ML030360238
| ML030360238 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 01/30/2003 |
| From: | FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| Download: ML030360238 (72) | |
Text
1 Safety Culture and Safety Conscious Work Environment Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Nuclear Power Station January 30, 2003
2 Opening Remarks Robert Saunders President and Chief Nuclear Officer
- FENOC Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Nuclear Power Station January 30, 2003
3 Opening Remarks.......... Robert Saunders FirstEnergy Commitment to Nuclear Safety.Robert Saunders
- Retrospective View of Davis-Besse..... Lew Myers
- Anchoring Safety Culture in Our Business.Lew Myers/Bill Pearce
- Anchoring the Changes in Safety Culture for Operations.Randy Fast
- Human Resources Leadership Development...Fred Giese
- Safety Culture Review Methodology... Dr. Sonja Haber
- Monitoring Safety Culture for Restart...Lew Myers/ Bill Pearce Closing CommentsRobert Saunders Agenda Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Nuclear Power Station January 30, 2003
4
- Re-emphasize FirstEnergys Commitment to Nuclear Safety
- Provide an update on the Davis-Besse Safety Culture and Safety Conscious Work Environment
- Obtain NRC feedback Desired Outcomes Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Nuclear Power Station January 30, 2003
5
- Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Commitment
- FirstEnergy Board of Directors Resolution
- FENOC Commitment to Safety Culture
- Policy Level Commitments
- Management Commitments
- Individual Commitments FirstEnergys Commitment to Nuclear Safety Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Nuclear Power Station January 30, 2003
6 Lew Myers Chief Operating Officer - FENOC Retrospective View of Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Nuclear Power Station January 30, 2003
7
- November 1997: FirstEnergy Formed
- April 1999: Commenced Transition of Beaver Valley Operations
- Root Cause Report on RPV Head Degradation found that Management had a Less than Adequate Nuclear Safety Focus
- Production focus, established by management, combined with taking minimum actions to meet regulatory requirements, resulted in acceptance of degraded conditions
- Davis-Besse was operated as a stand alone plant
- Conditions were identified at relative low threshold, but not properly classified or evaluated by management
- Quality Assurance finding were mixed quality
- Operations not active in role of improvements in plant conditions
- Building Block Plans Identify Improvements in Total Safety Performance
- Need to Anchor these Improvements in our Management of Nuclear Safety
Background
Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Nuclear Power Station January 30, 2003
8 Lew Myers Chief Operating Officer -
FENOC Bill Pearce Vice President -
FENOC Oversight Anchoring Safety Culture in Our Business Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Nuclear Power Station January 30, 2003
9 Definitions
- Safety Culture: That assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes an overriding priority towards nuclear safety activities and ensures that issues receive the attention warranted by their significance.
- Safety Conscious Work Environment: That part of a Safety Culture addressing employee willingness to raise issues and managements response to these issues.
Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Nuclear Power Station January 30, 2003
10 Anchoring Safety Culture in Our Business Safety Culture - - FENOC Model Safety Culture Individuals Commitment Managers Commitment Policy Level Commitment Clear Responsibilities and Cohesiveness Acceptance of Responsibility Qualification and Training High Organizational Commitment Questioning Attitudes Rigorous Work Control and Prudent Approach Open Communications Statement of Safety Policy Management Value Structure Resources Oversight and Self Regulation Emphasis on Safety Drive for Excellence Nuclear Professionalism Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Nuclear Power Station January 30, 2003
11 Policy Level Commitment
- FirstEnergy Board Passed Resolution on Nuclear Safety
- CEO - FirstEnergy Reinforced Safety Commitment
- Policy Established on Safety Culture
- Enhanced FENOC Values, Mission, and Vision
- Business Plan Focus Areas on Safety
- Board Strengthened Incentive Programs Tie to Safety
- Implemented FENOC Corporate Organizational Structure Changes
- Reviewed Resources for Adequacy
- Established Independent Executive-Level Quality Assurance
- Greatly Strengthened Employee Concerns Program
- Established a SCWE Policy Safety Culture Individuals Commitment Managers Commitment Policy Level Commitment Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Nuclear Power Station January 30, 2003
12 Managers Commitment
- Improved Management Technical Competence
- Strengthened Corrective Action Review Board
- Established Engineering Assessment Board
- Increased Manager Involvement in Safety-Related Work
- Revised Competencies in Appraisal Process
- Nuclear Professionalism
- Nuclear Safety Consciousness
- Leadership in Action Training on Additional Competencies
- Assigned Owners and New Expectations for Engineering and Programs
- Established Strong Management Observation Program
- Field and Training Observations
- Established High Organizational Commitments
- Programs Benchmarked to Industrys Best
- Design Modifications to Improve Safety Margins
- Improved Problem Solving and Decision-Making Procedure
- Restart Review Meetings for Changes in Plant Modes
- Lincoln Consulting Group Strategies and Activities to Increase Leadership, Teamwork and Alignment Safety Culture Individuals Commitment Managers Commitment Policy Level Commitment Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Nuclear Power Station January 30, 2003
13 Technical Competence VICE PRESIDENT -
FENOC OVERSIGHT L. William Pearce
FENOC CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER Lew W. Myers
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT - FENOC Gary R. Leidich
- VICE PRESIDENT -
NUCLEAR Lew W. Myers
PLANT MANAGER J. Randel Fast
DIRECTOR - MAINTENANCE Michael J. Stevens
DIRECTOR - SUPPORT SERVICES Robert W. Schrauder
DIRECTOR - NUCLEAR ENGINEERING James J. Powers, III
MANAGER - CHEMISTRY &
RADIATION PROTECTION Robert W. Pell
MANAGER - PLANT OPERATIONS Michael J. Roder
MANAGER - NUCLEAR TRAINING Michael Marler (A)
MANAGER -
MAINTENANCE Peter D. Roberts
MANAGER -
OUTAGE MANAGEMENT Greg A. Dunn
MANAGER -
REGULATORY AFFAIRS Patrick J. McCloskey
MANAGER -
PLANT ENGINEERING Richard Mende*
MANAGER - PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT David T. Gudger
MANAGER -
ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES Linda M. Dohrmann MANAGER - SECURITY William A. Mugge
MANAGER -
HUMAN RESOURCES Deanna L. Haskins*
MANAGER -
DESIGN BASIS ENGINEERING John J. Grabnar
- New to Position MANAGER -
Quality Assessment Steven A. Loehlein
MANAGER -
Operations Effectiveness Michael J. Ross
FENOC PRESIDENT AND CHIEF NUCLEAR OFFICER Robert Saunders SRO (PWR)
Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Nuclear Power Station January 30, 2003
14 Managers Commitment
- Improved Management Technical Competence
- Strengthened Corrective Action Review Board
- Established Engineering Assessment Board
- Increased Manager Involvement in Safety-Related Work
- Revised Competencies in Appraisal Process
- Nuclear Professionalism
- Nuclear Safety Consciousness
- Leadership in Action Training on Additional Competencies
- Assigned Owners and New Expectations for Engineering and Programs
- Established Strong Management Observation Program
- Field and Training Observations
- Established High Organizational Commitments
- Programs Benchmarked to Industrys Best
- Design Modifications to Improve Safety Margins
- Improved Problem Solving and Decision-Making Procedure
- Restart Review Meetings for Changes in Plant Modes
- Lincoln Consulting Group Strategies and Activities to Increase Leadership, Teamwork and Alignment Safety Culture Individuals Commitment Managers Commitment Policy Level Commitment Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Nuclear Power Station January 30, 2003
15 Strategy and Activities to Increase Leadership Teamwork and Alignment
- Leadership Teamwork and Alignment
- Senior Management Team Strategy Alignment Meetings
- Manager Alignment Meetings
- Coaching with Directors and Managers
- Site-wide Supervisors and above Alignment Meetings
- Transition Meetings
- Manager Team Meetings to drive Restart work forward
- Restart Readiness Meetings
- RHR Assessment Roundtable Debriefs and follow on Individual Developmental Plans and Coaching
- Transition from Common Process to Standardization across Nuclear Fleet Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Nuclear Power Station January 30, 2003
16
- Employee Communication and Alignment
- Town Hall Meetings (Weekly)
- 4C Meetings (Weekly)
- All Site Meetings (Monthly)
- Department Meetings
- Reactor Head Case Study Training
- Stand Downs
- Restart Oversight Panel Meetings
- Other site-driven activities and communications, e.g.
- Staff Meetings
- SCWE Meetings / Training
- Daily Focus regarding Restart Implementation Status
- Online Newsletter Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Nuclear Power Station January 30, 2003 Strategy and Activities to Increase Leadership Teamwork and Alignment
17 Functional Groups O
P E
R A
T I
O N
S E
N G
I N
E E
R I
N G
W O
R K
M G
T R
P
/
C H
E M
I S
T R
Y Management and Human Performance Root Cause &
Improvement Plan Change Management Consulting Cross-functional Integration Design/Facilitate Strategic Mtgs.
OD Leadership Plans Individual & Team Coaching New Management Transitions Organizational Restructuring Sensing / Pulsing Employees Individual Interviews and Focus Groups with Summary Reports Field Observations Leadership in Action Training Sessions Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Nuclear Power Station January 30, 2003 Strategy and Activities to Increase Leadership Teamwork and Alignment
18 Evidence that Demonstrates Increased Teamwork and Alignment Active Involvement in Plant work activities Cross-functional problem solving and decision making
- Restart Safety Review Board -
demonstrated ability to make collaborative decisions (tough decisions)
- Restart Readiness Meetings
- Mode Restraint Meetings
- Operations Leadership: M.
Roder stepped up to lead Manager Team Alignment Meetings
- Management of Contractor Reductions Cross-functional design and development of the Transformational and Transactional Organizations RHR Assessments - reinforced caliber of current leadership Engineerings expanded leadership team for Project Management strength Employee Testimonies (Managers, Supervisors, staff)
Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Nuclear Power Station January 30, 2003
19 Individuals Commitment
- Evaluated Supervisors
- Provided Case Study Training
- Provided Supervisor Refresher Training on Leadership in Action
- Provided Supervisor Training on SCWE
- Strengthened Individual Ownership and Commitment
- Engineering Rigor
- Operability Decision-Making
- Operator License Responsibilities Training
- Shift Manager Command Responsibility
- Participation in Town Hall and 4-C Meetings
- Participation in Monthly All-Hands Meetings
- Strengthened Questioning Attitude
- Standard Format for Pre-Job Briefings
- Implemented Operator Leadership Plan
- Requalified All Root Cause Evaluators Safety Culture Individuals Commitment Managers Commitment Policy Level Commitment Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Nuclear Power Station January 30, 2003
20 Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Nuclear Power Station January 30, 2003
21 Safety Conscious Work Environment
- Management Support / Worker Confidence
- Site Vice President has Met with >
400 Employees in Groups of ~ 15 to Reinforce Management Support
- Trained all Managers and Supervisors on SCWE
- Trained Operators on SCWE Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Nuclear Power Station January 30, 2003
22 Safety Conscious Work Environment
- Corrective Action Process
- Enhanced Performance Indicators and Performance Monitoring
- Independent validation of Completed Condition Reports
- Other Restart Improvements
- Process Changes
- Procedure Enhancement
- Oversight Changes
- Training Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Nuclear Power Station January 30, 2003
23 Safety Conscious Work Environment
- Employee Concerns Program
- Program became Effective 12/30/2002
- Benchmarked Other Nuclear Plants (Millstone, Diablo Canyon, San Onofre, Nuclear Management Company)
- Reports Directly to the Vice President of Oversight
- Independent of Site Management
- Protection of Confidentiality
- Four Independent Investigators Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Nuclear Power Station January 30, 2003
24 Safety Conscious Work Environment
- Review Team
- Chartered to Review Pending Action Dealing with People
- Team Made up of Top-Level Managers, Human Resources, and Legal
- Team Oversaw Contractor Reduction Effort
- Team Actively Looks for Issues Which May Even Give the Perception of Discrimination Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Nuclear Power Station January 30, 2003
25 Randy Fast Plant Manager Anchoring the Changes in Safety Culture for Operations Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Nuclear Power Station January 30, 2003
26
- Site-Wide Commitment to Safe Plant Operation
- Continuous Improvement Culture
- Training Program Improvements
- Leadership in Action Operations Leadership Program
- Benchmarking Program
- Measures to Prevent Recurrence
- Safety Culture Supporting Policies, Programs, and Procedures
- Strong Oversight
- Continued Safety Culture Monitoring
- FirstEnergy CEO Meeting with Each Shift Manager Anchoring the Changes in Safety Culture for Operations Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Nuclear Power Station January 30, 2003
27 Fred Giese Manager - FENOC Human Resources Human Resources Leadership Development Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Nuclear Power Station January 30, 2003
28
- FENOC Corporate: Strengthened the Human Resources Function
- Responsible for Leadership Development Process
- Actions Taken/Improvements Made
- Two New Competencies Added to Ownership for Excellence (Nuclear Professionalism and Nuclear Safety Consciousness)
- Management Team Assessment
- Hired Independent Contractor - Performance, Safety and Health Associates
- Sonja B. Haber, Ph.D. - Project Manager Human Resources Leadership Development Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Nuclear Power Station January 30, 2003
29 Safety Culture Review Methodology Safety Culture Review Methodology Presented by:
Sonja B. Haber, Ph.D.
January 30, 2003 Presented to:
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region III Performance, Safety and Health Associates
30 Background
Human performance issues in nuclear industry U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission research Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission research and application Organizational cultural assessments at Soviet Designed Reactors International Atomic Energy Agency activities in Safety Culture
31 Premise of the Methodology Safety culture exists in an organizational context Schein model of culture
- Artifacts
- Claimed Values
- Basic Assumptions Stages of safety culture development
- Compliance
- Performance
- Process
32 Culture Process Outcome Management of Safety and Safety Culture
33 Safety Culture Safety culture refers to the characteristics of the work environment, such as the values, rules, and common understandings that influence employees perceptions and attitudes about the importance that the organization places on safety
34 Safety Culture Characteristics Generic Aggressively seeking to know what you dont know Designing a reward and incentive environment to recognize the costs of failure as well as the benefits of reliability in which there is respect for people Consistently communicating the big picture and getting everyone to talk about it with each other
35 Safety Culture Characteristics Specific Safety is a clearly recognized value Accountability for safety is clear Safety is integrated into all activities A safety leadership process exists Safety culture is learning-driven
36 Mapping Expectations to the Methodology Expect to see behaviors indicative of:
Constructive Values Drive for Perfection Facilitation of Questioning Attitude Minimal Avoidance Behavior High Organizational Commitment Strong Work Group Cohesion Effective Work Coordination High Job Satisfaction Open and Effective Communication Heavy Emphasis on Safety
37 Organizational Behaviors Impacting Safety Culture Attention to Safety Coordination of Work Decision-making External Communication Formalization Goal Setting/Prioritization Interdepartmental Communication Intradepartmental Communication Organizational Culture Organizational Learning Organizational Knowledge Performance Evaluation Performance Quality Personnel Selection Problem Identification Resource Allocation Roles & Responsibilities Time Urgency Training
38 Safety Culture Characteristics and Organizational Behaviors Generic Safety Culture Characteristics Aggressively seek to know what you dont know Consistently communicate the big picture and try to get everyone to communicate with each other about it Design reward/incentive systems to recognize costs of failure as well as benefits of reliability
- Empower employees to act through teamwork/decision-making
- Train people to recognize/respond to anomalies
- Spend resources on redundancy
- Ownership: every problem belongs to someone until it is fixed
- What gets measured, gets managed
- Most people do what they think will be or is rewarded
- Use tools to ensure real goals are the public goals
- Part of evaluation system
- Top management encourages culture of open communication
- Formal, coordinated briefings
- Communicate stories about employees saving the organization dollars, injuries
- Spend resources to develop effective communication capability
- Decision-making
- Organizational Learning
- Performance Quality
- Problem Identification
- Resource Allocation
- Training
- Goal Setting/Prioritization
- Personnel Selection
- Performance Evaluation
- Time Urgency
- Communication
- Coordination of Work
- Formalization
- Roles/Responsibilities
- Organizational Knowledge
39 Multiple Methods for Review of Behaviors Methods are:
Capable for broad-based use Objective Quantitative and qualitative Able to withstand high scrutiny and use Able to provide convergent validity
40 Multiple Methods for Review of Behaviors Methods include:
Functional Analysis Structured Interviews and Focus Groups Behavioral Anchored Rating Scales (BARS)
Behavioral Observations Organizational and Safety Culture Survey
41 Implementation of Methodology Safety is Learning Driven Safety Leadership Process Safety is Integrated into all Work Accountability
& Ownership of Safety Safety Culture Characteristics Safety is a Value Support Staff Training &
Qualifications Technical Support Maintenance Operations Strategic Level Functional Areas of Facility
42 Implementation of Methodology (continued)
Functional Analysis:
Documentation Review to include: (examples)
-Organizational charts
-Important administrative procedures
-Past relevant evaluations conducted by (for) the organization
-Charters for steering committees and performance improvement initiatives
-Relevant external assessments
-Any information the organization thinks may be useful Some preliminary focus groups
43 Implementation of Methodology (continued)
Structured Interviews & Behavioral Anchored Rating Scales (BARS):
Personnel to be interviewed include individuals from all organizational components and levels Positions will be identified during the functional analysis; individuals to be chosen by the site Interviews last no more than one hour; occasionally follow-up interviews may be requested BARS are administered at the end of interview; no more than 4 rating scales completed by any interviewee
44 Implementation of Methodology (continued)
Behavioral Observations:
Activities to be observed include:
Scheduled meetings Routine activities; e.g., shift turnovers, work planning meetings Unscheduled activities Work processes (when applicable)
45 Implementation of Methodology (continued)
Organizational and Safety Culture Survey:
Administered in as large groups as possible Shift personnel scheduled at their convenience Coordinate administration schedule with Human Resources Conducted during first week of the review Coordinate use of demographic variables with site
46 Applications of Methodology Fully implemented in 18 different organizations; partially implemented in 17 additional organizations Implemented across different industries including:
- Nuclear Power
- Fossil Fuel
- Chemical Reprocessing - Health Care
- Mining
- Research Methodology used effectively in 5 different countries Methodology discriminates between organizations
47 Deliverables from Methodology Debriefing sessions on results with management and employees Report which includes:
-Overall conclusion on Generic Safety Culture Characteristics
-Summaries of Specific Safety Culture Characteristics with description of strengths and areas for improvement
-Conclusions on absence or presence of Safety Culture Characteristics
-Identification of trending of each Specific Safety Culture Characteristic Initiation of transfer of technology for use by site in self-assessment process
48 Outcomes of Methodology
- Status of generic and specific Safety Culture Characteristics
- Comparative results to other nuclear and non-nuclear organizations
- Results need to be integrated with other ongoing activities
49 Schedule of Safety Culture Review Phase Initiated Team Preparation Jan. 8, 2003 Functional Analysis Jan. 15, 2003 Survey Administration Feb. 4, 2003 (except for some shift crews)
Observations Feb. 4, 2003 Interviews and BARS Feb. 10, 2003 Analysis and Evaluation Feb. 21, 2003 Final Report March, 2003
50 Summary The Safety Culture Review Methodology will provide an independent evaluation of the current status of the safety culture characteristics The methodology will also assist in the enhancement of safety culture by identifying ways in which the organization can continuously improve safety culture through self-assessment The Review will facilitate the progression of the development of safety culture from the compliance to performance-based, to continuous improvement stages
51 Lew Myers Chief Operating Officer
-FENOC Monitoring Safety Culture for Restart Bill Pearce Vice President -
FENOC Oversight Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Nuclear Power Station January 30, 2003
52
- Prior to 2002, Davis-Besses Safety Culture was Mixed
- Several Areas of Good Performance
- Good Plant Material Condition
- Good Plant Performance with Few Trips
- Good Addressing of Industry Issues on Thermo-Lag
- FENOCs Assessment in 2002 Have Shown Some Weaknesses (e.g., Corrective Action, Technical Rigor, and Minimum Regulatory Standards)
- FENOCs goal is to verify that an adequate Safety Culture exists and take actions to address weaknesses Monitoring Safety Culture for Restart Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Nuclear Power Station January 30, 2003
53
- Safety Culture Commitments Rating
- Green: All Major Areas are Acceptable with a Few Minor Indicator Deviations
- White: All Major Areas are Acceptable with a Few Indicators Requiring Immediate Management Action
- Yellow: All Major Areas are Acceptable with Several Indicators Requiring Immediate Management Action
- Red: Several Major Commitments do not Meet Acceptable Standards and Require Immediate Management Action Monitoring Safety Culture for Restart Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Nuclear Power Station January 30, 2003
54
- Ratings Based on Convergent Assessment
- Performance Indicators (e.g., Risk Index, Backlogs)
- Management Observations
- Demonstrated Performance During Critical Plant Conditions (e.g., Fuel Load)
- Feedback from Independent Safety Culture Review and Nuclear Quality Assurance Assessments
-Performance, Safety and Health Associates
- Sonja B. Haber, Ph.D.
Monitoring Safety Culture for Restart Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Nuclear Power Station January 30, 2003
55
- Readiness for Restart
- Improving Safety Culture is a Long-Term Activity
- For Restart, no red areas, however, not Every Area Must be Green
- FENOC Expects that Some Areas may be White or Yellow
- Keys for Restart
- Show Improving Safety Culture
- Remedial Actions for Any White or Yellow Areas Monitoring Safety Culture for Restart Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Nuclear Power Station January 30, 2003
56 Monitoring Safety Culture for Restart
- Convergent Assessment
- Establishment of safety policy and emphasis on a regular basis by senior management
- Ad-Hoc surveys of employee awareness of safety policy
- Oversight will evaluate SCWE and safety performance
- Anchor in performance appraisal program
- Assess adequacy of resources during Restart Readiness Review Safety Culture Policy Level Commitment Statement of Safety Policy Management Value Structure Resources Oversight and Self Regulation Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Nuclear Power Station January 30, 2003
57
- Convergent Assessment
- Implementation of Management Observation Program
- Frequency of plant tours and questioning of observed conditions
- Nuclear safety emphasized to employees on a regular basis
- Completion of Leadership in Action and SCWE Training
- Encouragement of employee questioning attitude on safety (e.g., newsletters, 4 Cs Meetings)
- Recognition of employees who improve safety
- Application of NOP-ER-3001, Problem Solving and Decision Making
- Program ownership (e.g., fuel reliability)
- Modifications to improve margins (e.g.,
containment emergency sump)
- Operator Recertification Program Monitoring Safety Culture for Restart Safety Culture Managers Commitment Clear Responsibilities and Cohesiveness Acceptance of Responsibility Qualification and Training High Organizational Commitment Emphasis on Safety Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Nuclear Power Station January 30, 2003
58
- Convergent Assessment
- Personnel Error Rate
- Demonstration of clear ownership of programs
- Ad-Hoc surveys to pulse organizations understanding that nuclear safety is the highest priority
- Corrective Action Review Board assessments of ownership
- Engineering Assessment Board evaluations of ownership
- Program ownership (e.g., Leak Rate Program, Boric Acid Control Program, Reactivity Management Program)
Monitoring Safety Culture for Restart Safety Culture Managers Commitment Clear Responsibilities and Cohesiveness Acceptance of Responsibility Qualification and Training High Organizational Commitment Emphasis on Safety Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Nuclear Power Station January 30, 2003
59
- Convergent Assessment
- Performance Appraisals/Development Plans
- Ad-Hoc surveys of willingness to challenge employees, other managers and superiors regarding safety considerations
- System assessment as a means to increase safety margins, such as
-Flüs Leak Monitoring System
-Containment Emergency Sump
-Diesel Starting Air
- Nuclear Quality Assurance Field Assessments
- Number of Management Observations Requiring Coaching Monitoring Safety Culture for Restart Safety Culture Managers Commitment Clear Responsibilities and Cohesiveness Acceptance of Responsibility Qualification and Training High Organizational Commitment Emphasis on Safety Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Nuclear Power Station January 30, 2003
60
- Convergent Assessment
- Performed Benchmarking of organizational staffing
- Completed restart required training
- Completed root cause training completed (e.g., Tap Root)
- Completed operability determination training (> 175 individuals)
- Completed training on legal responsibilities of licensed operators
- Completed SCWE Training (>300 Individuals)
- Completed standdown on January 27 on Safety Culture Policy
- Completed training on NOP-ER-3001, Problem Solving and Decision-Making (e.g.,
Decay Heat Pump, Cavity Seal Post Mod Testing)
- Completed training on Case Study
- Completed training on Standards and Expectations
- Continuing training identified by Curriculum Review Committee meetings Monitoring Safety Culture for Restart Safety Culture Managers Commitment Clear Responsibilities and Cohesiveness Acceptance of Responsibility Qualification and Training High Organizational Commitment Emphasis on Safety Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Nuclear Power Station January 30, 2003
61
- Convergent Assessment
- Implementation and training of employees on Safety Conscious Work Environment
- Effective Employee Concern Program
- Restart Oversight Panel Assessment
- Licensed Operator Pipeline
- Benchmark programs against industry standards
- Operator crew benchmarking
- Scheduled Management Observation Program
- Goals for zero temporary modifications, zero control room deficiencies, and zero operator work arounds Monitoring Safety Culture for Restart Safety Culture Managers Commitment Clear Responsibilities and Cohesiveness Acceptance of Responsibility Qualification and Training High Organizational Commitment Emphasis on Safety Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Nuclear Power Station January 30, 2003
62
- Performance Monitoring
- Number of Systems Classified Maintenance a (1)
- Number of Workarounds
- Number of Temporary Modifications
- Number of Control Room Deficiencies
- Individual Error Rates
- Number of Long-standing Equipment Problems
- Percent of Self-Identified Condition Reports
- Number of Engineering Condition Reports Outstanding
- Engineering Assessment Board Index Monitoring Safety Culture for Restart Safety Culture Individuals Commitment Questioning Attitudes Rigorous Work Control and Prudent Approach Open Communications Drive for Excellence Nuclear Professionalism Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Nuclear Power Station January 30, 2003
63
- Performance Monitoring
- Quality of pre-job briefings as a management observation
- Number of Condition Reports (CRs) per person per group
- Number of programmatic CRs
- Number of procedure problems
- Number and type of operational events (e.g., tagging errors, mispositioning)
Monitoring Safety Culture for Restart Safety Culture Individuals Commitment Questioning Attitudes Rigorous Work Control and Prudent Approach Open Communications Drive for Excellence Nuclear Professionalism Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Nuclear Power Station January 30, 2003
64
- Performance Monitoring
- Employee Event Free Clock
- Industrial Safety Index
- Employee error rate
- Program process error rate
- Significant human performance errors resulting in plant transients
- Backlog of procedure change requests
- Quality Control hold point/rework rate
- Number of work orders Scheduled/completed each week
- Number of late PMs
- Backlog of corrective maintenance
- Number of a (1) systems Monitoring Safety Culture for Restart Safety Culture Individuals Commitment Questioning Attitudes Rigorous Work Control and Prudent Approach Open Communications Drive for Excellence Nuclear Professionalism Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Nuclear Power Station January 30, 2003
65
- Performance Monitoring
- Number of Condition Reports per person per group
- Number of concerns going to Employee Concerns Program vs. NRC
- Ad-hoc surveys pulsing of organization
- Feedback from 4Cs Meeting
- SCORE Program: Safety Consciousness Our Responsibility Everytime Monitoring Safety Culture for Restart Safety Culture Individuals Commitment Questioning Attitudes Rigorous Work Control and Prudent Approach Open Communications Drive for Excellence Nuclear Professionalism Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Nuclear Power Station January 30, 2003
66
- Performance Monitoring
- Completion of Ownership for Excellence
- Training attendance
- Rework
- Individual Development Plans
- Results of Engineering Assessment Board Assessments
- Number of yellow windows in training
- Absence of low-level Radiation Protection events
- Chemistry Performance Index Monitoring Safety Culture for Restart Safety Culture Individuals Commitment Questioning Attitudes Rigorous Work Control and Prudent Approach Open Communications Drive for Excellence Nuclear Professionalism Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Nuclear Power Station January 30, 2003 Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Nuclear Power Station January 30, 2003
67
- Safety Conscious Work Environment Policy
- Monitor
- Results of Survey Post Core Reload
- NRC Concerns vs. Employee Concerns Program
- Quality Assurance Interviews Monitoring Safety Culture for Restart Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Nuclear Power Station January 30, 2003
68
- Corrective Action Process
- Monitor
- Implementation of CAP improvements
- Root Cause evaluation quality
- Condition Report category accuracy
- Basic Cause evaluation quality
- Condition Report Self-Identification Rate
- Results of Survey Post Core Reload
- Quality Assurance Interview Results Monitoring Safety Culture for Restart Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Nuclear Power Station January 30, 2003
69
- Employee Concerns Program
- Monitor
- Use of ECP by Employees
- Satisfaction of employees that have used the ECP
- Number of issues directed to NRC vs. Employee Concerns Program Monitoring Safety Culture for Restart Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Nuclear Power Station January 30, 2003
70
- Review Team
- Monitor
- Use of SCWE Review Team
- Effectiveness of SCWE Review Team in avoiding valid discrimination claims
- All valid Harassment Intimidation Retaliation Discrimination Reports
- Total number of actions reviewed vs. number of rejected issues Monitoring Safety Culture for Restart Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Nuclear Power Station January 30, 2003
71 Closing Remarks Robert Saunders President and Chief Nuclear Officer
- FENOC Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Nuclear Power Station January 30, 2003
72
- Conclusions
- A work atmosphere for employees is being developed that:
- focuses on safety
- sensitizes individual awareness
- identifies and reports concerns
- encourages each other to report concerns
- fosters cooperation between workers and management
- seeks timely resolution of concerns
- Safety Conscious Work Environment is being nurtured
- Safety Culture has improved
- FirstEnergy is committed to nuclear safety Closing Remarks Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Nuclear Power Station January 30, 2003