IR 05000317/1993026
| ML20058P574 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 12/17/1993 |
| From: | Keimig R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20058P480 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-317-93-26, 50-318-93-26, NUDOCS 9312270191 | |
| Download: ML20058P574 (9) | |
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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I Docket / Report:
50-317/93-26, 50-318/93-26
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Licenses:
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Licensee:
Baltimore Gas and Electric Company Post Office Box 1535 Lusby, Maryland 20657 Facility Name:
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 & 2
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Dates:
October 26-28,1993 Inspectors:
MM 5-N -/7-93 gd. Silk, Senior E[4cy Mr'eparedness Specialistjgegeff' Pr date J. Lusher, Emerge L. Cohen, Emergency Preparedness Specialist, NRR/PEPB T. Fish, Resident Inspector, Artificial Island S. Barr, Resident Inspector, Artificial Island Approved:
8-/7-95
. Keimig, 8mergency Preparedness Section date
[ Division of
,f iation Safety and Safeguards
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SCOPE Announced inspection of the annual, full-participation emergency preparedness exercise.
RESULTS Overall, the on-site response to this exercise scenario was good. The crew correctly identified, classified and declared the event using the appropriate Emergency Action Levels (EALs) in a timely manner. No overall exercise strengths or weaknesses were identified. It was noted that the Radiation Protection Manager demonstrated strong performance. Areas identified for potentialimprovement were communications among the emergency response facilities, especially with the Operations Support Center (OSC), and the configuration of the OSC. Additionally, during this inspection, five previously identified items were closed.
9312270191 931217 PDR ADOCK 05000317'
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.
Persons Contacted......................................
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2.
Scenario Planning
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3.
Exercise Scenario Summary
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4.
Activities Observed.......................................
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Exercise Finding Classifications............................... 4 6.
Simulator Control Room (SCR)............................... 4 i
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Technical Support Center (TSC)...............................
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Operations Support Center (OSC).............................. 5
9.
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)........................... 6 10.
Overall Response Timing
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11.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items...................... 7 12.
Licensee Critique........................................ 9 13.
Concl u sion s..........................................
14.
Exit Meetin g..........................................
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DETAILS
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Persons Contacted-l
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- G. Detter, Director Nuclear Regulatory Matters
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T. Forgette, Supervisor - Emergency Preparedness
J. Lemons, Manager - Nuclear Support Services Department
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W. Maki, Compliance Engineer
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E. Roach, Emergency Preparedness Analyst
G. Rudigier, Emergency Preparedness Analyst
The inspectors also interviewed and observed other licensee personnel.
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Indicates those who attended the October'26,1993 entrance meeting j
Indicates those who attended the October 28,1993 exit meeting
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2.
Scenario Planning The exercise objectives and scenario were submitted to the NRC in a timely manner. The i
objectives and the scenario were reviewed by the NRC and the final scenario adequately tested l
the major portions cf ti,e Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures.
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On October 26,1993, NRC observers attended a licensee briefing on the scenario. The licensee f
stated that certain emergency response activities would be simulated and that controllers would-.
intercede in exercise activities at appropriate times to meet certain exercise objectives.
3.
Exercise Scenario Summary h
The scenario began with a security event that resulted in the declaration of an Unusual Event.
j An intruder was eventually apprehended outside of the protected area (PA). It was determined j
that he had not been in the PA and therefore did not sabotage any plant equipment. A short time -
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later, the containment personnel hatch was found ajar (not being able to completely close).
Personnel had exited through the hatch earlier after investigating a reactor coolant system leak.
Subsequently, a loss of condenser vacuum resulted in a turbine trip without an automatic reactor
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trip. Failure of reactor protection system to automatically trip the reactor met the criteria for
the declaration of an Alert. Then a loss of all main and auxiliary feedwater occurred which j
required the operators to go to once-through-core-cooling and declare a Site Emergency. - A.
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combination of circumstances (equipment being out of service, component failures, and the
power operated relief valve and its block valve failing open) resulted in inadequate high pressure-l safety injection (HPSI) flow. This led to core uncovery. A General Emergency was declared
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due to the degradation of the final fission product barrier.
Eventually, HPSI flow was established in conjunction with auxiliary feedwater to provide a coolant flow path and the
scenario was terminated.
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4.
Activities Observed
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The NRC inspection team observed the activation and augmentation of the Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) and the actions of the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) staff. The following activities were observed:
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Selection and use of control room procedures.
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Detection, classification, and assessment of scenario events.
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Direction and coordination of emergency respor.se.
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Notification of licensee personnel and off-site agencies.
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Communications /information flow and record keeping.
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Assessment and projection of off-site radiological doses.
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Issuance of Protective Action Recommendations (PARS).
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Provisions for in-plant radiation protection.
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Provisions for communicating information to the public.
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Accident analysis and mitigation.
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Accountability of personnel.
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Post-exercise critique by the licensee.
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5.
Exercise Finding Classifications Inspection findings were classified, where appropriate, as follows:
Exercise Streneth: a strong positive indicator of the licensee's ability to cope with abnormal plant conditions and implement the emergency plan.
Exercise Weakness: less than effective Emergency Plan implementation which did not, alone, constitute overall response inadequacy.
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Area for Potential Imorovement: an aspect which did not significantly detract from the licensee's response, but which merits licensee evaluadon for possible corrective action.
6.
Simulator Control Room (SCR)
The operators reacted well to plant conditions and parameters, and implemented the appropriate procedures in response to the conditions of the scenario. The crew was persistent in its attempts to restore safety injection flow. The shift recognized Emergency Action Levels and made the correct declarations in timely fashion. Crew members communicated well with each other, especially the Control Room Supervisor and the two reactor operators on the panels during the execution of Emergency Operating Procedure 8.
No SCR strengths, weaknesses, or areas for potential improvement were observed.
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Technical Suppod Center (TSC)
Overall, the TSC satisfactorily performed its functions during the exercise.
The reactor
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engineers provided timely and accurate information to the Plant General Manager (PGM)
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regarding the status of the core and projections on water levels, core temperatures, and core damage. Personnel accountability was maintained in the TSC throughout the exercise.
The TSC was staffed in a timely manner, however, its activation was not formally announced to the TSC staff. Also, the PGM did not announce when he assumed the mle ofInterim Site Emergency Coordinator. Other pertinent information was also not disseminated as well as it could have been within the TSC. For example, the status boards, showing Protective Action Recommendations (PARS) and significant plant problems, were not posted. The status board showing the meteorological data was not maintained in a consistent manner. The erratic posting of plant data may have contributed to confusion regarding the operational status of the l
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containment spray pumps, i.e., the status board indicated that they were not operating while the PGM believed, for a brief time, that they were operating. Eventually, it was confirmed that the
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pumps were not running. Also, the list of priority tasks were not maintained in the TSC.
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Finally, forms providing plant parameters and emergency messages did not indicate that they
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were exercise related. However, despite missed announcements and the lack of consistent posting of data on the status boards, the TSC members successfully performed their function as a part of the ERO.
No TSC strengths, weaknesses or areas for potential improvement were identified.
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Operations Suppod Center (OSC)
The center was staffed and activated in approximately 20 minutes. All OSC equipment functioned properly, and the OSC staff performed administrative functions, such as status board updating and log keeping, well. OSC area directors conducted good inter-OSC communications.
Team briefings prior to dispatch were generally thorough and included pertinent information on required repairs, work precautions and radiological controls. The OSC Director (OSCD)
provided good direction to the staff, conducting proper plant status updates and controlling the.
decorum of the OSC room. There was very good control and tracking of work teams and onsite monitormg teams that had been dispatched into the piant; one exception occurred as a result of a drill controller's apparent misdirection and not the fault of the OSC staff.
The OSC Radiological Protection Director (RPD) and staff performed excellent monitoring and posting of plant radiological conditions. The RPD maintained very good ALARA standards for damage control and repair team activities, including good consideration of meteorological conditions and their imprct on site activities. Additional dosimetry was promptly and properly provided to the OSC members.
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However, the OSCD was not always provided with current real-time data on plant conditions.
This sometimes lead to the OSCD misdirecting the efforts of OSC teams and to difficulty in clearly tracking and establishing OSC priorities. Examples included: the OSCD having the engineering staffinvestigate a problem with the 12 Emergency Core Cooling System train while it had actually been placed in service by Operations; the improper ?. racking of reactor core water level with the OSC members learning of core uncovery through a plant page announcement; and, the maintenance and engineering staff expending efforts on connecting fire water hoses to the 23 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Pump while at the same time hoses were being connected to the 13 AFW Pump. The timeliness of data reaching the OSC will be observed in future exercises as an area for potential improvement (IFI 50-317, 318/93-2.6-01).
OSC members encountered some difficulties with the physical layout of the OSC. A new partition had been added by the outage planning groep which normally uses the space. The resulting loss of space caused personnel traffic congestion, placed some area directors too close to the outside door, and made it difficult for the RPD from being able to conduct radiological briefings in the OSC. Also, the position of some of the status boards made them difficult to read by some OSC staff members. The arrangement of the OSC will be evaluated in future exercises as an area for potential improvement (IFl 50-317,318/93-26-02).
The following OSC strengths were observed:
RPD perforneance
Control and tracking of work and monitoring teams
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Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
The EOF was manned and declared activated by the Site Emergency Director (ED) in a timely manner. The ED was proactive in obtaining information and determining classification upgrades
even though there was an initial information lag on the status boards and plant status by as much as 40 minutes because of communications equipment problems. The General Emergency declaration was timely and the Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) was correct based on plant conditions (evacuate 0-2 miles,360 degrees, and sectors B,C and D from 2-5 miles; and sheltering for the rest of the 10 mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ)). I2ter, when the release began, the PAR was upgraded in a timely manner to evacuate 0-5 miles,360 degrees and 5-10 miles downwind in sectors B, C, D, E and F; and sheltering for the rest of the 10 mile EPZ.
Plume tracking was good and dose projections were prompt and timely. The dose projections were based on containment dose rates from the containment radiation monitors rather than results received from the Post Accident Sampling System (PASS). A PASS sample was taken during the exercise at the prompting of the controllers to meet that exercise objective but the results were not intended to be used in the exercise due to the artificiality when the PASS sample was taken.
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There were briefings for the EOF staff but the announcements to the staff regarding the upgrades of classification level to Site Emergency and General Emergency were slightly delayed.
- Classification upgrades could have been announced more promptly.
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No EOF strengths, weaknesses or areas for potential improvement were identified.
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Overall Response Timing Unless indicated as (not applicable), the following table lists the times of significant exercise occurrences and actions for Unusual Event (UE), Alert (A1), Site Emergency (SE), and General Emergency (GE) classifications,. These include simulated emergency occurrence, recognition, declaration, State and local (S & L) notifications, NRC notification,'ERO call-out, and ERF activation and full staffing. The ERO was timely in carrying out its functions.
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RESPONSE PERFORMANCE TIMETABLE MILESTONE UE Al SE GE Occurrence 0815 0930 1055 1220 t
Recognition 0820 0930 1057 1225 q
Declaration 0828 0943 1058-1232
S & L Notifications 0 831-40 0946-54 1100-05 1234-59 NRC Notification 0839 0954 NA NA ERO Call-out NA 1000-31 NA NA
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TSC Activation NA 1017 NA NA TSC Fully Staffed NA 1020 NA NA
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OSC Activation NA 1009 NA NA OSC Fully Staffed NA 1009 NA NA EOF Activation NA 1039 NA NA
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EOF Fully Staffed NA 1200 NA NA PAR Issued NA NA NA 1234 11.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items
(Closed: Violation 50-317,318/93-03-02) From the second quarter of 1992 until April 8,1993,
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emergency plan requirements to maintain designated calibrated equipment available were not followed. Specifically, according to the licensee's quarterly inventory records, during the last
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three quarters of 1992 and the first quarter of 1993, a total of 42 instances were documented where radiation survey equipment was found to be missing or out of calibration. Also, as stated in the licensee's June 8,1992 Issue Report, there were not sufficient reserves available to replace items removed from emergency kits for repair. Further, on April 8,1993, an NRC sampling review determined that an ion chamber survey instrument was missing from the emergency locker in the OSC.
To address this problem, the licensee prepared a detailed instruction on how to accomplish the calibration preventative maintenance. A system for tracking instrument calibration dates was also incorporated in the instruction. Training was also conducted to enhance knowledge and compliance. In addition, a pool ofinstruments was established and is being maintained to allow replacement of equipment out for calibration and repairs. Based upon the licensee's corrective
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action, this item was closed.
(Closed: Violation 50-317, 318/93-03-03) From March 2,1992 through April 9,1993, the emergency plan requirement to maintain the mobile laboratories so they could be operational in about one hour was not followed. Specifically, the mobile laboratory trailers were not equipped with a shielded counting system or gas partitioner, all laboratory glassware had been removed, ion exchange column lifetimes had expired in May of 1990 and February of 1992, and several other items listed in the Emergency Response Plan inventory procedures (tool kit, detergent, Tygon tubing, desiccant, air sampler, etc.) were not contained within the trailers. Consequently, the mobile laboratories could not provide either general laboratory capabilities similar to those of the Chemistry Lab or a back-up counting capability.
To address this problem, the licensee submitted a 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Review and 10 CFR 50.54(q) Effectiveness of Emergency Plan Review to the NRC for an emergency plan change that removed the requirement for the trailers. The submittal was reviewed by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Emergency Preparedness Branch (NRR/PEPB) and was determined to be acceptable based on the acceptability of the primary laboratory that negates the need for the mobiles. The item is closed.
(Closed: Violation 50-317, 318/93-03-04) As of April 9,1993, the required emergency plan training provisions were not followed for the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Energy Division managers.
Specifically, none of the six Nuclear Energy Division managers were currently trained as both Site Emergency Coordinator (SEC) and Corporate Spokesperson.
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To address this problem, the licensee completed an Emergency Plan change which removed the requirement of training ie ERO managers as SEC and Corporate Spokesperson. The licensee created two separate positions, bom of which are staffed greater than the minimum required depth in the ERO. The licensee established a training program for each position to maintain qualification. During the exercise the NRC was able to observe the SEC and evaluated his
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performance as successful. Based upon the licensee's corrective action, this item is closed.
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I (Closed: Unresolved Item 50-317,318/92-0642) During walk-through drills conducted during Inspection 92-06, the inspectors noted that all four shifts provided untimely follow-up notifications to off-site authorities that a radioactive release had commenced and one shift used an incorrect form to make initial notification.
The licensee has since revised the notification procedure, ERPIP 3.0, to specify the time interval for making followup notifications. Its use was effectively demonstrated during the 1993 full-participation exercise. Based upon the licensee's corrective action and effective implementation during the exercise, this item is closed.
j (Closed: Inspector Follow-up Item 50-317, 318/92-20-01) Prior scenario planning did not
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appear to assure that the scenarios would test responses across the range of possible initiating events.
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During this inspection, the inspector reviewed the dress rehearsal and exercise scenarios for
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I 1992 and 1993 and found them to be acceptable. The scenarios were varied and tested different initiating conditions from the emergency action levels in the classification procedure. Based on
the inspector's review, this item is closed.
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Licensee Critique On October 28,1993 the NRC team attended the licensee's exercise critique. The licensee's
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critique was assessed as thorough and it identified all discrepancies that had been noted by the NRC. No licensee critique inadequacies were identified.
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Conclusions Overall, the licensee's performance was assessed as good. The licensee's ERO personnel
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manned their respective ERFs and took appropriate responsive action during the exercise. The SCR crew identified and properly classified the events in a timely manner.
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performance in the OSC was generally very good. Information going into the OSC could have been more current and the configuration of the OSC could have been arranged for more effective '
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use. The TSC status boards were not fully used though reactor engineers provided timely and
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accurate information regarding the status of the core. EOF personnel made the correct PAR and PAR update based upon plant status and dose projection. Generally, announcements plant-wide
and within the ERFs could have been more complete and more timely to ensure that all ERO personnel are kept informed of plant status and emergency response activities.
14.
Exit Meeting
i The inspectors met with the licensee personnel listed in Detail 1.0 at the conclusion of the inspection to discuss the scope and findings as mentioned above. The licensee acknowledged the findings and stated that they would be reviewed for appropriate corrective action.