IR 05000317/1993025
| ML20057F322 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 09/29/1993 |
| From: | Larry Nicholson NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20057F320 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-317-93-25, 50-318-93-25, NUDOCS 9310150131 | |
| Download: ML20057F322 (19) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION -
.t REGION 1 l
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Report Nos.
50-317/93-25; 50-318/93-25 i
License Nos.
DPR-53/DPR-69 i
t Licensee:
- Baltimore Gas and Electric Company:
Post Office Box 1475 -
Baltimore, Maryland 21203
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Facility:
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unns 1 and 2 -
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Location:
- Lusby, Maryland -
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' h Inspection conducted:
August 8,1993, through September 11,1993 j
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Inspectors:
Peter R. Wilson, Senior Resident Inspector :
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. Carl F..Lyon, Resident Inspector '
l Henry K. Lathrop, Resident Inspector i
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Approved by:
44, M1
- Car'rj/Jf. Nicholson, Chief ~
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React 6r. Projects Section No.1 A Division of. Reactor Projects l
Inspection Summary: i-l
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This inspection report documents resident inspector core, regional initiative, and reactive inspections performed during day and backshift hours of station activities including: ' plant
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operations; maintenance; engineering;' and plant support.
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Rfsults:
_j See Executive Summary.
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EXECUTIVE SUMM AR1
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l Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant. Enits 1 nnd 2
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I Inspection Renort NosJ0 317/93-25 and 50-318/93-2J Plant Ooerations: (Operational Safety Inspection Module 71707, Prompt Onsite Response to Events at Operating Power Reactors Module 93702) Both units operated without a significant
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event during the period. The Plant Operations and Safety Review Committee and the Procedure Review Committee effectively executed their respective Technical Specincation responsibilities.
Maintenance: (Maintenance Observations Module 62703, Surveillance Observations Module
61726) BG&E's investigation of a surveillance test failure on 21 emergency diesel generator was appropriate and the plan to assure reliability was sound. BG&E's implementation _of the measuring and test equipment program was satisfactory. However, the inspectors noted some deficiencies in the storage and marking of out-of-calibration / defective equipment. This was a non-cited violation.
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Encineering: (Module 71707) BG&E identified three more plant areas where a postulated Appendix R Hre could cause the simultaneous loss of both control room ventilation trains.
i Compensatory measures were satisfactory. BG&E also discovered that a postulated Appendix R fire in Unit 1 Cable Chase 1A could cause the loss of power to both Unit 14160 V emergency buses. Compensatory actions were satisfactory; however, this issue was unresolved
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pending further evaluation and NRC review, i
Plant Supoort: (Modub 71707)
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Radiological Controls - Overall, a satisfactory level of performance was observed.
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Emergency Preparedness - BG&E demonstrated a good safety perspective in site preparations for the threat of Hurricane Emily.
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Security - Security program implementation was satisfactory.
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Plant Chemistry - Primary and Secondary water chemistry was maintained within
~i Technical Specification and procedural limits. No unacceptable conditions were noted.
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Fire Protection - No unacceptable conditions were noted.
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Housekeeping - In general, plant housekeeping was very good.
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l SUMMARY OF FACILITY ACTIVITIES Both units operated at power for the entire period.
2.0 PLANT OPERATIONS 2.1 Operational Safetv Veri 6 cation The inspectors observed plant operation and verified that BG&E operated the facility safely and according to licensee procedures and regulatory requirements. Regular tours were conducted I
of the following plant areas:
-- control room
-- security access point
-- primary auxiliary building
-- protected area fence j
-- radiological control point
-- intake structure
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-- electrical switchgear rooms
-- diesel generator rooms -
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-- auxiliary feedwater pump rooms
-- turbine building l
Control room instruments and plant computer indications were observed for correlatioa between l
channels and for conformance with technical specification (TS) requirements. Operability of engineered safety features, other safety related systems and onsite and offsite power sources was verified. The inspectors observed various alarm conditions and confirmed that operator response was according to plant operating procedures. Compliance with TS and implementation of appro-
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priate action statements for equipment out of service was inspected. Plant radiation monitoring system indications and plant stack traces were reviewed for unexpected changes. Logs and j
records were reviewed to determine if entries were accurate and identified equipment status or j
deficiencies. These records included operating logs, turnover sheets, system safety tags and
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temporary modifications log. The inspectors also examined the condition of meteorological and seismic monitoring systems. Control room and shift manning were compared to regulatory I
requirements and portions of shift turnovers were observed. The inspectors found that control i
room access was properly controlled and that a professional atmosphere was maintained.
In addition to normal utility working hours, the review of plant operations was routinely conducted during backshifts (evening shifts) and deep backshifts (weekend and midnight shifts).
Extended coverage was provided for 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> during backshifts and 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> during deep backshifts. Operators were alert and displayed no signs of inattention to duty or fatigue.
The inspectors observed an acceptable level of performance during the inspection tours detailed above.
2.2 Follow un of Events Occurrine Durine Inspection Period There were no significant operational events during the perio.
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2.3 Plant Operations and Safety Review Committee Inspectors attended several Plant Operations and Safety Review Committee (POSRC) meetings.
TS 6.5.1 requirements for required member attendance were verified. The meeting agendas included safety significant issue reports, proposed tests that affected nuclear safety,10 CFR 50.59 evaluations, reportable events, and proposed changes to plant equipment that affected nuclear safety. Members were focused on each agenda item's impact on nuclear safety, and technical issues were discussed in good detail. Overall, the level of review and member participation was satisfactory in fulfilling the POSRC's responsibilities.
2.4 Procedure Review Committee Inspectors attended the Procedure Review Committee (PRC) meeting on September 2. The PRC l
composition and agenda were in compliance with the requirements of TS 6.5.2. The agenda i
included a review of changes to procedures affecting safety-related activities. Ikyond the changes presented to the PRC, members made constructive comments and suggestions with
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l regard to specific procedure content and quality. Overall, the level of review and member l
participation was satisfactory in fulfilling the PRC's responsibilities.
l 3.0 MAINTENANCE
l 3.1 Maintenance Observation l
The inspector reviewed selected maintenance activities to assure that:
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the activity did not violate technical specification limiting conditions for operation and that redundant components were operable; I
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required approvals and releases had been obtained prior to commencing work; l
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procedures used for the task were adequate and work was within the skills of the trade;
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activities were accomplished by qualified personnel;
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where necessary, radiological and fire preventive controls were adequate and L
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quality verification hold points were established where required and observed; and equipment was properly tested and returned to service.
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Maintenance activities reviewed included:
MO 29302162 Tube bulleting of 21 service water heat exchanger (SRWHX)
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MO 19206927 Inspect coupling on 12 component cooling water pump (CCWP)
MO 19206929 Lubricate bearings on 12 CCWP MO 19300277 Lubricate motor on 12 CCWP MO 19302738 Stroke isolation valves on 12 component cooling heat exchan;;er MO 19207355 Change oil and lube 12 low pressure safety injection pump MO 19302717 Perform procedure SRWHX-02 on 12 SRWHX The work observed was performed safely and in accordance with proper procedures. Inspectors noted that an appropriate level of supervisory attention was given to the work depending on its priority and difSculty.
3.2 Surveillance Observation The inspectors witnessed / reviewed selected surveillance tests to determine whether properly approved procedures were in use, details were adequate, test instrumentation was properly calibrated and used, technical speciScations were satisfied, testing was performed by qualified personnel, and test results satisfied acceptance criteria or were properly dispositioned.
The surveillance testing was performed safely and in accordance with proper procedures.
Inspectors noted that an appropriate level of supervisory attention was given to the testing depending on its sensitivity and difficulty. Notable observations are included below for selected activities. The following surveillance testing activities were reviewed:
STP O-73B-1 Service Water Pump Performance Test STP O-73I-1 High Pressure Safety Injection Pump Performance Test STP 0-73K-1 Containment Spray Pump Performance Test STP O-8B-2 21 EDG and 4 kV Bus 24 LOCI Sequencer Test STP O-73I-2 High Pressure Safety Injection Pump Performance Test STP O-8A-1 11 EDG and 4 kV Bus 11 LOCI Scquencer Test STP O-5A-2 AFW System Quarterly Test
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3.3 21 Emercency Diesel Generator On September 9,21 emergency diesel generator (EDG) failed surveillance test procedure (STP)
0-8-2, "21 Diesel Generator Test," and was declared inoperable. The EDG failed to reach rated frequency and voltage within the 10 second test criterion. 21 EDG reached 60 Hz in'10.66 seconds and 4.16 kV in 10.35 seconds.
21 EDG was tested in accordance with TS 3.8.1.1.b., which required that, with one EDG inoperable, the other EDG must be demonstrated operable within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The 12 EDO, the swing diesel, had been taken out of service on September 8 to perform scheduled preventive maintenance. When the 12 EDG was restored, it was operable only to Unit 2 due to a problem with position indication on 1-SRW-1645, the 12 EDG supply and retum valve to Unit I service water (SRW) system. This was significant because it left each tmit with only one' operable EDG. With only 11 EDG operable to Unit I and only 12 EDG operable to Unit 2, both units were in a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> TS action statement leading to unit shutdown.
The 21 EDG had been tested satisfactorily during its monthly surveillance on August 13.
Following the September 9 test failure, BG&E conducted three fast starts of the 21 EDG to collect data. All of the times to reach rated frequency and voltage were under 9 seconds.
Based on the test data and observations and the maintenance history of 21 EDG, BG&E assessed that the most likely cause for the unacceptably slow start times during the STP was in the diesel air start (DAS) system. As documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-317 and 318/93-02,21 EDG had failed a surveillance test in January 1993 due to rust buildup in the air start distributor.
The condition was corrected in January, and the DAS system was refurbished in April.
Subsequent to the three fast starts on September 9, the DAS system was partially dismantled and inspected, but no definite cause for the slow start times was found.
STP O-8-2 was performed again on 21 EDG on September 10. The start times for frequency and voltage were approximately 9.5 seconds, which were slower than the normally expected 7.5
- 8.5 seconds, but within the test criterion of 10 seconds.
Following evaluation, BG&E concluded that the diesel was degraded, but operabic. They still believed that the slow start times were indicative of a DAS system problem, most probably an accumulation of rust or debris that could affect the system when it was started after a long shutdown period.
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Since the BG&E investigation identified no conclusive reason for the STP failure on September 9, and it had passed its surveillance test on September 10, BG&E declared the.21 EDG operable. Following repair and testing of 1-SRW-1645, both units exited the TS action statements for an inoperable diesel. However, since questions remained concerning the cause
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of slow start times, BG&E decided to increase the testing frequency on 21 EDG until they had reasonable assurance that it was reliable.
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Inspectors monitored the testing and inspection of 21 EDG, and BG&E discussed the issue with the NRC Regional engineering staff and with the vender. Since no concrete evidence of a definite root cause for the slow start times could be found, and the diesel had satisfactorily passed its subsequent testing, BG&E's plan for increased monitoring appeared sound. A
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i followup inspection from an NRC Region specialist inspector was initiated as this inspection period ended.
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l On September 13, following the end of the inspection period, STP O-8B-2, "21 EDG and 4kV bus 24 LOCI Sequencer Test," was performed satisfactorily. The start times for frequency and -
voltage were approximately 7.5 seconds. BG&E and tbc Wpectors will continue to closely monitor EDG performance.
3.4
- Imolementation of the Measuring and Test Eauinment (M&TE) Program in August 1993, the resident staff conducted an in-depth review of BG&E's implementation of.
I their M&TE program. This review, performed as a regional initiative, coincided with several observations by BG&E personnel of M&TE storage practices. The inspectors reviewed the subsequent issue report (IR) and the corrective actions taken because of the IR.
i Calvert Cliffs Administrative Procedure MN-2-100, " Control and Calibration of Measuring and i
Test Equipment," described the M&TE program and its controls, requirements and responsibilities. Personnel in the test equipment. shop (a work _section in the electrical and controls (E&C) maintenance group) performed all on-site calibrations; however, the various work groups to which the M&TE was assigned were responsible for the storage and proper use of the equipment. Bar coding uniquely identified each piece of M&TE that a technician checked out. A computer software program called SMARTRAK controlled the use of the M&TE.
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written and clearly delineated program requirements, responsibilities and controls. Several minor inconsistencies were identified to E&C supervision, who initiated a procedure change
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request to resolve the issues. For example, if the responsible supervisor rejected a calibration frequency change request (CFCR), apparently no one informed the requestor. The calibration facility supervisor (CFS) approved or rejected only CFCRs approved by the responsible
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supervisor. If the CFS rejected the CFCR, he informed the requestor. The inspectors reviewed
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approximately 100 calibration records for test equipment. In general, these records were complete and up-to-date. However, all documentation was missing for three instruments (HP 12757, Keithley 11591 and 11592), and there was no record of the equipments' current location, E&C calibration personnel found that the training department was using the equipment for i
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demonstration purposes where no calibration was required. This data was provided by the l
SMARTRAK software. Appropriate entries were made in the equipment hard copy files. The i
inspectors did not note any instances where test equipment found out-of-calibration after use was not properly documented and its use evaluated for effect on component operation / testing.
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The inspectors toured the various storage areas for M&TE and made the following observations:
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Main vault and performance engineering test shop. BG&E properly stored M&TE with l
out-of-calibration / defective test equipment segregated from in-calibration gear and appropriately tagged. The inspectors did not note any discrepancies.
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Auxiliary building 69 foot elevation hot shop. BG&E quality verification personnel documented deficiencies in this area in Issue Report IRO-0163-391 on July 22,1993.
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test equipment in a locker was not properly segregated. One piece of test equipment, a l
Dwyer manometer (DM-2A) was missing from its storage case and had not been signed out on its usage card. The manometer was still missing when the report period ended.
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Housekeeping in the area was acceptable.
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Auxiliary building 69 foot radiation monitoring equipment calibration area. During several tours of this area, the inspectors noted improper segregation of test equipment, a lack of use of rejected tags on appropriate equipment and marginal housekeeping.
They brought these issues to the attention of BG&E personnel who immediately corrected them. However, the next day the inspectors found another out-of-calibration air sampler (serial number 7287) untagged and placed among several in-calibration monitors.
In summary, the inspectors concluded that BG&E had implemented a satisfactory M&TE program with a controlling procedure, MN-2-100, which clearly delineated responsibilities and
j requirements. Calibration records generally were accurate and well-kept. The use of the SMARTRAK computer software provided good control over the calibration, issuance and use of M&TE. However, BG&E did not always meet the storage and tagging requirements of MN-2-100. Inspectors found out-of-calibration / defective equipment not appropriately tagged and ineffective physical segregation of M&TE. BG&E was making progress in their corrective actions for the. above noted deficiencies; however, they were not yet complete. TS 6.8.1.a required that procedures be established, implemented, and maintained covering activities referenced in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978, including l
provisions for control of M&TE. Therefore, failure to maintain M&TE according to MN-2-100 l
was a violation. This violation of M&TE program requirements was not cited because BG&E l
satisfied the criteria for discretion specified in Section VII.B of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
4.0 ENGINEERING i
4.1 Appendix R Fire issues Update l
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In October 1992, during a ventilation systems design basis reconstitution effort, BG&E discovered that a postulated fire in the room containing the control room heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) units could potentially prevent the safe shutdown of both units.
The loss of tne HVAC units would cause the loss of all cooling to the Unit I and Unit 2 vital bus inverters and distribution panels in the cable spreading rooms. This issue was initially
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documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-317 and 318/92-27. Unresolved item 50-317 and 318/92-27-02 was opened pending further BG&E and NRC evaluation.
In May 1993, BG&E identified nine other plant areas where a postulated Appendix R fire could cause the simultaneous loss of both trains of control room HVAC. The inspectors documented these additional issues in NRC Inspection Report 50-317 and 318/93-16.
During this period, BG&E identified three other areas where inadequate Appendix R separation existed between control room HVAC power and/or control cabling. The other areas where inadequate separation existed were:
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Unit 2 45 Foot Switchgear Room; and i
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The inspectors found that BG&E had promptly performed and documented an operability determination. BG&E concluded that the control room HVAC units remained operable with the
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implementation of several compensatory measures.
These included limiting hot work, minimizing transient combustibles, and confirming the operability of the rooms' Gre detection and/or suppression systems. The inspectors veri 0ed that these compensatory measures were in effect. BG&E's compensatory measures were satisfactory.
BG&E's development of long-term corrective actions was continuing as the period ended. This issue remains open pending the completion and evaluation of these actions.
4.2 Appendix R Deficiencies in Unit 1 Cable Chase 1 A On August 5,1993, BG&E discovered that a postulated Appendix R fire in Unit 1 Cable Chase i
1 A could potentially cause the loss of power to both Unit 14160 V emergency buses. This condition could prevent the safe shutdown of the unit. The inspectors conducted a review of this issue to determine the safety significance and the effectiveness of BG&E's response. The review consisted of personnel interviews, document evaluation and walkdowns of the affected area.
BG&E identified this problem during their evaluation of the proposed cable routing for the new emergency diesel generators. They found power cables ZCI A406T and ZCI A406 routed through Cable Chase 1 A via electrical conduits. Theses cables provided power from the 12 emergency diesel generator (EDG) to Unit 14160 V Bus 14. BG&E failed to recognize the existence of these cables in the cable chase when they had revised their Interactive Cable Analysis (ICA)in 1990. The ICA credited the 12 EDG powering Bus 14 for a Bre in the cable chase. This error occurred when BG&E revised the ICA in 1990. BG&E informed the inspectors that, based on preliminary evaluation, an Appendix R Gre in the cable chase also
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could cause a loss of offsite power due a postulated failure of control power to the unit's service transformers. Therefore, a postulated Appendix R fire in this cabic chase could potentially cause
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the loss of onsite and offsite power to the two Unit 14160 V emergency buses.
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The inspectors reviewed Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP)-9L, " Safe Shutdown due to a Severe Fire in Cable Chase 1 A." This procedure also assumtd that Bus 14 was powered by 12 EDG to perform the safe shutdown.
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BG&E promptly implemented several compensatory measures including:
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verifying the operability of the cable chase's fire detection and suppression systems;
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implementing controls to allow only safety significant hot work in the cable chase;
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limiting transient combustibics; and
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performing a daily inspection of the room.
The inspectors verified that BG&E properly implemented these measures. The compensatory measures were adequate.
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As the period ended, BG&E had not perfctmed a reportability determination regarding this
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problem. BG&E informed the inspectors that they had missed t.his issue in their corrective
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action processes and would promptly evaluate the issue for reportability.
The inspectors concluded that this problem was potentially safety significant due to the postulated loss of AC power. It was unclear if the 1990 revision to the ICA contained other safety
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significant errors. The failure to perform a prompt reportability review required further NRC review. Therefore, this issue is Unresolved pending further NRC and BG&E review (50-317
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and 318/93-25-01).
5.0 PLANT SUPPORT
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5.1 Radiological Controls i
During tours.of the accessible plant areas, the inspectors observed the impicmentation of selected portions of the licensee's Radiological Controls Program. The utilization and compliance with special work permits (SWPs) were reviewed to ensure detailed descriptions of radiological conditions were provided and that personnel adhered to SWP requirements. The inspectors observed that controls of access to various radiologically controlled areas and use of personnel monitors and frisking methods upon exit from these areas were adequate. Posting and control of radiation areas, contaminated areas and hot spots, and labelling and control of containers holding radioactive materials were verified to be in accordance 'with licensee procedures.
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t Health Physics technician control and monitaring of these activities were determined to be good.
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Overall, a satisLctory level of performance was observed.
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Emergency Preoaredness j
On Monday, August 30, the National Weather Service (NWS) issued a hurricane warning / watch
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was just outside the watch boundary, BG&E began to. carry out some of the actionsifor-
Conditions I and 11 of their emergency response plan implementing procedure (ERPIP) 3.0, l
" Severe Weather," including:
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monitoring NWS weather updates;
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closing manways and penetrations in the intake structure;.
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topping off tue condensate storage tanks;
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inspecting the site for and removal of potential missile hazards; and
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stopping all but man'datory surveillances and maintenance activities.
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By late Tuesday, August 31, BG&E had completed the removal or securing of potential missile -
H hazards and had sealed the intake structure. The storm passed the site during the morning of.
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September 1 with the storm's eye about 100 miles east. There were no adverse effects on plant operation or personnel safety.
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i The NRC resident staff was augmented by two other inspectors on August 31 to provide 24-hour site coverage. They made frequent tours of the area and all safety-related buildings. The NRC
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activated the regional incident response center to monitor the storm's progress and evaluate the potential threat to coastal ~ power reactor sites.
BG&E management' kept the' inspectors thoroughly informed of their preparation, plans and implementation status.
The inspectors noted that ERPIP 3.0 used wind speeds (actual and predicted) as entry conditions dictating power reduction and plant shutdown that the inspectors felt might not afford adequate time to safely achieve hot shutdown conditions if the storm was advancing rapidly. _When
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queried by the resident staff, BG&E emergency preparedness. personnel acknowledged _ the concern and stated that a draft procedure incorporating lessons learned from Hurricar.c Andrew's effects on the Turkey Point station in 1992 was in circulation for review. Additionally, they indicated that it was BG&E management's expectation.that, regardless of wind speed, plant shutdown would commence eight hours prior to the storm's predicted arrival at the site, which
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would allow adequate time to place the units in a safe condition.
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The inspectors concluded that BG&E was proactive in their early implementation of ERPIP 3.0.
Although Calvert Cliffs was never included in either the hurricane watch or warning areas, BG&E demonstrated a strong safety perspective in its preparations. The inspectors noted good coordination between the various work groups in performing a thorough walkdown of the site -
and securing or removing potential missile hazards. The inspectors determined that ERPIP 3.0 appeared adequate to prepare the units for a strike from a slow-moving storm such as Hurricane Emily (about nine miles per hour), but might not have afforded sufficient time to safely shut down both units should a more rapidly moving storm approach. However, BG&E's stated intention to shut down the units eight hours prior to the storm's predicted arrival appeared proper to address this possibility, and BG&E was in the process of revising the procedure to incorporate lessons learned from Hurricane Andrew.
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5.3 Security During routine inspection tours, the inspectors observed implementation of portions of the security plan. Areas observed included access poir.2 search equipment operation, condition of l
physical barriers, site access control, security force staffing, and response to system alarms and j
degraded conditions. These areas of program implementation wem determined to' be adequate.
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No unacceptable conditions were identified.
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5.4 Plant Chemistry l
l The inspectors verified that primary and selected secondary water cnemistry were maintained l
within technical specification and procedural limits. In addition, they reviewed secondary water activity analysis and radiation monitor alarm status to confirm steam generator tube integrity.
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The inspectors also examined analysis trending data to determine if appropriate action was being implemented to restore plant chemistry to normal values. There were no unacceptable conditions i
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identified.
5.5 Fire Protection During plant tours, the inspectors assessed plant areas for fire ha7ards including ignition sources-and flammable materials. They also examined fire alarms, extinguishing equipment, emergency lighting, actuating controls, fire fighting equipment, and fire barriers for operability.
In addition, the inspectors verified that required compensatory measures, such as fire patrols, were properly implemented. There were no unacceptable conditions identified.
l 5.6 Housekeeoing
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l The inspectors assessed the control of plant housekeeping in safety related areas. They also examined these areas for potential missile ha7ards such as gas cylinders that could damage safety significant equipment. In general, plant housekeeping during the period was very good.
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5.7 Employee Concerns Program
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The inspectors' conducted a review of BG&E's employee concerns program. NRC Temporary; j
Instruction 2500/028 provided the guidance for this inspection. The inspectors documented the
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results of the review in Attachment 1 to this report. No safety' issues were identified.
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- 6.0 FOLLOW-UP OF PREVIOUS INSPECTION FINDINGS Licensee actions taken in rerponse to_ open items and findings from previous inspections were.
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f reviewed. The inspectors determined if corrective actions were appropriate and thorough and previous concerns.were resolved. Items were closed where the inspectors determined' that
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corrective actions would prevent recurrence. Those items for which additional licensee ~ action was warranted remained open. The following item was reviewed.
6.1 (Undate) Unresolved Item 50-317' and 318/92-27-02 This issue involved inadequate Appendix R -separation between the control room heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) units. BG&E discovered other plant areas where a postulated Appendix R fire could result in the simultaneous loss of both trains of control room -
HVAC. Review of this issue is documented in section~4.1.
i 7.0 MANAGEMENT MEETING During this inspection, periodic meetings were held with station management to discuss inspection observations and findings. At the close of the inspection period, an exit meeting was held to summarize the conclusions of the inspection._ No written material was given to the
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licensee and no' proprietary information related to this inspection _was identified.
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7.1 P_reliminary Inspection Findings A non-cited violation was identified with regard to the control _of measuring and test equipment, as discussed in section 3.4. An unresolved item was identified with regard to reportability requirements of the effects of a postulated Appendix R fire in Unit 1 Cable Chase 1 A (URI 50-317 and 318/93-25-01) as discussed in section 4.'
7.2 '
Attendance at Manacement Meetings Conducted by Region Based Inspectors i
Inspection
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Date Subiect Report No.
Inspector
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9/10/1993 Health Physics 50-317/93-27 L Furia
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NITACHMENT 1 l
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l EMPLOYEE CONCERNS PROGRAhi
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PLANT NAME: Calvert Cliffs LICENSEE: BG&E DOCKET #: 50-317 and 318 -
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PROGRAM:
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1.
Does the licensee have an employee concerns program? -
Answer:. Yes.
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2.
Has NRC inspected the program?
Answer: No.
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B.
SCOPE:
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1.
Is if for:
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a.
Technical?
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Answer: Yes.
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b.
Administrative?
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Answer: Yes.
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c.
Personnel issues?
i Answer: Yes, but for safety and quality issues only.
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Does it cover safety as well as non-safety issues?,
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Answer:.Yes.
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3.
. Is it designed for:
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Nuclear safety?
Answer: Yes.
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b.
Personal safety?
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l Answer: Yes.
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c.
Personnel issues - including union grievances?
Answer: Yes, but for safety and quality. issues only.
4.
Does the program apply to all licensee employees?
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Answer: Yes.
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Contractors?
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Answer: Yes.
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6.
Does the licensee require its contractors and their subs to b' ave a similar program?
Answer: No.
7.
Does the licensee conduct an exit interview upon terminating employees asking
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if they have any safety concerns?
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l Answer: Yes.
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INDEPENDENCE:
1.
What is the title of the person in charge?
Answer: Supervisor-Quality Audits Unit.
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Who do they report to?.
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Answer: Manager-Nuclear Quality Assurance.
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3.
Are they independent of line managenient?
l Answer: Yes.
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Does the ECP use third party consultants?
Answer: Yes.
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5.
How is a concern about a manager or vice president followed up?
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Answer: Would be treated like any other ECP complaint.
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D.
RESOURCES:
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I 1.
What is the size of the staff devoted to this program?
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Answer: Collateral duty for member of QA audit unit.
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2.
What are ECP staff qualifications (technical training, interviewing training.
j investigator training, other)?
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l Answer: Lead Auditor Training.
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REFERRALS:
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Who has follow-up on concerns (ECP staff, line management, other)?
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Answer: Line Management.
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CONFIDENTIALITY:
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Are the reports confidential?
Answer: Yes.
2.
Who is the identity of the alleger made known to (senior. management, ECP staff, line management, other)?
Answer: ECP staff.
3.
Can employees be:
a.
Anonymous?
Answer: Yes.
b.
Report by phone?
Answer: Yes.
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G.
FEEDBACK:
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f 1.
Is feedback given to the alleger upon completion of the follow-up?
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Answer: Yes.
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2.
Does program reward good ideas?
Answer: No, BG&E has other programs that reward good ideas.
3.
Who, or at what level, makes the final decisic, of resolution?
Answer: Vice President.
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4.
Are the resolutions of anonymous concerns disseminated?
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. Answer: Yes, if the concerns have generic aspects.
5.
Are resolutions of valid concerns publicized (newsletter, bulletin board, all hands meeting, other)?
Answer: Yes, in a newsletter.
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EFFECTIVENFSS:
1.
How does the licensee measure the effectiveness of the program?
Answer:
Measures concerns received versus concerns received by other organizations.
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2.
Are concerns:
a.
Trended?
Answer: No, not enough concerns.
b.
Used?
Answer: Yes.
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3.
In the last three years, how many concerns were raised? -
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Of the concerns raised, how many were closed 7l
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q Answer: '19 i
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.What percentage were substantiated?.
Answer: 75 %
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4.
How are follow-up techniques used to' measure effectiveness (random survey,
interviews, other)?
~i Answer:. QA audits.
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How frequently are internal audits.of the ECP conducted and by whom?
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' Answer: The.Offsite Safety Review Committee reviews all hot line concerns.
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ADMINISTRATIVE / TRAINING: -
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. Is ECP prescribed by a procedure?
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Answer: Yes.
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2.
How are employees, as well as contractors, made aware of th'is program (training, -
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newsletter, bulletin board, other)?
i Answer: Newsletter, GOT, bulletin board notices,' procedures.
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ADDITIONAL COMMENTS: (Including characteristics which make the program-especially effective, if any.)
BG&E also has an issue reporting system where any person can document a problem. - This.
problem is then reviewed by their supervisor and by a collegial review group for disposition.
l The initiator eventually receives written notification of the corrective action taken. This system
does not provide confidentiality but it is the one most used by employees with concerns.
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NAME:
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PIIONE #
DATE COMPLETED:
P. Wilson Sr. Resident.
(410) 586-2626
'8/18/93 I
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