|
---|
Category:REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT (SEE ALSO AO
MONTHYEARML20024E2111983-07-20020 July 1983 Ro:On 830622,24 & 0711,PAB & Electrical Tunnel & Control Room & Cable Spreading Room Determined to Be Nonfunctional Due to Voids & Cracks in Coating of Penetration Fire Barriers ML20052H1801982-05-12012 May 1982 Telecopy of Ro:On 820415,surveillance Test 3PC-R4 Indicated That Pressure Transmitters PT456,PT457 & PT454 Were Out of Spec Nonconservatively.Cause Not Stated ML20051P5321982-05-0606 May 1982 RO 82-17:on 820505,air Conditioning Sys,Booster Fans for Filter Operation & Cooling Water Supply Declared Inoperable Due to Motor Failures.Also Reported Per Part 21 ML20050C2701982-03-29029 March 1982 Telecopy Message of Ro:On 820327,small Leak Discovered on Shell Side of Steam Generator 32 W/Reactor in Cold Shutdown Constituting Abnormal Degradation in Primary Containment Boundary.Cause Not Stated.Investigation Continuing ML20050A4471982-03-25025 March 1982 Telecopy Version of Ro:On 820324,small Primary to Secondary Leak Developed in Steam Generator 33.Generator Removed from Svc & Unit Proceeding to Cold Shutdown.Total Release to Atmosphere Was Less than 0.5 Ci,W/No Iodine Released ML20042A6641982-03-11011 March 1982 Ro:Operating Procedures Will Be Revised to Require Operability of Safeguards Equipment Necessary to Mitigate Steamline Break Transient Prior to Heating RCS Above 350 F from Cold Shutdown ML20042A5681982-03-0808 March 1982 RO 82-009:on 820305,nitrogen Pressure in Boron Injection Tank Observed Below 90 Psig.Caused by Failure of Two Nitrogen Pressure Regulator Valves.Procedure Changed.Also Reported Per Part 21 ML20039A7621981-12-0909 December 1981 Ro:On 811208,pint Per Minute Leak Observed in Cooling Coil in Number 34 Fan Cooler Unit Motor Cooler Inside Containment.Cause Not Stated.Approved Repairs Were Immediately Performed & Leak Was Stopped ML20011A4671981-09-29029 September 1981 Ro:On 810923,after Verifying Primary to Secondary Leakage in Number 31 Steam Generator Following RCS Hydro,Unit Proceeded from Hot Shutdown to Cold Shutdown.Verification of Calculation for Determining Leak Size Exceeded Tech Specs ML20010G8311981-09-0808 September 1981 Ro:On 810731,transformer 11EC4 Taken Out of Svc for Repair, Deactivating Bus Section 4 Which Feeds Motor Driven Fire Pump 12.On 810801,temporary Svc Restored to Fire Pump,But W/O Automatic Start.Transformer 11EC4 Back in Svc 810819 ML18085B1681980-10-17017 October 1980 RO 80-054/01P-0:on 801016,fire Pump Failed to Start on Receipt of Automatic Signal.Situation Recurred Following Day.Cause of Failures Is Undetermined ML0935608181977-01-12012 January 1977 RO 76-2-28(A):on 761214,boric Acid Storage Tanks Had Concentrations in Excess of Upper Limit.Caused by Inaccuracies in Sampling Technique of Concentrates Makeup to Boric Acid Storage Tanks 1983-07-20
[Table view] Category:LER)
MONTHYEARML20024E2111983-07-20020 July 1983 Ro:On 830622,24 & 0711,PAB & Electrical Tunnel & Control Room & Cable Spreading Room Determined to Be Nonfunctional Due to Voids & Cracks in Coating of Penetration Fire Barriers ML20052H1801982-05-12012 May 1982 Telecopy of Ro:On 820415,surveillance Test 3PC-R4 Indicated That Pressure Transmitters PT456,PT457 & PT454 Were Out of Spec Nonconservatively.Cause Not Stated ML20051P5321982-05-0606 May 1982 RO 82-17:on 820505,air Conditioning Sys,Booster Fans for Filter Operation & Cooling Water Supply Declared Inoperable Due to Motor Failures.Also Reported Per Part 21 ML20050C2701982-03-29029 March 1982 Telecopy Message of Ro:On 820327,small Leak Discovered on Shell Side of Steam Generator 32 W/Reactor in Cold Shutdown Constituting Abnormal Degradation in Primary Containment Boundary.Cause Not Stated.Investigation Continuing ML20050A4471982-03-25025 March 1982 Telecopy Version of Ro:On 820324,small Primary to Secondary Leak Developed in Steam Generator 33.Generator Removed from Svc & Unit Proceeding to Cold Shutdown.Total Release to Atmosphere Was Less than 0.5 Ci,W/No Iodine Released ML20042A6641982-03-11011 March 1982 Ro:Operating Procedures Will Be Revised to Require Operability of Safeguards Equipment Necessary to Mitigate Steamline Break Transient Prior to Heating RCS Above 350 F from Cold Shutdown ML20042A5681982-03-0808 March 1982 RO 82-009:on 820305,nitrogen Pressure in Boron Injection Tank Observed Below 90 Psig.Caused by Failure of Two Nitrogen Pressure Regulator Valves.Procedure Changed.Also Reported Per Part 21 ML20039A7621981-12-0909 December 1981 Ro:On 811208,pint Per Minute Leak Observed in Cooling Coil in Number 34 Fan Cooler Unit Motor Cooler Inside Containment.Cause Not Stated.Approved Repairs Were Immediately Performed & Leak Was Stopped ML20011A4671981-09-29029 September 1981 Ro:On 810923,after Verifying Primary to Secondary Leakage in Number 31 Steam Generator Following RCS Hydro,Unit Proceeded from Hot Shutdown to Cold Shutdown.Verification of Calculation for Determining Leak Size Exceeded Tech Specs ML20010G8311981-09-0808 September 1981 Ro:On 810731,transformer 11EC4 Taken Out of Svc for Repair, Deactivating Bus Section 4 Which Feeds Motor Driven Fire Pump 12.On 810801,temporary Svc Restored to Fire Pump,But W/O Automatic Start.Transformer 11EC4 Back in Svc 810819 ML18085B1681980-10-17017 October 1980 RO 80-054/01P-0:on 801016,fire Pump Failed to Start on Receipt of Automatic Signal.Situation Recurred Following Day.Cause of Failures Is Undetermined ML0935608181977-01-12012 January 1977 RO 76-2-28(A):on 761214,boric Acid Storage Tanks Had Concentrations in Excess of Upper Limit.Caused by Inaccuracies in Sampling Technique of Concentrates Makeup to Boric Acid Storage Tanks 1983-07-20
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217H8501999-10-14014 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 197 to License DPR-64 ML20206U2551999-02-0909 February 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 187 to License DPR-64 ML20236Y1571998-08-0303 August 1998 Part 21 Rept Re ASTM A351,GR. CF8 Matl at Indian Point Being Out of Specifications in Molybdenum & Chromium.Cause & Corrective Actions Are Not Stated ML20236V4281998-07-13013 July 1998 Safety Evaluation of TRs WCAP-14333P & WCAP-14334NP, PRA of RPS & ESFAS Test Times & Completion Times. Repts Acceptable ML20236T5511998-06-24024 June 1998 Consolidated Edison Co of Ny,Indian Point Unit 2,Drill Scenario Number 1998C ML20248B2371998-03-31031 March 1998 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for March 1998 for Indian Point Station Unit 2 ML17264A9381997-07-10010 July 1997 Deficiency Rept Re Potential Safety Hazard Associated w/FM-Alco 251 Engin,High Pressure Fuel tube-catalog: 4401031-2 in Which Dual Failure Mode Exists.Caused by Incorrect Forming Process ML18153A1431997-06-10010 June 1997 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Machining Defect in Certain Stainless Steel Swagelok Tube Fitting Bodies.Facilities Have Been Notified About Possible Problem ML20210E3591997-03-27027 March 1997 Part 21 Rept Re Sorrento Electronics Inc Has Determined Operation & Maint Manual May Not Adequately Define Requirements for Performing Periodic Surveillance of SR Applications.Caused by Hardware Failures.Revised RM-23A ML1005008001997-02-28028 February 1997 Conditional Extension of Rod Misalignment TS for Indian Point 3. ML20115J3981996-07-22022 July 1996 Interim Part 21 Rept Re 3/4 Schedule 80 Pipe Furnished to Consolidated Power Supply.Investigation Revealed Only One Nuclear Customer Involved in Sale of Matl ML20096E5101995-12-31031 December 1995 Resubmitted Rev 13 to QA Program ML17059A3611994-07-0606 July 1994 Emergency Action Level Verification & Validation Rept. ML17311A0181994-05-13013 May 1994 New York State EAL Upgrade Project Verification & Validation Rept. ML20029C7801994-03-31031 March 1994 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1994 for Indian Point Unit 1. W/940415 Ltr ML20056E5171993-08-31031 August 1993 Technical Review Rept, Tardy Licensee Actions ML20062J2281993-07-23023 July 1993 Consolidated Edison Co of Ny Indian Point Unit 2,Drill Scenario 1993 ML20118A2681992-12-31031 December 1992 Consolidated Edison Co of Ny Indian Point,Unit 2 Exercise Scenario,1992 ML20125C7161992-12-0707 December 1992 Part 21 Rept Re Possibility for Malfunction of Declutching Mechanisms in SMB/SB-000 & SMB/SB/SBD-00 Actuators. Malfunction Only Occurs During Seismic Event.Balanced Levers May Be Purchased from Vendor.List of Affected Utils Encl ML20127P5861992-11-23023 November 1992 Followup to 921005 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Defect in SB/SBD-1 Housing Cover Screws.Procedure Re Replacement of SBD-1 Spring Cover Bolts Encl.All Fasteners Should Be Loosened & Removed.List of Affected Utils Encl ML20096H2301992-05-21021 May 1992 Special Rept:On 920504,south Side Lower Electrical Tunnel Detection Sys 8 Taken Out of Svc for Mod to Reposition Detection Sys Run of Conduit.Detection Sys Declared Operable on 920520 After Mod Completed & Sys Retested ML20079F9181991-05-31031 May 1991 Structural Evaluation of Indian Point,Units 2 & 3 Pressurizer Surge Lines,Considering Effects of Thermal Stratification ML20059E9461990-08-31031 August 1990 Nonproprietary Rev 2 to Indian Point 2 Tube Fatigue Reevaluation ML20059G2011990-07-31031 July 1990 Final Rept on Steam Generator Insp, Repair & Restoration Efforts During 1990 Midcycle Insp ML20058K4151990-06-30030 June 1990 Steam Generator Insp,Repair & Restoration Program Presentation to Nrc ML20058K4121990-06-30030 June 1990 Status Rept,Indian Point Unit 2 Mid-Cycle Steam Generator Insp Presentation to Nrc ML20043A4891990-05-30030 May 1990 Nonproprietary Indian Point Unit 2 Steam Generator Insp, Repair & Restoration Program. ML20042F1441989-12-31031 December 1989 New York Power Authority Annual Rept for 1989. W/900430 Ltr ML19332B9371989-11-30030 November 1989 Nonproprietary Info Presented to NRC Re Indian Point Unit 2 Steam Generator Secondary Side Loose Objects. ML19332D6661989-10-31031 October 1989 Nonproprietary Rev 2 to Indian Point Unit 2 Steam Generator Girth Weld/Feedwater Nozzles Rept Spring,1989 Outage. ML20247J8161989-07-31031 July 1989 Safety Evaluation for UHS Temp Increase to 95 F at Indian Point Unit 3 ML20248B3171989-06-30030 June 1989 Rev 1 to Nonproprietary WCAP-12294, Indian Point Unit 2 Steam Generator Girth Weld/Feedwater Nozzles Rept,Spring 1989 Outage ML20248D3631989-06-30030 June 1989 Rev 1,to Indian Point Unit 3 Reactor Vessel Fluence & Ref Temp PTS Evaluations ML20247N5331989-05-31031 May 1989 Nonproprietary Indian Point Unit 2 Steam Generator Girth Weld/Feedwater Nozzles Rept Spring,1989 Outage ML20247J8071989-05-31031 May 1989 Containment Margin Improvement Analysis for Indian Point Unit 3 ML20247G5171989-04-30030 April 1989 Monthly Maint Category I Rept Pages from Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1989 for Indian Point ML20244C3311989-04-10010 April 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 137 to License DPR-26 ML20248F4211989-03-31031 March 1989 NSSS Stretch Rating-3,083.4 Mwt Licensing Rept ML20235V5931989-03-0202 March 1989 Special Rept:During Cycle 6/7 Refueling Outage Scheduled from Feb-May 1989,openings Will Be Made in Plant Penetration Fire Barriers in Order to Install Various Mods. Fire Watches Posted & Fire Detection Tests Completed ML20248F3001988-12-31031 December 1988 10CFR50.59(b) Rept of Changes,Tests & Experiments Completed in 1988 ML20246E2711988-12-31031 December 1988 Con Edison 1988 Annual Rept ML20196D3011988-10-31031 October 1988 Reactor Vessel Matl Surveillance Program for Indian Point Unit 2 Analysis of Capsule V ML20155H2541988-09-30030 September 1988 Rev 2 to Indian Point Unit 2 (NRC Bulletin 88-008 Thermal Stresses in Piping Connected to RCS) Indentification of Unisolable Piping & Determination of Insp Locations ML20154M5661988-08-31031 August 1988 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1988 for Indian Point Station Unit 2 ML20154M5691988-07-31031 July 1988 Revised Page to Monthly Operating Rept for Jul 1988 for Indian Point Station Unit 2 ML20151N7881988-07-31031 July 1988 Rev 1 to Charpy Toughness & Brittle Transition Temp Characterization of HAZ High Hardness Zone of Indian Point Unit 2 Steam Generator Girth Weld by Gleeble Weld Thermal Cycle Simulation ML20006B4741988-05-31031 May 1988 Nonproprietary Indian Point Unit 2 Evaluation for Tube Vibration Induced Fatigue. ML20151N7821988-05-31031 May 1988 Fracture Sensitivity Study of Girth Weld 6 Repaired Configuration,Indian Point Unit 2 ML20153F9161988-04-28028 April 1988 Changes,Tests & Experiments - 1986 ML20151T4681988-01-31031 January 1988 Experimental & Finite Element Evaluation of Spent Fuel Rack Damping & Stiffness 1999-02-09
[Table view] |
Text
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
. y Jahr D. OTooh
, v. o.m- e cmw m1 H w cor cry a tw Yor. me 4 u gp w rm, p .rn m 3 Te #one m vos June 9, 1982 Re: Indian Point Unit No 2 Docket No 50-247 Mr. Ronald C. Haynes, Regional Administrator Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pa . 19406
Dear Mr. Haynes :
On June 1,1982, Con Edison informed NRC Region I inspectors, who were at Indian Point 2, of an exposure to a worker at Con Ed i son 's Indian Point facility in excess of the limits specified in 10CFR Part 20. Pu rsuant to the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 20.403(b), this incident was reported on June 2, 1982 by telephone to Mr. Greenman of your of fice and was confirmed in a letter from Mr. Cha rles W. Jackson to you on that date. In that letter, con Edison committed to keep NRC Region I apprised of the results of our investigation of the incident and to suspend certain work activities pending de te rmina tion of the cause of the exposure and implementation of corrective action. The purpose of this letter is to provide additional information concerning the cause of the exposure and the corrective actions which will be implemented prior to resuming diving operations in the spent fuel pool.
As part of the review of this incident the location of fuel assemblies in the spent fuel storage facility has been verified. A visual check, with the use of an underwater television camera as necessary, was made of the fuel racks to assure that a fuel assembly was installed in each location {
where an assembly was supposed to be located and that a fuel assembly was not in any other location. This verification was independently reviewed by Quality Assurance personnel. One fuel assembly was found in location C-29, which should have been empty. Location B-29, which should have contained a fuel assembly, was empty. This fuel assembly will be I relocated prior to resumption of diving operations.,
A review was conducted of the instrumentation used in the radiation surveys of the pool immediately prior to the exposure. One alarming dosimeter used by the divers was found to be inoperable. Therefore, the dosimeter would not have properly alerted the diver to the radiation field. In addition, the ionization chamber (CPMU), which was used for the underwater radiation surveys prior to the exposure indicated int e rmi t t ent erratic behavior. We had relied on the survey conducted with this instrument which due to its e rra t ic behavior may have provided unreliable results.
8206170088 820609 PDR ADOCK 05000247 S PDR
%4
)
Con Edison has d et e rmined that the exposure was caused by several contributing factors. Rese factors included:
- 1. Incorrect location of a fuel assembly during fuel movement.
- 2. Failure of the health physics survey, which was con-ducted between the time of fuel movement and the time of the diving activities, to properly detect the high radiation caused by the misplaced fuel assembly.
This failure to properly detect the radiation field was attributable to an instrument malfunction.
- 3. Failure of the divers' active monitoring equipment to detect the radiation field. The diver was equipped with two types of active radiation monitoring instrumentation:
an alarming dosimeter and the ionization chamber designed for use under water (CPMU). The CPMU was the same instrument used to conduct the radiation survey prior to the exposure. The failure to detect the radiation field was due to the failure of both instru-ments.
Con Edison has instituted several changes to the management control system associated with the installation of the new fuel racks in the spent fuel pool. We believe that these changes provide adequate assurance that this project will be completed in a safe manner. To assure that the management control system is properly implemented, a senior Nuclear Power Generation manager has been assigned full-time to the project and has been relieved of all other duties. The manager is responsible for proper coordination among the Con Edison and contractor o rgani za t ions involved in the project and will review adherence to the procedural requirements of eacn participating organization.
In addition to increasing senior management attention and control of this project, Con Edison will implement the following corrective actions prior to resuming diving operations.
During the course of this project Quality Assurance personnel will be present during each fuel shuffle and will conduct an independent verification that each fuel assembly is moved to the proper location in acco rdance with approved procedures. This verification will be conducted independent of the verifications by plant operators and will not be based on the fuel movement instructions provided to the operators but rather on the spent fuel pool sto rage map. Movement of any other potentially highly radioactive objects (i.e. greater than IR/hr on contact) stored in the spent fuel pool is controlled by written procedure and will be independently verified by Quality Assurance personnel. A survey will be conducted prior to the next diving operation f ollowing such movement.
_3 Prior to daily diving operations, health physics supervision and a representative of the diving contractor will conduct an inspection of the fuel storage locations in the vicinity of the diving area to verify that the appropriate adjacent storage locations are empty. At that time health physics personnel will also conduct a radiation survey of the diving area using two independent types of radiation exposure monitoring equipment. In addition, the survey form will be designed to accurately reflect the layout of the racks in the fuel pool as they are being changed during the installation of the new racks.
Each diver will be equipped with an alarming dosimeter. This instrument will be calibrated under the supervision of station personnel and will be checked daily prior to the diving operations. These instruments will be maintained under the control of the Radiation Protection section.
The above corrective actions will be incorporated in procedures which will be reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety Commit tee before diving operations resume in the spent fuel pool.
Con Edison believes that these corrective actions provide adequate a ssu rance that no individual participating in this project will be subjected to exposures in excess of the limits set forth in 10CFR Part 20.
Very t/ ruly yours, kI ;y ) l Vf o n D. O' Toole Vice President attach.
cc: Mr. T. Rebelowski, Senior Resident Inspector U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O. Box 38 Buchanan, New York 10511 l
l