ML060690289

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PIR 20052757 Information
ML060690289
Person / Time
Site: Wolf Creek, Callaway  Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation icon.png
Issue date: 10/31/2005
From:
- No Known Affiliation
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
FOIA/PA-2006-0095
Download: ML060690289 (10)
v • d • e


Text

So. 72 (Nbv) a4 (3)ch or Q 4- ' fctsco, Jc/ 7i;41c4 PIR 20052757 INFORMATION P-os R PR/ ueDate: lI/3112005 CARBAccepted:j f l Cosd-J<

ffilcant YIN: o Leve: F Problem Y/N:JA Svstem Affected: l Resp Individual: FolloDue Date: II FoleW-UDt K

rDue Problem. Concern, Condition, or Recommendation ECompletel During a detailed review of the Post Fire Safe Shutdown (PFSSD) capability following a severe fire in fire area A-8 (2000' elevation of the Auxiliary Building) it was discovered that a design basis fire in the area could cause a number of spurious actuations to occur. For each spurious actuation, a diverse means (operator manual action) exists to mitigate the spurious actuation. However, due to the number of manual actions that may be required, the feasibility of performing all actions within required time margins is questioned.

The Wolf Creek commitment to 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section Ill.G states the following:

Redundant trains of systems required to achieve and maintain hot standby are separated by 3-hour rated fire barriers, or the equivalent provided by III.G.2, or else a diverse means of providing the safe shutdown capability exists and is unaffected by the fire.

Based on the above statement, Wolf Creek is allowed to credit "diverse means" to achieve post-fire safe shutdown. Diverse means has been interpreted by Wolf Creek to mean manual operator actions which are deemed feasible.

Wolf Creek document E-1 F9900, Post Fire Safe Shutdown Manual Actions, identifies operator manual actions that may need to be performed if a fire occurs in the plant. Section 4.0 discusses the methodology used to develop the document. A feasibility determination, per Section 4.5 of this document, is performed for each manual action or set of manual actions for a given fire area. One aspect of the feasibility determination described in Section 4.5(d) states the following:

"One operator outside the control room who is not on the fire brigade was assumed to be available to perform diverse means actions. It was also assumed that one of the four available operators in the control room could exit the control room l imporarily to perform some actions."

Due to the unpredictable nature of fire and the unknown point of origin, the NRC expectation is to assume a fire in a given area causes damage to every unprotected cable and component simultaneously at time 0. In reality, a fire of this scale is not credible in fire area A-8. However, considering a design-basis fire in area A-8, a number of Train A components, including the Train A motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump, are affected. Also, the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump may not be available. In addition, the following spurious actuations could occur:

1. Pressurizer PORV BBPCV0455A opens and block valve BBHV8000A fails to close.
2. Steam Generator A ARV ABPV0001 spuriously opens and cannot be controlled from the control room.
3. Steam Generator C ARV ABPV0003 spuriously opens and cannot be closed from the control room.
4. Both VCT outlet valves BGLCV01 12B and BGLCVO1 12C fail tk close and normal letdown isolates, causing a reducing inventory in the VCT and possible hydrogen intrusion into the charging pump suction.
5. Normal charging pump power cables pass thru this fire area and may be damaged, causing the NCP to trip.
6. RHR suction valve from the RWST, BNHV8812A, loses power and containment sump valve EJHV881 IA opens, causing the RWST to drain to the containment sump.
7. BIT inlet valve EMHV8803B fails to open from the control room handswitch.

The mitigating strategy to assure safe shutdown can be achieved following a fire in area A-8 is to charge through the BIT using CCP B; stop the RCP's and perform natural circulation cooldown; isolate seal injection and RCP thermal barrier cooling (if seal injection was lost for a period of time); operate MDAFP B and feed steam generator D initially controlling steam release using ARV ABPV0004 and, within 60 hours6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br />, after performing a cold shutdown repair to regain control of ARV ABPV0001 in the control room, line up auxiliary feedwater to steam generator A.

The following actions outside the control room may be necessary to achieve safe shutdown:

1. An operator exiting the control room temporarily may need to open two DC breakers (NK0104 and NK0105) in the control building, two floors below the control room (room 3408), to cause PORV BBPCV0455A to close. (Needs to be complete within 5 minutes). This same operator then can go to valve KHV0096 in the turbine building and close it. This will prevent hydrogen from repressurizing the VCT if level falls in the VCT. A walkdown with operations has shown that this operator can
  • , ke these two actions easily in 10 minutes.

Is ue to the possibility of losing seal injection, this operator may also need to open breakers PA0107, PA01 08, PA0204 and PA0205 to trip the RCP's if they cannot be tripped from the control room. A1A

2. A second operator may need to perform the following actions:

PIR 20052757 INFORMATION BDueDate:/ 110/31/2005 CARBSAcceoted:Jl j

- _ Yro_ blem Y/N: F System Affected: I Resp Individual: Follow-up l Due Date:

FoIlow-U6 Ce t e: l I I r

a. Proceed to the steam tunnel (fire area A-23) and fail close ABPV001 by isolating air and nitrogen to the valve using KAV1435 (air) and KAV1364 (Nitrogen) then vent air from the regulator.
b. Proceed to ABFHCO003 in the same fire area and close AEBPV0003. Steam generator atmospheric relief valves are now controlled.
c. Proceed down the stairway to the 1974 elevation of the auxiliary building. Enter the BIT room (1126) and manually open EMHV8803B to ensure a flow path is available to charge through the BIT using CCP B.
d. Proceed to room 1115, Normal Charging Pump Room, and close BGFCV0121 using BGFHCO121 to isolate seal injection.
e. Proceed to room 1107, CCP B room, and manually close B 38471 B to Isolate VCT suction from the pump (note: a ladder will be required to perform this action). After the control room opens the suction valve BNLCV1 12 to CCP B, a flow path will be lined up to charge through the BIT and seal injection is isolated.

Minimum flow from the CCP will be directed to the VCT.

f. Proceed to room 1111 and manually close BNHV8812A to prevent draindown of the RWST to the containment sump due to a hot short causing EJHV881 1A to open. Power cables for BNHV8812A may be damaged due to the same fire. Per calculation XX-E-013 (CCN XX-E-013-000-CN005), there would be 28.5 minutes after EJHV881 1A opens before the RWST level dropped to a level that would be unacceptable for boration to cold shutdown. This action may require donning PC's.

,g eause of the number of time-critical actions that could be required to mitigate a design-basis fire in area A-8, the available gIperations staff may be challenged if all spurious actuations occur at nearly the same time. Engineering is currently s erforming thermal-hydraulic evaluations and VCT draindown ca culation to determine available time margins to complete each action. These evaluations are not yet completed. Therefore, this PIR is being written to identify the potential concern and ensure timely completion of the evaluations, and corrective actions, if necessary.

1) The potential consequences of this issue are that the plant may not meet the commitments made in the USAR to protect one train of components needed for safe shutdown following a fire in the plant, or provide diverse means to achieve safe shutdown.
2) This fire could Impact several SSC s to perform their Intended functions, which normally can be mitigated by the use of manual actions. However, if the manual actions are not feasible, then reliance on the manual actions cannot be assumed.
3) If the feasiblily of the operator actions identified cannot be determined, then this issue may be reportable.
4) Organizations involved are Design Engineering, Safety Analysis Engineeering, Fire Protection, and Operations.
5) This issue was discovered while performing a detailed PFSSD analysis for the 2000' elevation in the Auxiliary Building.
6) This specific issue is limited to the 2000 elevation in the Auxiliary Building. Other issues have been found during detailed analyses of specific fire areas and were addressed appropriately. Detailed analyses are continuing and, as fire areas are examined, other issues of manual action feasibility may be discovered.
7) The possible cause of this issue is the assumptions used regarding combustible material and the interpretation of Appendix R during initial design of the plant. In addition, both the NRC and the Industry are becoming more educated on the issues of post fire safe shutdown.
8) Reference USAR appendix 9.5E, cable raceway drawings E-1 RI323B, E-1 RI323D, E-I R1343B, E-1 RI343C and E-15000.

F. Immediate Actions Taken (if applicable)

PIR 20052757 INFORMATION

- QgC5 P/RBDueDate: 110/31/2005 CARB AcceCted: __l SianificantYN: ' Level: Problem Y/N:fl 7 Svstem Affected: I Resp Individual:l Follow-up FolIOW-U l Due Date: Comglete:

Initiated a calculation to determine the draindown time of the VCT in the case of a loss of letdown and failure of valves BGLCV1 12B and C to close.

Initiated this PIR.

C. Initiator/Mail Stop: SELBE. WILLIAM L / CC DES Date: 0912912005 Phone: 8398

APF 26A-001-01, Rev. 8 K01 -003 Reportability Evaluation Request RER# 2c-532 qU.INITIATION (Completed by Originator):

1. Initiating Corrective Action Document: PIRIWR (attach copy): 20052757
2. Date/Time of Discovery: 9/30/05 0945_ Initiator's Name: Bill Selbe
11. SCREENING/NOTIFICATIONS (Completed by Shift Manager):
1. Potentially Reportable , Yes 0 No Per (list applicable reporting criteria met) QT b  ? is 3 * . b)(3'j); s
2. 0 Plant Manager or's Call Superintendent notified (check one) so 7 3 &Y)6v)

Person Contacted: Pi C_iL -CA Date/Time: Ib gS-

3. Corporate Services Notified 0 Yes $ No Person Contacted: Date/Time:_
4. ENS Reportability Determination per 10 CFR 50.72:
a. 0 Immediate 01 hr. 04 hr. 0 8 hr. O N/A
b. ENS Worksheet completed and attached: 7 Yes 0 N/A No c. Continuous open nnel quired: 0 Yes $1 No
5. Shift Manager signature: _ _ _ Date/Time: M o o: D :

III. DISPOSITION (Completed by Licensing):

Reportable Event:

LER #: Ltr. Number: Submittal Date:_

(No further processing required - send form to Document Services)

Non-Rewortable Event - brief description:

  • Reportability Evaluation Performed by Date_

Individuals signing above also indicate having verified that they are currently qualified to perform Reportability Evaluations. (Qualification may be verified using the 'Qualified Personnel <\\MAIN\SYS\SHARED\APPS\WCMENU\QUALIFY\ESP\ESQuais.exe>- icon on Paperless Environment, or by contacting your Supervisor, Training Representative or the Training Department).

IV. REVIEW and APPROVAL (Non-Reportable Events only):

  • Supervisor Licensing_ Date
  • Manager Regulatory Affairs Date V. POST-CLOSURE ACTIVITY (Completed by Licensing)

. ENS Retraction needed: C Yes C No (If yes, coordinate with the Control Room and attach the completed ENS form.)

I

PIR 20052757 INFORMATION PIR RB Due DGJZ Date: l 03112005 CARB Acceoted: Coe San L~tY~Jr Level: l[T Problem YIN: Jf7 1Svsem Affected: l Resp Individual: _ Folbw-ud l Follow-up D_ Date: Complete:

A.Problem. Concern. Condition, or Recommendation During a detailed review of the Post Fire Safe Shutdown (PFSSD) capability following a severe fire in fire area A-8 (2000' elevation of the Auxiliary Building) it was discovered that a design basis fire in the area could cause a number of spurious actuations to occur. For each spurious actuation, a diverse means (operator manual action) exists to mitigate the spurious actuation. However, due to the number of manual actions that may be required, the feasibility of performing all actions within required time margins is questioned.

The Wolf Creek commitment to 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section III.G states the following:

Redundant trains of systems required to achieve and maintain hot standby are separated by 3-hour rated fire barriers, or the equivalent provided by III.G.2, or else a diverse means of providing the safe shutdown capability exists and is unaffected by the fire.

Based on the above statement. Wolf Creek is allowed to credit 'diverse means" to achieve post-fire safe shutdown. Diverse means has been interpreted by Wolf Creek to mean manual operator actions which are deemed feasible.

Wolf Creek document E-1 F9900, Post Fire Safe Shutdown Manual Actions, identifies operator manual actions that may need to be performed if a fire occurs in the plant. Section 4.0 discusses the methodology used to develop the document. A feasibility determination, per Section 4.5 of this document, is performed for each manual action or set of manual actions for a given fire area. One aspect of the feasibility determination described in Section 4.5(d) states the following:

"One operator outside the control room who is not on the fire brigade was assumed to be available to perform diverse means.

actions. It was also assumed that one of the four available operators in the control room could exit the control roorn Omporarily to perform some actions."

Due to the unpredictable nature of fire and the unknown point of origin, the NRC expectation is to assume a fire in a given area causes damage to every unprotected cable and component simultaneously at time 0. In reality, a fire of this scale is not credible in fire area A-8. However, considering a design-basis fire in area A-8, a number of Train A components, including the Train A motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump, are affected. Also, the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump may not be available. In addition, the following spurious actuations could occur

1. Pressurizer PORV BBPCV0455A opens and block valve BBHV8000A fails to close.
2. Steam Generator A ARV ABPVOOOI spuriously opens and cannot be controlled from the control room.
3. Steam Generator C ARV ABPV0003 spuriously opens and cannot be closed from the control room.
4. Both VCT outlet valves BGLCV01 12B and BGLCV01 12C fail 1t close and normal letdown isolates, causing a reducing inventory in the VCT and possible hydrogen intrusion into the charging pump suction.
5. Normal charging pump power cables pass thru this fire area and may be damaged, causing the NCP to trip.
6. RHR suction valve from the RWST, BNHV8812A, loses power and containment sump valve EJHV881 IA opens, causing the RVWST to drain to the containment sump.
7. BIT inlet valve EMHV8803B fails to open from the control roorn handswitch.

The mitigating strategy to assure safe shutdown can be achieved following a fire in area A-8 is to charge through the BIT using CCP B; stop the RCP's and perform natural circulation cooldown; isolate seal injection and RCP thermal barrier cooling (if seal injection was lost for a period of time); operate MDAFP B and feed steam generator D initially controlling steam release using ARV ABPV0004 and, within 60 hours6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br />, after performing a cold shutdown repair to regain control of ARV ABPV0001 in the control room, line up auxiliary feedwater to steam generator A.

The following actions outside the control room may be necessary to achieve safe shutdown:

1. An operator exiting the control room temporarily may need to open two DC breakers (NK0104 and NK0105) in the control building, two floors below the control room (room 3408), to cause PORV BBPCV0455A to close. (Needs to be complete within 5 minutes). This same operator then can go to valve KHV0096 in the turbine building and close it. This will prevent ydrogen from repressurizing the VCT if level falls in the VCT. A. walkdown with operations has shown that this operator can JM1iyke these two actions easily in 10 minutes.

_ue to the possibility of losing seal injection, this operator may also need to open breakers PA0107, PA0108, PA0204 and PA0205 to trip the RCP's if they cannot be tripped from the control room.

2. A second operator may need to perform the following actions:

PIR 20052757 INFORMATION a f t £IR DueDate: l10/31/2005 CARB AcceDted: loe SiniJr Leel Problem YIN:1 ly System Affected: I Resp Individual:d FolICIw-ur, l Follow-up lr Due Date: Comrlete:

a. Proceed to the steam tunnel (fire area A-23) and fail close ABPV0001 by isolating air and nitrogen to the valve using KAV1435 (air) and KAV1364 (Nitrogen) then vent air from the regulator.
b. Proceed to ABFHCO003 in the same fire area and close AEIPV0003. Steam generator atmospheric relief valves are now controlled.
c. Proceed down the stairway to the 1974 elevation of the auxiliary building. Enter the BIT room (1126) and manually open EMHV8803B to ensure a flow path is available to charge through the BIT using CCP B.
d. Proceed to room 1115, Normal Charging Pump Room, and close BGFCV0121 using BGFHCO121 to isolate seal injection.
e. Proceed to room 1107, CCP B room, and manually close BG8471 B to isolate VCT suction from the pump (note: a ladder will be required to perform this action). After the control room opens the suction valve BNLCV112 to CCP B, a flow path will be lined up to charge through the BIT and seal injection is isolated.

Minimum flow from the CCP will be directed to the VCT.

f. Proceed to room 1111 and manually close BNHV8812A to prevent draindown of the RWST to the containment sump due to a hot short causing EJHV881 IA to open. Power cables for BNHV8812A may be damaged due to the same fire. Per calculation XX-E-013 (CCN XX-E-013-000-CN005), there would be 28.5 minutes after EJHV881 1A opens before the RWST level dropped to a level that would be unacceptable for boration to cold shutdown. This action may require donning PC's.

ecause of the number of time-critical actions that could be required to mitigate a design-basis fire in area A-8, the available a perations staff may be challenged if all spurious actuations occur at nearly the same time. Engineering Is currently performing thermal-hydraulic evaluations and VCT draindown calculation to determine available time margins to complete each action. These evaluations are not yet completed. Therefore, this PIR is being written to identify the potential concern and ensure timely completion of the evaluations, and corrective actions, if necessary.

1) The potential consequences of this issue are that the plant may not meet the commitments made in the USAR to protect one train of components needed for safe shutdown following a fire in the plant, or provide diverse means to achieve safe shutdown.
2) This fire could impact several SSC's to perform their intendei functions, which normally can be mitigated by the use of manual actions. However, if the manual actions are not feasible, then reliance on the manual actions cannot be assumed.
3) If the feasiblily of the operator actions identified cannot be determined, then this issue may be reportable.
4) Organizations involved are Design Engineering, Safety Analysis Engineeering, Fire Protection, and Operations.
5) This issue was discovered while performing a detailed PFSSD analysis for the 2000' elevation in the Auxiliary Building.
6) This specific issue is limited to the 2000' elevation in the Au~Jliary Building. Other issues have been found during detailed analyses of specific fire areas and were addressed appropriately. Detailed analyses are continuing and, as fire areas are examined, other issues of manual action feasibility may be discovered.
7) The possible cause of this issue is the assumptions used regarding combustible material and the interpretation of Appendix R during initial design of the plant. In addition, both the NRC and the Industry are becoming more educated on the issues of post fire safe shutdown.
8) Reference USAR appendix 9.5E, cable raceway drawings E-1 RI 323B, E-1 RI 323D, E-I RI 343B, E-1 RI 343C and E-Mr.

.A 15000.

Immnediate Actions Taken (if applicable)

PIR 20052757 INFORMATION

,GSU PI/CARB au Date: I l10/31/2005 CARB Accepted: l lC SicanjtJY/N: Levl F ProblemY/N: '

Svm Affected: l Resr Individual: l Follcw-uo I Follow-u I e Due Date: Complete:

Initiated a calculation to determine the draindown time of the VCT in the case of a loss of letdown and failure of valves BGLCV1 12B and C to close.

Initiated this PIR.

C. initiator/Mail Stop: SELBE, WILUAM L f CC DES Date: 09/29/2005 Phone: 8398

APE 26A-001-03 Rev. 02 NRC FORM 361 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (12-2000) OPERATIONS CENTER REACTORPLANT EN# L a EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEEET NRC OPERATION TELEPHONENUMBER: PRIMARY- 301-816-5100 OR 800-532-3469*, BACKUPS - ( 1 T) 301-951-0550 OR 8001449-3694*

(2N) 301-415-0550 AND (3R) 301-415-0553 *Ucensees who maintain their own ETS are provided these telephone numbers.

NOTIFICATION TIME FACILITY OR ORGANIZATION UNIT NAME OF CALLER CALL BACK #

Wolf Creek I James M. Kuras 620 364-8831 ext4800 EVENT TIME & ZONE EVENT DATE POWER / MODE BEFORE POWER / MODE AFTER CDT 0913012005 qC 1 100%, Mode 100%, ModelI EVENT CLASSIFICATIONS I-Hr. Non-Emergency 10 CFR 50.72(b)(1) (vXA) SafeVD capability ANA GENERAL EMERGENCY GENIAAEC l TS Dcnwion ADEV (v)(B) RHR Capabily AINB SITE AREA EMERGENCY SIT/AAEC r 4-H . Non-En i 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2) (vXC) ConaolofRadRelease AINC ALERT ALE/AAEC (i) J TSR nd S/D ASHU (vy)(D) Accident Mitigation AND UNUSUAL EVENT UNU/AAEC (iv)(A) ECC3 Discbarge to R CS (xii) Onite Medical AMED 50.72 NON-EMERGENCY

_ (see next colhun) ( X_ Actuton (scram)RS PvI)PRS (xiii) Lou Cmm/Axtsm/Re!p ACOM PHYSICALSECURrTY (73.71) DODDD_ (xi) Offxske Notification APRE 60-Day Optional 10 CFR 50.73(t 1)

MATERIALIEXPOSURE Bm 8-Hr. Non-Emegcy 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3) Invabd Specifed SyttmtActuation AINV FrrNESS FOR DUTY NMIT (iiXA) Degraded Condition ADEG Other Unspecified Requirement (Identify)

OTHER UNSPECIFIED REQMT (see lan column) X ( UbXB) areyzd Condition AUNA Preventfilftftetof A-D NONE INFORMATION ONLY NINM __ (vA) I NONR DESCRIPTION Include: Systems affected, actuations and their initiating signals, causes, effect of event on plant, actions taken or planned, etc (Continue on back)

During a design-basis fire in area A-8 (2000 level auxiliary Building), a number of Train A components, including the Train A motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump (control and power cables), are affected. Also, the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (control bles) may not be available. In addition, the following spurious actuations could occur:

1. Pressurizer PORV BBPCV0455A opens and block valve BBHV8000A fails to close (Train A).
2. Steam Generator A ARV ABPV0001 spuriously opens and cannot be controlled from the control room (Train A).
3. Steam Generator C ARV ABPV0003 spuriously opens and cannot be closed from the control room (TrainA).
4. Both VCT outlet valves BGLCV01 12B and BGLCV01 12C ffifl to close and normal letdown isolates, causing a reducing inventory in the VCT and possible hydrogen intrusion into the charging pump suction (Trains A & B).
5. Normal charging pump power cables pass thru this fire area and may be damaged, causing the NCP to trip.
6. RHXR suction valve from the RWST, BNHV8812A, loses power and containment sump valve EJHV881 IA opens, causing the RWST to drain to the containment sump (train A).
7. BIT inlet valve EMRV8803B fails to open from the control room handswitch (Train B).

Actions taken or planned: I) Detection / Suppression systems available in area A-8 are functional. 2) Hourly fire watch established JAW AP 10-104, Breech procedure.

NOTIFICATIONS YES NO WILL BE ANYTHING UNUSUAL OR NOT UNDERSTOOD?

NRC RESIDENT X El1 YES (explain above) - 3 NO STATE(s) X __ DID ALL SYSTEMS FUNCTION AS REQUIRED?

LOCAL - X 1R3 YES - O NO (explain above)

OTHER GOV AGENCIES MEDIAPRESS RELEASE X

_ _X MODE OF OPERATION UNTIL CORRECTED: I ESTIMATED RESTART DATE: N/A ADDITIONAL INFO ON BACK? C YES E NO NRC FORM 361 (12-2000)

-APF 26A-001-03 Rev. 02 ADDITIOAL INFORWATION PAGE2 OF2 RADIOLOGICAL RELEASES: CHECK OR FILL IN APPLICABLE ITEMS (sdci c deraiLs cxplanations should be covered I event descipdton).

GASEOUS RELEASE I UNPLANNED RELEAS.E lPANNED RELEASErONGOING TERMINATED UOUUD RELEASE MONrrORED UNMONITORED I OFFSnTE RELEASE -T EXCEEDED PM ALARMS AREAS EVACUATED PERSONNEL EXPOSED OR CONTAMINATED I OFFSITE PROTECTWV, ACTIONS RECOMMENDED

  • Stme release pah in d ,ipion G_ _ Release Rate (Ci/sec)  % T.S. LIMIT HOO GUIDE Total Activity (Ci)  % T.S. LIMIT HOO GUII)E NobkGu 0.1 CVsc H 1000 Ci Iodiel_ 10 uCiI:.ec 0.01 Ci Particulate I uCsec 0.01 mci LAquid (axludig a-u 10 uCi/ixin 0.1 Ci and dieentrld nobk ras)

Ll1quid ftritum) 0.2Cni 5 Ci Total Aevicty _

PLANT STACK CONDENSERIAIR EJECTOR MAIN STEAM LINE SG BLOWDOWN I OTHER RAD MONITOR READINGS ALARM SETPO5ITS

% T.S. LIbUT (Yappa able)

RCS OR SG TUBE LEAKS: CHECK OR FILL IN APPLICABLE ITEMS: (specific detailexPlanalions should be covered in event descripaion)

LOCATION OF THE LEAK (e.g.. SG #. valve. pipe, etc)

LEAK RATE UNITS: gpm/gpd I T.S. LIMITS lSUDDEN OR LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT LEAK START DATE TIME COOLANT ACTIVITY PRIMARY SECONDARY AND UNITS:

LIST OF SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT NOT OPERATIONAL EVENT DESCRIPTION (ContinuedJfomfront)

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