05000311/LER-1983-017, Supplemental LER 83-017/03X-1:on 810515,during Startup & Cycle 1 Operations,Leakage Past Pressurizer PORVs & Pressurizer Overpressure Protection Sys Values Observed. Cause Not Stated.Porvs Modified

Supplemental LER 83-017/03X-1:on 810515,during Startup & Cycle 1 Operations,Leakage Past Pressurizer PORVs & Pressurizer Overpressure Protection Sys Values Observed. Cause Not Stated.Porvs Modified

ML20080L571
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	09/16/1983
From:	Frahm R, Zupko J Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	Murley T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
References
LER-83-017-03X, LER-83-17-3X, NUDOCS 8309300371
Download: ML20080L571 (5)

LER-2083-017, Supplemental LER 83-017/03X-1:on 810515,during Startup & Cycle 1 Operations,Leakage Past Pressurizer PORVs & Pressurizer Overpressure Protection Sys Values Observed. Cause Not Stated.Porvs Modified

Event date:
Report date:
3112083017R00 - NRC Website

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7 . 60 61 DOCK ET Nuo8ER er 69 EVENT DATE 74 Tb #E PORT DATE 80 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROB ABLE CONSEQUENCES h IO I2j lOn a number of previous occasions during startup and Cycle 1 operations, leakage past l o 3 l various pressurizer power operated relief valves (PORVs) and Pressurizer Overpressure g O 4 l Protection System (POPS) valves was observed. Isolation of the relief lines to stop l l015j i the leakage resulted in either inoperability of the POPS or PORVs depending on the modq

[o[ g jof operation. Appropriate action requirements were met, and no degradation of the  ;

[o lT) l Reactor Coolant System was involved. The events constituted operation in a degraded mqde 10le1lin accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9b. l T ea ao s v 57 E V CAUSE C A USE COvp. VALvt CODE CODE SuBCODE Cov8DNENT CODE SveCODE 7

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40 42 u 47 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ITTF1 I Investigation of industry-wide problems vith PORV-tiype valves led to recommendation of l li g i l la change in material of the internals to eliminate galling. Due to recurrent problems l

, 7 lwith POPS valves, a new design valve was indicated. The PORVs were modified by g y l installing plugs of a different material; experience with Salem Unit 1 indicates the g pp l PORV problems have been controlled. PORV controls will be modified to allow use of y

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NAME OF PREPARER PHON E -

C PSEG Pubhc Servive E h ctnc arul G.is Corno iny P O. Box E Hancocks Bnd.m Ne . Jawy U8038 Salern Generating Station September 15, 1983 Dr. Thomas E. Murley Regional Administrator USNRC Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Dr. Murley:

LICENSE NO. DPR-75 DOCKET NO. 50-311 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 81-017/03X-1 SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 2 Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9b, we are submitting supplemental Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 81-017/03X-1.

Sincerely yours, J. M. Zupko, Jr.

General Manager -

Salem Operations RF :kil J.tfp CC: Distribution 7

. 7 The Energy People (O mum -

l Report Number: 81-017/ 03X-1 Report Date: 09-16-83 Occurrence Dates: 05-15-81 06-12-81 Facility : Salem Generating Station Unit 2 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTlELCATION OF OCCUREELLCl:

Reactor Coolant System - Pressurizer Overpressure Protection System -

Inoperable.

CONDIT1QRS_11 LOR TO OCR ERDLCE:

Mode 5 - Rx Power 0 % - Unit Load 0 MWe, DES CRIfl10N_QE_D.C_G11HRFJLCE :

On May 15 and June 12, 1981, during initial plant startup operations, problems were encountered with leakage past various pressurizer power operated relief valves (PORVs) and Pressurizer Overpressure Protection System (POPS) valves. The leakage in each case necessitated closing the appropriate pressurizer relief stop valves and Action Statement 3.4.10.3 was entered as required (when the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) temperature was below 312 F and a POPS channel was inoperable). An RCS vent > path was established as necessary in accordance with the acti.cn requirements.

During the maintenance outage commencing June 12, 1981, the leakage was determined to have variously involved all the PORVs and POPS valves. During the shutdown, the valves were inspected and restroked.

The valves, as well as POPS operation, tested satisf actorily and the action statement was terminated (see LER 81-043/03X-1). During the startup of the plant commencing June 18, 1981, however, leakage problems were again encountered. Due to the fact that seat leakage of the PORV type valves was a recognized generic problem and engineering investigation of the POPS valve problems was required, the decision was made to finish startup testing and commence Cycle 1 operation with the relief lines isolated.

The stop valves were closed and deactivated as required by Action Statement 3.4.5a (while operating in Modes 1, 2 or 3 with the PORVs inoperable). Action Statement 3.4.10.3 was entered again on July 9, 1981, when the RCS temperature decreased below 312 F during a short maintenance shutdown (see LER 81-059/03X-1). Startup testing was subsequently completed and power operation commenced in October 1981; the plant was then operated at power until the scheduled shutdown for refueling in January 1983. The probl'em reappeared during the shutdown when the POPS channels were again required but f ailed to actuate during surveillance testing (see LER 83-005/03L).

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LER 81-017/03X-1 APPARENT CAUEE OE OCCURRERCE:

As noted, problems with seat leakage on the PORV type valves had been identified as a problem by a number of utilities. The failure mechanism involved the galling of mating surfaces of the valve plug and seat, and was related to the use of 17-4pH steel for the manufacture of both components. Based on the recommendations by the valve manufacturer and the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI),

changing the material of one of the components would eliminate the galling problem.

The POPS valve failures also apparently resulted from galling of valve internals which, in turn, caused improper operation of the valve.

Failure of the position indication components was also involved.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURREMEE:

The operability of two POPS or an RCS vent ensures that the RCS will be protected from pressure transients when one or more of the RCS cold legs are less than or equal to 312 F. Either POPS has adequate relieving capacity to protect the RCS from overpressurization when the transient is limited to either tne start of an idle reactor coolant pump (with the secondary water temperature of the steam generator less than or equal to 50 F above the RCS cold leg temperature) or the start of a safety injection pump and its injection into a water solid RCS.

The PORVs and pressurizer bubble function to relieve RCS pressure during all design transients up to and including the design step load decrease with steam dump. Operation of the PORVs minimizes the undesirable opening of the pressurizer code safety valves; each PORV has a remotely operated block valve to provide positive shutoff capability should a relief valve become inoperable.

Action Statement 3.4.10.3a requires:

With one POPS inoperable, restore the inoperable POPS to operable status within 7 days or depressurize and vent the RCS through a 3.14 square inch vent within the next 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

Action Statement 3.4.10.3b requires:

With both POPS inoperable, depressurize and vent the RCS through a 3.14 square inch vent within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

Action Statement 3.4.Sa requires:

With one or more PORVs inoperable, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> either restore the PORVs to operable status or close and remove power from the associated block valves; otherwise be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

As noted, in each case the appropriate action was taken to either restore a! POPS channel to operability, establish an RCS vent path, or isolate a leaky pressurizer relief valve, in compliance with the

LER 81'017/03X-1 action requirements. The events therefore involved no undue risk to the health or safety of the public. The occurrences constituted operation in a degraded mode in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9b.

COR R ECTIYE_/LQIJOR:

Acting upon the recommendations of the manufacturer and the EPRI, the PORV plugs were replaced during the recent refueling outage with ones manufactured of stellite faced 316 stainless steel. Similar type plugs had been previously installed in Salem Unit 1 valves; the modified valves have performed satisfactorily to date on both units.

Design Change Request 2EC-1599 was implemented during the first refueling to improve operation of the POPS valves. Problems with the valves were again encountered during a recent maintenance shutdown (LER 83-048/03L will address this occurrence). The recurrence of problems shortly af ter the modification confirmed that an improved type valve was needed for the POPS application.

An engineering review of the problems was completed and recommended redesign of the PORV control circuits to allow the valves to function as POPS valves (similar to the control scheme in Unit 1). Design Change Request 2SC-1245 was issued to implement the change and is scheduled for the present shutdown (with the exception of removal of the formerly-used va)ves, which is planned for the next extended outage). Commitment _ for a Supplemental Report on the POPS problems were made in LERs 81-043/03L and 83-005/03L.

FAILURE _ DATA:

Copes-Vulcan, Inc.

Relief Valve Type D100-160 Marotta Scientific Controls Relier Valve Model MV-225C Prepared By R. Fr.ghm 6" General Wanager -

Salem Operations  !

SORC Meeting No.83-121 f