IR 05000263/1998018
| ML20199H845 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Monticello  |
| Issue date: | 01/20/1999 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20199H837 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-263-98-18, NUDOCS 9901250352 | |
| Download: ML20199H845 (17) | |
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l U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION lil Docket No: 50-263 License No: DPR-22 '
l Report No: 50-263/98018(DRP)
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l Licensee: Northern States Power Company
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i Facility: Monticello Nuclear Generating Station l
Location: 2807 West Highway 75 i Monticello, MN 55362 I
Dates: December 1,1998, through January 11,1999 Inspectors: S. Burton, Senior Resident inspector
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D. Wrona, Resident inspector l
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Approved by: B. Burgess, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 7 i
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i 9901250352 990120 i
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY l Monticello Nuclear Generating Station inspection Report 50-263/98018(DRP)
l This inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering, maintenance, and plant support. The report covers a 6-week period of resident inspectio Operations l
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In general, the plant was operated in a controlled and deliberate manner. Operators were knowledgeable of current and planned activities and performed duties in l accordance with plant procedures. (Section 01.1) i l
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Operators were knowledgeable and conducted themselves in a professional manner during a power reduction and control rod sequence exchange. Also, shift management displayed appropriate command and control during the evolution. (Section 01.2)
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The operations committee (the onsite review committee) meeting met the staffing requirements of Technical Specification 6.2.B. During review of the proposed test for !
l pressurizing the HPCI discharge line to evaluate the effect of the line on steam chase temperatures, the committee members asked detailed and probing questions. This questioning resulted in the decision to revise and resubmit the test. (Section 01.3)
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The licensee's response to the loss of the 24-volt direct current, Division 1 battery ,
! charger demonstrated conservative decision-making and proper application of I procedures, Technical Specifications, and temporary modifications. (Section 01.4)
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. Observations of material condition made during walkdowns of the control rod drive and l standby liquid control systems revealed no deficiencies. System engineers were cognizant of the current condition of and concerns for their respective system (Section O2.1)
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A review and walkdown of the control rod drive hydraulic system indicated that the i system was being maintained and monitored by qualified, knowledgeable personnelin accordance with station procedures and maintenance rule requirements. The licensee wrote a condition report to resolve an incongruity between the control rod accumulator Technical Specification and the associated basis. (Section O2.2)
. Licensee reviews of industry events resulted in the identification of administrative control deficiencies that had the potential to impact Technical Specification shift manning requirements. The inspectors noted that the licensee took corrective actions to ensure safety and compliance with the Technical Specifications, reactivate one affected license holder, and establish barriers to prevent recurrence. The inspectors reviewed the Technical Specifications and identified no impact on safety. (Section 05.1)
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I Maintenance
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Observed routine maintenance and surveillance activities, which involved systems or components, including the control rod drive system and reactor recirculation pump 3 motor generator sets, were conducted in accordance with procedures and in a J professional manner. Engineering staff provided appropriate support to the maintenance staff. (Section M1.1)
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Maintenance to remove inappropriate factory-installed jumpers on a reactor water cleanup isolation logic circuit board was conducted by knowledgeable technicians in accordance with approved procedures. Communications among maintenance supervision, technicians, and plant operators was thorough. (Section M1.2)
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During surveillance testing of the standby liquid control system, operators were knowledgeable of their assigned duties. Good peer-checking was noted. Operators responded promptly to an unexpected rapid increase in pump discharge pressure during standby liquid control system surveillance testing and properly notified supervisio (Section M1.3)
During maintenance on a control rod drive pump discharge check valve, the system engineer provided appropriate support to the maintenance activity. Mechanics stopped work and consulted with supervision when unexpected conditions arose. (Section M1.4)
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- System engineers provided appropnate support to operations and maintenance activities. (Sections 02.1, M1.1, and M1.4)
i Plant Support '
. During normal resident inspection activities, routine observations were conducted in the areas of radiation protection, security, and fire protection. No deficiencies were identified. (Sections R1, S1, and F2)
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Report Details Summary of Plant Statu_1
The Unit operated at or near 100 percent power for most of the inspection period. On December 6,1998, operators reduced power to approximately 50 percent to perform a control I rod sequence exchange and to replace brushes on the 11 and 12 recirculation pump motor ;
generators. The Unit was returned to 100 percent power later that da '
l l. Operations i
01 Conduct of Operations :
01.1 General Comments I l Inspection Scope (Inspection Procedure (IP) 71707)
i The inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations, including i observations of control room evolutions, shift turnovers, and operator rounds. The j inspectors also reviewed control room logbooks and operability determination '
Additionally, the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) Section 13, " Plant )
Operations," was reviewed as part of the inspectio l l Observations and Findinas in general, the plant was operated in a controlled and deliberate manner. Specific events and noteworthy observations are detailed in the sections below. Operator performance during routine operations and surveillance test activities was goo Operator turnovers were conducted in accordance with procedures. Operators were knowledgeable of current and planned activities and acted in a professional manne The inspectors performed spot checks of equipment isolation and restoration cards hung for maintenance. The cards were hung and cleared in accordance with station procedures. The inspectors verified that the cards were posted on the correct components, and that the systems were properly realigned as specified by the card Conclusions I In general, the plant was operated in a controlled and deliberate manner. Operators '
were knowledgeable of current and planned activities and performed duties in accordance with plant procedure '
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l 01.2 Load Reduction for Control Rod Seauence Exchance and Recirculation Pumo Motor Generator Brush Replacement
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The inspectors observed portions of the load reduction performed to allow for a control rod sequence exchange. Included in the review was Operations Manual Section C.2-05.B.2, " Load Following," Revision 1 Observations and Findinas On December 6, control room operators reduced power to approximately 50 percent to perform control rod sequence exchange and replace brushes on 11 and 12 recirculation pump motor generators. Nuclear engineers were present providing guidance for the l load reduction and control rod sequence exchange. Operators were knowledgeable of l
their assigned tasks, used three-way communications, and acted in a professional manner. The plant returned to 100 percent power later the same day, without inciden Shift management displayed appropriate command and control. Replacement of the motor generator brushes is discussed in Section M Conclusions Operators were knowledgeable and conducted themselves in a professional manner during a power reduction and control rod sequence exchange. Also, shift management displayed appropriate command and control during the evolutio .3 Operations Committee (OC) Meetina Inspection Scope (IPs 71707 and 37551)
The inspectors attended an OC meeting (the onsite review committee) which discussed Safety Review item (SRI)08-019, " Temporary Pressurization of High Pressure Coolant injection (HPCI) Discharge Line to Evaluate Effect on HPCI Line and Steam Chase Temperatures." The following documents were included as part of this review:
. Technical Specification 6.2.B. " Operations Committee,"
. USAR Section 13.6.2, " Operations Committee,"
. Administrative Work Instruction (4AWI)-04.07.01, " Operations Committee Charter," Revision 12, and
. 4AWi-04.07.02, " Flagging and Submittal Processes for Operations Committee Review items," Revision 9.
- Observations and Findinos A quorum of members of the OC assembled to review SRI 98-019. Members of the OC j asked detailed and probing questions. For example, the OC members questioned if a
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licensed operator would be required to run the test pump used to pressurize the HPCI line since any leakage past the isolation valves could affect core reactivity. Initially, the
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licensee planned to pressurize the HPCI discharge line to evaluate the effect of the line on steam chase temperatures while HPCI was operable. Steam chase temperature issues have been discussed in Inspection Reports 50/263-98011(DRP) and 50/263-98016(DRP). Based on questions posed by the OC members, the licensee decided to perform the work while HPCI was declared inoperable. OC members did not complete review of this topic and required resubmittal of the SR Conclusions The OC meeting met the staffing requirements of Technical Specification 6.2.B. During review of the proposed test for pressurizing the HPCI discharge line to evaluate the effect of the line on steam chase temperatures, the OC members asked detailed and probing questions. This questioning resulted in the decision to revise and resubmit the tes .4 Failure of 24-Volt Direct Current (Vdc) Batterv Charaer Inspection Scope (IP 71707)
The inspectors reviewed temporary modifications and event notifications associated with a failure of the Division 1,24 Vdc battery charge Observations and Findinas On December 20, the licensee experienced a failure of Division 1,24-Vdc battery charger D-13. The battery charger was declared inoperable and the associated Technical Specification reviewed by the licensee. Because Technical Specification 3.9.B required a plant shutdown upon loss of the charger, the licensee made notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(1), one-hour non-emergency events for a shutdown required by Technical Specifications. Repairs commenced on the charger and were completed in approximately four hours. On December 22, the licensee retracted the associated notification because a plant shutdown was never initiated, therefore the event was not reportabl The inspectors reviewed the event notification, event notification update and retraction, Technical Specifications, and work orders. No discrepancies were identified. The charger failure was the result of a damaged circuit board. The licensee did not have a replacement board of the same revision in stores, although a prior revision board existed. The licensee performed an equivalency evaluation and installed the older version circuit board using the temporary modification process. The inspectors reviewed the temporary modification and found no deficiencies. The inspector concluded that the licensee took appropriate and conservative action associated with the Technical ,
Specification and event notificatio ,
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. . Conclusions The licensee's response to the loss of the 24-Vde, Division 1 battery charger demonstrated conservative decision-making and proper application of procedures, Technical Specifications, and temporary modification Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment O2.1 Enaineered Safetv Feature System Walkdowns Inspection Scope (IP 71707)
The inspectors used recent events and the licensee's risk analysis to aid in the determination of which safety-related systems to walk down and selected the following systems:
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control rod drive (CRD) system
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standby liquid control (SBLC) system Observations and Findinos A walkdown of portions of the SBLC and CRD systems was conducted. The CRD system is discussed in more detail in Section 02.2, but observations of material condition made during walkdowns of the systems revealed no previously unidentified deficiencies. An equipment problem with the SBLC heat tracing and temperature switch was noted by the inspectors but was already being pursued by the licensee. No operability concerns were identified. The system engineers were cognizant of the current condition of and concerns associated with both system Conclusions Observatians of material condition made during walkdowns of the CRD and SBLC systems revealed no deficiencies. System engineers were cognizant of the current condition of and concerns for their respective system O2.2 Control Rod Drive and Hydraulic System WalkDown Insoection Scope ( IPs 71707 and 62707)
inspectors observed maintenance and engineering activities, as well as performeJ walkdowns of portions of the control rod drive hydraulic system. Inspectors venfied system operability and configuration in accordance with valve lineups, procedures, drawings, the USAR, and Technical Specifications.
, Observations and Findinos
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Periodically throughout the inspection period, the inspectors monitored the operation of the control rod drive and hydraulic system. The system valve lineup was in accordance
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with Operations Manual Section B.1.3, " Control Rod Hydraulic System," and piping and instrumentation diagrams M-118 and M-119. The inspectors spoke with the system engineer on multiple occasions and found the engineer knowledgeable of system design and performance. Observations of system material condition made during system walkdowns revealed no deficiencies. Additional maintenance observations associated with the CRD system are discussed in Section M During a review of the Technical Specifications, the inspectors determined that the specification for operable accumulators and the associated bases contained different requirements. Specification 3.3.D stated in part that #a rod accumulator may be inoperable provided that no other control rod in the nine-rod square array around this rod has an inoperable accumulator." The associated basis required "no more than one t inoperable accumulator in any nine-rod array and that procedural controls will assure i
that control rods with inoperable accumulators will be spaced in one-in-nine array rather j than grouped together " The inspectors asked the licensee about the difference and noted that the basis may contain a more restrictive requirement than the specificatio The inspectors reviewed licensee procedures and interviewed operators and found !
references to the related Technical Specification, but were unable to find procedural ;
controls as implied in the basis. Although definitions of what constituted a nine-rod square array varied among persons interviewed, no non-conservative definitions with regard to the Technical Specification were presented. Interviews with the licensee indicated that inoperable accumulators were rare and generally occurred only one at a time. Based upon this information, the licensee concluded that the possibility of a i condition with two inoperable accumulators in any nine-rod array was unlikely. Because the basis potentially referred to a different requirement than the specification, the licensee wrote Condition Report 99000044 to document the inconsistenc Inspectors also reviewed maintenance rule performance criteria, system outages, and sampled work requests. No discrepancies between maintenance rule performance criteria and system performance data were noted. Discussions with the system engineer indicated that the engineer was knowledgeable of the maintenance rule and associated requirements for the control rod drive hydraulic system, and was properly monitoring system performanc Conclusion A review and walkdown of the control rod drive hydraulic system indicated that the system was being maintained and monitored by qualified, knowledgeable personnelin accordance with station procedures and maintenance rule requirements. The licensee wrote a condition report to resolve an incongruity between the control rod accumulator Technical Specification and the associated basis.
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i 05 Operator Training and Qualification '
05.1 Maintenance of Active Operator Licenses Inspection Scope (IP 71707) l During a review of industry events, the licensee identified a potential for licensed senior reactor operators (SROs) to take credit for time spent in reactor operator positions for maintaining SRO license activation. The inspectors reviewed the controls for l maintaining activation of operatorlicense '
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On December 14, the licensee informed the inspectors that one licensed senior reactor l operator who was performing only reactor operator duties had credited the reactor i operator position towards maintaining the senior reactor operator license. Reactivation of this operator in the senior reactor operator position was conducted in accordance with i the guidelines established in 10 CFR Part 55. The inspectors found no deficiencies when they reviewed Technical Specification requirements and discussed the condition with the licensee to determine if the condition had resulted in operation with the control room staffing less than that required by Technical Specifications. The licensee wrote Condition Report 98003124, which included tasks to review and modify Surveillance Procedure 1440, "NRC License Active Status," and Operations Work Instruction (OWI)-01.06, " Duty Operations Personnel Requirements and Responsibilities."
Additionally, operations management initiated a memorandum to provide interim guidance in these areas until procedural modifications were complet Conclusions Licensee reviews of industry events resulted in identifying administrative control l deficiencies that had the potential to impact Technical Specification shift manning l requirements. The inspectors noted that the licensee took corrective actions to ensure safety and compliance with Technical Specifications, reactivate one affected license holder, and establish barriers to prevent recurrence. The inspectors reviewed Technical Specifications and identified no impact on safet ;
l 08 Miscellaneous Operations issues (IP 92901)
08.1 (Closed) Inspection Followup item (IFI) 50-263/98004-02(DRP): Licensee's evaluation of generation quality services identified locked valve discrepancie The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective actions which included locking valves that were identified as requiring locking, and revising procedures and valve checklists to include the appropriate locked valves. The inspectors had no concerns with the
licensee's corrective actions,
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l M1 Conduct of Maintenance !
M1.1 General Comments a. Insoection Scooe (IPs 62707 and 61726) :
As practical, the inspectors selected maintenance and surveillance activities associated :
with systems that were risk significant. Included in the inspection was a review of the surveillance procedures and work orders (WOs) listed below, as well as the appropriate .
USAR sections pertaining to activities inspecte '
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Surveillance Procedure 0466-1, "A Control Room Ven+ilation-Emergency Filtration Train Filter Efficiency and Leak Tests," Revision 18
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WO 9803290, " Check Valve (CRD 50-2) Does Not Appear to Check Properly"
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WO 9803771, " Swap Breakers Servicing Cubicle 152-402"
. Surveillance Procedure 0286, " Torus Water Level Instrument Semi-Annual Calibration Procedure," Revision 5
. Surveillance Procedure 0017 "APRM Heat Balance Calibration," Revision 15 !
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WO 9803547, " Install Surface Rounding Brushes as Necessary on 11 and 12 Motor Generator Sets"
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WO 9803527, " Repair / Replace GSA 1-3 (Emergency Diesel Generator Starting Air System Valve)"
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Surveillance Procedure 1136, " Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger Efficiency Test " Revision 20 Observations and Findinag In general, the inspectors observed that the work associated with these activities was conducted in a professional and thorough manner. Wor'k observed was performed with the work package present and in use. Technicians were experienced and knowledgeable of their assigned tasks, which were performed in a professional manner.
l The inspectors frequently observed supervisors and system engineers monitoring job progress, and quality control personnel were present whenever specified in the
, procedure. Three-way communication techniques were observed. When applicable, appropriate radiation control measures were in-plac In addition, see the specific discussions of maintenance observed under Sections M through M1.4, below.
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i Conclusions Observed routine maintenance and surveillance activities, which involved systems or components including CRD and reactor recirculation pump motor generator sets, were conducted in accordance with procedures and in a professional manner. Engineering staff provided appropriate support to the maintenance staf l M1.2 Removal of inaporopriate Jumper in Reactor Water Cleanuo isolation Loaic Circuit Insoection Scope (IP 62707)
On December 18, the inspectors observed the licensee perform corrective maintenance and post-maintenance testing for removal of an inappropriate, factory-installed jumper in accordance with Procedure 1459, Reactor Water Cleanup High Flow Trip Test and Calibration," Revision 1, and Work Order 980376 I Observations and Findinas l On December 9, the manufacturer issued notification per 10 CFR Part 21 for Rosemount Model 710 Trip Units. The report identified the potential existence of an inappropriate, factory-installed jumper on the circuit board. The jumper did not introduce any new failure mechanism, nor did it affect normal operation. The jumper bypassed a buffer circuit designed to minimize master unit damage in the event of failure in an associated slave unit. The licensee conducted maintenance on December 18, to validate the existence of jumpers and remove any if foun The inspectors reviewed the work order, procedure, Part 21 notification, and observed portions of the maintenance. Technicians were knowledgeable of the Part 21 i notification and familiar with the modification. A pre-job briefing was conducted in the l control room. Operations scheduled the start of maintenance to ensure that it did not interfere with evolutions in progress. Maintenance supervision discussed the work with technicians and was present during the briefing. Quahty assurance was present during the conduct of maintenance. Proper communication was observed between the ,
technicians and the control room during the maintenance and testing. Modifications and i post-maintenance testing was successful on three affected trip unit I Conclusions i Maintenance to remove inappropriate, factory-installed jumpers on a reactor water cleanup isolation logic circuit board was conducted by knowledgeable technicians in accordance with approved procedures. Communications among maintenance supervision, technicians, and plant operators was thoroug . ..--w .-n a .na---1 m . m n w s. u .~.----a a a. .-n- +.. .-aw.a..+ .n- .us~a., .. s..a.ma.---- -.wa.. ...a-. + - m.+, u.--
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l M1.3 Standbv Liauid Control System Surveillance
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! Inspection Scope (IP 61726)
The inspectors observed plant operators perform the activities specified in Surveillance !
Procedure 0085, " Standby Liquid Control System," Revision 2 !
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l The activities specified in the procedure were performed locally by two operators. Both !
operators were knowledgeable of their assigned duties. Good peer-checking was demonstrated when one operator prevented the other operator from incorrectly closing a ,
valve that was procedurally required to be ope !
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, The operators responded promptly when the pump discharge pressure increased faster i l
than expected during the startup of 12 SBLC pump, by quickly opening the discharge valve to the test tank. The operators subsequently notified the shift supervisor and ,
system engineer. The procedure was completed without additional problem ;
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assigned duties. Good peer-checking was noted. Operators responded promptly to an l unexpected rapid increase in pump discharge pressure during SBLC system ;
surveillance testing and properly notified supervisio i M1.4 Maintenance on 11 CRD Pumo Discharoe Check Valve l Inspection Scope (IP 62707)
The inspectors observed maintenance workers repairing a CRD system check valve in l accordance with WO 9802779, "CRD-4-1 Does Not Check Closed; Leaks." Observations and Findinas l Mechanics were attempting to disassemble the 11 CRD pump discharge check valve (CRD 4-1) to repair leakage. While attempting to remove the cap from CRD 4-1, the mechanics had to use more force than expected. They contacted supervision and delayed work to investigate. This resulted in a re-evaluation of the work plans. The j system engineer was present during the maintenance. A fire watch was present as
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required and the proper hot-work authorization was obtained. The inspectors checked isolation boundaries and spot-checked isolation cards. No concerns were identifie Conclusions During maintenance on the 11 CRD pump discharge check valve, the system engineer provided appropriate support to the maintenance activity. Mechanics stopped work and
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consulted with supervision when unexpected conditions arose.
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M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (IPs 92902 and 92700)
M8.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-263/97-003: Piping Between Double Containment isolation Valves Could be Stressed Greater Than Code Allowables During Certain Accident Condition This issue wdl be addressed by the licensee as part of the response to Generic Letter 96-06, " Assurance of Equipment Operability and Containment Integrity During Design-Basis Accident Conditions"; therefore, this item is considered administratively close Ill. Enoineerina E8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues (IPs 92700 and 92903)
E (Closed) IFl 50-263/96006-05: USAR revision associated with main steam line break analysi The inspectors determined that the USAR section change associated with the main steam line break analysis was entered in the licensee's database and scheduled for inclusion in the USAR revision associated with licensee amendment number 10 IV. Plant Support R1 Conduct of Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls (IP 71750)
During normal resident inspection activities, routine observations were conducted in the area of radiation protection. The inspectors noted that effective radiological controts were established and that technicians provided adequate support during maintenance l and surveillance activities. The inspectors found that access doors to locked high !
radiation areas were properly locked, radiation areas were properly posted, and !
personnel demonstrated proper radiological work practice !
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S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities (IP 71750)
During normal resident inspection activities, routine observations were conducted in the area of security and safeguards activities. The inspectors observed the licensee ,
implement proper physical security measures associated with the integrity of protected !
area barriers, personnel and package access, and personnel and vehicle searche F2 Status of Fire Protection Facilities and Equipment (IP 71750)
During normal resident inspection activities, routine observations were conducted in the area of fire protection. Fire extinguishers and fire hoses were properly stored and j inspected by licensee pe;sonnel. The inspectors reviewed records of self-contained l breathing apparatus (SCBA) monthly checks and also inspected several SCBAs. No l
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notable degradation of equipment was noted. The inspectors also checked the program for maintaining SCBA glasses for operators and identified no deficiencie !
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V. Mananoment Meetinos i l
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On January 11,1999, the inspectors presented the inspection results to members of i licensee management. The licensee acknowledged the f ; dings presented. The j inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials ex' nined during the inspection !
should be considered proprietary. No proprietary ir 3rr ; tion was identifie l l '
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l i PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED l l
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M. Hamme , Plant Manager :
'A. Ward, Manager Quality Services i l B. Day, General Superintendent Operations !
I E. Reilly, General Superintendent Maintenance !
C. Schibonski, General Superintendent Engineering
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J. Windschill, General Superintendent, Radiation Protection f
' L. Nolan, General Superintendent Safety Assessment ,
K. Jepson, Superintendent, Chemistry & Environmental Protection ,
L. Wilkerson, Superintendent Security !
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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551: Onsite Engineering IP 61726: Surveillance Observations IP 62707: Maintenance Observations IP 71707: Plant Operations IP 71750: ' Plant Support IP 92700: Onsite Follow-up of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor Facilities l lP 92901: Followup - Plant Operations l IP 92902: Followup - Maintenance l
IP 92903: Followup - Engineering IP 92904: Followup - Plant Support ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened None
Goted 50-263/98004-02 IFl Licensee's evaluation of generation quality services identified locked valve discrepancies 50-263/97-003 LER Piping Between Double Containment isolation Valves I Could be Stressed Greater Than Code Allowables During Certain Accident Conditions.
l 50-263/96006-05 IFl Ut. ' R revision associated with main steam line break l ana?, sis.
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L LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
' AWI Administrative Work Instruction
.CFR Code of Federal Regulations l CRD Control Rod Drive -
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DR Division of Reactor Projects HPCI- High Pressure Coolant Injection
, IFl Inspection Followup ltem
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'IP - : Inspection Procedure LER- Licensee Event Report NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRR Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Office of - NSP Northern States Power OC Operations Ccmmittee OWI Operations Work Instruction PDR Public Document Room SBLC Standby Liquid Control L SCBA Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus SRI Safety Review Item SRO Senior Reactor Operator USAR' Updated Safety Analysis Report Vdc Volt Direct Current g WO Work Order i
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