PNO-V-86-030, on 860527,all Four Channels of Reactor Coolant Low Flow Reactor Trip Protection Declared Inoperable While Unit 1 at 100% Power & Unit 2 at 10E-3% Power.Caused by Misset Rate & Step Channels of Low Flow Trip

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PNO-V-86-030:on 860527,all Four Channels of Reactor Coolant Low Flow Reactor Trip Protection Declared Inoperable While Unit 1 at 100% Power & Unit 2 at 10E-3% Power.Caused by Misset Rate & Step Channels of Low Flow Trip
ML20195F111
Person / Time
Site: Palo Verde  Arizona Public Service icon.png
Issue date: 05/30/1986
From: Miller L, Zimmerman R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
References
PNO-V-86-030, PNO-V-86-30, NUDOCS 8606090365
Download: ML20195F111 (1)


PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE--PNO-V-86-30 Date: 05/30/86 This preliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE safety or public j interest significance. The information presented is as initially received without verification or evaluation and is basically all that is known by Region V staff on this date.

FACILITY: Arizona Nuclear Power Project Emergency Classification Palo Verde Unit I and 2 Notification of Unusual Event DOCKET NO. 50-528/529 Alert Site Area Emergency General Emergency X Not Applicable

SUBJECT:

INOPERABLE REACTOR COOLANT LOW FLOW REACTOR TRIP PROTECTION On May 27, 1986, all four channels of reactor coolant low flow reactor trip protection ware declared inoperable at Palo Verde Units 1 and 2. Unit I was at 100% power and Unit 2 was at 10E-3% power at the time. The low flow trip has three components: high negative rate of change of flow, high instantaneous step decrease of flow from existing flow, and low flow. The " rate" and " step" components were discovered to have been mistakenly set too high, making all four flow trip channel setpoints less conservative than the Technical Specification Limiting Safety System Settings, and making them all inoperable.

The channels were apparently misset because the licensee mistakenly used design differential pressure values for 100% flow to calculate the flow trip setpoints, which are expressed in the Technical Specifications as flow percentages. This resulted in errors bscause the actual 100% flow differential pressures at Palo Verde have been approximately 25% less than design due to lower system frictional losses.

The licensee requested a 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> waiver of Technical Specification 3.0.3, which would have required a prompt shutdown. The waiver was authorized after the licensee demonstrated that the low flow component of tha low flow trip was sufficient protection, was let in conformance with the Limiting Safety System Setting, and would be received prior to the high rate or high step flow trip components for the actual low conditions present.

A 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> relief from 3.0.3 was granted May 25, 1986, at 7:00PM MSI. The licensee has

eset all flow instrument setpoints properly in both units, and declared all flow instruments operable.

This information is current as of 9:30 am (MST) May 30, 1986.

CONTACT: L. Miller, Jr. R. Zimmerman FTS 463-3869 (602) 386-5260 DISTRIBUTION H St. MNBB Phillips E/W Willste Air Rights Mail:

Chairman Palladino EDO NRR IE NMSS ADM:DMB Comm. Zech PA OIA RES DOT:Trans Only Comm. Bernthal MFA AEOD Comm. Roberts ELD ,,

Comm. Asselstine Regions: '"U SECY INPO NSAC ACRS Licensee: .

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CA (Reactor Licensees)i OL . U kECION V: FORM 211 PDR Resident Inspec t"o r__ (Revised 3/14/83) hw 03hE E

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8606090365 060530 PDR I&E -

PND-V-86-070 PDR l lb ~.$