ML030360238
| ML030360238 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 01/30/2003 |
| From: | FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| Download: ML030360238 (72) | |
Text
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Safety Culture and Safety Conscious Work Environment 1
avis-Besse January 30, 2003 ar Power Station
Opening Remarks Robert Saunders President and Chief Nuclear Officer
- FENOC 2
avis-Besse January 30, 2003 ar Power Station
Agenda pening Remarks . . . . . . . . . . Robert Saunders irstEnergy Commitment to Nuclear Safety.Robert Saunders
- Retrospective View of Davis-Besse..... Lew Myers
- Anchoring Safety Culture in Our Business.Lew Myers/Bill Pearce
- Anchoring the Changes in Safety Culture for Operations.Randy Fast
- Human Resources Leadership Development...Fred Giese
- Safety Culture Review Methodology... Dr. Sonja Haber
- Monitoring Safety Culture for Restart...Lew Myers/ Bill Pearce losing CommentsRobert Saunders 3
avis-Besse January 30, 2003 ar Power Station
Desired Outcomes e-emphasize FirstEnergys Commitment to Nuclear Safety rovide an update on the Davis-Besse Safety Culture and afety Conscious Work Environment btain NRC feedback 4
avis-Besse January 30, 2003 ar Power Station
FirstEnergys Commitment to Nuclear Safety hairman and Chief Executive Officer Commitment rstEnergy Board of Directors Resolution ENOC Commitment to Safety Culture
- Policy Level Commitments
- Management Commitments
- Individual Commitments 5
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Retrospective View of Davis-Besse Lew Myers Chief Operating Officer - FENOC 6
avis-Besse January 30, 2003 ar Power Station
ovember 1997: FirstEnergy Formed pril 1999: Commenced Transition of Beaver Valley Operations oot Cause Report on RPV Head Degradation found that Management d a Less than Adequate Nuclear Safety Focus
- Production focus, established by management, combined with taking minimum actions to meet regulatory requirements, resulted in acceptance of degraded conditions
- Davis-Besse was operated as a stand alone plant
- Conditions were identified at relative low threshold, but not properly classified or evaluated by management
- Quality Assurance finding were mixed quality
- Operations not active in role of improvements in plant conditions uilding Block Plans Identify Improvements in Total Safety Performance eed to Anchor these Improvements in our Management of Nuclear fety 7
avis-Besse January 30, 2003 ar Power Station
nchoring Safety Culture in Our Business Lew Myers Bill Pearce hief Operating Officer - Vice President -
avis-Besse January 30, 2003 ar Power Station
Definitions afety Culture: That assembly of characteristics and ttitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes n overriding priority towards nuclear safety activities and nsures that issues receive the attention warranted by their ignificance.
afety Conscious Work Environment: That part of a Safety ulture addressing employee willingness to raise issues and managements response to these issues.
9 avis-Besse January 30, 2003 ar Power Station
nchoring Safety Culture in Our Business Safety Culture - - FENOC Model Drive for Safety Culture Excellence Questioning Attitudes Rigorous Work Control and Prudent Approach Emphasis on Individuals Open Communications Safety Commitment Nuclear Clear Professionalism Responsibilities and Cohesiveness Acceptance of Responsibility Managers Statement of Commitment Safety Policy Qualification and Training Management Value Structure High Organizational Commitment Policy Level Resources Commitment Oversight and Self Regulation 10 avis-Besse January 30, 2003 ar Power Station
Policy Level Commitment
- FirstEnergy Board Passed Resolution on Nuclear Safety Culture Safety
- CEO - FirstEnergy Reinforced Safety Commitment
- Policy Established on Safety Culture
- Enhanced FENOC Values, Mission, and Vision Individuals *Business Plan Focus Areas on Safety Commitment *Board Strengthened Incentive Programs Tie to Safety Managers
- Implemented FENOC Corporate Organizational Commitment Structure Changes
- Reviewed Resources for Adequacy
- Established Independent Executive-Level Quality Policy Level Commitment Assurance
- Greatly Strengthened Employee Concerns Program
- Established a SCWE Policy 11 avis-Besse January 30, 2003 ar Power Station
Managers Commitment
- Improved Management Technical Competence
- Strengthened Corrective Action Review Board Safety Culture
- Established Engineering Assessment Board
- Increased Manager Involvement in Safety-Related Work
- Revised Competencies in Appraisal Process
- Nuclear Professionalism
- Nuclear Safety Consciousness
- Leadership in Action Training on Additional Competencies Individuals
- Assigned Owners and New Expectations for Engineering and Commitment Programs
- Established Strong Management Observation Program
- Field and Training Observations Managers
- Established High Organizational Commitments Commitment - Programs Benchmarked to Industrys Best
- Design Modifications to Improve Safety Margins
- Improved Problem Solving and Decision-Making Procedure Policy Level
- Restart Review Meetings for Changes in Plant Modes Commitment
- Lincoln Consulting Group Strategies and Activities to Increase Leadership, Teamwork and Alignment 12 avis-Besse January 30, 2003 ar Power Station
Robert Saunders VICE PRESIDENT -
Competence FENOC CHIEF EXECUTIVE VICE FENOC OVERSIGHT OPERATING OFFICER PRESIDENT - FENOC L. William Pearce
- Lew W. Myers
- Gary R. Leidich
MANAGER - VICE PRESIDENT - MANAGER -
Quality Assessment NUCLEAR Operations Effectiveness Steven A. Loehlein
- Lew W. Myers
- Michael J. Ross
PLANT DIRECTOR - MAINTENANCE DIRECTOR - SUPPORT DIRECTOR - NUCLEAR MANAGER Michael J. Stevens
- SERVICES ENGINEERING J. Randel Fast
- James J. Powers, III
MANAGER - CHEMISTRY & MANAGER - MANAGER - MANAGER -
RADIATION PROTECTION MAINTENANCE REGULATORY AFFAIRS PLANT ENGINEERING Robert W. Pell
- Peter D. Roberts
- Patrick J. McCloskey
- Richard Mende*
SRO (BWR) SRO Cert (PWR) SRO (PWR)
MANAGER - MANAGER - PERFORMANCE MANAGER -
MANAGER - PLANT OUTAGE MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT DESIGN BASIS OPERATIONS Greg A. Dunn
- David T. Gudger
- ENGINEERING Michael J. Roder
MANAGER -
MANAGER - NUCLEAR ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES TRAINING Linda M. Dohrmann Michael Marler (A)
MANAGER -
- New to Position HUMAN RESOURCES Deanna L. Haskins*
13 avis-Besse January 30, 2003 ar Power Station
Managers Commitment
- Improved Management Technical Competence
- Strengthened Corrective Action Review Board Safety Culture
- Established Engineering Assessment Board
- Increased Manager Involvement in Safety-Related Work
- Revised Competencies in Appraisal Process
- Nuclear Professionalism
- Nuclear Safety Consciousness
- Leadership in Action Training on Additional Competencies Individuals
- Assigned Owners and New Expectations for Engineering and Commitment Programs
- Established Strong Management Observation Program
- Field and Training Observations Managers
- Established High Organizational Commitments Commitment - Programs Benchmarked to Industrys Best
- Design Modifications to Improve Safety Margins
- Improved Problem Solving and Decision-Making Procedure Policy Level
- Restart Review Meetings for Changes in Plant Modes Commitment
- Lincoln Consulting Group Strategies and Activities to Increase Leadership, Teamwork and Alignment 14 avis-Besse January 30, 2003 ar Power Station
to Increase Leadership Teamwork and Alignment
- Leadership Teamwork and Alignment
- Senior Management Team Strategy Alignment Meetings
- Manager Alignment Meetings
- Coaching with Directors and Managers
- Site-wide Supervisors and above Alignment Meetings
- Transition Meetings
- Manager Team Meetings to drive Restart work forward
- Restart Readiness Meetings
- RHR Assessment Roundtable Debriefs and follow on Individual Developmental Plans and Coaching
- Transition from Common Process to Standardization across Nuclear Fleet 15 avis-Besse January 30, 2003 ar Power Station
to Increase Leadership Teamwork and Alignment
- Employee Communication and Alignment
- Town Hall Meetings (Weekly)
- 4C Meetings (Weekly)
- All Site Meetings (Monthly)
- Department Meetings
- Reactor Head Case Study Training
- Stand Downs
- Restart Oversight Panel Meetings
- Other site-driven activities and communications, e.g.
- Staff Meetings
- SCWE Meetings / Training
- Daily Focus regarding Restart Implementation Status
- Online Newsletter 16 avis-Besse January 30, 2003 ar Power Station
to Increase Leadership Teamwork and Alignment
- Management and Human Performance Root Cause &
Functional Groups Improvement Plan
- Change Management Consulting O E
N W R
P
- Cross-functional Integration P E
G I
O R
/
C
- Design/Facilitate Strategic R A
N E
K H E
Mtgs. T E M I R M I
- OD Leadership Plans O I G S N N T T
- Individual & Team Coaching S G R Y
- New Management Transitions
- Organizational Restructuring
- Sensing / Pulsing Employees
- Individual Interviews and Focus Groups with Summary Reports
- Field Observations
- Leadership in Action Training Sessions 17 avis-Besse January 30, 2003 ar Power Station
Demonstrates Increased Teamwork and Alignment
- Active Involvement in Plant
- Cross-functional design and work activities development of the
- Cross-functional problem Transformational and solving and decision making Transactional Organizations
- Restart Safety Review Board -
- RHR Assessments - reinforced demonstrated ability to make caliber of current leadership collaborative decisions (tough
- Engineerings expanded decisions) leadership team for Project
- Restart Readiness Meetings Management strength
- Mode Restraint Meetings
- Employee Testimonies (Managers, Supervisors, staff)
- Operations Leadership: M.
Roder stepped up to lead Manager Team Alignment Meetings
- Management of Contractor Reductions 18 avis-Besse January 30, 2003 ar Power Station
Individuals Commitment
- Evaluated Supervisors Safety Culture
- Provided Case Study Training
- Provided Supervisor Refresher Training on Leadership in Action
- Provided Supervisor Training on SCWE
- Strengthened Individual Ownership and Commitment Individuals - Engineering Rigor Commitment - Operability Decision-Making
- Operator License Responsibilities Training
- Shift Manager Command Responsibility Managers *Participation in Town Hall and 4-C Meetings Commitment *Participation in Monthly All-Hands Meetings
- Strengthened Questioning Attitude Policy Level
- Standard Format for Pre-Job Briefings Commitment *Implemented Operator Leadership Plan
- Requalified All Root Cause Evaluators 19 avis-Besse January 30, 2003 ar Power Station
20 avis-Besse January 30, 2003 ar Power Station
Safety Conscious Work Environment Management Support / Worker Confidence
- Site Vice President has Met with >
400 Employees in Groups of ~ 15 to Reinforce Management Support
- Trained all Managers and Supervisors on SCWE
- Trained Operators on SCWE 21 avis-Besse January 30, 2003 ar Power Station
Safety Conscious Work Environment Corrective Action Process
- Enhanced Performance Indicators and Performance Monitoring
- Independent validation of Completed Condition Reports
- Other Restart Improvements
- Process Changes
- Procedure Enhancement
- Oversight Changes
- Training 22 avis-Besse January 30, 2003 ar Power Station
Safety Conscious Work Environment mployee Concerns Program
- Program became Effective 12/30/2002
- Benchmarked Other Nuclear Plants (Millstone, Diablo Canyon, San Onofre, Nuclear Management Company)
- Reports Directly to the Vice President of Oversight
- Independent of Site Management
- Protection of Confidentiality
- Four Independent Investigators 23 avis-Besse January 30, 2003 ar Power Station
Safety Conscious Work Environment Review Team
- Chartered to Review Pending Action Dealing with People
- Team Made up of Top-Level Managers, Human Resources, and Legal
- Team Oversaw Contractor Reduction Effort
- Team Actively Looks for Issues Which May Even Give the Perception of Discrimination 24 avis-Besse January 30, 2003 ar Power Station
nchoring the Changes in Safety Culture for Operations Randy Fast Plant Manager 25 avis-Besse January 30, 2003 ar Power Station
nchoring the Changes in Safety Culture for Operations ite-Wide Commitment to Safe Plant Operation
- Continuous Improvement Culture
- Training Program Improvements
- Leadership in Action Operations Leadership Program
- Benchmarking Program easures to Prevent Recurrence
- Safety Culture Supporting Policies, Programs, and Procedures
- Strong Oversight
- Continued Safety Culture Monitoring irstEnergy CEO Meeting with Each Shift Manager 26 avis-Besse January 30, 2003 ar Power Station
Human Resources Leadership Development Fred Giese Manager - FENOC Human Resources 27 avis-Besse January 30, 2003 ar Power Station
Leadership Development ENOC Corporate: Strengthened the Human Resources unction esponsible for Leadership Development Process ctions Taken/Improvements Made
- Two New Competencies Added to Ownership for Excellence (Nuclear Professionalism and Nuclear Safety Consciousness)
- Management Team Assessment ired Independent Contractor - Performance, Safety and ealth Associates
- Sonja B. Haber, Ph.D. - Project Manager 28 avis-Besse January 30, 2003 ar Power Station
Safety Culture Review Methodology Presented to:
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region III Presented by:
Sonja B. Haber, Ph.D.
January 30, 2003 Performance, Safety and Health Associates 29
=
Background===
- Human performance issues in nuclear industry
- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission research
- Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission research and application
- Organizational cultural assessments at Soviet Designed Reactors
- International Atomic Energy Agency activities in Safety Culture 30
Premise of the Methodology
- Safety culture exists in an organizational context
- Schein model of culture
- Artifacts
- Claimed Values
- Basic Assumptions
- Stages of safety culture development
- Compliance
- Performance
- Process 31
Management of Safety and Safety Culture Culture Process Outcome 32
Safety Culture
- Safety culture refers to the characteristics of the work environment, such as the values, rules, and common understandings that influence employees perceptions and attitudes about the importance that the organization places on safety 33
Safety Culture Characteristics Generic
- Aggressively seeking to know what you dont know
- Designing a reward and incentive environment to recognize the costs of failure as well as the benefits of reliability in which there is respect for people
- Consistently communicating the big picture and getting everyone to talk about it with each other 34
Safety Culture Characteristics Specific
- Safety is a clearly recognized value
- Accountability for safety is clear
- Safety is integrated into all activities
- A safety leadership process exists
- Safety culture is learning-driven 35
Mapping Expectations to the Methodology Expect to see behaviors indicative of:
- Constructive Values
- Drive for Perfection
- Facilitation of Questioning Attitude
- Minimal Avoidance Behavior
- High Organizational Commitment
- Strong Work Group Cohesion
- Effective Work Coordination
- High Job Satisfaction
- Open and Effective Communication
- Heavy Emphasis on Safety 36
Organizational Behaviors Impacting Safety Culture
- Attention to Safety
- Organizational Learning
- Coordination of Work
- Organizational Knowledge
- Decision-making
- Performance Evaluation
- External Communication
- Performance Quality
- Formalization
- Personnel Selection
- Goal Setting/Prioritization
- Problem Identification
- Interdepartmental
- Resource Allocation Communication
- Roles & Responsibilities
- Intradepartmental
- Time Urgency Communication
- Training
- Organizational Culture 37
Safety Culture Characteristics and Organizational Behaviors Generic Safety Culture Characteristics
- Empower employees to act through *Decision-making teamwork/decision-making Aggressively seek to know what you *Organizational Learning
- Train people to recognize/respond to dont know anomalies *Performance Quality
- Spend resources on redundancy *Problem Identification
- Ownership: every problem belongs *Resource Allocation to someone until it is fixed *Training
- What gets measured, gets managed *Goal Setting/Prioritization
- Most people do what they think will Design reward/incentive systems to *Personnel Selection be or is rewarded recognize costs of failure as well as
- Performance Evaluation benefits of reliability
- Use tools to ensure real goals are
- Time Urgency the public goals
- Part of evaluation system
- Top management encourages *Communication culture of open communication
- Coordination of Work
- Formal, coordinated briefings Consistently communicate the big
- Formalization
- Communicate stories about picture and try to get everyone to employees saving the organization communicate with each other about it *Roles/Responsibilities dollars, injuries *Organizational Knowledge
- Spend resources to develop effective communication capability 38
Multiple Methods for Review of Behaviors Methods are:
- Capable for broad-based use
- Objective
- Quantitative and qualitative
- Able to withstand high scrutiny and use
- Able to provide convergent validity 39
Multiple Methods for Review of Behaviors Methods include:
- Functional Analysis
- Structured Interviews and Focus Groups
- Behavioral Anchored Rating Scales (BARS)
- Behavioral Observations
- Organizational and Safety Culture Survey 40
Implementation of Methodology Functional Areas of Facility Strategic Level Operations Maintenance Technical Training & Support Staff Support Qualifications Safety is a Value Safety Culture Characteristics Accountability
& Ownership of Safety Safety is Integrated into all Work Safety Leadership Process Safety is Learning Driven 41
Implementation of Methodology (continued)
Functional Analysis:
- Documentation Review to include: (examples)
-Organizational charts
-Important administrative procedures
-Past relevant evaluations conducted by (for) the organization
-Charters for steering committees and performance improvement initiatives
-Relevant external assessments
-Any information the organization thinks may be useful
- Some preliminary focus groups 42
Implementation of Methodology (continued)
Structured Interviews & Behavioral Anchored Rating Scales (BARS):
- Personnel to be interviewed include individuals from all organizational components and levels
- Positions will be identified during the functional analysis; individuals to be chosen by the site
- Interviews last no more than one hour; occasionally follow-up interviews may be requested
- BARS are administered at the end of interview; no more than 4 rating scales completed by any interviewee 43
Implementation of Methodology (continued)
Behavioral Observations:
Activities to be observed include:
- Scheduled meetings
- Routine activities; e.g., shift turnovers, work planning meetings
- Unscheduled activities
- Work processes (when applicable) 44
Implementation of Methodology (continued)
Organizational and Safety Culture Survey:
- Administered in as large groups as possible
- Shift personnel scheduled at their convenience
- Coordinate administration schedule with Human Resources
- Conducted during first week of the review
- Coordinate use of demographic variables with site 45
Applications of Methodology
- Fully implemented in 18 different organizations; partially implemented in 17 additional organizations
- Implemented across different industries including:
- Nuclear Power - Fossil Fuel
- Chemical Reprocessing - Health Care
- Mining - Research
- Methodology used effectively in 5 different countries
- Methodology discriminates between organizations 46
Deliverables from Methodology
- Debriefing sessions on results with management and employees
- Report which includes:
-Overall conclusion on Generic Safety Culture Characteristics
-Summaries of Specific Safety Culture Characteristics with description of strengths and areas for improvement
-Conclusions on absence or presence of Safety Culture Characteristics
-Identification of trending of each Specific Safety Culture Characteristic
- Initiation of transfer of technology for use by site in self-assessment process 47
Outcomes of Methodology
- Status of generic and specific Safety Culture Characteristics
- Comparative results to other nuclear and non-nuclear organizations
- Results need to be integrated with other ongoing activities 48
Schedule of Safety Culture Review Phase Initiated
- Team Preparation Jan. 8, 2003
- Functional Analysis Jan. 15, 2003
- Survey Administration Feb. 4, 2003 (except for some shift crews)
- Observations Feb. 4, 2003
- Interviews and BARS Feb. 10, 2003
- Analysis and Evaluation Feb. 21, 2003
- Final Report March, 2003 49
Summary
- The Safety Culture Review Methodology will provide an independent evaluation of the current status of the safety culture characteristics
- The methodology will also assist in the enhancement of safety culture by identifying ways in which the organization can continuously improve safety culture through self-assessment
- The Review will facilitate the progression of the development of safety culture from the compliance to performance-based, to continuous improvement stages 50
Monitoring Safety Culture for Restart Lew Myers Bill Pearce Chief Operating Officer Vice President -
-FENOC FENOC Oversight 51 avis-Besse January 30, 2003 ar Power Station
Monitoring Safety Culture for Restart rior to 2002, Davis-Besses Safety Culture was Mixed
- Several Areas of Good Performance
- Good Plant Material Condition
- Good Plant Performance with Few Trips
- Good Addressing of Industry Issues on Thermo-Lag ENOCs Assessment in 2002 Have Shown Some eaknesses (e.g., Corrective Action, Technical Rigor, and inimum Regulatory Standards)
ENOCs goal is to verify that an adequate Safety Culture xists and take actions to address weaknesses 52 avis-Besse January 30, 2003 ar Power Station
Monitoring Safety Culture for Restart Safety Culture Commitments Rating
- Green: All Major Areas are Acceptable with a Few Minor Indicator Deviations
- White: All Major Areas are Acceptable with a Few Indicators Requiring Immediate Management Action
- Yellow: All Major Areas are Acceptable with Several Indicators Requiring Immediate Management Action
- Red: Several Major Commitments do not Meet Acceptable Standards and Require Immediate Management Action 53 avis-Besse January 30, 2003 ar Power Station
Monitoring Safety Culture for Restart atings Based on Convergent Assessment
- Performance Indicators (e.g., Risk Index, Backlogs)
- Management Observations
- Demonstrated Performance During Critical Plant Conditions (e.g., Fuel Load)
- Feedback from Independent Safety Culture Review and Nuclear Quality Assurance Assessments
- Performance, Safety and Health Associates
- Sonja B. Haber, Ph.D.
54 avis-Besse January 30, 2003 ar Power Station
Monitoring Safety Culture for Restart eadiness for Restart
- Improving Safety Culture is a Long-Term Activity
- For Restart, no red areas, however, not Every Area Must be Green
- FENOC Expects that Some Areas may be White or Yellow
- Keys for Restart
- Show Improving Safety Culture
- Remedial Actions for Any White or Yellow Areas 55 avis-Besse January 30, 2003 ar Power Station
Monitoring Safety Culture for Restart afety Culture
- Convergent Assessment
- Establishment of safety policy and emphasis on a regular basis by senior management
- Ad-Hoc surveys of employee awareness of safety policy
- Oversight will evaluate SCWE and Statement of safety performance Safety Policy
- Anchor in performance appraisal Management Value Structure program
- Assess adequacy of resources during Policy Level Resources Restart Readiness Review Commitment Oversight and Self Regulation 56 avis-Besse January 30, 2003 ar Power Station
Monitoring Safety Culture for Restart
- Convergent Assessment Safety Culture - Implementation of Management Observation Program
- Frequency of plant tours and questioning of observed conditions
- Nuclear safety emphasized to employees on a regular basis mphasis on Safety - Completion of Leadership in Action and SCWE Clear Training sponsibilities Cohesiveness - Encouragement of employee questioning ceptance of Managers attitude on safety (e.g., newsletters, 4 Cs sponsibility Commitment Meetings) lification and - Recognition of employees who improve safety Training
- Application of NOP-ER-3001, Problem Organizational Solving and Decision Making ommitment
- Program ownership (e.g., fuel reliability)
- Modifications to improve margins (e.g.,
containment emergency sump)
- Operator Recertification Program 57 avis-Besse January 30, 2003 ar Power Station
Monitoring Safety Culture for Restart Safety Culture
- Convergent Assessment
- Personnel Error Rate
- Demonstration of clear ownership of programs
- Ad-Hoc surveys to pulse organizations Emphasis on understanding that nuclear safety is the Safety highest priority Clear Responsibilities - Corrective Action Review Board and Cohesiveness assessments of ownership Acceptance of Responsibility Managers - Engineering Assessment Board evaluations Commitment of ownership Qualification and Training - Program ownership (e.g., Leak Rate Program, Boric Acid Control Program, igh Organizational Commitment Reactivity Management Program) 58 avis-Besse January 30, 2003 ar Power Station
Monitoring Safety Culture for Restart Safety Culture
- Convergent Assessment
- Performance Appraisals/Development Plans
- Ad-Hoc surveys of willingness to challenge employees, other managers and superiors regarding safety considerations Emphasis on Safety
- System assessment as a means to increase Clear safety margins, such as Responsibilities and Cohesiveness
-Flüs Leak Monitoring System
-Containment Emergency Sump Acceptance of Managers Responsibility -Diesel Starting Air Commitment Qualification and
- Nuclear Quality Assurance Field Training Assessments igh Organizational - Number of Management Observations Commitment Requiring Coaching 59 avis-Besse January 30, 2003 ar Power Station
Monitoring Safety Culture for Restart
- Convergent Assessment Safety Culture - Performed Benchmarking of organizational staffing
- Completed restart required training
- Completed root cause training completed (e.g., Tap Root)
- Completed operability determination training (> 175 individuals)
Emphasis on Safety
- Completed training on legal responsibilities of licensed operators Clear Responsibilities - Completed SCWE Training (>300 Individuals) and Cohesiveness
- Completed standdown on January 27 on Acceptance of Responsibility Managers Safety Culture Policy Commitment - Completed training on NOP-ER-3001, Qualification and Problem Solving and Decision-Making (e.g.,
Training Decay Heat Pump, Cavity Seal Post Mod igh Organizational Testing)
Commitment
- Completed training on Case Study
- Completed training on Standards and Expectations
- Continuing training identified by Curriculum Review Committee meetings 60 avis-Besse January 30, 2003 ar Power Station
Monitoring Safety Culture for Restart Safety Culture *Convergent Assessment
- Implementation and training of employees on Safety Conscious Work Environment
- Effective Employee Concern Program
- Restart Oversight Panel Assessment Emphasis on Safety
- Licensed Operator Pipeline Clear
- Benchmark programs against industry Responsibilities standards and Cohesiveness
- Operator crew benchmarking Acceptance of Responsibility Managers - Scheduled Management Observation Commitment Program Qualification and Training - Goals for zero temporary igh Organizational modifications, zero control room Commitment deficiencies, and zero operator work arounds 61 avis-Besse January 30, 2003 ar Power Station
Monitoring Safety Culture for Restart afety Culture Drive for Excellence *Performance Monitoring Questioning
- Number of Systems Classified Attitudes Maintenance a (1)
Rigorous Work Control and
- Number of Workarounds Prudent Approach - Number of Temporary Modifications Individuals Open - Number of Control Room Deficiencies Communications Commitment - Individual Error Rates Nuclear Professionalism
- Number of Long-standing Equipment Problems
- Percent of Self-Identified Condition Reports
- Number of Engineering Condition Reports Outstanding
- Engineering Assessment Board Index 62 avis-Besse January 30, 2003 ar Power Station
Monitoring Safety Culture for Restart Drive for afety Culture Excellence Questioning
- Performance Monitoring Attitudes - Quality of pre-job briefings as a Rigorous Work management observation Control and Prudent Approach - Number of Condition Reports (CRs) per person per group Individuals Open Communications
- Number of programmatic CRs Commitment Nuclear - Number of procedure problems Professionalism
- Number and type of operational events (e.g., tagging errors, mispositioning) 63 avis-Besse January 30, 2003 ar Power Station
Monitoring Safety Culture for Restart
- Performance Monitoring Drive for - Employee Event Free Clock afety Culture Excellence
- Industrial Safety Index Questioning - Employee error rate Attitudes
- Program process error rate Rigorous Work Control and - Significant human performance Prudent Approach errors resulting in plant transients Individuals Open Communications - Backlog of procedure change Commitment requests Nuclear Professionalism - Quality Control hold point/rework rate
- Number of work orders Scheduled/completed each week
- Number of late PMs
- Backlog of corrective maintenance
- Number of a (1) systems 64 avis-Besse January 30, 2003 ar Power Station
Monitoring Safety Culture for Restart Drive for afety Culture Excellence
- Performance Monitoring Questioning Attitudes - Number of Condition Reports per person Rigorous Work per group Control and Prudent Approach
- Number of concerns going to Employee Concerns Program vs. NRC Individuals Open Communications - Ad-hoc surveys pulsing of organization Commitment - Feedback from 4Cs Meeting Nuclear Professionalism
- SCORE Program: Safety Consciousness Our Responsibility Everytime 65 avis-Besse January 30, 2003 ar Power Station
Monitoring Safety Culture for Restart
- Performance Monitoring Drive for afety Culture Excellence Questioning - Completion of Ownership for Excellence Attitudes
- Training attendance Rigorous Work Control and
- Rework Prudent Approach - Individual Development Plans Individuals Open - Results of Engineering Assessment Board Communications Commitment Assessments Nuclear Professionalism
- Number of yellow windows in training
- Absence of low-level Radiation Protection events
- Chemistry Performance Index 66 avis-Besse January 30, 2003 ar Power Station
Monitoring Safety Culture for Restart
- Safety Conscious Work Environment Policy
- Monitor
- Results of Survey Post Core Reload
- NRC Concerns vs. Employee Concerns Program
- Quality Assurance Interviews 67 avis-Besse January 30, 2003 ar Power Station
Monitoring Safety Culture for Restart
- Corrective Action Process
- Monitor
- Implementation of CAP improvements
- Root Cause evaluation quality
- Condition Report category accuracy
- Basic Cause evaluation quality
- Condition Report Self-Identification Rate
- Results of Survey Post Core Reload
- Quality Assurance Interview Results 68 avis-Besse January 30, 2003 ar Power Station
Monitoring Safety Culture for Restart
- Employee Concerns Program
- Monitor
- Use of ECP by Employees
- Satisfaction of employees that have used the ECP
- Number of issues directed to NRC vs. Employee Concerns Program 69 avis-Besse January 30, 2003 ar Power Station
Monitoring Safety Culture for Restart
- Review Team
- Monitor
- Use of SCWE Review Team
- Effectiveness of SCWE Review Team in avoiding valid discrimination claims
- All valid Harassment Intimidation Retaliation Discrimination Reports
- Total number of actions reviewed vs. number of rejected issues 70 avis-Besse January 30, 2003 ar Power Station
Closing Remarks Robert Saunders President and Chief Nuclear Officer
- FENOC 71 avis-Besse January 30, 2003 ar Power Station
Closing Remarks onclusions
- A work atmosphere for employees is being developed that:
- focuses on safety
- sensitizes individual awareness
- identifies and reports concerns
- encourages each other to report concerns
- fosters cooperation between workers and management
- seeks timely resolution of concerns
- Safety Conscious Work Environment is being nurtured
- Safety Culture has improved irstEnergy is committed to nuclear safety 72 avis-Besse January 30, 2003 ar Power Station