Information Notice 1988-70, Check Valve Inservice Testing Program Deficiencies

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Check Valve Inservice Testing Program Deficiencies
ML031150152
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant
Issue date: 08/29/1988
From: Rossi C
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-88-070, NUDOCS 8808230112
Download: ML031150152 (7)


UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 August 29, 1988 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 88-70: CHECK VALVE INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM

DEFICIENCIES

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power

reactors.

Purpose

This information notice is being provided to alert addressees to potential

problems uncovered by recent inspections of the check valve inservice testing

(IST) programs at Wm. B. McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 (McGuire),

Zion Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 (Zion), and R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power

Plant (Ginna). It is expected that recipients will review the information

for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this information

notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or

written response is required.

Background:

During November 30 to December 11, 1987, and January 4 to 8, 1988, a diagnostic

inspection was performed at McGuire by a team led by personnel from the Office

for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data. The major inspection findings

pertaining to check valves were as follows:

(1) Check valves located in the steam supply line to the turbine-driven

auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump were not included in the McGuire IST

program.

(2) AFW system valves, which include both isolation and check valves

used to isolate the three sources of non-safety-related water to

the AFW system, were not included in the McGuire IST program. The

non-safety-related water sources include the hot well, the AFW'

condensate storage tank, and the upper surge tanks.

(3) No reverse-flow operability tests were being performed on check

valves other than those valves used for containment isolation and

reactor coolant system pressure boundary isolation. This omission

112 A/e

IN 88-70

August 29, 1988 disregardsSection XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code

(ASME code), which requires testing in the open or closed position

(or both), as necessary, to verify the valve's safety function.

Consequently, undetected check valve failures could have existed

because of the lack of testing.

From September 14 to 18, 1987, an inspection team performed a special check

valve inspection at Zion. Many check valves in the AFW system, the component

cooling water system, the chemical and volume control system, the diesel cooling

water system, and the feedwater system were found to be not included in the IST

program. Other major inspection findings were as follows:

(1) Pressure isolation valves (PIVs) were not being adequately tested

individually as required by an NRC confirmatory order issued

February 29, 1980.

(2) Valve testing did not ensure thdt all safety functions could be

accomplished.

(3) Test procedures did not result in valid tests of all valves listed as

having been tested in accordance with the ASME code.

(4) Valves failing leak-rate testing were not being repaired before re- start, contrary to commitments made in a June 11, 1987, response to

Generic Letter 87-06, "Periodic Verification of Leak-Tight Integrity

of Pressure Isolation Valves (PIYs)."

This inspection was followed by a special safety inspection on PIVs at Zion, which was performed between September 21 and October 26, 1987. Major in- spection findings were as follows:

(1) Zion procedures did not provide adequate leak tests for certain

check valves in the safety injection system.

(2) Test procedures failed, in some cases, to provide a viable means

to determine the actual leak rate. In other cases, a viable means

existed, but the licensee failed to calibrate the measuring in- struments.

(3) Leaking valves had been left unrepaired since mid-1986.

As a result of this inspection, the NRC issued a Level III violation to the

Commonwealth Edison Company on January 4, 1988.

From May 16 to 20, 1988, an inspection team performed a special announced

inspection on the IST activities at Ginna. The major inspection findings

pertaining to check valves-were as follows:

IN 88-70

August 29, 1988 in the

(1) Certain check valves in the main feedwater (MFW) system and in the

turbine-driven AFW pump steam supply lines were not included

Ginna IST program.

AFW

(2) A check valve in the steam supply line to the turbine-driven and

pump was found by the inspection team to have serious binding

full- to be in need of repair. If this valve had been undergoing

stroke exercising and reverse-flow closure testing, this failure

would not have gone undetected.

(3) Numerous check valves in the service water system, the containment

spray line, the residual heat removal system, the safety injection

(SI) system, and the SI accumulator discharge line were not being

full-stroke exercised.

for

(4) Certain check valves in these systems were not being tested

ASME code

reverse-flow closure capability in accordance with the

requirements.

to the

As a result of this inspection, the NRC issued a Level III violation

Rochester Gas and Electric Company on July 27, 1988.

Generating Sta- Similar problems were also discovered at the San Onofre NuclearNovember 21, 1985 tion Unit 1 (SONGS 1) when a serious water hammer occurred on

trip be- in the MFW system. This water hammer event occurred after a reactorline that had

cause of injection of auxiliary feedwater into a main feedwater Notice

partially drained through multiple inoperable check valves. Information

Feedwater System

86-01, "Failure of Main Feedwater Check Valves Causes Loss of

this

Integrity and Water-Hammer Damage," was issued to call attention to

incident.

Discussion:

The common findings from these inspections are as follows:

(1) Not all safety-related check valves have been identified and included

in the IST programs.

(2) When check valves are included in the program, the valves are not

always tested in a way that verifies their ability to perform their

safety-related functions.

the

These findings point out the importance of verifying the completeness of of

list of components included in IST programs and of ensuring the adequacy

the actual testing being performed when developing an IST program. Not taking

these two factors into account could result in undetected serious degradation is an

of components, as happened at SONGS 1 and Ginna. The incident at SONGS 1 example of the possible consequences of such degradation.

IN 88-70

August 29, 1988 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional

office.

C~ar

1-A 4 ~tSsr

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contact:

Horace K. Shaw, NRR

(301) 492-0906 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

Attachment

IN 88-70

August 29, 1988 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NRC INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to

88-69 Movable Contact Finger 8/19/88 All holders of OLs

Binding in HFA Relays or CPs for nuclear

Manufactured by General power reactors.

Electric (GE)

88-48, Licensee Report of Defective 8/24/88 All holders of OLs

Supplement 1 Refurbished Valves or CPs for nuclear

power reactors.

88-68 Setpoint Testing of Pres- 8/22/88 All holders of OLs

surizer Safety Valves with or CPs for nuclear

Filled Loop Seals Using power reactors.

Hydraulic Assist Devices

88-67 PWR Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 8/22/88 All holders of OLs

Turbine Overspeed Trip or CPs for nuclear

Failure power reactors.

88-66 Industrial Radiography 8/22/88 All NRC industrial

Inspection and Enforcement radiography licensees.

88-65 Inadvertent Drainages of 8/18/88 All holders of OLs

Spent Fuel Pools or CPs for nuclear

power reactors and

fuel storage facilities.

88-64 Reporting Fires in Nuclear 8/18/88 All holders of OLs

Process Systems at Nuclear or CPs for nuclear

Power Plants power reactors.

88-63 High Radiation Hazards 8/15/88 All holders of OLs

from Irradiated Incore or CPs for nuclear

Detectors and Cables power reactors, research reactors

and test reactors.

88-62 Recent Findings Concerning 8/12/88 All holders of NRC

Implementation of Quality quality assurance

Assurance Programs by program approval

Suppliers of Transport for radioactive

Packages material packages.

OL = Operating License

CP = Construction Permit

IN 88-70

August 29, 1988 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional

office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contact:

Horace K. Shaw, NRR

(301) 492-0906 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

  • Transmitted by memo to Carl Berlinger from I.edyard Marsh dated August 25, 1988 -
    • SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES

CE,<X~ i 97K[t *C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR *RPB:ARM

CHBerlinger

NRR0 08/18/88 TechEd

08/12/88

  • OGCB:DOEA:NRR *EMEB:DEST:NRR *EME1:DEST:NRR *EMEB:DEST:NRR *EAD/DEST:NRR

RJKiessel HShaw ESullivan LBMarsh JRichardson

08/11/88 08/02/88 08/02/88 08/25/88 08/18/88

i m.
  • a

IN 88-XX

August xx, 1988 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical

contact listed below or theftegional $ministrator of the appropriate regional

office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contact:

Horace K. Shaw, NRR

(301) 492-0906 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

  • Transmitted by memo to Carl Berlinger from Ledyard Marsh dated l ! a2s5 a via 1%92 D/DOEA:NRR C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR RPB:ARM

CERossi CHBerlinger TechEdZ42r

08/ /88 08/ /88 08//2/88 OGCB: EA:NRR *EMEB:DEST:NRR *EMEB:DEST:NRR *EMEB:DEST:NRR EAD/DEST:NRR

RJKiessel HShaw ESullivan LBMarsh JRichardson

08/;j /88 08/02/88 08/02/88 08/25/88 08/ /88