ML20133M635
Text
a . .
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
_ , NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0911SSION In the Matter of .
DUQUESNE LIGHT CQPPANY OHIO EDISON COMPANY Docket No. 50-334 PENNSYLVANIA POWER COMPANY (Beaver Valley Power Station UnitNo.1)
ORDER FOR MODIFICATION OF LICENSE I.
Duquesne Light Company (DLC), Ohio Edison Company, and Pennsylvania Power Company (the licensees), are the holders of Facility Operating License No. DPR-66 which authorizes the operation of a nuclear power reactor known as Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No.1 (the facility) at steady state reactor power levels not in excess cf 2652 thermai megawatts (rated power). The facility is a pressurized water reactor (FWR) located at the licensees' site in Beaver County, Pennsylvania.
II.
As a result of the operating license review of the North Anna Power 3tation,itappearedthatthenetpositivesuctionhead(NPSH) available to the containment recirculation spray (RS) and low head safety injection (LHSI) pumps might be insufficient for the post loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) operation of the RS and LHSI syster.s.
The NRC staff review of this matter for the North Anna Power Station is g 81 g 3 050703 HERRMANB5-303 PDR
' ~
2-l l
ongoing. Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 1 (8VPS-1) is an operating plant with a design similar to that at North Anna.
To determine whether a similar problem existed at BVPS-1, we requested DLC to meet with us on August 19, 1977. As a result of this meeting and subsequent conversations with DLC, it was determined that in the event of a major LOCA, the vapor pressure of the water in the containment sump supplying the RS and.LHSI pumps may be closer to the containment pressure than previously indicated. This is due to a number of original assumptions which have been determined to be inappropriate for analysis purposes. This situation would occur for only a short period of time following a loss-of-coolant accident and could result in inadequate NPSH at the RS and LHSI pumps. DLC advised us that the assumptions made in the original analysis were based on assuring maximum containment pressure. However, these assumptions are not conservative when detennining the available NPSH for the RS and LHSI spray pumps. They indicated that more conservative assumptions for the NPSH analysis in the following areas must be made:
(a) mixing the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) water at the break to reduce the amount of energy to flash steam to the containment atmosphere and thereby increase the sump water temperature.
9 w#
t
- j. .
, 3
.g.
(b) flashing of the break effluent at the total containment .
pressure (pressure flash) to reduce the fraction of effluent which becomes steam and thereby increase the sump water temperature.
4 (c) 100 percent spray efficiency 'to maximize the heat removed from the containment atmosphere and thereby increase
, the sump temperature.
Items a through c above will. result in a lower containment pressure and higher sump water vapor pressure'. In addition to the above, minimizing initial containment pressure and using the coldest service water temperature also result in a more conservative NPSH calculation. It was' detemined that a lower calculated NPSH for
'~' the RS and LHSI pumps would exist at specific times during the I
recirculation phase of long term cooling at BVPS-1. This could result in either damaging of the pumps or reducing pump flow.
By a letter dated August 25, 1977 DLC infomed us that the BVPS-1 had shutdown to perfom routine maintenance work which would require l approximately three weeks. DLC also stated that prior to startup of the plant, they would provide us with the details of a proposed interim design modification supported by analyses which would demonstrate the capability of the RS and LHSI systems to function as required.
I i
i i
j ./ ;
{
~
_ _ _ . - _ . . _ . . . _.____._mn.___...__._...._____ _..___._,._. ---- .,
. . 6
. .4 .
At a meeting held on September '9,1977 DLC submitted a report entitlted " Analysis and System Modification for Recirculation Spray and Low Head Safety Injection Pumps Net Positive Suction Head,"
which presented: '(1) proposed interim modification of the RS and LHSI systems; (2) RS pump perfomance curves of the minimum NPSH required to prevent cavitation as a fun.ction of flow rate (the above cited curves are based on tests performed on August 22, 1977, with a North Anna RS pump, which is the same model as that installed at BVPS-1); (3) LHSI pump perfomance curves of the minimum NPSH required to prevent cavitation as a function of flow rate (these curves are based on tests perfomed on August 30, 1977, with a North q Anna LHSI pump which is identical to those at BVPS-1. The test
' d method and procedures were essentially identical to those used to test the RS pump at North Anna on August 22, 1977); and (4) the containment pressure transient response analyses and associated NPSH available to the RS and LHSI pumps. The calculated pressure in the containment and the temperature of the. water that accumulates in the containment sumps are important parameters in determining the RS and i.HSI pump operability following a LOCA, in regard to available NPSH.
These tems, in combination with the pump static head and associated e
A 2-.
_ . - :- u- :: : - -. _
.me . .
5-
~
line friction losses, establish the available NPSH during the transient. The required NPSH may be reduced by a reduction in the pump flow rate. Alternatively, the NPSH available at a given flow rate may be increased by the injection of cold water into the pump suction. The injection of cold water lowers the water tempera-ture at the pump suction and, therefore, lowers the vapor pressure of the water entering the pump. DLC proposes to utilize both of the above methods to resolve this problem on an interim basis.
Recirculation Spray Pumps Located Inside Containment Using the new modeling assumptions, a minimum available NPSH of greater than 11 feet is calculated for the two RS pumps located inside contain-ment, except for a short time interval of about 10 to 20 minutes,
- depending on the break location and engineered safety feature equipment available. The initiation of the time interval varies from 350 seconds to 800 seconds after a postulated accident. This amount of available NPSH assures satisfactory pump operation. Sensitivity studies perforned by DLC show that for a time interval of about 13 minutes, the available NPSH reaches a minimum of 8.3 feet during which the pump could potentially operate in a mild cavitating mode with a reduced flow rate of 3000 gpm. The design flow rate is
=
m+ gyn4.. m bM '
,,g. -E'#$' "' "
m .
a ; y
~. 6- -
3600 gpm. The test results, as presented in the above cited topical report, demonstrate that the pump can be operated in a
. cavitating mode for periods of time well in excess of the 10 to 20 minute interval discussed above, at a low.er efficiency, without damage to the pump. On this basis, DLC has not proposed any interim design modification to the RS pumps which are located inside the containment.
Recirculation Spray Pumps located Outside Containment For the two RS pumps located outside containment, the friction loss in the suction piping is substantially larger than that for the inside pump, and therefore results in a lower available NPSH.
f In order to assure an adequate amount of NPSH for the RS pumps located outside of the containment, DLC proposes to divert 250 gallons per minute (gpm) of cold quench spray (QS) water from each QS header to the sump area at that point where water is drawn to the outside RS pump suctions. The cold.QS water injection will lower the water temperature at the pump suction, and therefore, lower the vapor pressure of the water entering the pump. This proposed modification will allow the pumps to perform as originally specified.
No reduction in flow rate to increase the available NpSH is necessary. ,
Low Head Safety Injection pumps In order to assure an adequate amount of NpSH to the LHSI pumps.
DLC proposes to limit the pump flow rate from 4200 gpm to approximately e
- uge o ese - Ogassee N *a en-m ,e . .m.
m -- v,+ - - - -
.s ;' y 3100 gpm during the recirculation phase assuming a single pump .
failure. The ability to throttle the LHSI pump flow rate was demonstrated by a test at Surry Power Station, Unit 2. on September 16, 1977, and reported in a September 19, 1977, letter by DLC. The low head portion of the ECCS system for Surry Unit 2 is similar to that at BVPS-1. However, the pump discharge valves at Surry Unit 2 are Darling valves with 10 second closure times, magnetic brakes on the motor operators, and a rated pressure differential of 1750 pounds per square inch (psi). The discharge valves at BVPS-1 are Crane valves and have 120 second closure times, a rated differential pressure of 200 psi and do not have magnetic brakes on the motor operators.
- .J To assure that a pump flow rate of 3100 gpm is not exceeded in the event one pump fails, DLC will partially close both pump discharge valves to allow a flow rate of 2100 gpm per pump. Test results at
~
Surry, Unit 2 indicated a valve opening of 257, allowed a flow rate of approximately 2100 gpm. Although the discharge valves at BVPS-1 have a different design than those tested at Surry Unit 2, it is expected that the flow characteristics versus valve opening would -
be similar. The BVPS-1 discharge valves.will require a longer throttling time. However, the valves will be throttled just prior 6
A
,%- am. m., wwemm #'
- - - - - - , .p--, -s-- - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - . - - - -
- - - , - - . - - - , - - - - ..---g-_
e 8 &
i to the recirculation stage of LHSI when time is no longer a critical parameter for maintaining adequate core cooling. Additionally, the slower operating speed of the BVPS-1 discharge valves should provide a finer adjustment capability. The rated valve differential pressure is greater than the pump differential pressure of 125 psi at 2100 gpm.
In addition to the provisions for throttling, the time of transfer will be . delayed until an additional 10,000 gallons of water have I
been drawn into the containment from the refueling water storage tank (RWST). DLC proposes to increase the capacity of the RWST '
17,000 gallons to 441,000 gallons to allow the delay in the transfer i
time. This time delay was selected to provide further assurance
' that adequate NPSH is available to support 3100 gpm flow without pump cavitation. Operation of the LHSI system during postulated accident conditions is affected by the proposed modification, since j an additional 10,000 gallons of water from the RWST will be required u
! for injection.
The proposed interim modifications assure that the LHSI pumps will be operable during long term core cooling following a LOCA by eliminating pump cavitation. The proposed modification does not cause LHSI flows to be less than the minimum flow rate required for emergency core
, cooling requirements in either the short term or the long term.
.d
. - . - - , - - - - , , - - . - - - , - - - . . - , . - . . , . - - . . - - - , , - - - , . - . . - . , . - . , - - - - - - - - - , . - - , - - - - - _ . - , , . - , - , . , . - , .c-- - - - - - , , , . - - - - - - - - , _ - - - - - - -
o
-g.
Effect of the System Modifications on Containment Peak Pressure and Containment Depressurization Time Using the above containment spray flow rates which result from the proposed system modifications DLC performed a containment response analyses. The results show that the containment spray systems will function adequately. The peak containment pressure limit of 45 psia will not be exceeded and the pressure will return to '
subatmospheric conditions in less than 60 minutes, i.e.3 the depressurization time requirement for the design basis LOCA.
The containment will remain in a negative pressure once it is brought to subatmospheric pressure.
Conclusion -
Based on our review of the above cited topical report and on dis-cassions with DLC, we find that in the unlikely event of a major LOCA, the containment spray and LHSI systems at BVpS-1 will operate satis-factorily to maintain adequate core cooling and assure that the con-tainment design pressure is not exceeded and that the depressurization of time will remain under 60 minutes. We conclude that the continued operation of BVPS-1 with the proposed interim modifications is accept-able and will not pose an undue threat to the health and safety of the public.
4 D
e
e
- 4 .
However, we feel that operator a'ction to partially close the LHSI pump discharge valves and the minor reduction in the inside RS pump performance for the 10 to 20 minute interval discussed above are acceptable solutions only for an interim period. Therefore, we will require DLC to propose a pennagent solution and schedule of implementation by November 22, 1977. This permanent solution should provide that the containment spray and ECCS systems perform as originally designed without relying on the above operator action following a major LOCA.
~
Copies of the following documents are available for public inspection in the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20555 and at the Beaver Area Memrial Library, 100 College Avenue, Beaver, Pennsylvania, (1) Letters from DLC dated August 20, 1977, August 25, 1977 September 8,1977 and September 19,1977,(2) Stone and Webster Report entitled " Analysis and System Modification for~ Recirculation Spray and Low Head Safety Injection Pumps Net Positive Suction Head", dated September 9,1977, and (3) this Order for Modification of License, .
In the Matter of Duquesne Light Company, Ohio Edison Company, and ,
Pennsylvania Power Company, Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No.
, 1. Docket No. 50-334. ,
~
e e g .,*M*e
- -4ses N gsuspeemp Me- . * -
- I III.
- j In view of the foregoing, and in accordance with provisions of the -
l 1
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Commission's Rules :
and Regulations in 10 CFR Parts 2 and 50, IT IS ORDERED THAT Facility -
1 Operating License No. DPR-66 is hereby amended by adding the following new conditions: -
- 1. Reactor operation.shall be authorized only with the restrictions set forth below, until th'e perinanent modifications are approved by the NRC and in place:
J. With piping installed to divert 250 gpm of water from each quench spray header to the sump area at that point where water is drawn to the outside recirculation spray .
, pump suctions.
b.
The volume of water in the RWST shall be maintained at equal to or greater than 441,000 gallons.
- c. Operating procedures shall be maintained which require i
that in the event of a loss of coolant accident necessita-ting use of the low head safety injection (LHSI) system, plant operators will throttle the discharge of each LHSI pump just prior to initiating the recirculation phase of core cooling. The discharge shall be throttled such that l
l the flow shall not exceed 3100 gpm in the event of single j pump operation.
l
- l J
e
- s N
- 12 -
- 2. DLC shall submit by November 22, 1977, a proposed permanent design modification and a schedule for its implementation.
The proposed modification shall be based on detailed supoortive analyses which include consideration of containment total pressure, containment vapor pressure,'
available NPSH, sump water level, and sump water temperature for a spectrum of break ' sizes and break locations. For each analysis, the following shall be specified: the energy release rates as a function of time throughout the blowdown, reflood, and post blowdown phases, all the containment evaluation parameters, and the recirculation spray heat exchanger characteristics.
FOR NUCLEAR REGU RY COMMISSION A _e -
Edson G. Case. Acting Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this September 30, 1977 e
* M **"e****fu***
- atemme o a e , %,,.,, ,..p., , , , , _ __
L
e
,j'// f ' ' - -
. . '. ? , )
\ f .I<./ .
/
&,Jv, ) ,
.)
r
^
U . . ...s:' .,%
0
.a ,
ff .
% <41. .
A /
(~ l) d.(%, , .W a /).gu()v<w~:
g
'. .) -.
M. .
1 '
8 4 - - - - . . .- .. --. . . . . . . . . _ . . . _
(.4
,Q hh,y
<t,,3
.n:. %.1 n i,, o t) Q,,--m.
^- -
1 : . .' . ,
., , .rL:.p.,.. u.....
- . 4.4 ., .. , ,, .. .- e
. .'. .: . . * .. . . . o. \
,.o.*- !* .
,, b e. .' * * '- '
' .' * . , .' <- ; ~'s . -
. ,a .s t- i . ' . .',, : ; s 4 ..'. m . . ' ' . ' -
l'$ * ' *
'e .
.'." .' ^
..' . ' r,* ,,,*, ,
'Y.f -o r . . . ..* s, .
- t. ,
D *. f .!, e'. ,r*-* -(q) f ;s.
f c .; *.,s.
- o s ,* *
,Q=. .
, n .
,) ,
ti l' *' I g
. ; 8. . .. , ,, ' te. .s. , '; , '-t -
.j ) .t...--4
= . *. .- .
I (.o~'r . j- ~. a
,s .' : . 4 ,. . '...' ~. ,) .._
~1, -
o il l ,t y n 5t
. *~ m '*$*~ e, ,. ,, *. ..* *. . -
s .
r ^ .- . , ,
~ * .s- o r A ,, , .
- 'p{.t'!'. -. . . q ' f." *,
< , s,,
I. ** y' 's- -s ~ t' . ': *lJ ( * . * *r -: .* // ' .
. . [*
., y o *
- n ** 1 -
.- .- . ,* . J
(- f , . .
.. . . . g. h;l' ' r'
- N A. . < '. */ ! e, a 7 ' '. * * . * * " * - ..
(~ 's'O.sb..r.. l > .2 n y ;~- ? . $ R. a -d'
- N-: r. ~ . . . **?,. .
~
f
,, , .n
- ) c- ~ *
,'~,~,' .,
',(. ;. j ) -,y/ '.'.. c. c!. ,; , - : t- v. <A, .
o
.- ih-ch 9,1973 CHRONOLOGY OF 00R ACTION ON BEAVER VALLEY PIPE STRESS PROBLEM The Engineering Branch received a LER, dated December 6,1978, on BeaverThe Valley unit one which identified a design error in one piping system.
- ER pointed out that corrective action had satisfactorily been completed. c. - .
The I&E inspector Don Beckman, contacted the project manager and requested r
'o talk to a technical reviewer to get sc,*.e assurance that this problem
.vas solved and discuss some additional pir,ing related matters. Project [-
manager contacted Keith Wichman who assigned S. Hosford, EB to follow. He U
- ontacted D. Beckman several times during December and early January in r
(,,.
s consulting capacity while I&E explored this concern with the Licensee W L snd his vendor. The information available to DOR at this time, did not Y
~
identify a problem but was sufficiently unclear and ambiguous that both H EB and I&E reached the conclusion that more-indepth review by the DOR staff would be required'. DOR requested that all the available documentation M
be forwarded, and subsequently was received by the project marager for si review around the end of January 1979. A formal TAC,11431 was issue'd M to EB on February 2,1979, for this review. The EB staff internally review- d4 -
ed the documentation which pointed out a difference in the results of -
.two piping stress codes. EB's preliminary assessment was that the 4
- discrepancies in the Code results were probably due to a modeling error - t ;. .
.and limited to the systems identifieddhiab_b'ad been corrected by a f
dification. ' 7 con acted Beaver Valley and SWn'a 1 Yebster7n-March-17 ....
l7 ~
. 19, to get d . sitional information on the differences in the Code results..
5 tone & Webstep would not release any calculations to the staff but did . . . .~
agree to bring gin the calculations and' discuss the results with us. We s. *.
sgreed to this approach and Beaver Valley and Stone & Webster met with us sn March 8,1979. t tin .
in -during that/"4 g' '
thatgroblem exists It in first.g the came dal 3" appay
- techniqueus gt,%o my#'e"g the JryVi,fc5Cs Code. Having identified this, the potential for th ' generic /
- oncerns to othek Beaver Valley piping systems and, - ""':'t to other g;. '
- Stone & Webster plants was immediately brought to the attention of the line ** . E management of DDR up to the Division Director.
Contact:
PM - Dave,Wigginton
- g g g-gs @ @
Lead Revi er - Steve Hosford '
=.-
I.
D.
b c a, a s a l a a$-N 1~:w,.iclbC l: n';"*ut Igg $nt$ a Lt, 0.:
- P,u::" nua P.2 D. M .d h a o
._a2 m g-_-
s:0::md .
"S . . f. '.*Qw.,,.gb wjf .
M'b'&') ..+ >.:. w m. M.xa l. M w ( ,
- A rd wlwe cL&,m'/}gy!,14 JswJG, la L J_ bie .. , u;~J 3
....?' & .** A M wi~.
= =.= = = ..= .
- e
.;. b'.::!.':
.. .~ ~:.:./c:=:a*y/
n.~Post) t:t. r :m m.. Mar, . t!.
- 1. - ? b Y'S J21/11j%I $
- q. /0 0]/eb>]}r>r . -
?-
.._. _ 1 - _._ l d, ]ToJ WERC CALLEO BY- O vou wtac vi$:tro av-
, 00A L ~
OF (Organ. sat.on)
Ma\s.
O e' rest c^u--+ Eoc.'cx"r? MhM8 -/4M 5
- 0 WILL CALL ACAtN C is WAlflNG 70 sEE YOU C acTumNED voun CALL O w's ts As ***oemac~r ITi>J.*.KS j ~
~j M AU @%4 bun)
Oh 0900 & ,
0'?1 . ,
Medd<Es ZAs W ,
o a. M .
6,L .fA.e F(G use thi
&nuxas v.2-6. d'
- 2 :'s, formclearances, as a RECCR3 of approvals, and similar a:ti:ns concurrerce[* d'.4:2
[_
FRO?A:(Name, org. symbol, Agency /Fost) R::h lo.- B1dg.
Phonefio.
5'Al-102 CFitC.' At. FC.~.'A 41 (?.tv. 7-76)
Petztasr3 tv GM
.p t,g c m tp*>.4 211 44f 33*4 IfMNLIIEIIJI'I*IIIII
f o e' O
%g a
6y Aukia) m -
pa fae. am t
e5 Gall
+
6
.p*
-w
l
' ' ~
Own /.T / 76 -
A d c
~
ha ca - A, d </ a l
~~
cc.
A dn .skQ ryae $4 A,J4.hndy
+J 15 %, M SL Yp ad o .D c_ c .
_wd a X S ;Cu J9 Pnn <w!4a44 -
c2A<b h.% 04b5
- Nd M 4l l .
c.sshp.2 i v.a r..snum
< .-u .
... r.' p aMiJ.....l dw)c *' ~~d A d M V 2 % Yct,li gd 44
% % Wt tQw -t&1 /CA/g l & hf , .
O co, 3# /7 3 -
d.zbaM4aa$g..AAdde $46$6.
- -!~ ; f J ~ =_ '
^= 4/. y = J d k
- ._. I s. 1A 4.x..-- g . .
.p. -
.fte s a si.)atfi,~Ja,J < tad n culkh d G{a.( obo lg.Wyt.s4, i.hG.s
+;2J -t/L/ am ra s
' k ut{ q.si sk d B~ & i g t/ .nh./cv. d jutc4 ocir[% - 33/kj g;qg pg, su1wks' c c.4aa&G .J- m AL <'.4/
dd .c LcS/ sn.uld'Lt m u mm y ficie -
<fk t M L,R r . h f.4 $, .d-, .sv L G s M 11A N b<Y
&+4.(. y 4 eu ~~ w z.ga.ga A fi >. X,sAai~/.didada. J*
19 y- n ,Jcdd 66. ave . . . . .
c
,. : u t. < , .p . .,.c . c .: .- p.:t : . . . . .~
(;. - .. .
,.. . . :- _a.
- ~ 3 d .- 4,; y :. a~ ~ J . 2 v;; 2 . ,.. ;_- : ..
~~' . .. .
. _ _ln yrteg .p,. .,yr
},vob k & a c k ,.s & b t c t A e ic l ha
- ' r, i 6v. 4 4 2;. K 3t a E .n t p 4 .%
- .,$ Ghr.dbphyibll crf S/hJ, (ociai .n(~ bra.4 c~du (b.d ' s//v i
l'~ L L .Adic.e d).4 .. y c~ m A .
mp'al .JGa ch46 e ..% .m/dy uph 4%
i fin .a d .A ch%ad.'en iceM. '
d b4
>- Du .ua+ dtfl a w g [#2 1// x cf ~s,nd ,c,w&<y ,e a~'E e
f.n 4$7' i . n r, ehk ',nt.K d
' w sapp.fyd n v(,<t.
- k, l es(cu0dt .
MUM ". .
w /uy4../ fA4 %b na e .66,-
i af khi 6cdrAdf 4 ,.
- 4.a.btyp4 a,xp i
.wpu A aus m~wudiJ>r CId l's.d dhv lx rt.c<g/f Jr
,taa nM ah d acw .p+b
/d~d . 6
! q,&..snd~pp.enz,wz&o ,~ & --s l \ /- Q w>ilpin .
l 1 en k 5 p u A.. Ls . a u x e z u ,4 a c ,c a
! .s t&.uat: .& uoW ;d sus.uu -
e- Q1+p~ Awk 6; CL. P< L, in8x],
l
. . . , .,. , . . , :. - . ^ . - . _ . _ . _ . -
. n. . .. . :.
. : e..
5 . . . . . . . . . *.
,. ,: i,. . . . . . . , . **,s*. .,
.- .. .. g.5;_.72-ISO 2-QI.;(I-43/2) .
.-iass,34 n
oV-
=
'w ./VNOO
. EL.731'D" . .
(H312 01JLY) 5
' ~, '" ':;
YSIm.13-IGO2-Q1(H
.. gel. ,ze.'iog,'..
.\ ,
,; e .c c \ _. . \ () . . ,
.) ;:
, 9 c1 -
\ t. .-
e4"SCH80 P/PE
. '. g. . . . . . . . . . -
, . s . . . , - J- . . .1 .. .
- p Q .
1( ,
~h I ' * -
. . m M.
,T ,
T, /-CONC. EX/STS , .
, : a *, * -
. T~~~ .
'..M. .
n .
p
,N
@$O, . .
, (8)E"
. A RED HEAD SELF-DRILLING ANCHOR.S
- .- .. k' '
- l. o c A T io ^* -
OR EQUAL
- o, . .
o f J.o c A l .o v cit . ... . .
'- .. p1
- p u.py,*e gu y y .3 ,,y
- . ; s&cssso coaotrion ,
wa-n,n ,q-o p-sruss-u a n-IT 3;X/4X2,O',
- r. , , .
..7". , ' q n.. .;= ': yu >, .
y ;,
? , -
. ~4
. =
.== .
=
~lg (TYP) . .
\
3 si - '
_7 ja e, . . .
- l-(TYP)
.t ,
2 .
1 .. ..
+
+ --+
t a
, . +. -
m .
.d
,.' q.'
l V N(7yp)
~ = a ,
- .m .
- g* . < . . .-
.... v
. 1
-l .
4 .. _-. i 4 -
.s
. r ..- .n g ,, ,,
.. l LOAO - ' ' . i .I .. -
H-305 Fxc- 000 .
, ' . ', , B _X_(4 & Xggq,93, G G USSET @. "
ev=-3 coo H-312 '
F::.=-2000 y-3o5g H-3/2'
. 9Y
,. 7.50375 '-
i N.
l POWE4 INDUETRY CROUP TITI,.E
\* ' A NC.ER - U- 305 /nVO 3 l ,'V c=M c. NOI.JE I CH[CC[D '
l 1 g I
~-
- 4 *
'.
- DATES,, k n f
, *' CSROCC7 , . . I p . .-. . . .,
g l , psnevro -
SMETCH NUMutR.
ccvisions '
/ $; @j . @ .
. $ d .2Z' 6 ^* M B '
- . .. ? .
,. f.)UQU ~
E.:.bl4 :::. L s tal-LT % O. -
'j
. 855.LNUP. VA.LLF.Y UWIT I , . . .. -
2 ; .
- i e (
J'# #3 *k~~lS'I v'.O Rebex.w u b, ..?-
m.i v:t.s#..
- r. ' ;.
-- \
Io ~
1.1
,, i. .
"t 4 -y, (rva l N . ..g-a s 4 - -
- i. ; .- i
..t. 4 -
c ,.: ;,- -
, :.,_m}. .,
.. 4 0 .
.. . ~
x -
. . . PIPE G s.: c8.iGo. .,., ,, ..{
. * .. . .....p.t.
. . . .y.9 a:;. .-
- ., ......ie.,.,, . . .
.d.
' t -- .
. e ,- og ,$ '
G"-sr-2o Iso 2-gr< r t
\.,
o.en srgss5SO WP N' L- .-
,ky 7 g'%
wo nn 1;, y -
c .
T l yo.tVE AMW
., ie..- ,
' .P "
PLAk) EL 902.1I E "'/ -
7 ' ' O.. k'.N. '
? b ...i % puhjsxs +- <*
~'* "WW
) *s..
. . . . . = -
s wf,.x s . Q. 2.u,e,>,s7 . y, .
p'- w
.... A.: >- -
SST FL , X14X14 SQ
.,_ . e .
.,__ ..yi -l j ..
- C. conus.d novuone') -
~ ,
% n.1.. I . u, 9 f, we venn # nxautas ::
, :t.
n 2 p .y, >; I nw vapin. w: ..
.l .
+
1
.s "y .
d.,
o
- . [ -
.y - yl ..
,':L9g,',.i1%.,....37,d;@.,)
h::,
\t:- ! .- ]., ; .
- :. % 2 W. % 4, . a . a -
- . %w y._ c.,;.4 . : ...Sct.;co..,,q.,go..;g9.,
. ..p--
4
.. . AWCHoFS m 1* ..
j' oj -~N I
. .. "Typ. Iae i v~ L 5" r 5"' .i{vryP. *- F
. ,1 .
t 'm e ,_-
- j ]; --4 /\. 3y .
[5, J- Tyra 8 *
- ,o
+ ++ .
l!i
- kg
,) + .i- + ,.-
2 7 ,
/_x TS(y)xi(, m .
^ + + + 'P-} *2 do rs: Fea, tocuriou num -
- . S as- \ . (2.
' . ' . TiR.. eksE."'P:' ".M9 4 .
> ^1 des 1GM LD.
. DETA) L '.-
- T '~~ p p - Sc n 2 "
a
. . Ib. g - t ot 59 9 , a, ., . ..- . . d..
. , .. s . ...n.f...
- w. ' :.i...h.
l.' Fy:-!959 n y: - 19 5G . ._ . ... .- . ..
- 752G ' * - * -
1:a = i S'72 3 " 6\t -
~
POWCR INDUSTHY GROUP TITLC .
. q;=. - -
SCALCA M 8'MC .
v, CHtC*;to hl hU$$.T \ DAT ' /;.-t '? ?
W' Cnnnter l', 0"D Y b W J,_W o ft. - Ib ~C gj SKCTCH NUMDER
- -- ^a"c"v"'$'onsi@bi. l / @ k. -
gfy,, fg
=
9: ' -
.. . pg Y
..: VC. vc -
H-9DG.)
Haloo(p_)
4ty 47 Q 415 43o . VC_(AC. ,
, e n "
4 43.5 H -1 (D (..2.)
V 7 6-A g
. L.f,' s ! 1502 91 445 VC H -12.D(.2.)
450 i -
. 4ss 3
. x .,
L4.4,o H-13D
(.2.)
475 3 %5
,A48?- ,,
s CVER TTMCS?O I W C lip f QC AS5 ANCHOR
-(%b g J'. !: **
P e n *H u' h PE tiar). .
t g ge pio I O fot pfim?5 * - - -
s.o . ,. -
t .
3 .+ .
PRE w
14.TDR (e.w )
virt.c r:sycn inousiny caour , ,
, ,g,g 4 oc g opy SCAT.Ct & W I ,
... cacesco 6 DATCtld'I"7h'
'i.*
i- ccantcT .
t./ud 6 i S/ - R O ' -
SKETCH HUMDER
[, APPHOVCD } y[ '
..fg l $. , f.CVt*,10NS/,
l h .
L
aicurexcxioire exceA,cae Arg. 6c.r> P.a I2/ tie,aevg.c/.lfi9tsc< 'F4/.rg in):,p.eurneviewca/o}ar"/j,
.MA 2 GA CATgscarf ecat class
- ,uaJECT / TITLc
'~ PurRacr Resue.rs H3os- (6 "$ t ?3-ica2-spi) cnri et).w &
p%nete p spore w s uspare ears , p.sreen es s es w ,'
81P.0T(PSI) y e vos.i-(f.:,) w]utw 9,g:rg.- gaa AstunLT WlR5.co.! f D-n ,
Dlootsi.e .a L05u cittoo q Sg3 99t/f 10335 IO2,3.,I}
b:.:stn .u r + o se r .4 f.sh, = 2A 900 206 238 i? 26 8 298')9 594, 8, t>toep4ke+cdc7Frtrsm. 3.oI4,
- 49,too. 2 3 6 .9 9 4 40949 . 5 6 4-3 9. . . $6.'7((,.
~
os ao+ne 4 Dest- 1.Wpuo 2/966 9 Z./463 ' 328P9 . 20774 H30s '
. h6 g,3,4, .
vc
. .-6Sl~'?3-15'02-l?i H 409 LS2 '
H302 V C
> . L.C. .
'. '. L.C. A' EQ ut Ke.b by hjuPIPE RON .;
J 1)o'r >> Es b eb tn PS7nts.ET Rud ,
- 332. A "k .
YC. N, y ,
2 f y 3as f T/'E AFFEGS ' e7F rne Two t 'Eu)
// A NG.Ed.$
et.' l-WS 4 : S t - 9,'t. E fi& EA]
oJs
, E u) AR& IaCLuoSC jrf t*-ST A CC.f GCcif7/*CC vc uts ,
(?55KQ S Bssep oM: Sinss tuns?h0%
) ,.
fig O' A 228803,22.9206c,) Pi.-TmsT %
- E N,oG r.
+ e
\d)
Tha model Run in NU-PIPE and in PSTRESS are geometrical 17'- '
similar; however the mass distribution and support stiffness are different. Eurther the method of force summation (intra-modal) is different betw,een PSTRESS and KUPIPE. KUPIPE .
utilizes more conservative techniques for intra-modal combin-ations of generalized loadings. These never techniques arose following establishment of BV1 design criteria out of AEC ff0 egg 7 (now NRC) urgings combined with increasing industry experience in t oep e; with seismic design.
In December 1974, the USiRC published Regulatory Guide 1 92, applicable to facilities docketed af ter April 1975 whi required the use of the more conservative cocbinatdons.ch - -
~The P-STHESS methods used were accepted dynamic analysis techniques for Beaver Valley I generation plants, and is the basis for all computerized Category 1 pipe stress analysis done for Beaver Valley Unit 1. .
. Figure IA gives the hanger location and peak local stress vs.
allovable resulting from the KU-PIPE Model for line 6" SI-20.
Figure 23 is a sketch of the hangers-pipe (SI-A-60/6"SI-20) interface showing the overstressed area., The table attached to this sketch identifies the differences in the hanger attachment loads resulting fro = the two different co=puter
, models. Based on 'the above the Safety Injection
- line 6"-SI-20'
- is acceptable as designed. '
i Figure , IIA &S gives the most highly stressed hanger 1 location and stresses resulting from the NU-PIPE and P-STRESS runs on 6"SI-73 Based on this data, 6"-SI-73 is acceptable as design.
Fig. IIIA&3 gives the nost highly stressed hangery location and stresses resulting from the EU-PIPE and F-STRsSS runs for
' line- 6 "SI-72. Based on this data codification to hanger VC-LC-H306A (Fig. IV) and the addition of hanger LSS-H.
(Fig. V) is required to be added to line 6"SI-72.
~ We believe that the re=ainder of the containment annulus piping is acceptable based on th6 fact that the pipe stress analysis section has completed a review of seismic piping shown on the RP-3 series drawings (annulus piptig). The
. review vas limited to piping 2t" 0.D. to 6" 0.D. because of
. the possibility that these sizes may have been analyzed by the ' chart' method. The attached tabulation (Table I) contains all the seismic lines falling between 2k" & 6". This tabula-tion contains 103 seismic lines of which 55 were reviewed and '
found acceptable) / ,
A large pertion of this piping was analyzed during the "as-built revie0" using computer program P-STP.ESS. P-STRESS results are available for all or portions of 48 of the tabulated lines and are acceptable.
i ,
e REPORT APPARENT OVERSTRESS BEAVER VALLII I s
- i .
v SAFETY INJICTION LINES .)
3
. I 1
Approved. A h1Jh1 )
G.L. Harpdr ~
Appro','ed ' N#M
[ ~ '. J.M. Cumiskey I i
- C .
. m _
L_ .
e :_. 5 gl ;
,ig ;- g 7-j , , 7 r r- ; g, , ,
- ' : I ! !
- 9 : i + . i 1 . i i i , i ! : I i i : i Q :. ' I . , ,
i i : . l . , : i . /N i I
- N '4 l t ; i .g.' i
! ! I i ! 3 [*
,N,,W'.:
c l M u
7 a 'i rs No i d,
- W
.s.
- M! j e i ! 1
/! l l
l : \1 -
' %. _y .i -
k8iil i
! / ! i !
i^ l I ; $ " :\ % ! Q : (I l l 1 ! i'/i s/.
- ' lIli G $l r i .
4 i C E 13 ! ?g !i 'I .'. i Ifl I I i l I
$ ig t if I '
l it 'A to ~
R i" 3 k ! QlDi! i /l ! ! i i
, _l 4
i 14 33 t 7 i$! I/-1 I 1 1 ! ! I i l
. 3o h' ! if'$ ._
i ;4 i !t . g i /: ; i i i i I l '/ I ul l I I i
i 19 !_.
- 1
'Q i$ 0 iq R-l$ 13a 1 2 i ". :$11 iQ .@ l ./1!l3 I i l I i ,
lh 1C i W. 4 ! @i i/ ':E ll t i Ii ;i I
I
~
is in 1% 8Qi in ! /i l' l i F4 ;$ 1 %P. ! I i '
- ! I/
- ' i' ' f' I.I i i i! I' ' ' l l
i l ! ! : 1i . ' ' i f i i l' l.b . II I I I _i w i i
' W
! I i l l ! I ' ' '/l . .I I i ! ; i l i ii :
/i i ' l 'l i I II i l I i y_
I i l l l l l l i 1 i/i ! I t ,
,fN l i I l1~
lIi: i i_ t i I4 1/t /l I ! ! I I i i i !! i i
'1 i 1.
l i
. II i i ' lI i l l i -
IN 1 'A 1 l l l :Ql i I
(, I ' i i 1% A l_l/l i I I i .I I I I I I l i M i i I I vi GI l t/ I IIl l l Ii L : J l i 'L .*
.I ! I IED I/I ! I ll ! I I I I l i I l 1 !i V' ; II i lI i l l l1 8I i 1._
i l 1 71 l 2 I i !, Il l 18 l i ll i i ! .
! lS l Pl i l i l I 1 IIl ' Ii ! l 11 l L l l ! t '. I 1" l .L L i i i illI l i i l I .
I !
! l l 1 I thQ l i iii I r , : I1 ; I l l l 74.J l l 1 l l l l ,1 , X l - i1 ~
! L i '
! XL_I I l _
l I , i i Ni l .
ll L I I I I i N i n l
~
l
!- L\
ll l i ! _
l I ; I l l l 1 l l l l 3 !
a'
- I h
4! IilM'I I I l l1 I Il 1 l l lp _ i l _
., l l , l -l l l i l Vi @ f'l l I l l
( .
el 3HODId .
. .y
- a*
Lg '
- O
r
. ~25a- .
l s- . -
6.0 SPREADING OF AMPLIFIED RESPONSE SPECTRA (continued) -
l- -
+25 per cent." However, this statement appears to be with respect to general amplified response spectra which -
would be applied to ' equipment and components, and not specifically applied to piping. The quotation in the.
FSAR Appendix B applies spe'cifically to piping. , ,
The conclusion is that the amplified response spectra i
used in the design and analysis of Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No.1 piping do ndt appear to conform to -
I the'FSAR.
i .
(* , ,
lu. ~
i . .
l .
e 0 - .
1 . *
- s I
i *
. e e
- 's ,
e 5 e t
b
/*,
a l
i l
l
t .- -
!, 5.0 FSAR CO!O:ITMENTS CONCERNING
SUMMARY
OF X, Y, "AND Z T COMPONENTS FOR EACH MODE PRODUCED BY TUO OR THREE -
DIMENSIONAL EARTHOUAXE' ' ' ' (continued)' " "
I . .
the statement in the AEC SER correspondsrexactly with -
l the way NUPIPE handles results, which resulted in much greater results than the PSTRESS method on Safety In-l l ,
jaction Piping. (See History of Events relating to 6" Safety Injection Piping.) This would indicate that
, results generated by NUPIPE or ADLPIPE are*Tn accordance .
t with the methods stated in the AEC. SER. ,
The difference ,
^ ~
l in technique resulted in a factor of 10 difference in l
stress in the LHSI system inside containment.
e
. 1
- e O
j . .
i l
o g .
l e e' '
6 e
I i
e a I
FSAR CODiITMENTS CONCERNING
SUMMARY
OF X, Y, 'AllD Z m 5.0 COMPONENTS FOR EACH MODE PRODUCED BY TWO OR THREE DIMENSIONAL
'(continued) *
- combining results .for each mode. Furthermore, the NRC ,
had been made to believe that one or more modes which are closely spaced in. frequency and parallel in mode shape are added absolutely.
Actually, Stone &. Webster has computed algebraic sums of the multidirectiona'l components of three simultaneous
, earthquakes'. This method may bd more or less conserva-
- tive (depending upon number signs) than the method out-lined in the FSAR; whether it is htore or isss conservative
~
is undetermined without detailed analysis on a case by ,
case basis. -
A hypothetical example is in order:
Given three earthquakes (X, Y, Z) resulting in three '
- - force responses (x, y, z) : , .
"X" Earthquake "Y" Earthquake "Z" Earthquake Fx F2 Fx Fv Fz Fx T* J Fu F
-2 % W 4' Y JF fWW Yield different resultant forces by the NRC and Stone & '
Webster methods: .
- e
- s 0 .
s
. *H> 4 ewq e
% ~- - --_J
i 2
FSAR COMMITMENTS CONCERNING
SUMMARY
OP X, Y, AMD Z
)
5.0 COM.PONENTS FOR EACE MODE PRODUCED BY TWO OR * ' THREE DIMENSIONAL EARTHOUAKE Reproduced below are sections of the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No'.1 FSAR, with comments:
"B 12 Stone Webster Equipment.
"B.2.1 Analyses and Design Criteria,of Seismic Class I and Seismic Class II Piping .
"B.2.1.1 General' analytical procedure. The modal r analysis technique computes the peak in-
- ortial responses for all significant par-
- ticipating modes, which are then combined
- by the I.,ethod of square root of sum of -
squares (SRSS) at each mass nodo."
[
Note tha description above of computation of peak incr- ..
tial responses, stating that combination of modal responses is by the square rcot of the sum of the squaros.
" Question 3.15.2
" the critoria for co-bining medal responses (shears ,
moments, stresses, deflections, and/or accelerations) when modal frequencies are closely spaced and a 're-sponso spectrum modal analysis method is used. "
" Response ,
"The square root of the sum of the squares (SRSS) method, employed in the combination of maximum modal responses, was supplemented by a scarch of closely spaced medal responses and an evaluation ofThe theirevalu-offect on the maximum structural responso.
- ation incorporated: ,
4 e
9 9
6
_______m
F . ' *
-l8-i 4.0 COMMITMENTS MADE IN FSAR APPENDIX B AND NON-COMPUTER *
- '(continued)
ANALYZED' PIPING 4.2 Comment 2 * . .
" Calculations" done on small bore piping con'sist of sketches of piping, about twodthirds of which have a sitatement that the constraint location is
- seismically adeuqate, G with a statement of natural
- frequency. The basis of the' riatural frequency is ,
often not stated. In several instances, the natural frequency stated is known to be unrealisti-cally high, which is nonconservative. ,
- The remaining one-third of the audited design docu-ments have no statement of seismic adequacy and no natural frequency included. 'Of roughly fifty ,
(50) piping design " calculations," not one stress calculation is perforrhed. ,
4.3 Com:nent 3
'In eleven (11) piping designs of thirty-three (33)
- examined in somo detail, valves, elbows, etc. are l
.lef t unconstrained in such a manner as to cause what appears to be inadequato design (i.e., see H74 discussion). The fact that valves , elbows, etc.
a a
9 e .o m e em me e .**
. ,s . . .
COMMITMENTS MADE IN FSAR APEE?.; DIX B AND ON-COMPUTER 4.0 '" **" ' ' ***
- ANALYZED PIPING '
The sections'of the FSAR under discussion are reproduced . .
below with comments.after each section.
. "B.2.1.9 Simplified Seismic Analysis of Small Size
- Seismic Class I Piping .
- " Piping systems designed to ANSI-B31.1 pressure piping code with diameters of 6 inch NPS and below, are subjected to analyses using accelera-tion values -from the amplified response spectra. ,
Th,e length of span between supports is selected
.such that the fundamental frequency is removed fr'om the resonant band of the amolified re-sponse spectra as specified in Section B.l.5.
"The basic approach to the design of small-bore seismic Class I piping is to make the system relatively rigid whe .ever engineering design -
cri.teria dictate. .
"The spacing between pipe constraints is deter-mined so that fundamental frequency of piping section will always be greater than 1.5 f where f = peak resonant frequency of structure, as determined from applicable amplified re-sponse spectrum.
" Inertial loads ("C" factor), from OBE and DBE,
- are conservatively set at one-half peak accelera- .
' - tion of OBE and D3E using this predetermined span. The deadweightfactor stresses are multiplied by the applicable "g" in X, Y, and Z
' - directions as specified, which is set at one-
- ~
half peak acceleration, or 0.5 g minimum; this produces seismic stress induced by OBE and D3S respectively in all thrde directions. The seis-mic stress calculation is based upon equations in paragraph 119.6.4 of Reference 1. [D 31.1) l The "g " f ac to r for the X , Y , and Z directions is specified explicitly for each problem.
_ -,,-_- - . - - ----.m- , - , . - - - , - , _ - - _ . - - -
, - - - - - - - - - - - , - - - . - - ----_---em .- --- - --
. 3.0 SAFETr INJECTION ?IPING SIX *[6): INCH (continued) ~ ')
June 12, 1975.- H39B was modeled as an anchor in this analysis.
An interoffic'e correspondence was sent from P.
- Piraino to H. Moscow and G. Harper, with a copy to C. Fonseca, on June 20, 1975, transmitting revised comment sheets for Iso 265 and Iso 266.
This revised comment sheet indicated that H39B
~
should be an anchor instead of a vertical support. .
C. A. Fonseca had the responsibility to incor-( porate these changes'by E&DCR: however, no E&DCR 5'
- was generated incorporating a change to H39B.
E&DCR
- H39B is installed as a vs.rtical constraint.
P-1083c is an E&DCR ~ requesting changes to five (5) pipe restraint sketches to reflect as-bui,1t con- ,
ditions. H39B was not installed exactly as it's
' sketch indicated. Mr. Bob Cashi stated that the
' - as-built designs were acceptable in thiS E&,DCR.
However, this E&DCR was neve.r signed by C. Fonseca or the Project Engineer, and not one person was put on distribution. .
I a
i
3.0 SAFETY INJECTION PIPING SIX [6] INCH (continued) ,
]
. two (2) vertical and East-West restraints and no
. -- North-South. restraints. The significant differ-
~
ence is that the MSK and original design draking indicate a lateral and vertical constraint on the bypass, but instead a vertical, East-West re- -
straint was installed o,n the pipe in which FCV CH-122'is located. MSK-110D8-2 and the original -
d5 sign and the as-built condition do not conform .
to the directive _ outlined in FSAR Appendix B for non-computer analyzed pipe.. An extremely;high stress was determined under North-South earth-quake condition by ADLPIPE for the as-built con-figuration.
This illustrates an inadequate original piping -
design which was installed essentially as originally
. . designed. There may have been an Latermediate change in design, but the.MSK which would indicate
this is unclear. The intermediate change, if it existed, appears no better than the original design.
The valve assembly design does not appear to con-form to th letter or intent of the FSAR (paragraph
^
- B .2 .1. 9 ) .
e ,
- 8 e= 0 .,s. j. 4 e . .N
. ..- -10
- ~
SAFETY INJECTION' PIPING -(SIX [61 INCH) ~
(continued) 3 3.0 -
foot.of their design location, the discrepancy is
- i not reported to the pipe stress personnel for dis-position. ,
F. -
This is a situat' ion which may result in unaccept- .
Able as-built configurations (i .e . , movement of a restraint near a concentrated w&ight may affect i
- pipe stress levels, constraint load' and load dis-tribtition in both dead weight and seismic con-ditions). .
Under thermal growth conditions, movement of a
\; \
restraint near an elbow to a position too close to an elbow may result in excessive pipe stress and .
restraint loads, due to the lacik of sufficient pipe to absorb an imposed deflection caused by thermal growth". Flexibility of a cantilever end -
- in' creases hith the cube of length, indicating that a small length change may caus'e a large change in load and stress.
e 9
we -e - es ' =+m e ns Nas op e- we.> grep m e_, =M M*****-e* * ,
_ .____m_ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
( .
-a-3.0 SAFETT INJECTION PIFING -(SIX -[6] INCH) (continued) -
).
The original design of this piping system was with
~
MOV-SI-667 A & B constrained by snubbers in the "Z" direction. No indication is made of which direction is the "Z" direc. tion, but per Gary Harper of Stone
& Webster, it is understood among Engineering Mec-hanics personnel to be North. RP10X has a detail-of the manner in which snubbers are to be atta'ched to motor operators.
As originally designed, 3" SI-60 on Iso 272 had a lack of restraint in the North-South direction at
.s '
. a portion of the pipe between SI-TK-2 and MOV-SI-867A. ,
This situation was corrected in E&DCR sequence such that H-3-7B-4 was modified to provide North-
- South restraint. The support table indicates this
. restraint, however, to be a vertical and East-West restraint only. J. M. Cumiskep indicated that the Support Table is not a controlling document but an index. The design sketch was properly updated, referencing appropriate E&DCR's. E&DCR 1085-B and 11700-AZ-10A-is -1 indicate that this restraint is to be a North-South restraint.
4
- i e
e**-== mens N ew- eM w , =m. - -p.gn g,,, w , , , ,%p,.,
,. ~ .- . , .
3 .~ 0 SAFETY INJECTION' PIPING '(SIX :[6] TNCH) (continued) . w; of ana. lysis that was made on LHSI piping.
The overstress condition of the piping is attributable to the fact that the hand and chart method is sometimes unconservative, particularly with increasing pipe sizes, per Mr. Cumiskey.
During the audit, it was determined that
. the engineering justificat. ion of the 6" LHSI
-line inside containment was considerably more detailed than any other engineering jur.- ,
'- tification performed in accordance with the s
. hand and chart method which was reviewed
. during the audit. (See Section 2.0 of this report.)
- Therefore, the implication is that other piping systems may have undetermined over- .
- stress conditions due 'to the in' adequacy of engineering justification noted.previously.
. 3.1.2 The Stone & Webster r,eport on the overstress condition of LESI piping states that one of the salient reasons why differences exist d
- - , . . . - . . . . . . .a. .. . . _ _ - - - - . - . . -
.,'*~. - 4- -
, s
' "~
1
. 3.0 SAFETY INJECTION PIPING :(SIX 46]* INCH). .
~)
3 .1 , During Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No.1 de-sign change involving the safety injection system inside containment, two 6" check valves, which were originally installed, were weighed before reinstal-lation. Their weight'was determined to be 450 .
pounds, although the weight shown on the vendor ,
(Velan) drawing-is 225 pounds. A Stone & Webster ,
letter dated February 17,,1978, to Westinghouse .
~
addressed this discrepancy and requested a check for validity of valve weights indicated,on drawings for' all Westinghouse-supplied valves. Westinghouse re-
- s '
sponded by .a letter of May 30, 1978, stating that J
- < subsequent valve order for 6" check valves from Velan list a weight of 450 pounds, and that there are fourteen (14) 'such check valves at Beaver Valley
- Power 5tation Unit No.1 supplied by Westinghouse. .
Westinghouse also indicated that the only other
~
valves manufactured by Velan for Beaver Valley Power
~ .
Station Unit No.1 supplied by Westinghouse are three (3) 12 " MOV 's . Westin~ghouse stated that the Velan-supplied weights of these 12" MOV's appeared to be " seemingly about the correct weight."
~
)
- * * * " * * * * * " * * *
- wmm . es e .l- m se
,- , .-,-n, . , - ,- , .c,, . - . - - , . - - - - , . ~ . , . ,,.
~ ' . .
2.0
SUMMARY
AND CONCLUSIONS l In many' instances, it appears that many piping designs
~
and analyses, as well as actual procedures, used by piping design personnel are not in conformance with the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 1 FSAR and with the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) . The techniques used by Stpne & Webster were of ten less conservative; in the ~
- case of LHSI piping inside containment, the techniques -
used result in stress levels which are one-tenth of the stress which res its from the technique outlined in the SER. The techniques outlined in the SER are essentially
the same Ls those used by NUPIPE and ADLPIPE computer .
x,
- codes..
~
Certain techniques outlined in the FSAR for small bore piping are unconservative for Beaver Valley (and possibly
. for Beaver Valley only) because of th,e shapes of the amplified response spectra. Also, the manner in which amplified response spectra peaks were spread does not appear to be in conformance with the FSAR. The method used in developing amplified response spectra is less conservative. . -
In s'everal instances, piping reviewed during the audit In those piping appeared to be of poor original design.
.)
' - - ' ~ --
1
. AUDIT REPORT PIPING DESIGN AND ANALYSIS .
3 I
I N D E'X Page 1;0 INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2.0
SUMMARY
AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . .. . . 2
. . . . . 4 3.0 -SAFETY INJECTION PIPING (SIX [6] INCH).
4 .~ 0 COMMITMENTS MADE IN FSAR APPENDIX B
. AND NON-COMPUTER ANALYZED PIPING. ,. . . . . . . . 16 ,
4.1 Comment 1 . . . . . ' . . . . . . . . ... . . 17 4.2 Comment 2 . . . . ; . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 y _
4.3 Comment 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 4.4 Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 5.0 FSAR COMMITMENTS CONCERNING SUMM.U,Y OF X, Y, AND Z' COMPONENTS FOR EACH~ MODE .,
PRODUCED BY TWO OR THREE DIMENSIONAL .
- EARTHQUAKE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
20 6.0 S?PRADTNr,OF AMPLIFIED RESPONSE SPECTRA . . . . . 25 -
7.0 LATERAL RESTRAINTS ON VERTICAL LINES. . . . . . .26.
. FIGURE'la . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 FIGURE lb . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . 28 i
- s
..)
- W*** w***m6+ - wo mo me o ,m,, , , , , , . , , __
f '. , ' a s..i-s, sms.. Mr. J. M. Cumiskey Page 2
)
Please provide a response to the above concerns and the balance of the report by March 1, 1979. (Note: In the report, please consider the word " audit" to mean " report . ")
If you have any questions, please contact J. J.
Lynch.
Very truly,yours, -
p;f,' : Q$ WIV e
H. A. VAN WASSEN Project Manager JJL/mr COPIES TO: G. W. Moore F. Salmon '
. R. J. Washabaugh R. J. Swiderski J. A. Werling J. J. Carey -
M. E. Williams MEDFEO
t EMERGENCY CORE COOLINU SYSTEM BEAVER VALLEY #1 !
AUTO TRANSFER - PUMP ALIGNMENT - NPSH CORE COOLING MODE C
! . (HHSI)
NORMAL O OPERATION R .
RI .
. W I S
,,,_,, HHSll INJECTIONI
[R
- ) D' =
C E A 1
lf \ -- .6,l
~~
. -2 SUMP I- . Z
- L.HSil y p'
_ ___ V _
QUENCH' CHEMICAL
, SPRAY ADDITION PUMP l
. 4)T_ s j C _.HHSil iRi R
,e RECIRCULATION - -
l, l E j_ (j.LHStl _ . _ _
- 5 SUMM .
- ~
Q, OR.S. j
.o DEFINITIONS TO ACCOMPANY SIMPLIFIED ECCS SCHEMATIC FOR BEAVER VALLEY 1 l Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) or Charging Pumps 1
Circulates reactor coolant at high pressures through chemical and gases clean-up systems. Maintains control of the reactor coolant volume in the reactor system. (Same pump as High Head Safety -
Injection)
High Head Safety Injection Pump (HHSI)
Provides (or injects) cool'and highly borated water to the reactor upon Safety Injection System (SIS) actuation. Used while cooldown ,
of reactor is at high pressures. HHSI pump draws water from RWST, LHSI, or containment sump depending upon size of break and available paths.
Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST)
Normally stores water used during refueling operations. In emergencies provides initial cool water to reduce temperature of reactor core and pressure / temperature in containment building.
Low Head Safety Injection Pump (LHSI)
Provides large volumes of water at low pressures during accidents to boost the water available at the HHSI pump suction for large breaks (boost not needed.for small breaks) and replaces the HHSI pump when the reactor coolant pressure is reduced to a level allowing the LHSI to cool the core directly. In normal operation, transfer RWST water for refueling.
Chemical Addition Tank (CAT)
Provides concentrated caustic solution to containment sprays during containment depressurization which acts to raise pH of containment sump and trap Iodine gases in the sump water. Depressurization of containment and trapping Iodine in the sump water reduces the likelihood of radioactive leaks to the atmosphere.
a=
i - \
4
+
Chemical Addition Pumps Provides positive transfer of caustic to suction of Quench Spray Pumps.
Quench Spray Pumps ,
Provides cool RWST water and caustic solution to containment sprays for depressurization and Iodine removal from the air and for the NPSH problem resolution, provides cool water to the containment sump / pump intakes for the IRS and ORS pumps.
Inside Recirculation System Pumps (IRS) -
Located inside containment,.provides long term cooling of the sump water and long term cooling and depressurization of the containment.
Outside Recirculation System Pumps (ORS)
Located outside containment so that they could be repaired (if necessary), provides redundant long term cooling of the sump water and long term cooling and depressurization of the containment.
. Due to pump alignment problem on LHSI, now cross connected to LHSI
.- and can provide long term cooling of core should one LHSI fail. "
i i