IR 05000317/1988008

Insp Repts 50-317/88-08 & 50-318/88-09 on 880404-08.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Implementation of Inservice Testing of Pumps & Valves

ML20154R450
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	05/26/1988
From:	Eapen P, Gregg H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20154R424	List: IR 05000317/1988008 ML20154R419
References
50-317-88-08, 50-317-88-8, 50-318-88-09, 50-318-88-9, NUDOCS 8806070306
Download: ML20154R450 (7)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGIO /88-08 Report Nos. 50-318/88-09

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.. 50-317 Docket Nos. 50-318 DPR-53 License No PR-69 Licensee: Baltimore Gas and Electric Company P. O. Box 1475 Baltimore, Maryland 2120 Facility Name: .Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plants, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Lusby Maryland Inspection Conducted: April 4-8, 1988

.N- C/2 6/7I Inspector: harold Gregg, Ser(ior Reactor Engineer' dat'e

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Approved by: _ &$ K&L Dr. P. K. Eapen, Chief, Special Test TkS[87 date'

' Programs Section, EB, DRS Inspection Summary: Inspection'on April 4-8, 1988 (Combined Inspection Report Nos. 50-317/882 08 and 50-318/88-09)

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Areas Inspected: Licensee's implementation of Inservice Testing (IST) of .

pumps and valve !

Results: No violations were identified. One item was designated as unresolved and pertained to a steam line check valve failure and Yurther licensee review of this type valve is warrante Two other issuas relating to:

1) an Auxiliary Feedwater piping revision; and, 2) the Containc.ent spray pump acceptance criteria, were identified by the licensee and are in process of-resolution.

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DETAILS 1.0 Persons"Contacted 2 1.1 Baltimore Gas and Electric (BG&E) Compa *R. Allen, Principal Engineer, NESD

• R. Douglass, Manager QASD

• R. Heibel, GS01, N00 J. Lemons, Manager, Nuclear Operations Department

• Lippold, Manager, NESD T. Lupold, Systems Engineer

• J. Lohr, A-G-S-0, NOD

• R. Niedzielski, Operations Surveillance Coordinator

• C. Phifer Jr. , QA Auditor, QASD

• D. Shaw, Licensing Engineer, NESD T. Sydnor, Principal Engineer, Secondary Systems C. Mahon, Principal Engineer, Primary Systems R. Martin, Reactor Operator K. Mills, Systems Engineer U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

• Trimble, Senior Resident Inspector

• Denotes those present at the exit meetin .0' IST Program Background

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The. inspector reviewed the program background with cognizant licensee personnel'. The following determinations were mad * The IST pump and valve testing program is a separate and distinct program. It is-a combined Unit 1 and Unit 2 progra * The licensee is currently in the second ten year interval. The second ten year interval start date is April 1, 1987 for both Unit * IST commitments are to ASME Section XI, 1983 Edition through summer 1983 addenda

The second ten year program is in the final stage of Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) revie * A meeting between NRR and their consultant and the licensee was held on site on February 17-19, 198 __ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ - _ _ _ .

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• Based on the meeting discussions several additional-evaluations and relief requests were to be submitted by the license *' Final program modifications will be made by the licensee upon receipt of NRR respons .0 IST Organization Lead responsibility for writing, reviewing and modifying operational Surveillance Test Procedures (STPs) and initiating program relief requests is with the surveillance coordinator. The coordinator schedules the operational STs, reviews test results and has involvement in resolution or referral of problem areas. The coordinator is in the operations reporting chain. Problems encountered during testing that is performed and reviewed by operations are referred to systems engineers whose reporting chain is the engineering departmen The scheduling of mechanical STPs (those to disassemble valves or to test pressure relief valves) is through the maintenance planning and scheduling uni The oversight or responsibility for these IST area is with the system engineering whose reporting chain is the engineering departmen The operational surveillance coordinator and the systems engineering were found to be technically competent, knowledgeable and effective in their performance of the operational STP' At the start of this inspection licensee management advised the inspector that the IST organizational structure was to undergo a complete reorganiza-tion and additioinal personnel will be adde The impending IST primary responsibility will be under the Performance Engineering unit in the Nuclear Engineering Services Department. The effectiveness of the forthcoming IST organizational structure will be reviewed in a future NRC inspectio .0' Test Results STP-0-5-2 Auxiliary Feedwater System Pump Tests i The inspector reviewed the quarterly test results of pump 21 AFW performed on March 29, 1988. This test is performed with minimum recirculation line flow. The pump flow was 91. gpm (below the 92.7-96.8 alert range and below the low valve 92.7 action range). The pump was retested on March

< 31, 1988 after verification of instruments and the flow was 91.5 and still in the action rang Lif ting of a recirculation line relief valve (2RV 4501) was suspected as the cause for reduced flo The pump was declared L

out of service and required further engineering follow-up.

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'On April.1, 1988 the pump was again tested and was still below acceptance. A retest-was then performed with additional steps taken to isolate relief valve 2RV 4501. This resulted in a flow of 104 gpm and within the acceptance range. .This testing verified that the problem was a system and not a pump or valve problem. Running the pump at shutoff head (with only a minimum recirculation) may cause higher pressure fluctuations in the line at the relief valv The normal AFW flow to the steam generator would be higher and would not cause relief valve lifts, therefore, the test encountered problem is not considered a safety concer The inspector also determined that the licensee had discussions with NRR and has submitted a relief request to full flow test the AFW pumps during refueling outag The licensee recognized that the system may have operating occasions similar to the minimum recirculation pumping conditions and is planning a design revision. The revision would install a flow orifice in the line to the relief valv Upstream of the relief valve there had also been some evidence of leakage at a cooler which may also indicate the need for the flow orifice in that line. The inspector had no further questions at this tim .1 Review of STP-0-5-2 Auxiliary Feedwater System Pump Test During review of this STP the inspector noted that the licensee's flow acceptance range was 86.8-108.1 gpm. This represents a range of .94 to '.05 times reference flow which is more than the ASME code acceptance range of .94 to 1.03 times reference flo The inspector determined that the licensee's program submittal provided the basis to increase the flow and differential pressure high end of the range. This topic was also discussed with NRR at the February meeting. The licensee's bases were that pumps would not produce more flow over time, small. increases in differential pressure are not significant, and instrument inaccuracy and water density changes could readily lead to spurious alert and action range .2 Test Results STP-0-73-1 ESF Equipment Performance Test (HPSI, LPSI, CS)

The inspector reviewed the test of number 21 containment spray pum The recorded differential pressure of 196.5 was below the 196.6 ac-ceptance range and the pump head of 454.9 feet was below the minimum acceptance of 455 feet. A maintenance request was written to evaluate the problem. Instrumentation problems were believed to be the cause; however, upon subsequent testing this was found not to be the case.

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. 5 The inspector reviewed the STP further and discussed the STP acceptance requirements with the operations surveillance coordinator. The inspector determined that the STP acceptance was an ECCS requirement from the original plant design criteria and is more stringent than IST requirements. The licensee's engineering department is presently evaluating the ECCS criteria. They are attempting-to lower the differential pressure acceptance range for the ECCS while still maintaining a more conservative than code required IST range. The inspector had no further questions at this tim .0 Test Witnessing STP-0-65-2 Quarterly Valve Operability Verification -

While Operating The inspector witnessed the stroke testing of HPSI flow path MOVs, SI-616, 626, 636, 646, 617, 627, 637, 647, 653, 654, 655 and 65 Requirements for testing these valves is described on pages 8 to 14A of the subject procedure. The inspector observed the stroke timing and recording of data for'each of the valves and verified in each case that the stroke alert range was not exceede This test procedure had recently been revised to include IEB 85-03 requirements to obtain starting and run current (amps). The valve testing witnessed by the inspector was performed efficiently and was effectively controlled by the reactor operato .0 Check Vr.lve Failure (Valve 2 MS103)

The inspector observed the disc of a failed check valve that had been on the main steam supply to auxilliary feedwater pump No. 21. The disc was bent approximately 70 , had a sevaral inch fracture crack at the bend area, and a large piece of one hirge boss was completely broken off. The disc seating surface also had :,ignificant seating surface wear and .the relatively high hinge pin location may have contributed to the top disc edge being caught in the valve seat as the disc was checking closed.

l: The valve was a 6" tilting disc check valve manufactured by Chapman Division of Crane Compan This valve is an angular split body design i with the two body halves bolted together. Since the valve is butt welded L in line and the angular body split is through the piping run plane, there is no means to open the valve for inspection other than cutting it out of l the lin Based on the inspectors obseri ; ions of the broken disc and from review of the valve drawing, the inspector concluded the valve may not be suitable for the service condition. The inspector was also concerned

, about the other valves of this design installed in each of the plants.

[ The inspector determined that both the MS-103 and MS-106 valves on Unit 2 l

were replaced with 6"-900# Anchor Darling tilting disc check valves which l

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. 6 have a top access pressure seal cover. The licensee is also planning some action related to other valves of this design in main steam lines farther downstrea The inspector reviewed STP-0-67-2 which verifies actuation of the valv The STP however, doesn't verify chech closed position and since the valves can't be disassembled and inspected the licensee is evaluating.how to verify that' the valve is intact and can perform all its operational functions. The inspector determined that this issue was also discussed during the meeting with NR This item is unresolved pending the licensee's determining if the valve design is fit for service, and resolution of actions required on the same location valves on Unit 1 and also other valves of this type on both Units (50-317/88-08-01 and 50-318/88-09-01).

7.0 Main Steam Safety Valve (MSSV) Ring Settings The inspector reviewed the licensee's activities related to NRC Information Notice (IEN) 86-05 and its supplement. This notice provided licensee's information of potential problems with ring setting adjustments on MSSVs (an IST listed component) which could prevent obtaining full rated flow capacit The inspector determined that the licensee has 16 MSSVs on each unit (8 on each steam generator). The valves are Dresser 6" x 10" model 3707 R AX RT 22 valves. The inspector also determined that this licensee has been actively involved with MSSV ring settings and each of their valves are set to the ring settings (lower ring at -8 notches and upper ring at

+160 notches) as recommended in the manufactures letter dated October 30, 1984. Additionally, as a result of LER 85-11 concerning MSSVs out of set point range, the licensee had two of their valves (RV 3992 and 3993)

tested at Wylie Laboratories (Test Report 48048 of December 23,1985)

under full flow conditions to determine set point, lif t and blowdow Testing was also to determine set points at different ambient temperatures with hydroset and without hydroset (full steam set point).

The licensee currently performs maintenance on 8 valves each refueling outage. Their maintenance procedure RELV-5, Rev. 2 was reviewed. This procedure calls for ring setting determination and verification that as left positions are: lower ring at - S notches and upper ring at +160 notche Based on the above activities the licensee's Plant Operations Experience assessment committee decided that no further action was required. The inspector concluded that this licensee had performed extensive actions, was knowledgeable of their ring settings, had details of manufacture's recommendations and their valve test report records available, and per-forms censiderable MSSV maintenance with verification of ring setting The inspector assessed licensee's MSSV ring setting efforts and agreed with the licensee's close out actio ' - -

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s 8.0 Unres~olved Items

. Unresolved itet! are matters about which more information is required.in orderEto ascertain whether:they are acceptable items, violations or deviations. -An unresolved l item is discussed-in paragraph 6.0 of_-this report.

$2, '19.0 Exit' Meetin .The irspector met.with the licensee's representative at' the~ conclusion'of-the inspection on April 8, 1988,-to summarize the findings of this in-spection. . Attendees at the exit meeting are listed in paragraph'1.0 of-

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this repor .During this inspection, the inspector did not provide any written 4t ' ,'i c -

to-the licensee. The licensee did not indicate that the inspectio.,

involved any proprietary infomation.

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