ML20058A707

Insp Repts 50-317/90-28 & 50-318/90-28 on 901010-11. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Personnel Access Control

ML20058A707
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	10/19/1990
From:	Keimig R, Galen Smith NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20058A701	List: ML20058A700 ML20058A707
References
50-317-90-28, 50-318-90-28, NUDOCS 9010290099
Download: ML20058A707 (4)

See also: IR 05000317/1990028

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

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50-317/90-28

LReport Nos.

50-318/90-28

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50-317

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' Docket Nos.'

50-318

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DPR-53

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. License Nos.

DPR-69

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Licensee

Baltimore Gas and Electric Company

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Inspection At: Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 and 2

Inspection Conducted:-

October 10 and 11, 1990

Typ~e of Inspection: Special, Announced Physical Security

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.Special,-Announced Safeguards ~ Inspection (Combined

InspectionSSummary: .

'(lnspection Report Nos..

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50-317/90-28 and 50-318/90-28)

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1 Areas-Inspectedi'; Personnel 1AccessControl.

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( Results:- :0ne' apparent:-violation was identified; failure to perform aisearcil

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with a metal detector of personnel entering the

protected' area.

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9010290099 901019

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DETAILS

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Key Persons-Contacted

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.V ;Bradley, Director, Security Services

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J.-Alvey, Assistant General Supervisor, Nuclear Security

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Milbrant, Compliance. Engineer

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L,-Nicholson, NRC Senior Resident Inspector

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All of.the above were present at the exit interview.

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The inspector also interviewed other licensee employees.

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2.

Follow-Up on Safeguards Event

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Background

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On'S_eptember 13. 1990 the NRC Region I Duty Officer received an

anonymous allegation.that,.on Septembe.r 11,~1990, the site access

- control personnel.- portal metal . detectors had been turned ~ of f af ter

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l going.into constant alarm.

The alleger.further stated.that no.

compensatory measures were implemented and that 200-400 persons were

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' allowed to enter the site without being searched for contraband

metalic objects',

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NRC-Region:I management requested the licensee to.. investigate thel

1 alleged incident,.and to provide a report of the investigation

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results;

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In an October'2, 1990 letter,.the'11censee' notified the NRC Region-I'

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. office that/.the invest _igation wasLcompletedjand that the allegation

shad been'~oasically; substantiated. .On October 10, 1990 an NRC:

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l physical security inspector was dispatched'to the site to: review and.

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validate the.results'of the licensee's' investigation.

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NRC Review

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'Ont0ctober.10l 1993 an on-sit 6 inspection of.the event was conducted.--

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?The, ins'pection; included -aireview of the licensee's.' investigation,-

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Linterviews with security management:and the security personneli

involvedlin.the' event, andl observation'of personnel processing 11ntoi

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?the: site at thesarea where theLevent> occurred (The! Security

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! Processing-Building)-

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NRC Findings

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The; inspector's review-of.the-licensee's investigation.and interviews

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~ wjth security ' officers on post"at the metal detectors-when the'evento

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ioccurred determined that'the metal detectors'were not actually turned.

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off,-but-that the: volume ~on the alarm annunciators wascturned down so-

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personnel-processing through the detectors would not know they were

alarming.

This action was taken at the direction of the on-shift

security shift supervisor because three of the four metal detectors

were in constant alarm.

The shif t superv?sor also rirected that

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metal detector searches be suspended and to let th's employees process

through the alarming detectors.

This action of:s caken at approxi-

mately: 6:15 a.m. on September 11, 15'90, during a peak traffic period

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'for personnel entering the plant.

Tht: Security Officers posted at

the metal detectors stated that they did not feel comfortable with

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the action, and at approximately 6:30 a.m. , when the nietal detectors

stopped 'the constant alarms, they reinstated -the me'.a1 detector

searches and returned the alarm annunciator volume to a normal-level.

Additionally, the inspector determined through interviews with the

security officers and 'the security shif t supervisor involved in the

incident and with their management, and through review of associated

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records that:

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The security shif t supervisor thought he had the-authority to

suspend the search requirements when the malfunctioning metal

detectors were causing-backups in the search area.

He thought -

this decision was acceptable because the search backups were

hindering operations personnel from entering the plant.

His'

rationale was that the operations personnel were attempting to

restart the plant af ter an' extended outage and .their expedited

access.took precedence over.the search. requirements.

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The security officers, although they thought _itLwas a poor

decision,!did not question-the: supervisory decision.

Further,

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-the officers estimated'approximately 1150-200 employees were

. processed.during'the period the metal detectors were

nonfunctional.

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The inspector's' review of the post orders governing the

licensee's securityLforce members on M y at the access control.

point' disclosed that each such order. contained the-following

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statement:

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"The above orders do nottlimit'the members of.the Nuclear

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Security . Force in: their duties and responsibilities.

Orders

may.be temporarily _ changed to' conform to a current' situation by

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.the Nuclear Security-Supervisor or Senior."

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.The metal detectors-were,approximately 11_ years ol_d:and they'

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contained degraded circuit boards that could;not be replaced

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because they .were~ .no . longer.l manufactured.

Because of;the-

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' degraded circuit boards, the 1.icensee:was-having difficulty

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adjusting the sensitivity of the detectors.at the properilevel

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and having the detectors stabilize without a high: number of

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nuisance alarms.

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5). The licensee was in the process of replacing the metal

detectors at the time of the event and the new detectors were

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on-site being tested.

The licensee installed the new metal

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detectors between the time the event occurred and the

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inspection. At the time of the inspection, the licensee had

only five days of experience with the new detectors, but they had

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experienced no problems with the detectors during that period.

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Summary

The inspector determined that:

(1) the events had occurred,

basically as alleged and documented in the licensee's investigation,

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as a result of a supervisor assuming he had the authority to suspend

. search _ requirements when, in fact, he did not have the authority to

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take that action; (2) the securi_ty officers followed the. supervisor's

orders without question, even though they thought it a poor decision;-

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(3) the statement in each post order that gave the supervisor the

authority to change the order to conform to a current situation

contributed to the supervisor assuming he had authority to suspend

the- search requirement, and to the security officers' lack of questioning

the order.

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Part!73.55 of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, states, in part:

(d) Access Requirements

(1). The licensee.'shall control all points of personnel and .

vehicle access into-a protected area.

Identification

and search of individuals ... must be checked at these

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points.

The search function.for detection of fire-

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arms, explosives.and-incendiary devices.must'be

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. accomplished.through the use of both firearms and

exp_losive detection equipment capable of detecting

'those' devices.

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The Calvert Cliffs Nuclear' Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, NRC-approved'

Security Plan, states, in Section 5;3.a., "All personnel entering!the.

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protected' area through the Security Processing Buildingcare searched'

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with acceptable metal and explosive detectors."

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The September 11, 1990 failure to perform a search with an. acceptable

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' metal-detector of personnel entering the protected area through.the

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Security' Processing Building.'is an apparent violation.

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L(VIO 50-317/90-28-01; 50-318/90-28-01)

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Esit' Interview

The. inspector ret with the licensee representatives ~ indicated in

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paragraph 1Lat the conclusion of the inspection on.0ctober 11, 1990. At

that time,Lthe purpose andiscope of the inspection were' reviewed, and the-

findings were presented.' -The licensee was informed that they would be

notified'of NRC. Region I' management's assessment of this matter at ai

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later date.

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