ML20245F259

Insp Repts 50-317/89-12 & 50-318/89-12 on 890501-05.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Review Corrective Actions Resulting from IE Bulletin 85-03 Re Improper Limit Switch & Torque Switch Settings in Motor Operatored Valves

ML20245F259
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	06/16/1989
From:	Roy Mathew NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20245F253	List: ML20245F249 ML20245F254 ML20245F259
References
50-317-89-12, 50-318-89-12, IEB-85-003, IEB-85-3, NUDOCS 8906280074
Download: ML20245F259 (14)

See also: IR 05000317/1989012

Text

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION-

. REGION I

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50-317/89-12

Report lNo; 50-318/89-12

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50-317

, Docket No._~50-318'

DpR-53'

License No. DPR-69

, , Licensee: 3altimore Gas' and Electric Company

P.O. Box 1475

Baltimore.-Maryland 21203-

Facility,Name: 'Calvert Cliffs Units 1 & 2-

Inspection At: Lusby, Maryland ~

Inspection Conducted: May 1-5, 1989

' In spect' ors : -

6 G f

Roy p'..-Mathew,. Reactor Engineer date

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-Approved by:

'C. J Anderson,. Chief, Plant Systems Section

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date

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Insp6ttion' Summary: Inspection o'n May 1-5, 1989-(Combined Insp'ection Report

Nos.-50-317/89-12 and 50-318/89-12)

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Areas Inspected: A special announced inspection was performed to review the

corrective actions that resulted from IE Bulletin _85-03 regarding improper

-limit switch and torque switch settings in motor operatored valves. This

inspection reviewed the licensee's engineering and maintenance' activities to

assure the operational readiness of the motor operated valves.

- Results: The licensee had not addressed all the significant aspects of the

bulletin. Two violations were identified regarding: (1)lackofprocedures

for-setting the limit switches and providing stem lubrication; and, (2) the

"as-left" Torque switch settings were different from the specified settings in

the setpoint file. Three items remained unresolved at the end of the

inspection.

8906280074 890616 9

gDR ADOCK 05000317

PDC

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DETAILS

1.0 Persons Contacted

1.1 Daltimore Gas and Electric Company

• G. Bell, Engineer, Licensing

• R. Booin, AGS, Electrical Maintenance

• R. Branch, Senior Engineer, Environmental Qualification

S. Cowne, Senior Engineer, Licensing

R. E. Denton, Manager, Quality Assurance and Services Department i

• M. J. Gahan III, Principal Engineer, Calvert Cliffs

• J. D. Hayden, Engineer, Mechanical Maintenance

P. Hebrank, Engineer, Electrical Modifications

• J. Jerald, Supervisor, Maintenance Training

T. Koneath, Mechanical Engineering Unit

B. Nelson, Training, Electrical and Instrumentation

• D. E. Nickerson, AGS, Mechanical Maintenance

• K. Nietman, General Supervisor, Nuclear Training

• W. H. Robinson, Project Manager, MOV Program

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S. Rosenbach, Mechanical Engineering Unit '

• L. Russell, Manager, Calvert Cliffs

• M. W. Taylor, Engineer

• A. Thornton, General Supervisor, Plant and Project Engineering

• L. L. Wackbaugh, General Supervisor, Electrical and Controls

1.2 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission j

• H. Eichenholz, Senior Resident Inspector

V. Pritchett, Resident Inspector

• Present at the exit meeting on May 5, 1989.

2.0 Purpose

The purpose of this inspection was to review the licensee's actions taken

in response to IE Bulletin 85-03 regarding motor operated valve (MOV)

common mode failures during plant transients due to improper switch

settings and to review the licensee's program to assure the operational

readiness of the motor operated valves covered under this bulletin.

3.0 Background

l On June 9, 1985, the Davis-Besse Plant experienced a complete loss of

main and auxiliary feedwater whf ch was caused, in part, by MOV failures.

l This event resulted in IE Bulletin 85-03 that promulgated NRC requirements

to as:ure the operational readiness of MOVs in the high pressure coolant '

injection, core spray and emergency feedwater systems. The bulletin

specified that licensees take the following actions.

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(a) Review and document the design basis for the operation of each

valve, including the maximum differential pressure expected during

normal and abnormal operation.

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(b) .Using the above data, establish the correct switch settings for

torque, torque bypass, position limit and overload for each valve

and perform modifications as needed.

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(c) Individual valves should be demonstrated to be operable by testing

the valve at the maximum differential pressure based on the

performance requirements. In the absence of differential pressure

testing, a justification should be provided.

(d) Prepare and revise procedures to ensure that correct switch settings

are determined'and maintained throughout the life of the plant.

(e) Submit a schedule to accomplish the above program including a final

submittal with the results of (b) through (d).

Item (a) was reviewed by the NRC office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

(NRR). The scope of this inspection was to review items (b) through (d).

4.0 Baltimore Gas and Electric Company response to IE Bulletin 85-03

4.1 Status of Commitments

In a letter dated May 15, 1986 (Ref. 1, Attachment-1), the licensee

provided their schedule for Item (e) of Bulletin 85-03, which requested

a written report within 180 days of the date of this bulletin. The

licensee completed documentation on May 15, 1986 of the maximum

differential pressure expected across MOVs during normal and abnormal

operation. Of the systems identified in the bulletin, only the High

Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) system motor operated valves are

subject to the bulletin concerns. The motor operated valves identi-

fied for Calvert Cliffs 1&2 for IEB 85-03 consideration are listed in

attachment 3 to this report. In the same letter, the licensee committed

to complete item (b) of the bulletir by July 15, 1986, item (c) by

December 1, 1986 for Unit I and June 1, 1987 for Unit 2, and item (d)

by July 1, 1987.

An NRC letter to the licensee dated July 29, 1987 (Ref. 2, Attachment-1)

requested additional information regarding the licensee's response

dated May 15,1986 (Ref.1, Attachment-1). The licensee responded to

this letter on September 21, 1987.

The NRC requested a written report within 60 days on completion of

the program. In a letter dated January 28, 1988 (Ref. 4, Attachment 1),

the licensee completed the final response to IE Bulletin 85-03.

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4.2 Switch Settings

Item (b) of the bulletin requires that correct switch settings

for torque, torque bypass, position limit and overload for each

value be' established. These items are addressed below.

Open. Torque Switch and Open Bypass Limit Switch

This switch is normally used to limit the mechanical thrust applied

to the valve in the open direction. This switch is usually bypassed

during the initial valve unseating which is-the most challenging

portion of the open stroke. Failure to set this switch to the required

valve, or, not bypassing this switch in the initial opening stroke,

can cause valve failure.

At Calvert Cliffs Units 1&2, the torque switch is initially bypassed

during the unseating of the valve. The MOV will then " ride on" the

torque switch until the open limit switch contact opens. The licensee

has elected to set the open torque switch to a conservative value

based on the limitations of the actuator assembly and the valve

operator manufacturer's (Limitorque) recommendations.

Close Torque Switch and Close Torque Bypass Limit Switch

The close torque switch bypass acts in a similar manner to the open

torque switch bypass. This torque switch is bypassed during the

lightest duty portion of the stroke, the beginning of the closing

stroke. This torque switch should be set to assure that valve closure

is not prevented by the torque switch.

At Calvert Cliffs Units 1 and 2, the close torque switch bypass switch

is set to a percentage of the valve travel from the backseat position.

For the remainder of the valve stroke, the torque switch is used in

the control circuit, in series, with the close limit switch.

The licensee does not torque seat the subject MOVs in the closed

direction. However, the torque switch acts as a secondary control

device during the closing cycle. The limiting requirement of the

close torque switch is at the end of the closure stroke when the

thrust requirements are the highest. If the valve demands more thrust

due to mechanical friction or binding of the valve during the valve

travel between the open and close limits, the torque switch will trip

the motor depending on the torque settings. The torque switch is set

to protect the motor as well as to assure valve operability during a

design bases accident. The licensee obtained Limitorque recommenda-

tions on required torque settings and the supporting data sheets.

The torque switch trip set point was calculated based on the most

limiting closure thrust requirement including the thrust needed to

overcome the differential pressure across the valve.

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Open Limit Switch /Close Limit' Switch

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Normal industry practiceLis.to seat valves under torque switch control

"and backseat valves under limit switch control. This is to assure

tight seating during closure and to provide a positive stop of the

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operator during valve opening.

At Calvert Cliffs Units 1 and 2, the licensee.uses limit switch control

-for both opening-and clos.ing,of valves. -The.open li_mit-switch provides

the control function for determining the upper limit of the valve

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stem' travel in'the open direction and stops motor. rotation by opening

'the circuit. The setting of this switch must assure adequate valve

opening and should prevent backseating. Valve backseats normally

provide'a.se'al that is redundant to the valve packing in order to'

allow valve packing replacement without the need to drain'down the

process system. Using the motor power to backseat can and has, caused .

valve stem shearing and stem thread twisting. Therefore, it is-

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important to set the open limit switch away from the backseat with

enough margin to allow for motor deenergization and inertia.

The close-limit switch is usually used with the close torque switch

in series for over torque protection. For high speed operators,

where torque switches cannot react in sufficient time,' the close

limit switch'deenergizes the motor and the remaining inertia force

is used to seat the valve.

At.Calvert Cliffs Units 1 and 2, the licensee has set both th'e open

and close limitLswitches to position valves a sufficient distance from

the backseat / seat to deenergize.the motor. The remaining inertia

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forces are used to open/close the valve. The inspector noticed that

the. licensee is relying on the electrician's expertise to' set the

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' limit switches. Since the limit switch is the primary control for

opening / closing.the valve, the valve will operate per the limit switch

setting, unless, there is a. mechanical failure of the valve which

demands excessive thrust causing the' torque switch.to operate.

Incorrect limit switch settings could lead to damage to the valve,

valve operator and related components. See section 4.4 for a further

discussion of this issue.

Another related concern regarding limit switch control for controlling

valve closure is the influence of wear on the valve seat. The motor

will get a signal to shut off the limit switch at a definite point

during the closing stroke based on the limit switch setpoint. If the

valve seat suffers erosion or other wear, the inertia force available

after the motor shuts off may not be sufficient to fully seat the

valve. The inspector noted that the licensee does not perform

surveillance checks or leak rate tests to assure proper closing of

the bulletin valves. This is an unresolved item pending NRC review

of the licensee action to assure proper setting of the close limit

switch considering the influence of seatwear on valve closure for

valves that are closed using the limit switches. 50-317/89-12-03;

50-318/89-12-03.

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Open/Close In'dication

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' A red lightlindicates a valve open signal. This light is taken from

- the close rotor limit. switch'which is set'-to actuate very close to-

the:end of valve closure. A green: light provides a valve closed

signal'.and is taken' from the open rotor limit switch actuation. The'

. greenLlight will turn off.when the MOV is in the full open position,

andethe red light-will turn off when the MOV is in the full closed--

position.- Whon both lights are'on,;the valve is in.an intermediate

- position.

At Calvert Cliffs Units 1 and 2, the licensee uses a 2 roter limit

switch assembly for; controlling M0V operation. ;The torque bypass

switch and' the indication light signals are taken fm. the' same rotors.

Any adjustment to the torque bypass switch will. affect the indica-

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tion. In a'similar.' manner. limit switch adjustment to get the correct

indication will-change the bypass switch' settings. Operators rely on

- the indication lights to' determine the valve status. .Any change.in:

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limit switch' setting can influence MOV stroke time testing as well'as

valve position dependent interlocks and permissives. .This is an

unresolved item pending h,* review of the licensee's' actions to assure

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that changes'to bypass switch settings do not' adversely affect' indica-

tion and' limit switch settings. (50-317/89 .12-04; 50-318/89-12-04).

Thermal Overload Relay

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Thermal overload relays are used to protect motor winding insulation

. from' breakdown during overload conditions. Devices used consist of

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heaters at-the motor control center which trip a heat sensitive relay,.

the ' contacts of which either. interrupt current to the contactor closure

or.open the coil (which stops the motor) or initiate an overload alarm,

-or both. Where thermal overload rela /s stop operator. motor rotation

on' tripping, the heaters must either be sized to prevent inadvertently

stopping the motor or the overload relays must be. bypassed.when motor-

operation is important to safety. They should also_ba sized to' protect

the motor windings from thermal damage. Regulatory Guide 1.106, thermal

. overload protection for electric motors on motor operated valves .

provides guidelines on the design criteria for thermal ' overloads.

Designs that are being used at this time to el'rinate the threat of-

inadvertent motor trips include: (1) removing the heaters or relay

contacts from use; (2) using the relay contacts for alarm only; (3)

bypassing the relay contacts during all oper., ting modes except when

a valve is being exercised for testing; (4) Lypassing the relay '

contacts only during the presence of an automatic safety actuation

signal; and, (5) oversizing the thermal overloads.

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At1Calvert Cliffs Units 1- and-2, the licensee utilizes the following  !

. general criteria for sizing the overload relays that are used in the

control circuit of all bulletin valves to protect the motor- without-

-compromising'the safety function.

1. .A minimum of twenty minutes trip time.at fu'11 load current.

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2. 'A ' maximum' of fifteen seconds and minimum off two: seconds trip

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time at locked rotor current. This allows at least 2 seconds 1

to unseat the valve and a maximum-of fifteen seconds to operate-  !

c the valve under locked rotor condition.

During the review of the overload heater calculations, the inspector

obser_ved 'that the licensee sized the overload relays to trip between 1

a band of approximately 4.5 seconds minimum to a 15 seconds maximum

locked rotor current' range. Limitorque requires its motor manufacturers .{

to provide a minimum of 10-15 seconds allowable stall- time. According j

to Limitorque,10 seconds locked rotor time for overload selection

gives the highest degree of motor protection, even though, 15 seconds-

locked rotor t,ime is considered adequate protection for the motor. I

The licensee 3 elected the overload relay such that motor protection j

and availability of the MOV is not compromised. During the field '

walkdown,:the inspector verified thermal overloads for four HPSI valves

for Unit 1. The installation agreed with the required ratings

established.in the calculation.

The licensee determined that control room indication is not provided

to identify tripped overload relays. The licensee is reviewing this -3

issue to determine the need for- control room indication of tripped j

overload relays.

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4.3 Demonstration of Operability

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This involves demonstrating the valve to be operable by testing the  !'

valve under maximum differential pressure (AP) after changing the

individual valve settings, as appropriate; based on the design bases.

In the absence of testing with full differential pressure across-the  !

valve, a justification.is to be provided. The use of a Limitorque/ l

M0 PATS data base to set the torque switches for a particular type'of  !

valve is considered an acceptable alternative to differential l

pressure testing, provided this type of valve has sufficient test  ;

data to establish similarity. '

The inspector noted that the licensee has not used signature tracing )

methods to determine ti:.e traces of motor current, torque and limit '

switch actuations and axial motion of the worm gear. Lacking this

information the licensee cannot determine the actual available. thrust ,

developed by the motor at the maximum design bases differential pressure. (

However, the licensee uses Limitorque information to calculate the

stem thrust and the required torque settings to seat and unseat the

valve.

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'The MOVs subject to the requirements of the bulletinLwere. tested at .

the maximum Ap and at full flow for both units. .The' valves:were stroke.

tested using the "asLfound" switch settings' with.the maximum differential

^ pressure.(Ap). Additionally, the Unit 1 MOVs were tested lat a-reduced" ,

voltage

of.432 volts- (minimum 480V. bus voltage allowed by: tech specifi-

cations). . Unit;1; completed the differential pressure test twice:and

the.second test-for Unit 2.is' scheduled.for this outage. The. full

Ap- test-is scheduled every refueling outage. The inspector: verified'

the-test records. ' All MOVs operated properly'in both the~ open and-

shut directions with the maximum design bases differential pressure-

across the valve. -In five cases the HPSI system was not capable of-

producing maximum. design Ap. (1310 psid'vs. 1313 psid required).

.For these. cases, the. difference in Ap was minimal. -'During the test,

the licensee took opening / closing time and starting and. running current'

to establish'the operability of the MOVs.

' No changes'to the switch settings were required as a result of the

testing. However, some torque switch settings were changed, either

to increase the conservatism'in the settings or, to standardize settings

' on similar MOVs in order to assist in long-term valve trending. The'

inspector noted that the licensee performs a quarterly valve operability-

verification test consisting of valve cycling to provide additional

confidenceLof valve operability. The list of the bulletin' valves'and

their torque and thrust values are shown in attachment 3.

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4.4 Maintenance and_ Procedures 1

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The bulletin requires that licensees prepare or revi.se procedures to 1

ensure that correct switch settings are maintained throughout the  ;

life of the plant and also'to ensure that' applicable industry  ;

recommendations 'are considered' in the preparation of the procedure. ~

The inspector reviewed the procedures and documents listed in Attach- l

ments 1 and 2. The licensee had revised existing-procedures for

maintaining the limit and torque switch settings.. The procedure i

addressed the details on installing torque switches with the spring

pack in'the relaxed condition. However, procedures were not provided

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to specify the greasing levels and acceptable level / quantity of

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grease for the-limit ~ switch gear assembly.  !

A walkdown was conducted to assess the adequacy of MOV maintenance and

to verify torque switch and limit switch settings. As Unit 1 was  !

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operating at full power, access to these valves was lir;ted. However,

the inspector inspected three valves (MOV 653, 654 and 655) in the

HPSI system. The torque and the limit switch contacts appeared to be

set correctly, aligned, clean, and free from corrosion and pitting.

The inspector verified the control wiring to be in conformance with

the licensee documents listed in Attachment 2.

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During the' procedure review, the inspector noted that no specific

criteria were provided to specify limit switch and bypass switch

settings to cut off the motor circuit. Industry practice is to use

either the stem measurement or the hand wheel movement method to get

the desired limit switch setting. Industry analysis indicated'that

the lack of information of proper limit switch settings and torque

switches was one of the causes of failures of MOVs.

During the walkdown, the inspector noted that '.he 2MOV653, 654 and <

655 valve stems were without a trace of lubric tion. No procedural '

requirements exist for SMB-00 and SMB-3 M0V actuators to specify the

frequency of inspections or to specify the criteria for stem lubrication >

of the actuators to assure proper MOV operation. I dustry experience

indicates that a lack of adequate lubrication of valve stem leads to

premature tripping of the operator because of excessive torque require- l

ments. The above two examples constitute a violation of Baltimore

Gas and Electric Company Technical Specification, section 6.8.1, in

that no procedures were provided for these important maintenance

activities that can affect the performance of safety related

equipment (50-317/89-12-01; 50-318/89-12-01).  !

During the review of the test records, the inspector noted that at >

the last refueling outage, several MOVs in Unit 1 exhibited potential

lubrication deficiencies for the main gear box assemoly (such as

potential degradation of grease and using different grease). Pre-

ventive maintenance records, PM 2-52-MR8 thru 15 for the last outage  ;

for Unit 2 indicated discoloration of the grease. This is an indica- '

tion of potential grease degradation. During the current Unit 2

outage, tSe licensee stated that ten out of 12 Bulletin valves

exhibited similar lubrication deficiencies. '

This issue of potential lubrication deficiencies for the main gear

box assembly is an unresolved item pending the licensee establishing C

clear acceptance criteria for the lubricant, licensee determination

of the acceptability of the main gear box lubricant; and the

licensee's actions to correct unacceptable lubricant conditions

(50-317/89-12-02; 50-318/89-12-02).

During the walkdown, the inspector noticed that the torque switch

settings were nonconservatively set at 1.0 for both opening and

closing valve 2MOV653. The setpoint file manual and the licensee's

final response to the Bulletin specifies 1.5 for both opening and

closing the valve. This discrepancy was brought to the attention of

the licensee during the inspection and at the exit meeting.

The Baltimore Gas and Electric Company Quality i.ssurance policy,

Revision 19, Section 18.5 requires that activities affecting quality I

shall be prescribed by procedures and shall be accomplished in '

accordance with these procedures. This finding constitutes a

violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V, failure to follow  !

procedures (50-317/89-12-05; 50-318/89-12-05). '

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The inspector reviewed the licensee's training program. The mainte-

nance personnel have attended the Limitorque training presented by

power safety international and also undergo in-house training. The

training consists of operation, disassembly and assembly of MOV,

setting torque and limit switches and hands on training. .Since the

licensee'did not have any diagnostic equipment, technicians are not

trained in this area. The inspector interviewed an electrician who

was responsible for the MOV maintenance. He was determined to be

knowledgeable in the maintenance aspects of MOVs. The inspector

observed that the existing training requalification interval is three

years.

'The inspector reviewed the post maintenance testing of MOVs. The

licensee is currently timing the valve stroke and monitoring the  ;

current reading to establish the operability of MOVs after minor and  ;

mid-level maintenance. Following major maintenance, full op stroke {

testing is performed to establish MOV operability. The licensee is

currently reviewing their valve testing program to determine if there

is a need for full Ap stroke testing after mid-level maintenance.

5.0 Conclusions

The licensee has not addressed all of the significant aspects of the bulletin.

A deficiency was noted during the walkdown regarding a torque switch setting.

Maintenance procedures were not provided to specify the limit switch settings.

Maintenance deficiencies were observed in the lubrication area. Surveillance, i

preventive, and post maintenance procedures were not descriptive.

During the. inspection, the inspector observed that the licensee lacked

dedicated MOV maintenance personnel to address the MOV program. They now

have a dedicated project manager to oversee the program. The licensee

stated that they are in the process of implementing an extensive plan that  !

should address concerns regarding the existing MOV maintenance' program.  !

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The inspector concluded that since all the bulletin valves were tested

with full differential pressure across the valve, there is reasonable  ;

assurance that these valves can perform thcir safety function. Based on

the review of the licensee's LER's and PM's, no MOV failures were observed

during the past two years.

6.0 Unresolved Items

Unresolved items are matters fce which more information is required in j

order to ascertain whether they are acceptable, violations, or deviations. j

Three unresolved items are discussed in sections 4.2 and 4.4 of this report. i

7.0 Exit Interview

l At the conclusion of the inspection on May 5, 1989, the inspectors met

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with the licensee representatives, denoted in section 1.0. The inspector

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summarized the scope and findings of the inspection at that time, No {

written material was given to the licensee during this inspection.

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Attachment -1

REFERENCES

'1. . Letter from Mr. J. A. Tiernan (BG&E) to Dr. T. E. Murley (NRC), dated May

15, 1986.

2. Letter from Mr. E. C. Wenzinger (NRC) to Mr. J. A.' Tiernan (BG&E), dated i

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July 29,1987, Request for Additional Information i

3. Letter from Mr. J. A. Tiernan (BG&E) to NRC Document Control Desk dated

September 1, 1987

4. Letter from Mr. J. A. Tiernan (BG&E) to NRC Document Control Desk dated

January 28, 1988.

PROCEDURES

Procedure No. FTE-41, Rev 6. Insulation Resistance Testing

Calvert Cliffs Instruction 2051, Rev 0 - Setpoint Control Procedure

STP No. 066-2 Rev 0 - Quarterly Valve Operability Verification - Shutdown

GEN-19, Rev 5 - Disassembly and assembly of limitorque actuators SMB-0, SMB-1,

SMB-2 and SMB-3

065-1, Rev 32 - Quarterly Valve Operability Verification.

GNE-18, Rev 1 - Instruction and Maintenance of timitorque Actuator SMB-00

FTE-47, Rev 6 - Functional Test Procedures - Electrical Motor Operated Valve

Test Procedure

Quality Assurance Policy Rev 19

STP No. 0-103-1 (Unit 1) - Surveillance Test Procedure - HPSI MOV Maximum

Differential Pressure

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STP No. 0-103-2 (Unit 2) - Surveillance Test Procedure - HPSI MOV Maximum

Differential Pressure

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Attachment-2

Documents Reviewed

STP-066-1 - Maximum Differential Pressure Test Record

Maintenance Order No. 206-294-277A - Perform Testing on SI MOV

Manual. #14 - Set poi:1t file for MOV torque switch settings

Calculation No. E-81-1 - Overload heater selection

Bechtel File No. 1475/2703 - MOV overload relay calculations

BG&E Drawing No. 61-014B Shet 4 Rev 23 - Relay Settings, MCC 104R

BG&E Drawing No. 61-0148 Sht 48, Rev 25 - Relay setting, MCC 114R

BG&E Drawing No. 63-014-B, Sht 4, Rev 24 - Relay settings, MCC 204R

BG&E Drawing No. 063-014B, Sht 48, Rev 22 - Relay settings, MCC 214R

BG&E Drawing No., 61-076-8 Sht 23, Rev 10 - Reactor Safeguards MOVs 616, 626;.

636, 646 i

BG&E, Drawing No. 61-0768, Sht 22, Rev 10 - Reactor Safeguards MOVs 615, 625,

'635, 645, 617, 627, 637 and 547

BG&E, Drawing No. 61-076-B, Reactor Safeguards MOV 656 Sht 21, Rev 7 '

BG&E, Drawing No. 61-076-B, Sht 19, Rev 10 - Reactor Safeguards, MOVs 653,

654, 655  !

BG&E, Drawing No. 63-076-B, Sht 23A, Rev 0 - Reactor Safeguards MOVs 616, 626,

636, 646

Motor Operated Valve Safety Data

PM No. 1-52-E-2R-3, Safety Injection MOVs

FCR No. 89-10 - Limitorque Motor Operators

PM No. 1-52-M-R-16, 18 - SI, 1-MOV-653, 654

PM No. 2-52-M-R-8 thru 18 and 21 - Safety Injection MOVs

PM No. 1-52-E-2R-6 - Preventive Maintenance for Valves 653, 654, 658, 659,

660, 662

PM No. 1-52-E-2R-7 - Preventive Maintenance for Valves 665, 656, 663

l PM No. 2-52-E-2R-6 - Preventive Maintenance Safety Injection MOVs

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Attachment-2

Documents Reviewed (Continued)

LERs

LER 79-11/3L, 2 LER 7787

LER 79-44/3L, 1 LER 8416

LER 77-87/3L, 1 LER 7911

LER 80-01/3L

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