IR 05000317/1993029
| ML20059D340 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 10/21/1993 |
| From: | Albert R, Mccabe E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20059D325 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-317-93-29, 50-318-93-29, NUDOCS 9311020217 | |
| Download: ML20059D340 (6) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
50-317/93-29 Report Nos.: 50-318/93-22
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50-317 Docket Nos.: 50-318 DPR-53 License Nos,: DPR-69 Licensee:
Baltimore Gas and Electric Company Facility Name:
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant. Units 1 and 2
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Inspection At:
Lusby. Maryland Inspection Conducted:
Scotember 28 - October 1.1993 Inspector:
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/o 41.M yfAlber't, P/jdic'a} Security Inspector Date i
r Approved By:
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8. C. McCaberChpf' afegt. 'ds Section Date
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Facilities Radiolo i Safe - 'and Safeguards Branch Areas Inspected: Follow-up of Previously Identified Item; Management Support; Protected Area Physical Barriers, Detection and Assessment Aids; Protected Area Access Control of-
Personnel, Packages and Vehicles; Alarm Stations and Communications; and Security Training and Qualification.
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Results: The licensee's program was directed toward ensuring public health and safety. A
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potential weakness was identified in that the licensee incorrectly extended an NRC-approved exemption for searching on-duty security officers at the new access control facility._ Security program upgrades and enhancements continue to be made. No safety concerns or violations
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of regulatory requirements were identified.
9311020217 931026 PDR ADOCK 05000317.
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DETAIIS 1.0 Key Personnel Contacted 1.1 Licensec J. Alvey, Assistant General Supervisor
D. Dean, Security Training Specialist
L. Gibbs, Director, Nuclear Security
C. Gradle, Compliance Engineer
J. Kennedy, Supervisor, Security Training and Support M. Neyman, Security Program Specialist
J. Pasko, Security Technician
R. Pumphrey, Security Shift Supervisor
C. Schertle, Security System Analyst V. Williams, Nuclear Security Facility Project Coordinator
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J. Wood, Senior Engineer, Quality Audits
1.2 U.S. Nuclear Renulatory Commission P. Wilson, Senior Resident Inspector
indicates those present at the exit meeting.
- The inspector also interviewed other licensee and contractor personnel during the inspection.
2.0 Eollow-uo of Previously Identified Item (Closed) Inspector Follow-up Item (IFI) 50-317/93-19-01 and 50-318/93-19-01:
During a previous inspection conducted on June 28 - July 2,1993, the inspector determined that the licensee did not appear to make a clear distinction between a
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major loss of lighting, which is covered by the NRC-approved security plan (the Plan), and lesser lighting de6ciencies, such as burned out bulbs. Compensatory measures for the latter were not always effective. The licensee was in the process of revising its procedures and post instructions to correct this matter. The matter was to be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.
During this inspection, the inspector reviewed the licensee's revised procedures and post instruction concerning lighting within the PA. Based on that review, the inspector determined that the guidance was suf0ciently clear to ensure that minor lighting deficiencies would be identified, reported, and properly compensated for until repairs could be made. The inspector did not identify any deDciencies during a lighting survey conducted on September 29,1993. This item is cicsed.
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3.0 Management Support and Security Pronram PlaDS Management SupD9d Management rupport for the licensee's physical security program was determined to be excellent by the inspector. This determination was based upon the inspector's review of various upgrades to the licensee's program during this inspection, as documented in this report. The upgrades include a new access control facility; new security computer system; new intrusion detection system (IDS) complemented by a new, reconfigured PA barrier; and new, state-of-the-art assessment aids.
4.0 PA Physical Barrier. Detection and Assessment Aids 4.1 PA Barrier The inspector conducted a physical inspection of the new PA barrier on September 28,1993, and determined by observation that the barrier was installed in accordance with regulatory requirements. The barrier has been reconfigured to encompass the new access control facility and to eliminate the unnecessary angles in the previous barrier, which optimizes straight line-of-sight camera coverage.
4.2 PA Detection Aids The inspector conducted physical inspections of the new PA perimeter IDS on September 28 and 30,1993, and reviewed performance testing data. Based on the inspections and review, the inspector determined that the IDS was installed in accordance with regulatory requirements, j
4.3 Isolation Zones The inspector verified that the isolation zones were adequately maintained to permit observation of activities on both sides of the PA barrier.
j 4.4 Assessment Aids The inspector observed the PA perimeter assessment aids, during both hours of
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daylight and darkness, and determined that they were functional and effective for both covert and overt penetration attempts following an IDS alarm. The assessment aids appeared to have been installed in accordance with regulatory requirement.
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5.0 Protected Area Access Control of Personnel. Packanes and Vehicles 5.1 Personnel Access Control The inspector observed activities within the new access control facility and determined that the licensee was exercising positive control over personnel access to the PA. This determination was based on the following.
5.1.1 The inspector verified that personnel are properly identified and authorization is checked prior to issuance of access badges and key cards.
5.1.2 The inspector verified that the licensee has a search program for firearms, explosives, incendiary devices and other unauthorized J
materials. However, the inspector determined that all on-duty armed security force members (SFMs) were exempt from further search after alarming a portal metal detector upon entry into the PA. In accordance with the Plan, the exemption is limited to armed SFMs whose duties outside the PA are within the swurity processing building or who are performing search functions related to access processing. The security processing building, where all access control functions formerly took place was a one-story, close-quartered facility which allowed SFMs, regardless of their specific functions within the building to be seen by each other.
As of August 17, 1993, the access control functions were moved to the new nuclear security facility (NSF), which is a two-story building. The search exemption was being applied in that building for all SFMs -
including those returning from second-floor offices, which are outside of the PA, and alarm assessment duties atop the NSF, which is also outside the PA. In addition, armed SFMs returning from owner-controlled area patrol apparently were also afforded the exemption.
The NRC is reviewing a proposal to relax the search requirements for on-duty armed security personnel, i.e., to have them only process through explosives detectors and not have to undergo further search after alarming metal detectors upon entry into the PA. However, this i
propossl has not been approved by the NRC. Upon identification by the inspector, the licensee took corrective actions. The implementation
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and effectiveness of those actions is an unresolved item (URI 50-J 317/93-29-01 and 50-318/93-29-01) and will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.
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5 5.1.3 The inspector observed a 100 percent test of personnel search equipment. All equipment tested satisfactory.
5.2 Vehicle Access Control The inspector determined that the licensee properly controls vehicle access to and within the PA. The inspector verified that vehicles were properly processed prior to entering the PA and that the process was consistent with commitments in the Plan. The inspector also reviewed the vehicle search procedures and determined that they were consistent with commitments in the Plan. This determination was made by observing vehicle processing and search, inspection of vehicle logs, and by interviewing SFMs and licensee's security staff about vehicle processing and search procedures.
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The new vehicle access control point is equipped with a pit for searching the undercarriage of vehicles. The inspector observed vehicle search officers effectively utilize the pit as a search aid. However, installed lighting for the-i pit was poor. The licensee was aware and has taken steps to have the lighting replaced. In the interim, search officers were effectively using hand-held lighting devices to complete searches.
6.0 Alarm Stations nnd Communications The inspector observed the operations of the central alarm station (CAS), which still functions from the old computer system, and the secondary alarm station (SAS),
which functions from the new computer system, and determined that both stations were equipped with appropriate alarms, surveillance and communications capabilities.
The licensee indicated that the CAS and SAS will function as stated above until such
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time as the CAS is renovated and attached to the new computer system.
The inspector verified that neither station contained any operational activities that would interfere with the execution os assessment and response functions. Each station
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maintained intercommunications and communications with the security force. The inspector also verified that each station maintained communications with local law enforcement authorities. CAS and SAS operators were interviewed by the inspector
and found to be knowledgeable of their duties and responsibilities.
7.0 Security Traintne and Oualification The inspector reviewed lesson plans and training documentation for SFMs who served i
as CAS/SAS operators for the new computer system. Based on that review, the inspector determined that each operator attended three days of classroom training, i
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6 passed a comprehensive written examination, demonstrated practical proficiency on a CAS/SAS simulator and received on-the-job training on an individual, as-needed basis.
The inspector reviewed the training and qualification records of six randomly selected CAS/SAS operators. The inspector determined that the training had been done in accordance with security program plans and had been properly documented.
8.0 Exit Interview The inspector met with the licensee representatives indicated in Section 1.0 at the conclusion of the inspection on October 1,1993. At that time, the purpose and scope of the inspection were reviewed and the findings were presented. The licensee acknowledged the findings.
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