IR 05000429/2006011

Insp Rept 50-461/85-27 on 850429-0611.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Actions on Previous Insp Findings

ML20129B314
Person / Time
Site:	Clinton, 05000429
Issue date:	07/10/1985
From:	Danielson D, Muffett J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20129B311	List: IR 05000429/2006011 ML20129B306
References
50-461-85-27, NUDOCS 8507150486
Download: ML20129B314 (8)

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~9 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-461/85027(DRS)

Docket No. 50-461 License No. CPPR-137 Licensee: Illinois Power Company 500 South 27th Street Decatur, Illinois 62525 Facility Name: Clinton Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 Inspection At: Sargent & Lundy Engineers, Chicago, Illinois Inspection Conducted: April 29-30, May 1-3, and June 5-7, 10-11, 1985

. Inspector- ames W. Muffett 7 /oI[f DT1'e Approved By: D. H. Danielson, Chief 7/10)/T Materials and Processes Section Dat'e Inspection Summary Inspection on April 29-30, May _1_-3_,_ and June _5_ _7x 10_-11,1985jR_ep_ ort No. 50-461/85027(DRS))

Treas Inspected: Unannounced special safety inspection to review licensee action on previous inspection findings. The inspection involved a total of 122 inspection hours by one NRC inspecto Results: No violati6ns or deviations were identified.

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DETAILS 1. Pe_r_s_ons Contacted Illinois Power Company (IP)

• George Buffington

• Wilfred Connell Sargent & Lundy ensi neers (S&L)

• Bryan Erler, Structural Design Director

• R. W. Hooks, Assistant Head, Structural Engineering Division

• John Kovach, Project Engineer

• Thomas Best, Structural Engineer

• A. Morcos, Assistant Head, QA Division

• T. Longlais, Head, Structural Engineering Division

• Phil Kasik, QA Coordinator

• E. B. Branch, Mechanical Design Director-

• H. S. Taylor, Head, QA Division

• G. T. Kitz, Head, Engineering Mechanics Division

• K. T. Kostal, Assistant Manger, Structural Department

• H. M. Sroka, Project Director, Clinton

• O. Callahan, Supervisor, Engineering Mechanics Division Illinois Attorney Genera _1

• Steve Moore, Assistant Attorney General Schiff, Hardin & Waite

• Sheldon A. Zabel, Attorney The inspector also contacted and interviewed other licensee and contractor employee * Denotes those attending the final exit interview at Sargent & Lundy's office on June 11, 198 . Licensee Action on P_rev_ious In_sp,ec_ti_on_ Findi_njs (Closed) Open Item (461/84-37-02) Illinois Power Company notified the NRC RIII office on March 29, 1985, of their intention to modify' the Implementing Procedures of the Overinspection Program. One of the modifications of the program was the termination' of the Overinspection of large bore piping, small bore piping and pipe supports. Before termination of this portion of the program, a detailed NRC review of the discrepancies and the engineering dispositions of the discrepancies was performe On April 29, 1985, a review of the discrepancy evaluations was initiated

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'at Sargent & Lundy Engineers. The discrepancies reviewed were as follows:

NCR Discrepancy Number Discrepancies 50666 Hardware loose; cold setting 50767 ID missing 50935 Tolerance 50949 Clearance 51058 Clearance 51088 Clearance 63999 Undercut; thread engagement 64016 Gouge; slope 51460 Gaps 64214 Arc strike; overlap; undercut 64527 Weld size; gaps 65235 Cap missing 65265 Tolerance 66667 Clearance 66843 Clearance 66961 Undercut; tolerance; clearance 67657 Hardware loose 67792 Cold setting; orientation 61669 Clearance; wrong hardware; gaps 61775 Weld size 62179 Arc strike; slag; reinforcement 63636 Hardware loose; orientation; undercut; tolerance; clearance 51544 Tolerance 51619 Tolerance 51632 Tolerance 51642 Tolerance; overlap 51648 Tolerance; gouge 51758 Hardware loose 60392 Hardware loose; cold setting; arc strike; ID missing 50076 Inspection error 51088 Slope 51307 Cold setting 51348 Lack of fusion 50077 ID missing 51528 Overlap; weld size; lack of fusion; arc strike; orientation 64552 Gaps 63763 Wrong hardware; tolerance thread engagement 51105 . Hardware loose; dent 64485 Overlap; porosity 66342 Weld size; grinding 67104 Tolerance; clearance; overlap; porosity; dirt; arc strike; gouge 67257 Weld size 67152 Undercut; overlap; porosity; gouge

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NCR Discrepancy Number Discrepancies-67257 Weld 67152 undercut; overlap; porosity; gouge 67405 Weld size 66342 Weld size; grinding 65184 Tolerance 50578 Weld size; overlap 50634 Wrong welds; slag 51460 Gaps 51075 Gaps 51075 Weld size; overlap; tolerance; arc sttike 51043 Weld size; overlap; undercut; slag 62687 Arc strike 63840 Weld size 64016 Gouge; slope 64401 Dent 64956 Tolerance 65517 Weld size 65673 Arc strike; tolerance; gaps defective material 50578 Overlap; weld size; hardware loose; tolerance 66063 Weld size 51108 Tolerance; arc strike 50621 Lack of fusion; overlap 50837 Wrong hardware; grinding 50057 Overlap; weld size 51192 Arc strike 51509 Lack of fusion 51587 Tolerance 60163 Undercut; overlap 51307 Cold setting 50949 Clearance 61680 Weld size; arc strike; gaps 61023 Weld size 62407 Bolt broken; arc strike; clearance ,

62888 Undercut; overlap 62179 Reinforcement; arc strike; slag 66185 Hardware loose 61545 Wrong welds 61542 Hardware loose; grinding 64214 Arc strike; overlap; undercut 63810 Slag; weld size; overlap 63637 Weld size; undercut; arc strike; slag 62984 Undercut; overlap During this initial review, it was determined that in a number of the engineering evaluations there were inaccuracies due to either inattention

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to detail or lack of proper engineering review. Some examples of the inaccuracies are: .The evaluation for NCR 63636 stated that "two locations on the pipe

.did not meet code allowables because an inappropriate seismic

. response spectra was used". The evaluations for NCR 51528 stated that "there is no weld #9 and therefore no evaluation of weld #9 was performed." In fact, weld #9 did exis The evaluation for NCR 62719 contained a mathematical error which

~c hanged the value of a force by 44%. The evaluations for NCRs 50949, 51058, 51088, 63636 all dealt ~with the problem of " box type" supports which had improper gaps. These gaps would not allow the supports to provide dead weight support to the piping system. This appears to be a recurring discrepancy which requires a more generic analysis, The evaluation for NCR 50076 which dealt with a missing "high point vent" contained no engineering analysis. Also, the evaluation stated "will not effect operations, but may make startup and testing difficult." It was impossible for the inspector to make a determination of the safety significance of this discrepanc At the conclusion of the initial review, it was determined that prior to the conclusion of the NRC review, a number of actions needed to be performed by Illinois Power. These actions were: Perform an improved technical review of the evaluations of discrepancies which resulted in more than a 10% reduction in strength, Perform an improved technical review of the evaluations which were evaluated based solely on engineering judgemen ~ Perform an analysis to address the problem of gaps in " box type"-

support Review the discrepancy data base to determine if any other cases of missing vents or drains were discovere On June 5, 1985, the NRC inspector began the second phase of the review of the discrepancy evaluations. Illinois Power and Sargent & Lundy had concluded the necessary actions noted above and in addition Impell Corporation had performed an extensive independent review of the discrepancy evaluations. The NRC inspector reviewed a number of procedures and documents which controlled various aspects of the discrepancy evaluations. These documents were:

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e " Technical Verification Procedure for Mechanical Department Overinspection and Field Verification Program NCR Evaluations r

for the Cl!nton groject," Revision 1, dated May 29, 198 i Design Control Summary for Calculation SDQ10960G22 (Structural Discrepancies). SED-EP6, " Structural Engineering Division Technical Evaluation Procedure for Resolution Calculations Performed for NCRs Based on Clinton Overinspection and Field Verification Program,"

dated May 20, 198 Baldwin Associates Project Procedures Manual, Clinton Power Station checklists:

Form JV-693, Phase II, Hydraulic Snubbers Form JV-694, Phase II, Variable Spring Hangers Form JV-695, Phase II, Restraint Hanger Form JV-696, Phase II, Rod Hanger Form JV-697, Phase II, Mechanical Snubbers Form JV-698, Phase II, Sway Strut Form JV-1091, Phase III, Hydraulic Snubbers Form JV-1092, Phase III, Variable Spring Hanger Form JV-1093, Phase III, Restraint Hanger Form JV-1094, Phase III, Rod Hanger Form JV-1095, Phase III, Mechanical Snubber -

Form JV-1096, Phase III, Sway Strut Form JV-1097, Phase III, Constant Support Hangers Form JV-1098, Phase III, Riser Clamps Form JV-1099, Phase III, "U-bolt" Support Form JV-1100, Phase III, Sliding Support Form JV-1101, Phase III, Multi-directional Clamps "Baldwin Associates Project Procedures Manual, Clinton Power Station," BAP 3.2.5, Piping Component Support Sargent & Lundy Report on Internal Audit No.127 (QA audit of Overinspection discrepancy evaluations).

g.- Sargent & Lundy Report No. EMD-053140, "Out of Tolerance Gaps at Box-type Pipe Supports," dated June 5, 198 Impell Corporation, "Clinton Power Station Overinspection Independent Review," dated June 7, 1985. (Impell's review of 1,357

' discrepancy evaluations).

Eleven of the evaluations reviewed initially were again reviewed in the second phase of the review to monitor the effect of the review performed in the interim. These were:

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NCR N '64401 62407 51509 63810 62888 In addition, a new random sample of NCR discrepancy evaluations were selected. These were:

NCR Discrepancy Number Discrepancies 50638 Cold setting; tolerance 50834 Tolerance; hardware loose; wrong hardware 50972 Weld size; overlap 51075 Gaps 51306 Clearance; gaps 51353 Weld size; overlap 51428 Weld size 51572 Weld size 51809 Weld size; overlap; lack of fusion 60462 Wrong welds 60542 Arc strike 60644 Orientation 60821 Defective material 60927 Undercut; overlap; lack of fusion; grinding; defective material 50076 Drawing incorrect; inspection error 61025 Weld size 61078 Weld size; gaps 61511 Weld size; lack of fusion; slag; gaps; arc strike 61871 Gaps 62079 Arc strike; gouge 62266 Undercut; arc strike; dent 62445 Weld ' size; undercut; slag; gouge 62523 Undercut; overlap; clearance; gaps; arc strike; gouge 62659 Arc strike 62657 Undercut; overlap; slag; arc strike;

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gouge All of the NCR evaluations inspected in the second phase of the

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inspection were adequate to properly disposition the discrepancie The Impell review, in addition to the second review by Illinois Power 3 4 and Sargent and Lundy, was sufficient to demonstrate that the discrepancies were properly evaluated and that no safety or design significant discrepancies were discovered. Also, no pattern of potentially safety l

significant discrepancies was discovered.

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In addition, the NRC inspector was able to determine that in the discrepancies reviewed: Linear elastic fracture mechanics was properly used where required to determine if cracks or linear indications would propagat No instances of improper reliance on future actions to disposition the NCRs were discovered, In cases reviewed in which the discrepancy was reworked before Sargent & Lundy acquired sufficient information for the analysis, appropriate conservative assumptions were made or NDE techniques were employed so that an adequate disposition could be mad As a method to determine the overall significance of the welding discrepancies reviewed by the NRC inspector, the discrepancies (which are discrepancies against AWS D1.1) were reviewed for compliance with Visual Weld Acceptance Criteria (VWAC) developed by the Nuclear Construction Issues Group (NCIG). This review determined that virtually all the weld discrepancies which resulted in a strength reduction of less than 10% (categories A and B1) would not have been identified as weld discrepancies under the NCIG Visual Weld Acceptance Criteria. This new acceptance criteria was approved by the NRC on June 26, 1985, in a letter from J. Knight, Acting Director, Division of Engineering, NRR, to Mr. D. E. Dutton, Chairman, Nuclear Construction Issues 0 Group, Southern Company Services. The use of this new acceptance criteria must be requested in a change to the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) and approved by the NR Conclusion During this inspection no violations or deviations were identifie This inspection revealed no violation of FSAR conmitn.ents as they pertain to design and analysis. Also, the procedures dealing with the dispositioning of the discrepancies were functioning properly. This open item is therefore close . E i_t_ Interview The inspector met with representatives (denoted in Persons Contacted paragraph) at the conclusion of the inspection. The inspector sunmarized the scope and findings of the inspection noted in this report. The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents / processes as proprietar