Documentation and Identification of Responsible Supervisor A.
Tindir'r De s cription:
Tinding Number:
Il-2(,-elo - 8 T ug, g.covLtc Mduts ' f*o/L Aos Paocewo Af.MA Audi tee :
fCY Q MP2, MP3, 24v.c.as woom Et alAndssde, Awo wisdb N MP2,2,&3J POSI., N1.'D~.
- cuc*ng Asssp stisfwsscsterics RA5 1
1 3.
Cl a s s i f f.r...e_t.a. n. :
O NoncoCP.liance I - Violation of I
D Nancompliant.e.11 - Viola tion of
}
D b. ficiency
?
gym,a bergs, sgg ALAqn
,,ngsa a, T
e q.o g h Accommendation]
ggg,ar g :.n'a o 5. E.1-C.
Immediate Actions 7aken (if reouired) lend Priority of Corrective Actions:
2.
Irmec' tait: Actions Taken D
R If yes, detail actions below:
(NCE: k %/,ecepliance I Y
N recuires a Yes) 2.
Cor:ective Actio::s Tricri:7:
2 Wi hi: 2.ve M.ng day
- Shert-.cre ;
days R'I.o g-c:=
rc:ths
'N Due by:
der !g7 W /2
't ls L /n -
he+ti :
Lne Ani:..c I:ste D.
Tiri'.cr 'h ne :d 'Eescensibili
- I.P.
2 Fe:-I.P.
Iespensible Supr.:
- J A ran. Ws Aou '.ut y.
I.
A:hrov3edre=e:::
ft< bar iurszeims:
- j.,
G.k. Go >c sq 22 &.J4. 2.0 (2,.l. u5 iL(itl1t Su a e: ?.e.:ese nt%
I;ne AJsRe "
?z-: 2:
Cor:dzi.s A::icts Lo:::e: z ic: z-S "r J Fe ert EevieV A.
Ce re: ive Ar-d--= zien:
,'3.
One cf C:=e:-ive A:-_ic=.._s..
?. esp:::.sille 5:per-_s::
One s
i C
?.r & m l h- :
~~
5 r.::. : Sec. 5:;::.
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A :.:._::
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1 h.:
3:
Eca rere:: Crve:-ier
'l Sup:. I.zt.'?::.. Se::ic:/ Juger, ? *3
- F.IFIFr" CI:
Cc: pert:e /~.JJJ. }1 ;ti, ?tr:: 5, 2 oceinre f3 5
l
]
.]
t-
.l
mm.
o -
ww. g -
Da18 1/86 Pate'E/3 Health Physics Audit Tinding Torm
- Part 1:
Documentation and Identification of Responsible Supervisor A.
Tinding
Description:
Tindior Number:
ll-2b-8/o-S Cemalteta. 124dsig we etermo e'o we.lcs, Auditee:
CY. MP3, MP2, MP3, ALAlta Ces 4,e commv.Acarts
[MP2,2,&3)Pos!.,Kt-.
B.
Classification:
D Noraco:pliance I - Violation of D Noncompliance II - Violation of D Deficiency (K Eccomendation]
foc foerwce.bt. ras > $tt AM h/4^'i" Il
. I?.4forer 5d o Tica) 3. 21 y
C.
Imediate Actions Taken (if recuired) and Priority of Corrective Actions:
1.
Ie:=e dia tt Actions Taken D
5 If yes, detail actions below:
(NOTE: A Nonce:pliance I Y
N requires a Yes) 2.
Corrective Artier.s ? ierity:
O k':C-4 3 verhing day O Shert-ter=-
days Y I,e g-ter=
~ c:ths armud'Cl'is Lue b :
s ler /,5
% &/L(L
- n/,du 7
(**%'c70 s A er.L o u w Late Aci:..c
~ te '
- a T> '04 Dcrtit,-,latn 3.
7_:di:r ~ree and 7.esperribild r:
Y I.P.
O No:-E.T.
hspensible Supr.:
O/A I.
Arinovledr re:::
Pu f. sir ivrca.vis *J M.K!u.4f 1 t.[st.l8(,
5 z.:: ?.e::ehe: z.:.ve Izte
":z:- 2:
Ce renive Anic:s Lor==er z dc: z:d E.t:2g re:: Reviev A.
Cer enive A::i: 5 " ig:
m 3.
Iz.e cf C =e r.ive A--ders :
?.espr_sC:le 5:pervise:
- t.e
.I C.
?.z-deed b- :
5 at:.c Ser. 5=:t..
'tte 5.trie: 5:p - te:ce::
Lzte 3.
Anfd.e: Clesec ::
Anister La;e
? 1 -~ 3:
ht:agere:t Cwe:-iev Sup. 7.ad. ?:::. Se::te:/ tar.arer. P. i
- 7.IFIF.I'; :"I :
Cc pertt e.C.H:. Ezenti, Pt - 1, ? ocedure 63
a.
- a g e.i. 6 Date 1/86 PaFe L/3-15
}icalth Physics Audit Tinding Torm
- I Pa rt 1:
Documentation and 2 identification of Responsible Supervisor i
A.
Tinding Descript f or.:
Tinding Number:
ll-26 10 f.o.>3 e'r> c ti. stL Ass #6.aluj twe 12ts staidt Auditee:
r CY, r1P1 tiP2, fiP3, r34/eri,g roc N ALMA paties or e., e Pat. to rrom rwe Aoa co.ctb,.><ne), M'sTa rr', ott.
Soctadisoa. ro twc u,/,v munA.
L fiPJ.2,&3 POSI. '
)."J.,
e u p m T m c.a.n AL AttA co.eo.uaroa B.
C1 ossification:
C Nonce:pliance 2 - Violation of D Noncompliance II - Violation of D Deficiency 7
FoR Fv/tTwd a bdTAli s, 5(d $LAII4 S Aasia t.
2 Recom::;emdation]
7 F-Ego ttr s 6c n.e.] ~1.2.3 C.
Immediate Actions Taken (if recuired) and Priority of Corrective Actions:
2.
Iceediate Actions Taken D
2-If yes, detail actions belev:
(NOTE: A Nonce:pliance I l'
N recuires a Yes) 2.
Cerrective A io::s ?:ierity:
O W hi 2 werhing day
- Shen-te r=
days 2r 2.c g-te:=
- -hs Ilespoas e C
-m u w e nue 37:
sI,ris,
, val
,1/.,/u Gat 2cw*ve Aers'o e bue bare Lt e Ach c:
Lne "Tb D b TEA g',wca D.
Tirdi:r !vre and Eeseensibility:
YI.P.
O Ec::-E.P.
lespcnsible Sup:.:
O/A I.
A:h ev2 e d rene:::
Pu War ima he st s
6 k dose 42b
.L1. IUu d 6.,r l'L fs *. !B(
- 5. i.:. :: Eep:es e: 11:.ve I Bne
?a-: 2:
Cc :e::ive A : dens Lo:::er ztien z:d l'.z.agere:: Review A.
Cc-e tive A::de._r Tater:
3.
3z.e cf 0:- ernire Ar.ic_.s:
?x:;::: a is 5r;e:..1::
- z 1 C.
r_-_eua: _- :
Sin:. : 5er. 5:pt.
Late 5:2:. c: 5:p - ;emcer:
Ltre 2).
Andire: 01eseort:
Aut :
?1-- 5:
21:aie=t=~ Civ t '-^i ev Sup:. Ezi. ?:::. Se::ic:/'_'at.zger. 5fi
- FITIT-IS C"I. :
Cc pertte f /J.A Et.uti, 7tn 3, ? ocedure f3
Eev. 6 a.
Date 1/66 PaFe E/3-15 Health Physics Audit T2nding Torm
- Part 1:
Doc aentation and Identification of Responsible Supervisor A.
Tindint Des crirition:
Tinding Nunber:
ll-24-Sb -ll FI4npeu sett ALMA (% Avoir 265[e4Sici0t;t4 Aud: tee:
CY,l tiP), fiP2, MP3, A"D Gstantisa F%cDB4N H4ce*4vhm.s F.e po7iric. coa MP1,2,L3] POSL, NL*DL oF Aubir 2ctu'Tt TuooiH M 4.MA (b.4miaarea. To wt 1 3/mShg B.
Classification:
C Noncompliance I - Violation of.
D Noncompliance II - Violation of D DeficieDcy 3.2.Ll' see ALA/LA Ap* aisar )
Fo a ramen. de r m /u.
lE Recoceendation )
E(foar Stfl'M C.
Icenediate Actions Taken (if recuired) and Priority of Corrective Actions:
1.
Ic:=ediat e Actions Tshen D
sr If yes, detail actions below:
- (NtiII: A Nonco:pliance I_
Y N
recuires a Yes) 2.
Correcuve Actio_s ?:ierity:
O Wi-W 2 verking day
- Short-ter:
days
( 1,ong-te:=
- rc: hs (2e spo~ se
((
Cc.r....a A d s Due by:
4kis f8>
7M.b i t
~
adst[ %
foN6ctu 4edoa but b4rc Late Auc:.c:
~ te T*
Se s t ren.m ;a n 3.
Tirdi:r 7rre a:d Eesterribilitr:
-nespcnsible Supr.:
O/A Y I.?.
O For-E.?.
I.
A:hrevledr re:::
76: wer ivrc M oc sus Co. II. So se w/t n b i M IU(.4.6 Le I 7.-
8 I4 i
I;i.te 5 ane: I.e.::ese z ure
?z-: 2:
Cerre::ive A::iens Dor =entz:de: z 4 Ez 2rement Keviev A.
C:= endre A::de._s Tzher:
3.
Ozte cf Cere ive A nic_r:
Eerp::sihie 5:pe-r s::
.;t a f
Er-teef h :
5_zne: 5 er. 5 =p..
- tte 5 z
- c: 5:pe - -t e:6e:-
Lare 3.
Anfiter C2esec:::
Audi ::
Dz e e
af Ee e*
e Sup:. had. ? :.. Se: ic:/tazager J.15
- JITI:.I': CI:
Cc.perz e.2~._:53. h::ti, Ptn 3, ?:ocedure f3 1
1 i
Eev. 6-Date 1/86 Pate B/3-15 Health Physics Audit Tinding Torm
- Part 1:
Documentation and Identification of Responsible Supervisor A.
Tinding
Description:
Tinding Number:
ll~2(e-8b-I7.
Repssess nc IttpsiGTies Fott AMa useor SmP Audstee:
" CY, Q MP2, MP3, Lo ttw Avry. Mig Fon. vio'wws oF AARA Costitots-o KPI,2,E3, POSI., N'J.
Coasma. smf amtuiAT%,> of somt Lodee Lives. Earortedr.tsur roou.
yg B.
Classification:
D Nonecepliance I - Violation of D Noncompliance II - Violation of D Deficiency c~
s Eccom:pendation\\
Fott fumCet it, Tans, su AN A f44'E' f
J Repe.tr seenoa 3.2.5 C.
Immediate Actions 7aken (if reouired) and Priority of Corrective Actions:
1.
Ic=ediate Actions Taken D
D If yes, detail actions below:
{
(NOTE:
A Nonce =pliance I l'
N recuires a Yes) 2.
Corrective Actie:s ?:ieri:v:
O 'Wi:li: I verhing day D Shert-ter=
days
&'Lon g-t e =
netths "i2t s C.........
.peast
.... me br:
w/,rs>
w.4ad a/mly.
Lz:.e Aud:.ter Lt.e 3.
Ti.:dirr 7tre z:d Reseenribili v:
O/A F I.P.
O For-I.P.
Iespensible 59:. :
I.
A:'c oule d r-~-
? u Sir turen.0 4 1 C A b>c u<t>..h i<m t y, (2.0.4.4 te s le [s 4. [d4 5:1::.c: Ee::es : t :he Ltie Aan ang -
?z-: 2:
Cc=ertive A::iens Le :=miden z:2 lit:arere : Review A.
Ce rective A::ie s Tzie::
3.
Izte c: Cere: dve A -ders:
Eespe sirle Supe _- :_s::
te i
C.
Er--iewed h :
5:. ::.== 5er. 5:p..
Izze 5:1 ic: 5:p-- -tences:
Date 3.
A:iiter C1eseert:
Andi_::
Date s
P t -- 3:
Et:a gerent Crve:-iev 5up. Ez1. Pret. 5 e::t c:/.'.'z:2 E er. E!.I J.I ?J.E';CI:
Cc:pe rat e > ~ *J.A Ez..uti, ?t : 3, ? ocedure 63 l
l I
Lte. G 1
6e **
Date 1/86 i
Pate E/3-15 1
Health Physics Audit Tinding Term
- Pa rt 1:
Documentation and Identification of Responsible Supervisor A.
Tindint
Description:
Tinding Number:
ll* E* % -0 e
Rd Assess rud assut er t<rdam>vivy Paovios bcrmeo net A>0m 664 Auditee:
C1 h tiP2, tips,
Aub 'TH Pd of og4 ca.s caJ e ao8
.MP1,2,&3, P O S L, P. n'.
RL sfousi4\\drics, en t mou s o r FE"fot"'*".) E si > An's C uitmues t selbriegiu,Moa/ITodduj Twd pJJMMg oF wttg445 SND NerhoDS fort CoaJbe ota RAS B.
Classification:
C Nonecepliance I - Violation of * # *** *'r"5 D Noncompliance 23 - Violation of C Deficiency MN M DEmis s 5(f M $4^'id l!
}2hecocne.ndation}
ggpgr g,Ee:n'4a 3. 2,6 1
C.
Immediate Actions Taken (if recuired) and Priority of Corrective Actions:
2.
Icnediate Actions Taken D
Er If yes, detail actions below:
(NOTE:
A Nonce pliance I T
N recuires a Yes) 2.
Cc rective Attices ?rierity:
O Vi + - 2 verting day C Sher -te.m days f le:g-te::
' :::ths 4 fe r fe,7 MMk I"t /s t. [B r.
Oc..c
- Due by:
a derftle&c Acrd but hart Date A :L-;cr
~
.e
- t To ~B f de rcrtm,Le s 3.
7#-'#*r ~vre and Eeractribility:
C E.?.
2 Nc:-I.P.
ne.spensible Supr. :
f) A rort m'i s AAA/ta ' a t i
rs I.
Ath=orledre e ::
PM. 6%r seiem
- c. N.%c..,w,.1 \\ R tm R.c.2 h 1t[k[gc 5.2.:: I. ---< - 2::.'re 2t e Awu RAS -
?t:t 2:
Cene::ive A::ie:s Doc =e:.2:de: 2:d W-> ge:e:: ?.eview A.
Ce r e-ive A::irer !zh_::
i l
3.
3zte cf
- =e:-ive A--ie:r:
?.e:?:::i::11 5=;er:u ::
"t.e C.
?.e--iewei h- :
5 z: :: 5er. 5:p..
I.t e 5 :::.c: 5:p -.e:ies:
Lzie
'D.
Arti::: C esee:::
And.:._::
Late
?t-: 3:
litra gere:. Crverviev Supr. I.zi. ? ::. Se: ic:/tz 2 t e r. IJ l
- EITI r:2:
Corporate AUJ.A Et. ti, ?t t 3, Proced::e C3 l
Date 1/86 i
PaFe E/3-15 j
Health Physics Audit Tindier Torm
- i i
Part 1:
Documentation and Identification of Responsible Supervisor A.
Tindint
Description:
Tinding Number:
11-2G. SG -19 Provide ocim.: c, aidriss Fewt TMe.co) dggespsont54f s, 7sl.,) A cnm, MP3,2,&31 POSL, IC L re vio 4 m r ro t C Q vA u te o j 6 Aud: tee:
C Q tipi, MP2, MP3, m ob;o g rtes y si
%D kerHoos of E*J/oted m(A/T-Rqs i
B.
Classification:
C Noncompliance I - Violation of D Noncompliance II - Violation of D Deficiency g %gg egy3;us s,g-A u g4 A u,3 %
[9Eecom=croa1 c.n)
<1r sgefoa 3, g, *]
t C.
Innediate Actions Taken (if recuired) and Priority of Corrective Actions:
J 1
1 2.
Incediate Actions Taken D
R If yes, detail actions below:
j (NOTI: A Noncompliance I l'
N recci:es a Yes) 2.
Cor:ecrive Acticas ?:icri:7:
C Wi hi 2 vertirg day
- She:t-ter=
days-( Long-ter=
re hs f2essea34 Er ne... 6 -I n. s Due by:
Nfif$7 M Mb is/4 F4 Ceauenc AcWea but bye-Da :.e Arkic:
Dz e To Be D (Tea.n o t A 2).
Tindi r ~rre med Resce-ee'e'e v:
O E.P.
Y Nc:-I.P.
Eespensible Supr.:
A Ns rw.'s A MA.4,'t x 61 I.
A:h=orle d rement:
Pts Esir inrr u itsx c.n.a.sc.-w m n ec. u,u > reklu 5 Ine: Ee::ese:.zurb' Lne Mb RMb -
?z-: 2:
Cer:e: ive A::iens Dor==e: 2:i== z d liz zgere:. Review A.
Ce-e: ive A::de-e_ -'zh _: :
3.
Orte cf C:=e:.ive A:-iens :
lesp::sibl.e 5:pe T s::
~.t a C.
EMeed h- :
'ne 5.2:ic: 5:p*- -te:ies:
Line 5:2ne: Sec. 5:p..
2).
A dite: 01esee ::
Aze ::
La e
?a- : 3:
h:are ert Crae:-dev Supr. 7.a:. ~-::1. Sectic:/h :2 r t r.
J.' -
7.ITI?.I'; CI :
Cc pert:e A Ja Mzenz.1, Pt-5, ?:otedure f3
Date 1/86 Page E/3-15
. Health' Physics Audit Tinding Term
- Part 3:
Documentation and Identification of. Responsible Supervisor A.
Tinding
Description:
Tinding Number:
// - 2le - 6(e -l f suscsr.c Auditee:
% fiP3, tiP2, MP3, itoses#rt riet vx er Pd./t-4us.st rto vs. Pet.
~
. ro a. Aata ptasov./1dm W44.a soor MP1,2,E3,! POSI., NUD.,'
or up Psaurs r..m ea. ave s$t gaurs,
B.
Classification:
D Noncompliance I
. Violation of D Noncompliance II - Violation of
_D Deficiency 502 Futineit b: rm.s 1
5 art $<^C4 ()fXA^^L
( E' Recommerciat2on]
Rtro/tt s s e no,0 3.3 s
C.
Im:nediate Actions Taken (if recuired) and Priority of Corrective Actions:
1.
Immediate Actions Taken D
B*
If yes, detail actions below:
(NOTE: A Honco pliance I Y
N recuires a Yes) 2.
Corrective Artic=s ? ierity:
2 Win"m I verking day
- Sher:-ter:
days It"Long-te==
- ths 3 N Jf e, w e 37:
d,d,4 w /2 8 #
<t /nlu dermtche Moo b,a barr.
La.e A :.:.tc Oz e
~
"To '86 Da r c t m w n
'D.
Tiriirr !vve and Eescenzibildtv:
2*E.P.
O Ec:-E.P.
Ee.spe=sible Sup:.:
O/A I.
Ach=ouledrere:::
I24. ErdT lb.!Tittdie w$
O.k be
- A tth, - J.1 k str/v de geo.m II II. !dI=
5:1 s:: 1.e::e s e:~.1us e' Dz s e,un, arrs -
?z:-: 2:
C:::er ive A::ie:s Lo::=e: 1 ic: z:d I'.r zgere:: Eeview A.
Ce= ettiv-2--d--e
' ier:
z E.
Dzte cf Cer er dve A::iers:
Eesp : -11.e 5:pc:::s::
- t e C.
? -hes W:
1:.zn e: S er. 1:-.
La.e 1 t :.c z 5 : p - -t e r:ie -
Ltte
'D.
Antite: C2esec ::
Ani:..::
Late
?t - 5:
Et:arenes: Crv e r--ier 5 pr. ?.2d. ;-:::. 5e:.ic:/02:.2ger, I. 3 w
- s. g e e.
g.ig
.I
1
====.
NORTHEAST UTILITIES 1
.. -,.ac c co g
........u 4011' 4 45,w,L"El usuutCE map.p.,
April 22, 1987 NE-87-RA-312(
)
TO:
M. R. S 1
q, W. G. Collin A
R'. // K crath,R.fa PROM:
N.
A. Crandall (Ext. 3754)
(Ext. 5863)
SUBJECT:
ALARA Program Appraisal
REFERENCE:
1)
NE-86-RA-1229, Same Subject, M.R. Bellman, etc.
to S. E. Scace, dated December 18, 1986 2)
HP-87-165, D. B. Miller to R. C. Rodgers, dated March 17, 1987 3)
MP-102-74, S. E. Scace to R. C. Rodgers, The attached are responses to recommendations concerning the ALARA Program contained in the reference.
The items addressed are applicable to the RAB ALARA Section responsibilities.
Station responses are provided in References 2 and 3 also attached.
The attached defines an action plan and schedule for carrying out recommendation responses.
Please contact us with any questions.
RNM/rdo RAC3.37 Attachments cc:
D. B. Miller S. E. Scace E. A. DeBarba J. P. Kangley F. C. Rothen
)
H. W. Siegrist
{
R. K. Doherty j
D.W. Fitts J. O. Powell S. M. Turowski ROUTE TO:
R.T. Harris R. C. Rodgers R.A. Crandall S. M. Torf J. G. McHugh j
OSFO REV 343
Attachment i
1.
Recommendation 11-26-86-1 Goals which have been established do not reflect the actual work planned and of ten are not communicated to the workers.
Resoonse The goals development process has been revised to more closely reflect the actual work.
These goals will be established with input from line supervisors who will be held accountable for performance against those goals.
The goal setting process along with other measures of estimated exposure (INPO Guideline Based Targets) will be formalized in a Corporate ALARA Program procedure.
A draft of this procedure will be available for review by June 15, 1987.
2.
Recommendation 11-26-86-2 Communication of the RAB's function should be improved.
Response
As a result of ALARA Service Redesign, the method of reviewing and monitoring projects during the design and construction phase is being modified.
A corporate ALARA procedure will be issued to descr ibe this new methodology and will define the responsibilities of the RAB and the unit ALARA will define coordinators concerning design phase reviews and monitoring of projects.
The draft of this procedure will be available for comment by June 15, 1987.
Additionally, other major RAB functions are being addressed as part of service redesign.
For example, RAB's role during outages and in the goal setting process will be better defined through either procedures or improved communications with the station.
3.& Findings 11-26-86-3 and 11-26-86-4 4.
ALARA Design Installation Review implementation problems.
Response
Revisions to the project ALARA review and monitoring process is addressed in the response to #2 above.
5.
Recommendation 11-26-86-5 Standardization of ALARA Coordinators function.
2.-
Response
Response to this issue is the responsibility of station management. See MP and CY responses.
RAB will. reevaluate' RWP coding with considerations of interactions with PMMS.
6.
Recommendation 11-26-86-6 Establishment of department ALARA coordinators.
Response
Response to this issue is the responsibility of station management.
See MP and CY responses, 7.
Finding 11-26-86-7 Deficiencies in ALARA Training.
Response
The Nuclear Training Department has the action to develop a discipline specific training program.
RAB along with the stations and Generation Engineering and Construction, will provide support for the development of this program.
The program will be initiated in time for the MP-1,.1987 outage to address initially construction supervision. ' It will tue expanded to address other job classifications in late 1987-1988.
8.
Recommendation-11-26-86-8 Define responsibilities for job procedure reviews.
Response
Corporate ALARA procedure #5, "ALARA Job Reviews" will be revised to be more applicable to repair type jobs and clearly assign responsibilities.
A draft of this procedure revision will be available for review by June 15, 1987.
9.
Recommendation 11-26-86-9 Improve communication of ALARA controls.
Response
a Response on this issue is.the responsibility of station mangement.
See MP response.
10.
Recommendation 11-26-86-10 Define responsibility for pre-job briefing.
.. Response Response.on this issue is.the responsibility of station management.
It will be addressed in the rewrite of ALARA Procedure 45'as the responsibity of job supervisor.
Station HP will assist on all hi-rad area jobs.
11.
Recommendation 11-26-86-11 Re-emphasize audits of ALARA controls.
Response
Station Responsibility.
See CY and MP responses.
12.
Recommendation 11-26-86-12 Responsibilities and use of stop work authority.
Response
1 Station Responsibility.
See CY and MP respones.
13.
Recommendation 11-26-86-13
Response
Station Responsibility.
See CY and MP responses.
14.
Recommendation 11-26-86-14 i
Provide guidance, tracking, and action level for exposure equalization.
Response
1 Guidelines for exposure equalization will be defined in draft form for the Millstone Unit #'l outage, if it is decided that current controls are not adequate.
j 15.
Recommendation 11-26-86-15 r
Use permanent TLD results for comparisons of NU plants to" other plants.
Response
Permanent TLD results are used by NU as input to NUREG-0713-for comparison to other plants and therefore, there is no inconsistencies in the basis for comparison.
Annual totals based on TLD's-and PIC's are typically within 10%'of each other.
hhh """
~~6
' ~ ~
NORTHEAST UTILITIES I =- _: =-. --
a
'yJ < w a.um. =..=,. --
owo
-g
,q ;
w Jucc 3, 1987 NE v I-RA-512 B. Miller W. W -
- $l.N W, R. C. Rodgers TO:
S.
E. Scace, D.
FROM:
M.
R. Bellman, W. G. Collins (Ext. 5279)
(Ext. 5472) i
SUBJECT:
ALARA Appraisal Response Evaluation i
REFERENCES:
1)
NE-86-RA-1229, ALARA Program Appraisal, M.
R. Bellman /W. G. Collins to S.
E. Scace, R.
H. Graves, R. C. Rodgers, dated j
December 18, 1986 j
2)
HP-87-16 5, CY Response,
D. B. Miller to R. C.
Rodgers, dated March 17, 1987 j
3)
NE-87-RA-312, RAB Response, R. N. McGrath/R. A.
Crandall to M.
R. Bellman /W. G. Collins, dated April 22, 1987 4)
NE-87-RA-372, RAB Response, R. A. Crandall to M.
R. Bellman /W. G. Collins, dated April 22, 1987 5)
MP-10274, Millstone Response, S.
E. Scace to R. C.
Rodgers, dated April 28, 1987 1.0 Introduction In November 1986, an appraisal of the ALARA program was conducted at both Millstone and Connecticut Yankee.
Reference 1 detailed the,two findings and 13 recommendations, identified during the appraisal.
Responses (References 2 through 5) have been received from Connecticut Yankee (CY), Millstone (MP) and the Radiological Assessment Branch (RAB).
As a result of our review of these responses, three of the fifteen items ha M men zlosed with no further action required.
Of the remaining open items, the responses and proposed Corrective Actions for nine of a
the items were acceptable.
A further response or clarification is reWuested for three of the items.
The Corrective Action commitment for several of the findings was for the development of a draft procedure.
Since issuance of a draft procedure for review would not complete
{
the corrective-actions, a final completion due date will be j
requested upon issuance of the draft procedures.
j
. es70 nev 3 e3
{
- - - - - - The following is a summary of the status of each finding.
This is followed by a discussion of each of the items.
2.0 Finding Status Summary 1
Lead Finding No..
Status Due Date Responsibility Action Required 11-26-86-1 Open 6/15/87' RAB Issue a draft procedure 11-26-86-2 Open 6/15/87' RAB 11-26-86-3 open 6/15/87 RAB 11-26-86-4 open 6/15/87 RAB
~
3 11-26-86-5 Open 9/30/87 RAB Evaluate use of PMMS' codes-Open 6/1/87 MP Standardize RWP coding plus other commitments 11-26-86-6 open 6/30/87 M P & -- C Y A further response is requested i
11-26-86-7 Open 7/31/87 RAB Plans for further ALARA l training will be evaluated 11-26-86-8 Open 6/15/87 RAB Issue a draft ~ procedure ]
11-26-86-9 Open 6/30/87 MP A further response ~ is i
requested
.I 11-26-86-10 Open 6/15/87 RAB Issue a draf t procedure 11-26-86-11 Closed 3
)
11-26-86-12 Closed 11-26-86-13 Open 6/30/87 MP,CY, & RAB A further response is i
requested 11-26-86-14 open 6/15/87 RAB Evaluate questionnaire and determine further.
action
{
I 11-26-86-15 Closed 3.0 Finding Response Evaluation
]
11-26-86-1, ALARA Goals:
RAB has committed to formalizing the goal setting process in a Corporate ALARA Procedure.
A draft of the procedure will be available for review by June 15, 1987.
This item remains open.
11-26-86-2, Communication of RAB's Functions:
RAB has committed to the issuance of a draft Corporate ALARA Procedure which will define RAB's responsibilities during
)
the design phase of a project.
This draft procedure will be available for review by June 15, 1987.
Concerning RAB's functions during an outage, the commitment to address this issue during Service Redesign is acceptable.
Memo NE-87-RA-361, dated April 15, 1987, was an example of progress in this area.
The meno established a schedule of meetings with the Station Services Superintendents "to determine their outage support needs and protocol for.RAB's site' presence...".
This finding remains open.
-. 11-26-86-3 and 11-26-86-4, ALARA Design Review Pr ocess (including RAB's involvement, change control, and installation review):
The RAB commitment to issue a draft'Corpo: ate ALARA-Procedure to address new methodology for review and monitoring of projects by June 15, 1987 is aceptable.. Note that the Millstone response suggested that changes may be
~
required at the NEO Procedure level.
R. A. Crandall agreed that the need for NEO Procedure changes will be evaluated once the methodology has been established.
These two items remain open.
11-26-86-5, Standardization of Unit ALARA Coordinator Functions:
The CY response to this finding is acceptable.
The CY-recommendation that the PMMS codes be evaluated for use in the RWP system was accepted by RAB.
R.'A.
Crandall offered a verbal commitment to complete this evaluation by September 30, 1987.
The MP response was also acceptable with commitment to standardize the coding of RWPs by June 1, 1987, to standardize the allocation of departmental exposure goals ~by.
May 1, 1987, and to standardize outage'and annual reports by May 1, 1987.
The additional commitment to utilize all ALARA Coordinators during one unit's outage should also.be effective.
i 11-26-86-6, Consider establishing Departmental ALARA
)
Coordinators:
The CY response accepted the concept of a " Project
)
Coordinator".
Will the responsibilities of this coordinator J
be specified in a formalized procedure?
Will any q
specialized training be provided?
If so, when?-
1 The MP response focused on the use of the existing project
)
- staff, i.e.,
PDCR engineering staff and assistant 1
supervisors.
The response stated the need for more training i
and procedural guidance but offered no commitments.
What procedures will be revised?
What training will be offered?
When will these items be completed?
j A further response to this finding by both MP and CY is
]
requested by June 30, 1987.
This finding remains open.
1 1
4
i
_4 11-26-86-7, ALARA Training:
As specified in the RAB response, an ALARA' Awareness Training Program has 'been initiated for Construction,
Supervision.
Per:a disucussion with L. A. Chatfield,-
Manager, Nuclear Training, the' schedule for expanding this:
-training to other. job classifications will be discussed-during an upcoming Training Program ControlLCommittee. (TPCC)'
meeting.in June. -This finding remains open.
Plans for further ALARA training will be evaluated by the' auditors by July 31, 1987.
11-26-86-8, Job-Procedure ALARA reviews RAB has committed to revising ALARA. Procedure #5 with a draft of the procedure available for review by June 15,-
1987.
It was noted that there was disagreement between the CY and MP responses on this recommendation..'CY maintains that only the Job Supervisor has the expert'ise to' review the procedures.. Millstone suggested that PORC should be inolved in the decision of which procedures need the review.
RAB has committed to evaluating the. station responses during the ALARA procedure revision process.
This finding remains open.
11-26-86-9, Communication of ALARA Controls:
This finding was directed to MP only..The MP response stated:
"The present method of communicating ALARA controls via the Job Supervisors and posting controls at the work site is valid.
The failure of the current system is in not making the Job Supervisor accountable for fai. lure'to inform his personnel of those controls ~ and ensuring they are in effect.
The responsible supervisor for the job must be well defined, his responsibilities specified by procedure and a deficiency / audit program has to monitor his performance and provide for correction of deficiencies."
While we agree with the response, further information.is required.
What changes are going to be made to correct the
~
" failure of the current system"?
Where will the responsible supervisors for the job be defined?
In what procedure will a
the Job Supervisor's responsibilities be specified?' ALARAL Procedure # 5 or a station procedure?
What Deficiency / Audit program will monitor the Job Supervisor's performance and provide for correction of deficiencies?
This finding-remains open and a-further response to this finding, by MP is, requested by June 30, 1987.
l l
_..__,__________-__J_m_
l
- 111-26-86-10, Pre-Job Briefings:
RAB's commitment to address the responsibilities,for. pre-job briefing in the rewrite of ALARA Procedure. 4 5 is acceptable.
As in the response to 11-26-86-8,. this procedure-draft should be available for review by June--15, 1987.' Note that
.the MP response did not specifically commit-to-having Station Health Physics involved in the pre-job.brief for all High Radiation Area jobs as mentioned by CY and'RAB.
This should be clarified in ALARA Procedure 4 5.
This finding l
remains open.
11-26-86-11, ALARA Control Audits:
All' responses were acceptable.- This finding-is closed.
RAB should consider adding references to the station procedures which address ALARA control audits in ALARA Procedure 45.
11'-26-86-12, Stop Work Orders and Lower-Level Enforcement-Tools:
The responses to this finding were acceptable and the finding is closed.
11-26-86-13, Determining the number and type of workers on a job:
The responses have all seemed to agree thattan excessive j
man-loading problem exists.
However, no specific corrective actions have been specified.
A further response to this finding by MP, CY, and RAB is requested by June 30, 1987.
11-26-86-14, Exposure Equalization:
The RAB response to this finding stated:
" Guidelines for exposure equalization will be defined in draft form for the MP Unit #1 outage, if it is decided.that current controls are not adequate."
R. A. Crandall has indicated that a questionnaire.would be submitted to the Station Superintendents and Vice Presidents with a response requested by June 1, 1987. The'results from this questionnaire should indicate if further controls are deemed necessary by upper management.
R. A. Crandall offered a June ~15, 1987 commitment to evaluate the a
questionnaire.results and determine further action, if any.
This finding remains open.
_ _. 11-26-86-15,- Use of Permanent TLD versus PIC results for' Person-Rem comparisons:
i.
The responses to this finding were acceptable and the finding is closed.
4.0 Attachments
. 4.1 CY Response, HP-87-165 4.2 RAB Response, NE-87-RA-312 j
l 4.3 RAB. Response, NE-87-RA-372 4.4 MP Response, MP-10274 MRB/WGC:rdo HWS 5.2 Attachments cc:
E. J.'Mroczka (w/o Attachments)
L..A. Chatfield W.
D.
Romberg R. A. Crandall C. F.-Sears H. W. Siegrist (w/o Attachments)'
R. T.
Harris R. K. Doherty E. A. DeBarba D. W. Fitts J.
P. Kangley S. M. Turowski' B..L. Granados
.J.'O.
Powell' H. E. Clow
'l J
e
Page No.
1 CONNECTICUT YANKES 12/14/87 ALARA APPRAISAL FINDINGS I
'1 FINDING SEVERITY APPRAISAL DATE DUE DATE CORRECTIVE DATE CII) SED j
CATEGORY ACTION TAKEN 11-26-86-1 RECOMMENDATION 17 11/15/87
/ /
/ -/
11-26-86 RECOMMENDATION 17 11/15/87
/ /
/ /
1 11-26-86-4 RECOMMENDATION 17 11/15/87
/./
/ /-
'11-26-86-5 RECOtHENDATION 17 09/30/87 06/03/87 09/04/87 11-26-86-6 RlIOMMENDATION 17 06/30/87 10/19/87 10/19/87 11-26-86-7 NONCOMP-II 17 07/31/87 10/19/87 10/19/87 11-26-86-8 RECOMMENDATION 17 11/15/87-
/ /
/ /
11-26-86-10 RECOMMENDATION 17 11/15/87
/ /
/ /
11-26-86-11 RECOMMENDATION 17 04/15/87 06/03/87 09/04/87 11-26-86-12 RECOMMENDATION 17 04/15/87 06/03/87 09/04/87 11-26-86-13 RECOMMENDATION 17 06/30/87 10/19/87 10/19/87 11-26 86-14 RECOMMENDATION 17 06/15/87 08/31/87 09/04/87 11-26-86-15 RECOMMENDATION 17 04/15/87 06/03/87 09/04/87-
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R. C. R. M March 4, 1987 I
NE-87-RA-178 R.T.H.
C. F. S.
TO:
D. B. Mi11er y
Mk FROM:
. Sie rist (Ext. 3591) l
SUBJECT:
Trend Analysis of Connecticut Yankee's Health Physics Audit Results
REFERENCE:
1.
Memo (NE-86-RA-186), H. W. Siegrist to R. H.
Graves, " Trends Analysis of Connecticut Yankee's Health Physics Audit Results", dated February 18, 1986 2.
Memo (NE-86-RA-1229), M. R. Bellman, W. G. Collins and C.
A. Flory to S. E. Scace, R. H. Graves and R. C. Rodgers, "ALARA Program Appraisal", dated December 18, 1986 Audits of Connecticut Yankee's Health Physics Program are conducted by the NUSCo Radiological Assessment Branch (RAB) in l
accordance with NU's ALARA Program Procedure # 3.
An analysis of I
the findings, resulting from the audit program, has been conducted to identify any trends which may be useful in improving the Health Physics Program.
A trend analysis report is attached.
The attached trend analysis report updates the last analysis trend report (see reference 1)'which considered audit data from 1980-1985.
The objective of this analysis is to identify any continuing trends based on findings over the last four years, 1983-1986.
I The following conclusions are made based on the trends analysis report:
Overall Connecticut Yankee's Health Physics program has been o
effective in maintaining compliance with Federal Regulations, Technical Specifications, and implementing procedures.
I o
The total number of Audit Violations has decreased, and this decrease is reflected in all audit categories.
t o
This positive trend could be maintained with continued emphasis on the categories of Area Posting, RWPs, and Radioactive Material Control.
~
i OS70 AEV. 3-83 em
O l
. There have been no negative trends identified in h' ealth o
physics practices'concerning-control of high exposure-rate work.
This indicates that the 1986 overexposure incident was an isolated. occurrence.
There were no continuing negative trends identified for o
violations-which are the responsibility of the Health'_ Physics-Department.
For non-HP violations there.was one negative trend identified-improper use of protective clothing by.
workers.
the RAB In response to identified weaknesses at Millstone, o
Audit Section has increased audit activity in the categories of ALARA Procedures and Radwaste Shipments.
Negative' trends, in as measured by audit violation findings, are not evident these two categories.
However, a recent ALARA' appraisal (see i
reference 2) indicates a weakness in the ALARA Program.
HWS/CAF/rdo HWS El.29 Attachments cc:
E. J. Mroczka C. F. Sears l
W. D. Romberg R. T. Harris E. A. DeBarba.
H. E. Clow ROUTE TO:
R. C. Rodgers I.L. Haas W. G. Collins M. R. Bellman C. A. Flory l
RAB File 8
m
NUSCO Rab Health Physics Audit Findings 1986 Trends Analysis Report for Connecticut Yankee 1.
TOTAL VIOLATIONS AND AUDIT MAN-HOUR TRENDS Total violations and onsite audit man-hours are plotted in Figure 1 for each year from 1981 to 1986.
Violations include non-compliance and deficiency findings but not.
recommendations.
From Figure 1, the fluctuation of total violations indicates a positive trend toward a reduction in l
Audit Violations.
l The onsite audit manhours represent only those spent in actual audit investigation at the station.
This does not include hours spent in preparation for the audits or follow-up of audit findings.
The fluctuation in onsite audit manhours is directly related to the length of refueling outages.
The' audit procedure, which requires monthly audits, increases the audit frequency to weekly during outages because of the increased HP activity during those time periods.
Figure 1, therefore, indicates the lowest audit manhours in the non-outage years of 1982 and 1985.
l l
2.
DISTRIBUTION _OF HP VIOLATIONS Figure 2 shows the distribution of those violations for which l
the Health Physics Department has responsibility.
Over half of the HP violations occurred in three categories -- Area Postings, RWPs, and External Exposure Control.
Findings in 1986 continue this trend in distribution.
Although a majority of the HP violations are in three categories, this does not imply programmatic weaknesses within the categories.
These categories are more frequently audited because the programs in these categories are broadly applied and easily observable.
3.
RECURRENT HP VIOLATIONS For the four year period 1983-1986, the HP violations were analyzed to identify recurrent violations.
A violation was considered recurrent, f or the purposes of this repor t, if 1t occurred three or more times.
There was one recurrent violation, the failure to record available exposures on an RWP. This type of violation occurred three times, the most recent in February'1986.
The other two violations occurred in February 1983.
I L
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It. is the opinion of the auditors that this recurrent violation is not a trend toward decreased ef festiveness of.
the Health Physics Program.
However, additional efforts to' i
prevent recurrence should be made.
l 4.
DISTRIBUTION OF NON-HP VIOLATIONS The non-HP violation distribution of Figure 3 also indicates the trend in violation reduction.
The categories with 'the majority of violations in the three years prior to 1986; j
RWPs, Radioactive Material Control, and Area Posting;' are those which were most heavily audited.
During 1986.there were'no violations in these three categories.- Of the three i
findings in-1986, two were violations in the category of Personnel Contamination Control and one was a violation in i
the category of ALARA Procedures.
The two violations in the category of Personnel Contamination Control. increases this category's distribution to 14% for the four year period l
1983-1986.
l 5.
RECURRENT NON-HP VIOLATIONS l
There were two recurrent non-HP violations for the four year period 1983-1986.
1.
Three findings were for failure to initial an RWP, the most recent in August 1984.
2.
Five findings were for violations of protective clothing requirements or improper use of protective clothing, the most recent in April 1986.
Other violations occurred in l
October 1985, August 1984, February 1984, and Febrdary 1983.
Improper worker use of protective clothing is the only continuing negative trend identified at Connecticut Yankee.
6.
COMPARISON OF FINDINGS TO NRC SEVERITY CLASSES Table 1 indicates both the audit finding classifications and NRC severity classes for 19 83 thr oug h 19 8 6.
Most of the i
audit violations are of relatively minor safety significance (Severity Level V).
The NRC Severity Level IV type violation involved the f ailure to require a survey meter or HP coverage for an entry into a High Radiation Area.
7.
Areas of NRC Concern Because of the overexposure incident in 1986 the NRC has questioned many aspects of CY Health Physics Program concerning controls of high exposure-rate work.
The NRC has also identified ALARA and Radwaste Shipments as areas of concern at Millstone.
In response to these NRC concerns, the RAB Audit Section in 1986 increased its audit activities in the categories of ALARA Procedures and'Radwaste Shipments and in health physics practices relative' to high exposure-rate work.
This increased audit activity will continue in 1987.
r 1
1
~
I
.There wereino recurrent RAB audit' violation findings in the categories of ALARA Procedures and Radwaste Shipments or in the: control of high exposure-rate -work for the four year period 1983-1986.
There were single violation findings in 1986 for both ALARA Procedures and Radwaste Shipments.. There were also ten' recommendations made'in the category of ALARA Procedures as a result of a special'ALARA. Appraisal conducEed in' November 1986.
(See RAB' memo NE-86-RA-1229.)
The j
significance of this' appraisal.is.that.the ALARA Program has
'{
been identified as an area of concern despite the absence of
{
any trends in audit violation findings.
i i
1 s
'l Figure 1.-
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u Table'17 Audit Violation Severity Audit Program Violation Categories
- Non-Compliance I-Non-Compliance II Deficiency 1983 0
12 3
y 1984-1 9.
2
~/
,1 1985' O
2 1-1986 1
7 l
I
. Violations categorized - accordinglto NRC severity levels
- Severity. Class I
II
.III IV V'
s 0
15' 1
o1 1
11'
..s4 3
1985 9
1986
- The violation categories listed are from the " Northeast Utilities Corporate Management' Proqqam f or Monitoring Occupational Exposures As Low As Reasonably Achievable",
Part B, Procedure #3, " Audits of the Stations'-Health Physics Programs".
1)
Non-Compliance I - Violation of Federal Regulations, Technical Specifications or By-Product Materia $ Itcense.
2)
Non-Compliance II - Violation of station procedures or station orders, Corporate ALARA program.
.)
3)
Deficiency - No apparent violations, but a lack of i
j approved written procedures, written documentation, etc.,
to show compliance with 10CFR, Technical Specification;,
Station Procedure or Corporate ALARA Program.
- *NRC Severity Levels are' detailed in 10CFR2.
The number of violations assigned to the varidds Severity Classes in not official.- Categorization is for' information n
'l only, and is subject to the interpretation of the auditor.
4 Class IV violations typically involved the potentia 1' entry,;
the bntry of a worker into either an improperly posted orHigh Radiation Area, or a High Radiation Area that lacked such a posting, where a worker could potentially receiveuan exposure in excess of the limits of 10CFR20.101.~
Class V violations typically involved situations that had" minor safety or' environmental significance ( i.e., ' f ailwitf of-a worker to initial a'RWP, inconsistent, area postings, procedural discrepancies, etc.)
' -f Qu
,