ML20081B207

Response Opposing Applicant 830927 Motion for Summary Disposition of Contention I-62

ML20081B207
Person / Time
Site:	Limerick
Issue date:	10/24/1983
From:	LEWIS, M.
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
Shared Package
ML20081B075	List: ML20081B073 ML20081B187 ML20081B199 ML20081B207
References
NUDOCS 8310270368
Download: ML20081B207 (3)

Text

7.

15

• WITIJ STATI:I CF A; ERICA NUCLEAR HIGUZATORY C3EIIIION 00CMCTED USNRC 3efore the Ator:ic Eafety and Licensing Board 33 00 26 Al0:23 In the :htter of Docket Nos 50-353 and 352 .

Philadelphia Electric Company OFF;CE OF SEcA.,ijo DOCKETING & S[pyft,f' (IGS units 1 and 2) BRANCH Intarvtgor's Rasconse to Antlicant's Dtion for c um :ary Distositionof Contention I-62.

4 Leral Introduction The legal analysis found on the pages 1 thru 6 of " Applicant's ?.en3 in Support of its Motion for Summary Disposition of Contention V4"is incorporated herein by reference.(Sept. 27,1933.)

Argument.

For tho sake ~ cf this present response , the renorded Contention I-62,which was accepted by Board ruling during the Prehearing Conference on17 Oct.1933, will be used:

Staff's. dependence upon a comparison of Limerick to PWRs in which PTS has been studied in order to develop its low probability for PTS failure at Limerick, is not justified. An operat-ing license should not be issued with-out a full engineering analysis of PTS at Limerick, since PTS can cause a major breach of containment, which is (1) an accident beyond the design basis.

Staff has joined the Applicant in a filing of 17 Oct. 195). "NRC Staff aespons e to Motions to Reword Contentions V4 and I-62." However since the Staff =akes the same point as the Applicant and that point was overruled by the Board's Order during the PHC 17 Tt 1983, Intervenor assumes that there is some justification for basing a legal argument upon the reworded and accepted rewordirg.

8310270368 831024 '

PDR ADOCK 05000352 i O PDR

16.

Inttry.inor osphasizes savaral points which bear directly upon the legalities in my response. In the Regulation 10CFR 2 749 and the citations of the Applicant in his Xemo for Summary pisposition of Contention V-4, the phrase that comes up repeatedly is "any material fact." The word " fact " is not in the plural. The inference is tharefore that one material fact is sufficient to go- forward to evidentiary hearings.

Intervenor , however, does not require the protection afforded by the regulation.

I ntervenor asserts that there are many material facts which are strongly in dispute and which will be discussed in the enclosed "Statament of the Material facts as to which it is contendad that tere exists a genuine issue to be heard."

10CFP.2. 749(a) .

Points of Iaw as well as points of material fact weaken the Applicant's position and Motion for Summary Disposition.Specifically, Applicanth Motion for Sumry Disposition rests entirely upon the statements of 4 employees of the supplier of the Nuclear Steam Supply for the Limerick Generating Station. These four men hava excellent credentials. There is no question that they feel their answers are honest. However , the question is not honesty only. T here are also questions of completeness and bias.

An employee telling about his employer's goods is like a mother dispensing food and

_ medicine during a famine. No matter how fair t.nd honest a Mother will try to be in dispensing food and medicine during a famine, there is a very great chance that her children will get a little more . I am not talking about dishonesty. I as talking about bias and vested interest. There is no doubt that the Applicant's witnesses have a vested interest in their ;aychecks, and that their paychecks flow from the NSS supplier to the Applicant.(1)

"This contention was reviewed and analyzed by four employees of the Nuclear Engineering Division of the General Flectric Company." Page 3 Applicant's Memo in Support of its Motion for Summary Disposition of Contention I-62.

"~

I 17

, These four employees of tho ;{.:S supplier defend their employerk product as.

is only proper for a loyal employee to do. However ths.~.intervenor has also

- analyzed the problem of FIS in a 3'da such as 1GS. In fact t b intervenor's analysis goes much farther than the FSAR and compliance with regulatory guides.

His analysis goes to the basic reasearch as detailed in NIEIO 0744 and CRNI, ,

reports. (See Statement of Marvin I. 'Jwis In Support of His Response to Applicant's Dtion for Summary Disposition of ':ontention I-62). Intervenor concludes that FIS can be a problem in IGS.(Intervenor's Statement at A5)

Part of the difference in opinions issues from the limited manner that Applicant looks at FIS and ignores many sipificant and important historical experiences.

(Statement of Intervenor at A4.) These include the immersion of the RPV in cold water as happened at Indian Point 2.(Id.)Here the cold water is introduced on the outside of the reactor while the inside stays hot and pressurized. his e ambination can lead to a FTS. There are several other possible way s that FIS can occur in a 3'4R such as IG3: Relatedly the materials of which the RPV is made can become embrittledasaresultofsubstantialneutronbombardment.(h.) Unhappily, several factors in the prediction and measurement of the calculation of neutron flux have been ignored leading to an unsubstantialted prediction.("ee Intervenor's Statement at A. 9,11,12.) Also the reliance on the physical dimension and

-- geometry may or may not be appropriate. (Intervenor's Statement A.S.(2)) Dependence on fracture mechanics considerations may not be valid and there is reason to believe that such dependence is not valid. (Intervenor's f tatenent at A.ll) Finally ,

enneerns about the surveillance program make that program inadequate to be depended upon to issue warning when significatt neutron bomoardnent has occurred in the RPV materials.

Finally the intervenor emphasizes that thrughout his Statement he points out many areas that the Applicant has ignored. These are not all the areas that have not been adequately considered. The effect of intergranular stress corrosion cracking on the FIS problem is not discussejat all. The synergistic and cumulative effects of all unresolved safety issues with the FIS issue is not discussed. There is a possibility that there are no synergistic or cumulative effects. Nonetheless, synergistic and cumulative effects of other (EI should be analyzed for their interrelation with FIS.

Conclusion.

FTS can be a problem in the IG3 due to many areas that have not been sufficiently pu t to rest by the Applicant and the NRC Staff.

.